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Abstract 
Knowing Authority: Colonial Governance and Local Community in 
Equatoria Province, Sudan, 1900-56 
Cherry Leonardi 
With a current interest across Africa in the actual or potential role of 'traditional 
authorities' in local government, there is a need for ftirther research into their 
historical background. Scholars have argued that the colonial period destroyed 
previous political traditions, replacing them with novel, and often despotic, forms of 
local government, which have contributed to the failures of post-colonial states. But 
in the largely unstudied region of Western Mongalla, Southern Sudan, chiefship was 
domesticated as well as created during the colonial period. The thesis therefore 
argues for the continuity and adaptation of local traditions by showing that chiefs 
remained constrained by their communities. Rather than being the invention of the 
colonial state, they represented an institution for mediating with foreigners which 
had evolved since the mid-nineteenth century. Authority was generated by the 
conversion of outside knowledge into community ways through the power of 
speech. The colonial government was only one source of such knowledge, and so the 
chiefs were restricted to a specific role, alongside multiple other forms of authority. 
The moral and political economies and traditions of communities were developing 
behind these gatekeeper chiefs in the realm of local politics and were shaped by 
popular discourse and public debate. 
The thesis also contributes to the revision of Sudanese history by arguing that the 
Condominium was significant not so much in terms of creating north-south 
divisions, nor as a process of devolution, but rather in terms of the centralising 
momentum of the state and its production and changing utilisation of knowledge. 
This has been ftmdamental in shaping a popular view of the state as a distant and 
largely extractive entity - the hakuma - against which communities have sought to 
strengthen and protect their local autonomy. Only leaders embedded in the local 
landscape of social relations could be trusted to achieve this. 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it 
should be published in any format, including electronic and the Internet, 
without the author's prior written consent. All information derived from 
this thesis must be acknowledged appropriately. 
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Introduction 
The Current Context 
The old districts of Yei River, AmadWoru and Central/Juba which formed the 
western part of Mongalla Province, later Equatoria Province, during the Anglo- 
Egyptian Condominium of the Sudan are today mainly under the control of the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). 1 Southern Sudan awaits the 
final signing of a peace agreement after two decades of war between the SPLA and 
the Government of Sudan (GOS), a complex conflict Nvhich also involved other 
Southern movements and militia groups, some of which were allied at times Nvith the 
GOS. As a final peace deal seems to be within sight, there is currently much interest, 
both within and outside Southern Sudan, in bringing about local reconciliation and 
in rebuilding local government structures, and this in turn is raising questions about 
the historical, present and future roles of so-called 'traditional' authorities. 
Occasionally people also mention that in some areas at least, chiefs were originally 
appointed by the colonial governinent. Yet there is still a frequent tendency, 
particularly among international observers, to assume that chiefs or kings represent a 
static institution that has existed since time immemorial and which embodies an 
uncontested set of traditions and customs. As in the historiography of Southern 
Sudan, which will be discussed in a moment, there is also much generalisation about 
the nature of these authorities across the region. Yet there has also been greater 
recognition more recently, and somewhat belatedly, that "local government is the 
key level for understanding the potential success or failure of post-conflict SPLA 
political consolidation, and ultimately, peace itself '. 2 In this context, there is urgent 
Mongalla Province was established in 1906 and its boundaries changed repeatedly before it was 
oined with Bahr El Ghazal Province in 1936 to form a giant Equatorla Province. Ten years later it 
was redivided and Mongalla retained the name Equatoria, though with a new western boundary. I 
therefore use the invented name 'Western Mongalla' to avoid confusion, since 'Western Equatoria' 
usually refers to the Zande area. The three districts also changed their shape repeatedly; the rough 
delimitation of this study has been based on their borders in 1935, including Kajo Kaji and Meridi. 
2 Zachariah Mampilly and Adam Branch, 'Winning the War, but Losing the Peace'? The Dileminas ot- 
SPLM/A Civil Administration', paper presented at the Sudan Studies Association Conference, Santa 
Clara, May 2004. An initial report reflecting this recognition is Daniel Large, 'Local Govemance in 
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Introduction 
need for research into the varied, complex and changing forms of local authonty that 
exist in the region, and for a deeper understanding of their origins and relationships 
to the state, if they are to be effectively utillsed in the governance of Southern 
Sudan. 
In a recent article on the Nuba Mountains, Willis asks why the forins of local 
authority developed under the Condominium proved "so unstable, and so ill-fitted to 
the demands of the post-colonial state". 3 But in the case of Western Mongalla, the 
area of study for this thesis, the key figure of local government Linder the 
Condominium - the chief - has played a surprisingly stable and resilient role in the 
provision of local-level justice, administration and protection since Independence. In 
2004, chiefs and their supporters complain that their authority has been seriously 
undermined by military administration, which has interfered in their courts, 
administration and even appointment; chiefship is also criticised, especially by 
younger people and women, using the language of human rights, democracy and 
modernity. But there is also recognition from all sides of the key role that chiefs 
played during the wars in organising recruitment, provisions and aid distribution, 
and in arbitration. The SPLM held a conference of 'Kings, Chiefs and Traditional 
Leaders' in 2004 and the SPLM Local Government Secretariat has produced a Local 
Government Policy Framework recommending that "Traditional Authority should 
4 take a leading role in local government" . 
This in turn connects with wider discussion currently about the 're-traditionalisation' 
of local govenunent across Africa in the last decade. Modernisation and dependency 
South Sudan: Context, Condition and Change', unpublished Thematic Paper on Local Government in 
South Sudan (LTNDP, Nairobi, 2004). 
3 Justin Willis, 'Violence, Authority and the State in the Nuba Mountains of Condominium Sudan', 
The Historical Journal 46, no. 1 (2003), pp. 89-114, at p. 9 1. 
' SPLM Local Government Secretariat, 'Local Government Framework for Southern Sudan, Fourth 
Draft', (Rumbek, 2004). My comments on the current situation and the role of the chiefs during the 
conflict are not based on thorough or widespread research, but on general observations in Yei and 
surrounding villages, and conversations with individuals working in the Yei County Administration, 
Yei Boma court and council, the Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society (IPCS), the Training of 
Boma Council Trainers Workshop run by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the SPLA Institute of 
Strategic Studies, and the South Sudan Law Society, all in Aug-Sept 2004; also the draft 'Baseline 
Survey on Chiefs, Elders and Traditional Leaders in the Counties of Yei, Mandi, and %lundrl', by 
Jackline NasiNva, IPCS, Feb 2004; Jane Namadi, 'Are Traditional Leaders Partners in Peacemaking"', 
Sudan Mirror, 9th-22nd August 2004, p. 20. 
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theories, from different perspectives, argued that chiefs, kings and priests N-., -ould 
become outdated and irrelevant in the modem African state; yet the reality is that 
there has been not only a survival, but also a recent resurgence of their prominence 
in many areas. They are even being promoted as alternative, and African, models of 
accountable and democratic governance. Recognition of the capacity of such forms 
of authority to be accountable, dynamic and adaptable has also reav,, akened greater 
interest in the historical complexity of their origins and trajectones, cspecially in the 
colonial period. 5 In a recent conference paper, Nyamnjoh called for empirical studies 
of the diversity of "domesticated agency in Africa" in order to ox, ercome the 
reductionist theories which have in the past subsumed the vaned local realities of 
governance. 6 
So my questions at the outset are more about how far chiefship was a novel colonial 
creation, and consequently why it remains, or has increasingly become, key to 
definitions of community and custom, thus appeanng to be an intrinsic component 
of local government structures today. The trajectory of chiefship since Independence 
lies beyond the scope of this study and is a topic for future research. But part of the 
explanation for its significance and survival also lies in the fori-nation and evolution 
of chiefship in Western Mongalla during the Condominium. A further question, 
related to Willis', is why the relationship and means of interlocution between local 
communities and the state broke down at the time of, and after, Independence, 
resulting in two lengthy periods of rebellion and civil war. Again, some of the 
answers must be beyond this study; this is primarily a study of local government, not 
national politics. But nevertheless, there are clues in the relationship of local 
communities to the state during, and preceding, the Condominium, and, the thesis 
will argue, particularly in the knowledge-relationship. And again this touches on the 
wider issue in Africa of what can be "the massive gap between state agencies and 
diverse local communities", and the role of 'traditional authorities' in mediating 
across that gap. 7 
5 Oluferru Vaughan, Nigerian Chiefs: Traditional Power in Modern Politics 1890s- I 990s (Rochester, 
NY, 2000), esp. pp. 1-5. F: Ch efta ncy and ' Francis B. Nyamnjoh, 'Our Traditions are Modem, Our Moderruties TradItIona II 
Democracy in Contemporary Africa', paper presented at the conference on 'Traditional 
Accountability and Modem Governance in Africa', University of Durham, July 2004. 
' Vaughan Nigerian Chiefs, p. 5. 
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The thesis will therefore address these questions by exploring how local 
communities in Western Mongalla shaped the institution of chiefship, it ývill be 
argued, in ways which enabled them to maintain a degree of autonomy in their 
internal moral and socio-economic regulation, and to defend their systems of 
knowledge against the impositions of the colonial state. The nature of colonial rule 
in the area ensured that the state was viewed as a vague, distant and lar-ck, alien 
entity - the 'hakuma' - made up of the 'turuk' (foreigners, government), and 
historically experienced as a series of extractive and unwelcome impositions. The 
success of chiefs therefore relied on a balancing-act and effective 'gate-keepill-' 
between state and people so as to keep the former at bay as much as possible. 8 The 
knowledge and skills required for this task would be less useful, however, \N'hen the 
people of the area were expected to become part of the nation of Sudan and 
participate in an arena of politics for which they felt ill-equipped and disadvantaged. 
The violence which ensued reflected the breakdown of trust in the ability of the 
mediators with the state to effectively defend the communities they claimed to 
represent, and hence the apparently irreconcilable disparity between "local integrity" 
and "national integration". 9 It has been difficult to conceive of representatives 
operating within the external realm of the hakuma, especially in Khartoum, without 
losing their rootedness in the local community. The civil wars in Sudan have been 
complex conflicts over nghts, identities and resources, between central government 
and the penpheral regions (and within the latter); they have not been the result of the 
simplistic dichotomy portrayed endlessly in the Western media as the 'Arab and 
Muslim North' against the 'Christian and animist South'. 10 Yet too often even the 
academic scholarship has tended towards simplistic generalisations or polarised 
arguments regarding the role of colonial governance in the causes of war. 
8 Turuk has been widely used in Southern Sudan to refer to the foreign rulers, be they Turks, 
Egyptians, Northerners or Europeans; the Ban alternative is gela: G. 0. Whitehead, 'Suppressed 
Classes among the Bari and Bari-Speaking Tribes', SNR 34, no. 2 (1953), pp. 265-80, at p. 274, while 
the Dinka use the ternijur: Francis M. Deng, The Dinka and Their Songs (Oxford, 1973), p. 69. 
9A disparity reconciled for a time by the Min of the Nuba Mountains, through a process termed 
'redintegration' by Gerd Baumann, National Integration and Local Integriiy- The Aliri of the Nuba 
Mountains in the Sudan (Oxford, 1987). For the breakdown in this process in the 1980s, see Douglas 
H. Johnson, 'Religion and Communal Conflict in the Sudan: The War against Paganism', Bulletin oj 
the Rqyal Institutefor Inter-Faith Studies 2, no. 2 (Autumn 2000), pp. 63-84, at pp. 73-4. 
10 Sce Johnson, 'Religion', pp. 63-4. 
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The HistoriograPhy of Sudan 
A large proportion of the scholarship on Sudan focuses on identifying the causes of 
the civil wars: this has produced two main schools of thought, one which sees a 
long-standing division between north and south, Arabs and Africans, exacerbated b%, 
the history of Arab slave-raiding in the south and later policies of Islamicisation, and 
another which blames British colonial policies for creating new di%, isions and 
disparities which made unity after independence almost impossible. II Nyaba 
combines the two approaches, arguing that historical "religious and cultural 
differences" between North and South were exacerbated by slave trading and later 
the Southern policy of the Condominium Government, and the consequent 
marginalisation of southemers by the northern politicians on the e\, c of 
independence. Non-Arabs, he argues, have been relegated by these processes to the 
role of 'apprentice', and have felt themselves to be 'outsiders' in the state of 
Sudan. 12 This latter point will be explored in the thesis, in terins of the crisis of 
confidence among Southerners in the 1950s about their ability to defend their local 
interests effectively in national political institutions. 
More recently, the causes of conflict have been re-examined by Johnson in a book 
widely hailed as the authoritative interpretation of Sudan's wars. He sees a long 
continuity of patterns of governance since the nineteenth century involving a 
centralising and exploitative state with an ambiguous relationship to its peripheries. 
The latter were neglected in terms of development in the colonial period, and the 
nationalist movement and postcolonial governments in the north have sought to 
build a national identity based on Arab culture and Islam which has further alienated 
Southerners. 13 Viewing the conflicts as a question of the relationship between 
11 For the former argument see Dunstan M. Wai, 'Introduction' to his (ed. ), The Southern 
Sudan. - The 
Problem of National Integration (London, 1973), pp. 1-3; Oliver Albino, The Sudan: A 
Southern 
Viewpoint (London, 1970). For the latter view see Raphael Koba Badal, Origins of the 
Underdevelopment of the Southern Sudan: British administrative neglect (Khartoum, 1980). 
Mohamed Omer Beshir also argues generally for the unity of Sudan: The Southern Sudan: 
Background to Conflict (London, 1968). 
12 Peter Adwok Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider's Neiv (Kampala, 
1997), pp. 15-20. 
13 Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil JVars (Oxford, 2003). 
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central government and the regions or localities thus frees us from some of the 
dichotomies and sectarianism of previous interpretations. 
But this state-local relationship has rarely been focussed upon. Another set of 
literature has examined the central state in Khartoum since the nineteenth century. 
beginning with the Turco-Egyptian regime in Sudan, established by the Egyptian 
Khedive, Mohamed Ali, in 1821, and its overthrow and replacement by the Mahdist 
state. 14 Woodward's history of the twentieth-century state describes local 
government in terms of the 'collaboration' of Sudanese elites, and the concept of 
tclientelism'; a point to which I will return in discussing whether chiefs were simply 
'clients' of the state. 15 In his major two-volume administrative history of 
Condominium Sudan, Daly largely restricts his discussion of local government to 
the changing policies of the British colonial government. The books are an 
impressive study of the Condominium government and its personnel, but do not 
draw out the longer-term continuities of Sudanese history, and nor do they look far 
into the actual nature of local government in the districts. Together with the concise 
history by Holt and Daly - which does adopt a longer historical perspective - they 
also give substantially less coverage to the Southern Sudan than to the north. 16 
The major works on the Southern Sudan by Collins provide a much more detailed 
account of colonial administration, economic development and high-level diplomatic 
and political manoeuvres. However, they are weakest when focussing on Southern 
Sudanese societies and local government; they rely heavily on British versions of 
history and tend to make sweeping generalisations about ethnic characteristics and 
the primitivism of Southern Sudanese societies before the colonial period. The first 
volume traces the period of colonial 'pacification', the incapacity of the Southerners 
to resist, and their resulting 'submission' to 'westemisation', and presents a very 
14 E. g. Richard Hill, Egypt and the Sudan 1820-81 (London, 1959); P. M. Holt, The Mahdist State in 
the Sudan 1881-1898: A Study offts Origins, Development and Overthrow (Oxford, 1958). 
15 Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989. - The Unstable State (Boulder, 1990), p. 7. 
16 Martin Daly, Empire on the Nile: The Anglo Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934 (Cambridge, 1986), and 
Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 1934-1956 (Cambridge, 199 1); Peter M. Holt 
and Martin W. Daly A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day, 5 ed. 
(Harlow, 2000). The northern focus is apparent from the beginning of the latter; in their section on 
the 'tribes of Sudan' they only mention the Shilluk, Dinka and Azande, and otherwise the 
"bewildering variety of ethnic groups and languages" in Southern Sudan (p. 3). 
Introduction 
simplistic picture of local governance: "the British were able to utilize their 
traditional institutions to maintain order and to rely upon the people's custoniarv 
acceptance of authority to preserve security`ý. 17 Chiefs who resisted were defeated 
and stripped of much of their power. The second volume continues this story, 
suggesting that, since pre-colonial leadership reflected the Intrinsic violence Of 
Southern society, Pax Brittanica further undermined the traditional authorities. After 
the interim provided by Indirect Rule, the emergence of the modem state by the 
1950s ensured that "the days of the shaykh and chief were virtually over". 18 The 
books thus imply, albeit with much sympathy for the Southern Sudanese, a 
continuum from primitivism to modernity, and provide a narrative of colonial 
administration without exploring its nature or impact at a local level. 
The Sandersons' history of educational policy in Condominium Southern Sudan also 
focuses more on government and missions than on the social and political 
implications of mission education for local communities. 19 Going back to the 
nineteenth century, Gray's study of the Southern Sudan between 1839 and 1889 
does explore the interaction between the foreign traders, officials and soldiers and 
local society rather more, but he also contributes to Collins' stereotypes by depicting 
the south as unprepared for the foreign incursions due to its complete isolation 
before 1840, despite the evidence from that date of existing long-distance trade 
networks. 20 Collins takes up the story again from 1883 to 1898, but mostly narrates 
the military history of the Mahdist period in the south, arguing that initial good 
relations between the Mahdist forces and the 'negroids' were followed by a period 
21 of 'anarchy' as the 'tribal government' of the 'sovereign tribes' was destroyed . 
As Johnson puts it, "[t]he history of the southern Sudan has been written essentially 
as a chronicle of a succession of alien administrations, not as a set of internal 
17 R. 0. Collins, Land Beyond the Rivers: The Southern Sudan, 1898-1918 (New Haven, 197 1), pp. 
207-8. 
" Robert 0. Collins, Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956 (New Haven, 
1983), pp. 3,43 1. 
19 L. M. Passmore Sanderson and G. N. Sanderson, Education, Religion and Politics in Southern 
Sudan, 1899-1964 (London, 198 1). 
20 Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1889 (London, 1961). 
21 Robert 0. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898. - A Strugglefor Control (New Haven, 1962), 
pp. 71-3. 
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histories linked to broader regional patterns. iý22 The relationship betNveen state and 
local communities has been explored more by anthropological studies, such as that 
on the Nuer by Hutchinson, and that on the Min of the Nuba %Iountains by 
Baumann, demonstrating the ways in which economic changes and new ideas and 
forms of knowledge were debated by communities in the 1970s-80s, as they sought 
to balance and manage their relationship to the world beyond their 
neighbourhoods. 23 Johnson's own historical anthropology draws out the longer-term 
continuities of the Nilotic 'moral community', and the internal and dynamic role of 
the Nuer prophets. But while he locates the history of prophecy in the "continuing 
re-evaluation of the moral relations which exist between the Nuer and external 
authority", his study by its nature focuses on the prophets and not on the other 
mediators of these relations. He refers to the 'seculansation' and 're-organisation' of 
Nuer and Dinka administration and the simultaneous "fragmentation of the moral 
community" from the 1930s, thus implying an imposition from above that lacked the 
indigenous nature of the prophets (an argument also taken up less effectively by 
Beswick). 24 
The crucial question this raises of the political legitimacy of the novel forms of 
authority under the Condominium has been addressed more in relation to northern 
Sudan. Asad argues that in northern Kordofan the Kababish accepted these rulers 
because they were seen to have power, through their control of the means of 
administration. 25 Willis unpacks this virtually tautological argument further by 
focusing more on why the Kababish accepted the authority of this lineage, which 
22 Johnson, Root Causes, p. xvi. 
23 Sharon Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War and the State (Berkeley, 1996); 
Baumann, National Integration. 
2' Douglas Johnson, Nuer Prophets. -A History ofProphecyfrom the Upper Nile in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries (Oxford, 1994), pp. 339,231,268,290,296,354-6. Despite substantial oral 
research, Beswick fails to really produce such an 'internal history' of the Dinka, and even takes their 
ethnic identity for granted. She raises key questions in describing the tendency of leaders and elders 
to appoint 'retainers' as 'chiefs' in the early colonial period; the rise in particular of ex-police as 
chiefs; the effects of changes in the political economy; and the continuation of multiple forms of 
authority. But she sees 'legitimation' as derived from connections to resources outside the 
community, and thus also fails to ftilly explore the internal legitirnisation of new kinds of authority; 
instead it was the British who 'revolutionized' and 'secularized' Dinka leadership from above: 
Stephanie F. Beswick, 'Violence, Ethnicity and Political Consolidation in South Sudan: A History of 
the Dinka and Their Relations with Their Neighbors', PhD thesis, Michigan State University, 1998, 
pp. 258-98. 
' Talal Asad, The Kababish Arabs: Power, Authority and Consent in a Nomadic Tribe (London, 
1970). 
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was fundamentally linked to their attitude towards the colonial state, as %vell as by 
examining the limits and tensions of this acceptance. 26 
Returning to the south, Reining's study of the Zande development scheme in the 
1950s also offers a more nuanced understanding of the changes in political authority 
under colonial rule, although his informants provided a particularly negati%, e 
impression of the chiefs, which, in the context of the strain placed on their authority 
by the demands of the Scheme and the political changes of the 1950s, should 
perhaps not be taken as entirely indicative of the general experience. 27 But he 
highlights the failure of the Zande chiefs to be effective or legitimate channels 
between people and government, thus raising the significance of functions of 
interlocution and offering a useful contrast with my impressions of chiefs in Western 
Mongalla. Willis' articles on the Nuba Mountains, in discussing the encounter with 
the colonial state and Christian missionaries, also demonstrate the longer-term rise 
of local leaders since the nineteenth century, who became 'gatekeepers' with the 
"world beyond the mountains" through their role in trade and warfare, and later 
through their mastery of languages, literacy and the colonial state apparatus. But the 
eclecticism of local authority was not obliterated; and the position of these leaders 
was always uncertain and unstable . 
28 1 argue in the thesis that understanding of the 
nature of this kind of authority, its functions and its limitations, is key to 
understanding the articulation of the relationship between state and local, in Sudan 
and elsewhere. 
26 Justin Willis, 'Hukm. The Creolization of Authority in Condominium Sudan', JAH, forthcoming 
(2005) 
27 Conrad C. Reining, The Zande Scheme: An Anthropological Case Study of Economic Development 
in Africa (Evanston, IL, 1966), esp. pp. 12-38. 
29 Justin Willis, "The Nyamang Are Hard to Touch': Mission Evangelism and Tradition in the Nuba 
Mountains, Sudan, 1933-1952', Journal of Religion in Africa 33, no. 1 (2003), pp. 32-62, at p. 46; 
Willis, 'Violence, Authority', esp. pp. 10 1 -3,110,112-14. The term 'gatekeeper' was 
first used in the 
context of external brokerage and the caravan trade in nineteenth-century East Africa 
by John 
Lonsdale, e. g. 'The Conquest State of Kenya, 1895-1905', in B. Berman and J. Lonsdale (eds. 
), 
Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, (London, 1992), pp. 13-44, at p. 22; also Willis, 
Potent Brews: A Social History ofAlcohol in East Africa 1850-1999 (Oxford, 2002), pp. 77-94. 
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Western Mongalla 
This study will further the exploration of relations between central government and 
locality, by focusing on the ways in which communities conceptualised the state and 
the kinds of interlocutors that emerged to mediate with it. The western part of 
Mongalla Province was chosen, largely because the English records of the Church 
Missionary Society are available for this area, and also because of my initial interest 
in the impact of the sleeping sickness campaigns here. It is also a region which has 
attracted relatively little scholarly attention: while anthropologists and historians 
have long been drawn to the larger 'tribes' of the Nuer and Dinka and the kingdoms 
of the Azande, the smaller ethnic and linguistic groupings of Equatonia have 
received less attention, despite the nineteenth-century accounts by Samuel Baker, 
General Gordon and Emin Pasha. Simonse produced a lengthy historical 
anthropology of the Ban, Lokoiya and Latuka of the east bank, which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. 29 Buxton's anthropological fieldwork 
among the Mandari in the 1950s resulted in two books on political traditions, 
religion and medicine; they provide a detailed account of the situation in the 1950s, 
but her discussion of historical change is limited to clan histories and current 
complaints about government impositions. 30 Otherwise there are briefer accounts of 
the sleeping sickness campaign, cattle and ecology, and ivory poaching, but very 
little examination of local authority or community in the region. 31 
These topics are discussed in the recent historical anthropology thesis produced by 
Leopold on the neighbouring West Nile district of Uganda. 32 As he shows, Western 
Mongalla is part of a region which is not simply peripheral to the central state in 
29 Simon Simonse, Kings ofDisaster: Dualism, Centralism and the Scapegoat King in Southeastern 
Sudan (Leiden, 1992). The age-sets of the Pari in eastern Equatoria were also studied by Eisei 
Kurimoto: e. g. 'Resonance of Age Systems in Southeastern Sudan', in Kurimoto and Simonse, 
Conflict, Age and Power in North East Africa (Oxford, 1998), pp. 29-50. 
30 Jean C. Buxton, Chiefs and Strangers: A Study of Political Assimilation among the Mandari 
(Oxford, 1963), and Religion and Healing in Mandari (Oxford, 1973). 
3 'Heather Bell, Frontiers ofMedicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1940 (Oxford, 1999); Kjell 
Hodnebo, Cattle and Flies: A Study of Cattle Keeping in Equatoria Province, the Southern Sudan, 
1850-1950 (Bergen, 198 1); R. 0. Collins, 'Ivory Poaching in the Lado Enclave', Uganda Journal 24. 
no. 2 (1960), pp. 217-28. 
32 Mark Leopold, 'The Roots of Violence and the Reconstruction of Society in North Western 
Uganda', DPhiI thesis, Oxford, 2001, 
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Khartoum, but is defined by its location in the borderlands of Sudan, Uganda and 
Congo, with a long history of trade and cultural exchange, especiall\ý to the south 
and east. The land falls in elevation from the hilly country along these borders to the 
ironstone plateau, and then further towards the rivers and plains, broken b\' hills and 
the mountains east of the Nile; the rainfall also decreases from south to north, and 
from west to east. The region is mainly covered in woodland savanna vegetation, 
with small areas of tropical high forests along the rivers; the open plains stretch to 
the north and east with marshy flood-plains along the Nile. 33 The population fall into 
two main linguistic categories: the Lokoiya and Bari-speakers (including Kakwa, 
Kuku, Nyangwara, Mandari and Fajelu) belong to the Eastern Nilotic branch of the 
Eastern Sudanic subfamily; while the Moru, Madi, Luluba, Kaliko, Avukaya and 
Baka languages are classed as part of the Central Sudanic subfamily (all are part of 
the Chari-Nile branch of the Nilo-Saharan family). The few Makaraka Zande- 
speakers also represent the Adamawa-Eastern sub-family, part of the Niger-Congo 
branch of the Congo-Kordofanian family. 3" The Eastern Nilotes are believed to haN'c 
migrated a few centuries ago into the region, which was inhabited by Central 
Sudanic people and probably also Western Nilotic Lwo east of the Nile. By the time 
of the Egyptian expedition, cattle were widespread across the region, the vegetation 
was therefore mostly open parkland savanna, and the population practised shifting 
cultivation, herding and hunting. 35 The extent of cultural exchange in the region 
probably gave rise to the theory of the 'Nilo-Hamitic' origins of the population; this 
heterogeneity has also become obscured by the more recent promotion of discrete 
ethnicities. 36 
'Tribal Purposes' 
Throughout the colonial period, British administrators struggled to comprehend the 
nature of the societies of Western Mongalla. Influenced by the development of the 
European nation-state, they assumed that Africans belonged to 'tribes': territorially 
33 Hodnebo, Cattle and Flies, pp. 5-13; H. Ferguson, 'Equatoria Province', in J. D. Tothill (ed. ), 
Agriculture in the Sudan: Being a Handbook ofAgriculture as Practised in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan (London, 1948), pp. 875-918, at pp. 882-4. 
34 See Collins, Land Beyond, pp. 49-5 1. 
35 Hodnebo, Cattle and Flies, pp. 7-8,126. 
36 Simonse, Kings, pp. 49-61. 
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discrete and linguistically and culturally homogeneous social and political units. 37 
But in Western Mongalla they found no si I M, or leadership of 
corresponding to such a unit: 
Village communities have a certain corporate existence, but of the tribe as a 
whole, or even of the section, there seems to be little practical conception. 
The ease with which neighbouring tribes, even of apparently different stocks, 
can amalgamate by intermarriage is in certain localities remarkable. 38 
Linguistic categories did not work as definitions of 'tribe', and administrators 
resorted to rather ambiguous language to try to make sense of the heterogeneity of 
social and political organisation that they encountered: "[t]he Kuku speak a Ban 
patois but fratermse with the Madi, with whom they associate themselves for tribal 
purposes' '. 39 Repeatedly, reports and ethnographies emphasised the 'mixed' ethnic 
40 groupings and the local histories of successive migrations and segmentations. 
There was reported to be no word for 'tribe' in any of the languages of Westem 
Mongalla; Bari 'villages' were said to be "autonomous" territorial and political 
units. 41 There are parallels in this sense with Kipsigis society in westem Kenya, 
where Komma argues that the 'neighbourhood' was and is the basic social unit, 
though identity of neighbourhood members was also cross-cut by multiple other 
domains such as age-sets, military units and the exogamous and dispersed clans. 42 
37 John Lonsdale, 'Globalization, Ethnicity and Democracy: A View from "the Hopeless Continent"', 
in Anthony G. Hopkins (ed), Globalization in World History (London, 2002) pp. 194-219; Igor 
Kopytoff, 'The Internal African Frontier: The Making of African Political Culture', in Kopytoff (ed), 
The Ajrican Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional Afi-ican Societies (Indianapolis, 1987) 3-84, at 
4. 
Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The ftiture of Native Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 
1/39/105. 
39 Jackson, Governor of Uganda, to Harcourt, 14 March 1912, PRO WO 181 236. 
40 Buxton, Chiefs, pp. 18-33; T. H. B. Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40; L. 
F. Nalder, (ed. ), A Tribal Survey ofMongalla Province, by Members of the Province Staff and 
Church Missionary Society (London, 1937), pp. 10-11,205. The significance of segmentation and 
migration to understandings of pre-colonial ethnicity is argued by Kopytoff, 'Internal African 
Frontier'; see also B. Bravman, Making Ethnic Ways: Communities and Their Transformations in 
Taita, Kenya, 1900-1950, (Oxford, 1998), p. 4; Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', pp. 183-6. 
4' Nalder, Tribal Survey, p. 18; Margery Perham, 'Native administration book: draft chapter on the 
South' (1946) RHL MSS Perham 542/5; Lewis, 'Notes on Bari', SAD 600/7/1-49. 
42 Toru Kornma, 'Peacemakers, Prophets, Chiefs and Warriors: Age-Set Antagonism as a Factor of 
Political Change among the Kipsigis of Kenya', in Kurimoto and Simonse, Conflict, pp. 186-205, at 
p. 193. 
17 
Introduction 
Since the colonial period, ethnicity in Af rica has generated debate among scholars. "" 
As primordialist assumptions about the historical cultural content of ethnlclt-,, - ha%-e 
been challenged, and as the colonial ethrionyms have been deconstructed, it has 
become apparent that they could represent novel definitions of identity: the Lugbara 
and Madi of northern. Uganda, for example, claim nowadays that these names were 
created and applied by Arabs and Europeans . 
44 Yet if ethnic categories N-%-ere entirel, ý, 
invented and imposed by colonial governments, the question remains as to how they 
appear to have gained so much meaning. As memorably articulated by Iliffe, for 
example - "Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes; Africans built tribes to 
belong to" - instrumentalist and constructivist explanations have explored the NN-ays 
in which ethnicities developed in response to the particular context of the colonial 
period. People discovered the value of membership of wider interest groups, 
especially in the new urban settings where migrant labourers needed new support 
systems. 45 People emphasised existing or new social identities in order to gain 
access to resources such as land through the colonial focus on 'custom. 46 Political 
elites and educated intellectuals learrit to manipulate European assumptions about 
tribes in order to depict themselves as the holders of tribal knowledge and thus to 
advance their own interests; and they also sought to mobilise their own ethnic 
constituencies in the arena of national PolitiCS. 47 
Other studies have challenged the idea of colonial creation by re-focussing on pre- 
colonial ethnicities, and especially on the role of alternative means of production in 
43 The various explanations of ethnicity are reviewed in Thomas Spear, 'Neo-Traditionalism and the 
Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa', JAH 44, no. 1 (2003), pp. 3-27, at pp. 16-25; 
Bravman, Making, pp. 9-14; and Justin Willis, 'The Makings of a Tribe: Bondei Identities and 
Histories', JAH 33, no. 2 (1992), pp. 191-208. 
44 Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', pp. 178-9; Tim Allen, 'Ethnicity and Tribalism on the Sudan- 
Uganda Border', in Katsuyoshi Fukul and John Markakis (eds. ), Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of 
Aftica, (London, 1994), pp. 112-39, at p. 123-5; John Middleton, 'Myth, History and Mourning 
Taboos in Lugbara', Uganda Journal 19, no. 2 (1955), pp. 94-203. Worby also explores the power of, 
and resistance to, ethnic naming in a comparable "ethnic border zone" in colonial Zimbabwe: Eric 
Worby, 'Maps, Names and Ethnic Games: The Epistemology and Iconography of Colonial Power in 
Northwestern Zimbabwe', Journal of Southern Aftican Studies 20, no. 3 (1994), pp. 371-92. In 
Western Mongalla, the Makaraka, Lokoiya and Kaliko all called themselves by alternative names in 
the 1930s, according to Nalder, Tribal Survey, pp. 114,183,223. 
45 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 3234. 
46 Sara Berry, No Condition Is Permanent: The Social Dynamics ofAgrarian Change in Sub-Saharan 
4ýrica 
(Madison, 1993), pp. 40- 1. A 
4 E. g. Iliffe, Tanganyika, pp. 3314 1; J. Lonsdale, 'Globalization', and 'Contests of Time: 
Kikuyu 
Historiography, Old and New', in A. Harneit-Sievers (ed. ), A Place in the World: New Local 
Historiographies from Africa and South Asia (Leiden, 2002), pp. 201-54. 
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encouraging ethnically-defined claims to resources. 48 But like the colonial 
construction arguments, these can seem overly materialist or functionalist. Lonsdale 
therefore distinguishes between the exterior and intenor 'architecture' of ethnicitN,, 
arguing that while colonial structures and socio-economic changes may have helped 
to shape and politicise ethnic identities, these processes also involved the ongoing 
renegotiation of 'moral ethnicities' within communities, which drew on much 
'deeper' historical traditions of political thought, socio-economic relations and 'civic 
virtue'. He thus sees the roots of ethnicity in Kenya in the pre-colonial networks of 
marriage and trade within areas of "linguistic, economic and social similarity". Such 
similarity did not automatically define ethnicity; rather it was strategies of building 
up relations of mutual obligation, or 'reciprocal bargains', which formed the "deep 
political language" that was later drawn upon in the arena of high politics to define 
and mobilise ethniCity. 49 James explores in more detail this underlying language in 
the case of the Uduk, through the idea of a cultural archive of moral knowledge. 50 
Lonsdale also points out that in much of pre-colonial eastern Africa, this kind of 
moral ethnicity was wider than the small political units within which people 
operated in their daily life. His analysis does not quite fit Western Mongalla; here it 
was true that political units were small, but the wider kinds of network did not 
correspond very clearly to any past or present definitions of ethnicity. This thesis 
will refer to 'community' in the sense of these smaller social and political units of 
'neighbourhood', village or chiefdom. Their members also belonged to numerous 
wider networks of trade, marriage, ritual protection, spiritual welfare and social 
relations - the latter usually articulated through the 
language of kinship and clan - 
which would all have been especially important in times of crisis. 
51 But none of 
these networks necessarily corresponded to ethnic groupings, and nor should the 
49 See examples in Thomas Spear and Richard Waller (eds. ), Being Maasai: 
Ethnicity and Identity in 
East Aftica (London, 1993), although in his 'Introduction' Spear also notes the power of ethnic 
ideology: p. 16. 
49 J. Lonsdale, 'The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: Wealth, Poverty and Civic Virtue in Kikuyu 
Political Thought', in Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy Valley, pp. 315-504, esp. pp. 317-55,466. 
50 Wendy James, The Listening Ebony. - Moral Knowledge, Religion and Power among the 
Uduk of 
Sudan (Oxford, 1999). 
51 Feierman warns of the danger in discussing community formation, of depicting the outside world 
as external to localised communities, when in fact there were endless 
linkages: Steven Feierrnan. 
Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania (Madison, 1990), pp 34-7. 
One 
informant described ceremonies, funerals etc when relatives from a distance of 10-20 miles away 
would be invited: Interview with Festo Limi Sominda, 14.1.03, Khartoum. 
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social formations of the region be seen as a 'short-lived' frontier stage in a process 
of ethriogenesis. 52 Instead, people belong primarily to the local community and then 
to a much wider regional arena, as Leopold argues in relation to West Nile: "it is 
important to emphasise that local people share a common history, and 
notwithstanding linguistic distinctions, are part of a regional culture zone which 
extends deep into southern Sudan and the north-east Congo". 53 Since Independence, 
a Southern Sudanese, or at times an Equatorian, identity has had more salience than 
the smaller ethnic categories; people have also operated even more in the zone 
Leopold refers to, through trade, education and general migration and interaction. 54 
This is not to say that ethnicity is, or was, meaningless, but rather to argue that the 
commonalities of experience across Western Mongalla, in the colonial period at 
least, outweighed any ethnic distinctiveness. I include the ethnographic map in order 
to guide the reader as to the particular geographical areas associated with the ethnic 
labels, but it is important not to impose any rigid boundaries between what were 
overlapping and fluid groups. The colonial administrators sought to demarcate such 
boundaries, but even they occasionally had to admit the inherent difficulties: 
The Baka, Mundu, Avokaya, some Zande and Buguru and a few Morokodo 
and Moru Agi... inhabit a compact area in haphazard confiision such as it 
would be hard to parallel anywhere in the Sudan... It is essential to realise 
that there are no areas or localities however small that can be said to belong 
to any of these tribes. In this respect my tribal map is perhaps misleading, but 
in it I have tried to indicate tentatively the areas in which any given tribe 
tends to predominate... Not even at the subchiefship level do the tribes keep 
separate. 55 
The ambiguity and multiplicity of identity in Western Mongalla is of more interest 
in terms of the debates within local communities over moral knowledge. Spear sees 
ethnicity as both a dynamic historical social process, and a process of historical 
52 This is the view taken by Kopytoff, in 'The Internal', p. 5, although he usefully highlights the 
fluidity and successive migrations inherent in African social formations. 
53 Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', p. 3. Compare also with the Rift Valley zone of economic 
interdependence and cultural similarity: Spear, 'Introduction' to Being Maasai, pp. 1- 18. 
54 See Johnson, Root Causes, pp. xvi-xvii, 18 on Equatorian identity. 
55 M. F. A. Keen, 'The tribes of Meridi Sub-district', 1946, NRO DK 112/14/95. 
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representation, drawing on the past to explain current identities. 56 To use Kenvan 
examples again, people living in localised communities increasingly drew on "vider 
sources of identity during the twentieth century, as they renegotiated older 
'traditions' to define community values in the face of wider changes. 57 In a sense, 
ethnicities have been continually reinvented since before colonialism, through 
processes of exclusion in order to claim 'insider' status. 58 As Hames argues, 
ethnicity is a result of the general need for a sense of community, especially during 
periods of socio-economic upheaval; it is therefore generated from below as well as 
manipulated by elites. 59 
I therefore interpret ethnicity in the colonial period as one means by which claims to 
a particular origin, history and set of moral values and rights were asserted, either to 
the colonial government, or within the local community. In the latter case, it was a 
subject of negotiation and debate, not a definItive tradition, and clan-based identities 
could also be used to make similar claims. As one administrator put it, clans and 
age-sets provided some of the apparatus "by which the individual's rights and duties 
are regulated", but they largely functioned within the village communities even 
though their members might be dispersed across an area . 
60 Ethnic and clan-based 
versions of identity drew on history to assert particular claims to rights and status, 
and through processes of "recursive" debate and conversation they became 
important to a sense of tradition and culture (a point to which I will return in 
discussing sources below) .61 But they existed as an 
inter- or intra-neighbourhood 
identity, cross-cutting the fundamental moral and political domains within which 
56 Spear, 'Neo-Traditionalism', p. 2 1. 
57 Bravman, Making; Charles H. Ambler, Kenyan Communities in the Age ofImperialism. - The 
Central Region in the Late Nineteenth Century (New Haven, 1988). 
58 Spear, 'Neo-Traditionalism', p. 22; Allen, 'Ethnicity and Tribalism, p. 129. Fukui refers to 'we 
consciousness', in Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis, 'Introduction', to their Ethnicity and 
Conflict, pp. 1-11, at p. 5. 
59 Patrick Harries, 'Imagery, Symbolism and Tradition in a South African Bantustan: Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, Inkatha and Zulu History', History and Theory 32, no. 4, Beiheft 32: History Making in 
Africa (1993), pp. 105-25, esp. pp. 107,113,124. 
60 Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The ftiture of Native Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 
1/39/105; A. C. Beaton, 'The Bari: Clan and Age-Class Systems', Sudan Notes and Records 19, no. I 
(1936), pp. 109-45, at p. 132. 
" Willis, 'The Makings', pp. 192-3. 
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(ideally) disputes were settled, collective decisions were agreed, the moral economN. 
62 was debated, and the well-being of the community was managed. 
Political Institutions 
These small-scale social and political units fall into the category of 'acephelous' or 
4stateless' societies. Geschiere warns against these simplistic classifications, and 
certainly the terms are misleading if they are taken to mean the absence of any kind 
of authority or government, if they are treated as egalitarian or 'democratic', or if 
they are treated as static and ahistorical. 63 Tosh argues against Southall's negatlx, e 
definition in 1968 of stateless societies as lacking "political institutions or roles", 
adopting instead a definition of societies in which "political authority is widely 
diffused; such authority positions as do exist touch only a limited area of the lives of 
those subject to them; the unit within which disputes can peacefully be settled is 
small, and it tends to lack constant membership and fixed boundaries". 64 But the 
continuum between the categories of states and stateless societies is also apparent 
from the evidence of the first Egyptian expedition to the Equatona region in 1841, 
which reveals the centralised ritual and commercial role of the Bari 'rain-kings' as 
Simonse calls them; he argues that through a structural opposition between king and 
people, they functioned as sovereign kingdoms. But his suggestion that the societies 
to the west also ftinctioned as segmentary kingdoms is more debatable; the evidence 
is limited to the period after the arrival of the foreign interlopers, but suggests 
multiple and flexible forms of authority based on gerontocracy, mentocracy and 
patronage. 65 Rather like Lango in Uganda, the societies of Western Mongalla could 
be considered "amorphous" in the sense that they were organised on the basis 
neither of segmentary lineage systems nor of age-groups (except the Lokoiya 
62 Lonsdale defines 'moral economy' as the set of rights and obligations negotiated between genders, 
generations and classes: 'Globalisation', p. 196. See James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the 
Peasant. - Subsistence and Rebellion in Southeast Asia (New Haven, 1976). 
63 Peter Geschiere, 'Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon: Inventing Chiefship, French and British 
Style', Africa 63, no. 2 (1993): 151-75, at p. 15 1. 
64 John Tosh, Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs in Lango: The Political History of an East African 
Stateless Society C. 1800-1939 (Oxford, 1978), pp. 1-3, citing A. W. Southall, 'Stateless Societies', 
in international Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 15 (New York, 1968), p. 157. 
65 Simonse, Kings, e. g. pp. 7-8,47-8. Sovereignty can be diffuse, as Donald 1. Ray argues in 'Divided 
Sovereignty: Traditional Authority and the State in Ghana', Journal of Legal Pluralism 37-38 (1996), 
pp. 181-202, at p. 182. 
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monyemiji age-sets); although both clans and age-sets were found in the region, they 
were not usually political organisations. 66 But this also reflects the mixed economic 
strategies pursued in the region and hence the mixed forms of organisation of the 
relations of production. 67 
I argue that it is still possible to discuss political 'institutions' before the colonial 
period, firstly in the sense of the kind of diffused or multiple forms of authontly, 
which will be discussed more below in relation to knowledge; and secondly in terms 
of the ongoing process of institutionalisation of functions for mediating with the 
foreign traders and governments. And it was from these roots that the chiefs - 
identified and backed by the colonial state - underwent a process of further 
institutionalisation over the colonial period. I use 'institutionalisation' partly in the 
sense of the definition given by Kasfir: "the process through which most active 
participants in a polity come to value highly a set of basic procedures for solving 
disputes". 68 But I also argue that another aspect of chiefship became highly valued 
as a necessary institution, that is the role of gate-keeping; indeed, it was their ability 
to perform this role effectively that earned the early colonial chiefs their initial 
legitimacy, as well as their identification by the colonial administration. It was when 
the balancing-act required for the successful performance of this function was 
threatened by the increasing government demands from the 1930s that the role of 
solving disputes also became increasingly significant in the ongoing 
institutionalisation of chiefship. It is also important to emphasise that the chief was 
not the only institution with such functions; the participants in the polities of 
Western Mongalla observed more than one 'set of basic procedures' for the 
maintenance of stability and cohesion. Rain and earth chiefs or priests also 
represented long-standing institutions for mediating with external forces and for 
maintaining the internal cohesion and survival of communities; the fact that their 
roles could also adapt and alter does not obviate their significance as institutions. 
66 Tosh, Clan Leaders, p. 241. 
67 Spear's 'Introduction' to Being Maasai discusses the link between means of production - 
pastoralism, agriculture and hunting - and the relations of production as embodied in age-sets, 
lineages or flexible forest groups; he also shows that the relatively recent development of highly 
specialised pastoralism in the Rift Valley caused greater economic and ethnic differentiation, albeit of 
an inclusive and accessible nature. 
68 Nelson Kasfir, 'Southern Sudanese Politics since the Addis Ababa Agreement', African Affairs 76. 
no. 303 (1977), pp. 143-66. 
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Above all I argue that authority relied upon the popular consensual perception of its 
necessity and utility and therefore upon the demonstration of the knowledge and 
attributes that gain such recognition. 
Colonial Governance and Local Authority 
Like the topic of ethnicity, the nature and impact of local governance under colonial 
regimes has generated an ongoing historical debate. It has long been shown that the 
British colonial rhetoric of 'Indirect Rule' - the reliance on 'traditional' local forms 
of authority - masked complex indigenous renegotiations of power and tradition, as 
individuals and groups within societies manipulated the colonial officials' 
assumptions about African authority and custom to profit and exert control over 
other sections of society. Ranger's phrase, 'the invention of tradition' has been 
somewhat misleading if taken to indicate a straightforward process of construction 
by colonial powers, removing the agency or critical faculties of colonial subjects-, as 
Ranger himself emphasised, the colonial state was less hegemonic, and the processes 
more interactive and contested than this. 69 They have been explored in more detail 
by, for example, Chanock, whose study of the invention of customary law 
demonstrates the way in which male elders and chiefs manipulated the colonial 
courts to shape a version of customary law that asserted their own control over 
women and younger men, in the face of the socio-economic changes of the colonial 
70 
period, a point also made in Ranger's original article. 
These arguments thus suggest that the colonial period heralded a fundamental break 
with the past in enabling tradition and authority to be reshaped by those Afticans 
who saw the advantages of operating within the colonial systems. This Is argued 
most vociferously by Mamdam, who depicts native administrations under colonial 
rule as "decentralised despotisms": chiefs who collaborated with the colonial 
69 Terence Ranger, 'The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa', in E. J. Hobsbawm and T. 0. 
Ranger (eds. ), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 211-62; see also his self-revision in 
'The invention of tradition revisited: the case of Africa', in Terence Ranger and Oluferni Vaughan 
(eds. ), Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century, ýfi-ica (London, 1993), pp. 62-111. 
70 Martin Chanock, Law, Custom and Social Order. - The Colonial Experience in I falaivi and Zambia, 
(Portsmouth, NH, 1998); see also John Iliffe. 4/ricans. - History of a Continent (Cambridge, 199 
5), 
pp. 198-9. 
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regimes gained control of coercive force and of access to resources; traditional 
restraints on Individual power were removed by the colonial state, enabling chiefs to 
act as the authoritarian 'clenched fist' of state power, answerable only to higher state 
authority. 71 Other writers have also argued that the imposition of colonial rule saw 
the removal or destruction of pre-colonial political traditions and constraints. 71 
Willis criticises the "sweepingly judgemental" account by Mamdani, but 
nevertheless highlights the innovative kinds of authority that developed under 
colonial rule and that had "profound political consequences". He also draws 
attention to the general isolation of Sudan from studies of this "reshaping of African 
authority under the guise of colonial conservatism". 73 
But while it has clearly been important to demonstrate the innovative nature of much 
of the so-called traditional authority in colonial Africa and to apply such argumelits 
to Sudan, it is equally important to show the continuities in political tradition and the 
limitations on the ability of either the colonial state or the chiefs themselves to 
entirely reinvent such traditions. There is a tendency to ascribe to elites and 
intellectuals the power to shape coherent traditions, which risks the neglect of 
popular discourses, evaluations and constraints: the 'deep' moral and political 
language of communities. 74 Instead Feierman draws attention to the long-term 
continuities and transformations of political traditions by focussing on the role of 
ý 75 local "peasant intellectuals' . As Harries argues, traditions cannot be imposed 
unless they strike a resonant chord locally and bear a semblance of repetition. 76 
71 M. Mamdani, Citizen and Subject. - Contemporary Aftica and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(Princeton, 1996). Berman and Lonsdale also depict the personal accumulation by colonial chiefs 
with state backing and the use of their retainers: "the bully boys of colonial control", in 'Coping with 
the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State 1895-1914', in Berman and Lonsdale, 
Unhappy Valley, pp. 77- 100, at p. 87. 
72 j. Vansina, Paths in the Rainforests: Towards a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa 
(Madison, 1990) pp. 245-8; Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', p. 200; Jan-Bart Gewald, 'Making Tribes: 
Social Engineering in the Western Province of British Administered Eritrea, 1941-1952', Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History (online) 1, no. 2 (2000); Tosh, Clan Leaders, pp. 182,248; Holly 
E. Hanson, Landed Obligation. - The Practice ofPower in Buganda (Portsmouth, NH, 2003), pp. 17- 
18; Michael Crowder and Obaro Ikime, 'Introduction', to their (eds. ), West Aftican Chiefs. - Their 
Changing Status under Colonial Rule and Independence (Ife-Ife, 1970), pp. vii-xxix. 73 Willis, 'Violence, Authority', p. 90. 
74 Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', p. 317. Examples of an intellectual/elite-centred approach include 
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. - Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
ýLondon, 1983); Gewald, 'Making Tribes', esp. paragraph 2. 
5 Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals. 
76 Harries, 'Imagery', pp. 106-7,113,124. 
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Vaughan also reveals the way that the various elite manipulations of tradition 'were 
effective only because they "resonate in the collective imagination of local 
communities". 77 The Zande chiefs failed to retain legitimate authority because 
neither their versions of tradition nor of development corresponded to those of their 
people. 78 Thus 'resonance' is clearly an intrinsic requirement of traditions, 
constraining those who attempt to construct their own versions of custorriarý, ways 
and authorities, and ensuring a degree of continuity that even the Niolence of 
colonial conquest could not entirely shatter. 
In a comprehensive recent review article, Spear therefore argues that scholars should 
question why the intellectuals credited with inventing tradition were believed, and by 
whom. 79 The contested nature of tradition has been demonstrated by, for example, 
research into the ways in which the courts and customary laws of the colonial period 
were also used by women, and other groups considered marginalized in Chanock's 
study, to challenge the dominance of male elders and chiefs . 
80 Similarly, Claims to 
authority, identity and history were and are the subject of political competition in 
western Cameroon. 81 
Spear also highlights the "fine line" that chiefs had to tread between colonial 
demands and the obligations that they had to ftilfil in order to retain legitimacy. 
Legitimacy does not have to rely on written laws and constitutions, and nor should it 
be taken to mean that authority is popular; it rather represents the narrow limits 
within which individual power is tacitly, and no doubt grudgingly, accepted as a 
somehow necessary form of authority. Clough emphasises the balancing-act 
required of colonial chiefs in Kenya if they were to meet the demands of colonial 
77 Olufemi Vaughan, 'Chiefship Politics and Conununal Identity in Western Nigeria, 1893-195 1', 
JAH 44 (2003), pp. 283-302. 
78 Reining, Zande Scheme, esp. pp. 36-8. 
79 Spear, 'Neo-Traditionalism'. 
go Brett L. Shadle, 'Bridewealth and Female Consent: Marriage Disputes in African Courts, 
Gusfiland, Kenya', JAH 44 (2003), pp. 241-62; and "Changing Traditions to Meet Current Altering 
Conditions': Customary Law, African Courts and the Rejection of Codification in Kenya, 1930-60', 
JAH 40 (1999), pp. 411-3 1; Kristin Mann, and Richard Roberts, 'Law in Colonial Africa', in their 
(eds. ), Law in Colonial Africa (London, 1991) pp. 3-58. 
81 Mitzi Goheen, 'Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs and Local Control: Negotiations over Land, Struggles over 
Meaning', Aftica 62, no. 3 (1992), pp. 389-412. 
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officials and satisfy the popular requirements of legitimate authonty. Bra%, man 
demonstrates the vulnerability of chiefly power in Taita to the disappro%'al of elders 
and the wider populace, particularly as here the chiefs were usuallY younger 
`3 Christian men appointed by the colonial government, with no precedent locall\,.,, 
This thesis will provide a further example of the limitations of chiefly power. but the 
case of Western Mongalla will also differ somewhat from these other studies. 
Firstly, the colonial chiefs were not an entirely novel form of authority imposed 
from outside by the colonial administrators, but had instead evolved gradually since 
the mid-nineteenth century in relation to the foreign incursions into the region. 
Secondly, the chiefs appear to have been ultimately rather more successful at (or 
perhaps their communities more effectively enforced) the balancing-act required of 
them. In this sense the area has more parallels with chiefship in some parts of West 
Africa, where chiefs have more successfully tapped into versions of history and 
communal identity to redefine their importance in the postcolonial as well as 
colonial periods. 84 
The Domestication of Chiefship 
In fact recent work on post-colonial chiefship - in particular the collections edited in 
1996 and 1999 by van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal with Ray and van Dijk respectivejY85 
- has offered some of the most useful theoretical analysis, by exploring in more 
depth the idea of the dual role of the chief, as the "double gate-keeper". 86 The latter 
collection argues that the mediating functions of 'chiefing' can be understood as 
cmutational' or 'conversion' work, translating between the modem state and local 
82 Marshall S. Clough, Fighting Two Sides: Kenyan Chiefs and Politicians, 1918-1940 (Niwot, 
Council, 1990); also for Tanzania, see Thomas Spear, Mountain Farmers. - Moral Economies of Land 
and Agricultural Development in Arusha and Meru, (Oxford, 1997), esp. pp. 112,195; and for 
Mayotte, Michael Lambek, Knowledge and Practice in Mayotte: Local Discourses of Islam, Sorcery 
and Spirit Possession (Toronto, 1993), p. 82. 
83 Bravman, Making, esp. pp. 231-8. See also Geschiere, 'Chiefs and Colonial Rule', p. 152. 
84 E. g. Vaughan, 'Chieftaincy Politics'; and Nigerian Chiefs. 
85 Special Issue of the Journal of Legal Pluralism, 37-38, (1996); E. Adr-iaan B. Van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal, and Rijk Van Dijk (eds. ), African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape (Leiden, 
1999). 
86 Donald 1. Ray and E. Adriaan B. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 'The New Relevance of Traditional 
Authorities in Africa', Journal of Legal Pluralism 37-38 (1996), pp. 1-38, at p. 8. 
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interests, the latter expressed as 'tradition'. 87 The value of the focus of these 
collections on the brokerage role, and the dynamic nature, of chiefship is, hov, -ever. 
somewhat diminished by the tendency to assume that these are more recent or noN, el 
developments, and to refer to a static concept of the 'tradition' from which chiefs 
derive their 'sacred' or 'customary' powers, just as some of the colonial studies 
imply a unitary 'pre-colonial' tradition . 
88 Thus the transformation of the 
"administrative chieftaincy" of the despotic colonial and post-colonial states into a 
"civil chieftaincy" is sometimes assumed to be a recent, or even projected future 
development. 89 This thesis will argue that such a transformation - the 
'domestication' of chieftaincy as van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and van Dijk terin it - 
was in fact part of the processes of change going on in Western Mongalla during the 
colonial period, as popular pressures forced the chiefs to adapt their role in order to 
retain legitimacy, which in turn involved mobilising the deeper elements of local 
political thought. I argue that there were, and are, powerful popular political 
traditions in Western Mongalla, which were evident in the nineteenth century and 
which have evolved through the colonial and postcolonial periods. In the face of 
individual ambition and exploitation by the central state, these traditions - or 
64peasant political discourse", to use Feierman's term - do not necessarily represent a 
reality, but rather a commentary on power, which can in itself exert a considerable 
influence and restraint upon local authorities. 90 This is only the case, however, if 
those authorities remain answerable to and dependent upon their local communities. 
The van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal collections also highlight the role of the chiefs in 
defending and advancing the interests of the local community, which raises this 
important question of the location of chiefs: were/are they conceptually situated 
within or outside the state? As we have seen, many of the studies of colonial chiefs 
see them as the agents of a despotic state; even the less critical studies view them as 
87 Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and van Dijk, 'Introduction: The Domestication of Chieftaincy in 
Africa: From the Imposed to the Imagined', in their (eds. ) Affican Chieftaincy, pp. 1-20. 
88 E. g. Ray, 'Divided Sovereignty', p. 198; Karen E. Fields, Revival and Rebellion in Colonial 
Central Africa (Princeton, 1985), pp. 31,72-3,248: references to a 'customary order'. 
89 E. g. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and van Dijk, 'Introduction', p. 10: the public now has a "stricter 
moral gaze" on chieftaincy and seeks to 'domesticate' it; Trutz Von Trotha, 'From Administrative to 
Civil Chieftaincy: Some Problems and Prospects of African Chieftaincy', Journal of Legal Pluralism 
37-38 (1996), pp. 79-107. 
90 Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, e. g. pp. 3-9. 
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part of the colonial state apparatus, albeit at the lowest level. 91 But the pattern seems 
to have varied across Affica, contributing to the diverse, contingent and complex 
nature of chiefship. 92 Colonial chiefs in Lango, Uganda, for example, Nvere often 
'outsiders' transferred from place to place, who hence acted despotically, 
unrestrained by kinship reciprocities. 93 Those in West Nile, Uganda were 
symbolically pushed outside the community by the curse of the elders on anyone 
who worked with the government. 94 Hutchinson describes political struggles in Nuer 
communities in 1980s Sudan over the locus of chiefly power, whether in the local 
community or in the world of the 'turuk' or government. 95 In a comparative study of 
French and British rule in Cameroon, Geschiere shows that those chiefs who, under 
the French, situated themselves outside their own societies lacked legitimacy and 
have since become marginalized; whereas British uncertainties created more scope 
for chiefs to develop legitimacy and to be seen as rooted within local society and 
outside the state, so that they have become a rallying-point for local identities, in the 
face of an influx of migrants to the area. 96 'Traditionality' might better be measured 
then, not in terms of chiefs' pre-colonial institutional roots, but in ternis of "the 
degree to which their power is rooted in local societies". 97 
Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and Ray suggest that chiefs, if not totally 'uncaptured' 
by the state, may at least have considerable room for manoeuvre, operating in "the 
shadow of the state". 98 This is explored in the colonial period by Pels, who argues 
91 Examples of the latter include Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', p. 363; Fields, Revival, p. 3 1; Peter 
Pels, 'Creolisation in Secret: The Birth of Nationalism in Late Colonial Uluguru, Tanzania', Africa 
72, no. 1 (2002), pp. 1-28. 
92 David Gordon, 'Owners of the Land and Lunda Lords: Colonial Chiefs in the Borderlands of 
Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo', International Journal ofAfi-ican Historical Studies 34, 
no. 2 (2001), pp. 315-38, at p. 337. 
93 Tosh, Clan Leaders, pp. 206-7. Tosh notes that this 'outsider' status of the chiefs was the exception 
rather than the rule in colonial Uganda, but Burke also comments on the frequent transfers of chiefs, 
and their resulting lack of local knowledge: Frederick G. Burke, Local Government and Politics in 
Uganda (New York, 1964). 
94 Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', pp. 153,207,216-7. 
95 Hutchinson, Nuer Prophets, esp. pp. 271-83, for. 
96 Geschiere, 'Chiefs and Colonial Rule', pp. 156-7,166-7. A similar comparison is made in passing 
by Reining between the unpopular Zande chiefs of Sudan, seen as agents of the government, and their 
counterparts over the border in Congo who had more autonomy and 
hence a better relationship with 
their people: Zande Scheme, p. 35. 
97 Peter Geschiere, 'Chiefs and the Problem of Witchcraft: Varying Patterns in South and West 
Cameroon', Journal of Legal Pluralism 37-8 (1996), pp. 307-28, at p. 307. For an example of the 
former approach, see Crowder and Ikime, 'Introduction'. 
98 Ray and van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, 'New Relevance', pp. 7,25. 
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that chiefs in Uluguru operated in an intermediate 'pidgimsed realm' of local 
government, satisfying the British administrators, and at the same time concealing a 
hidden realm of local politics. 99 Hatt similarly describes the role of chiefs in 
Morocco, who, like those in Western Mongalla, lacked a long history of hierarchical 
political structure but came to play a central brokerage role: 
The practical authority of chiefs lies in their ability to mediate between two 
political systems which operate in two completely different styles and 
through different political idioms - one bureaucratic and hierarchical and 
concerned with the implementation of policies mainly generated elsewhere, 
and the other personalistic and bound up in the subtle politics of reputation in 
the tribal sphere. ' 00 
But the development of the intermediate sphere of local government - and the 
intermediary role of the chief - in turn reflected the popular desire for a means by 
which to deal with the state. As Willis shows, people in northern Kordofan, Sudan, 
were often more willing to put up with the novel or arbitrary judicial and 
administrative practices of a sheikh or chief than to invite the interference of the 
colonial state. Like Pels, he uses the term 'creolised' rather than Bhabha's 'hybnd' 
to evoke the in-between language, institutions and practices of colonial governance, 
that were created more by antagonisms than by mimesis. 101 The 'creolised' practices 
of local government under colonialism thus reflected local strategies for obtaining 
protection against the state, rather than simply the creation of novel kinds of 
authority by that state or its local agents. 
In Western Mongalla the chiefs had to be seen to inhabit the realm of the local and 
function at its creolised threshold, drawing in benefits from beyond but not 
becoming part of the world outside. The thesis will show that this balancing-act 
required chiefs to possess particular skills if they were to be successful. They had to 
be seen by both their own communities and the colonial government to know the 
99 Pels, 'Creolisation in Secret, esp. pp. 10- 12. 
100 Doyle G. Hatt, 'Establishing Tradition: The Development of Chiefly Authority in the Western 
High Atlas Mountains of Morocco, 1890-1990', Journal of Legal Pluralism 37-38 (1996), pp. 123- 
53, at p. 137. 
101 Willis, 'Hukm'. See also John L. Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, 
Vol. 2: The Dialectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier (Chicago, 1997), p. 59: 
'hybridisation' implies that creolisation only occurs along some frontiers, when it is an ongoing 
process everywhere. 
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ways of the turuk - to understand their languages, diplomatic techniques, rituals and 
methods - in order to be useful as negotiators and inten-nedianes; it was this 
knowledge that earned them their position in the first place. 102 Yet at the same time, 
their authority and effectiveness would also increasingly rest on knowing the v,, ays 
of the community and drawing on political skills with a longer tradition than their 
own institution: listening, arbitration and consensus building, oratorical and 
persuasive abilities, adjudication and decisive leadership. Particular kinds of 
knowledge thus formed the structure of the varied agency of individual chiefs, and 
the political traditions of Western Mongalla involved the maintenance and ongoing 
popular evaluation of knowledge. 103 
Knowledge and Power 
The thesis will argue that both the changing rhetorical policies of the colonial 
government, and the debated discourses of local communities can be understood as 
commentaries on the value and application of different kinds of knowledge. The 
debate over the invention of tradition is also a debate over the relationship between 
knowledge and power; the ability of states, elites and intellectuals to impose a 
hegemonic episteme in order to reinforce and recreate their own authority. ' 04 Much 
of the early postcolonialist writing, like some of the interpretations of the invention 
of tradition, credited the colonial state with the ability to impose hegemonic 
epistemologies which destroyed the knowledge systems of the colonial subjects. 105 1 
argue that while the colonial project did involve the imposition of European 
scientific expertise and moral-religious ideas, this does not mean that it was effective 
in obliterating or replacing indigenous understandings and systems of knowledge, as 
102 See also Gordon, 'Owners', p. 325: "[e]ven though the authority of chiefs in the Congo was 
tenuous and localized, villagers recognized that they needed someone 'clever enough' to deal with a 
cunning umusungu (white person)". 
103 On the structure of agency, see Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, p. 34. 
104 Ronald Inden defines 'episteme' as "a way of knowing that implies a particular view of 
existence", e. g. the Western belief in a single factual reality accessible through scientific knowledge: 
'Orientalist Constructions of India', in P. J. Cain and M. Harrison (eds. ), Imperialism: Critical 
Concepts in Historical Studies, Vol. 3 (London, 200 1), pp. 94-13 6. 
105 E. g. Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London, 1978); Frantz Fanon, 
'On National Culture', in Cain and Harrison, Imperialism, pp. 3-29; G. C. Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern 
SpeakT, in Cain and Harrison, Imperialism, pp. 171-219; also J. 1. Guyer and S. M. E. Belinga, 
'Wealth in People as Wealth in Knowledge: Accumulation and Composition in Equatorial Africa', 
JAH 36 (1995), pp. 91-120, at pp. 94-5,118. 
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discussion of land-use and medicine will show. Communities in Western Mollgalla 
evaluated and selectively appropriated new kinds of knowledge, but thex., also 
maintained multiple sources of expertise that were not seen to be as mutually 
exclusive as the Christian missionaries and European administrators, scientists and 
technicians might have intended. In addition, as has been emphasised in more recent 
studies, the latter encountered the uncertainties and limitations of their own 
knowledge through the colonial experience, and by seeking to appropriate tradition 
in order to create legitimate forms of useftil authority, they also found themselves 
subject to local discourses over which they had little control. 106 
The relationship between knowledge and power has of course been highlighted by 
the work of Foucault. In a sense, this thesis is an attempt to produce what Foucault 
calls a 'genealogy': to uncover the relationship between local communities and the 
colonial government through "the claims to attention of local... knowledges that are 
opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the 
effects of the centralising powers which are linked to the institution and functioning 
of an organised scientific discourse". ' 07 
It will therefore examine the 'centralising powers' of the colonial state: its 
production and reproduction of knowledge through inspections, mapping, 
resettlement, registries, prisons and medical campaigns, its application of that 
knowledge to the landscape and bodies of the colonised, and its categorising 
"apparatuses of knowledge" through which it attempted to effect "disciplinary 
normalisations". 108 However, without entering too much into the debate over 
defining hegemony, the thesis will argue that such normalisations in Western 
106 Spear, 'Neo-traditionalism', pp. 6-7,13; Emily Lynn Osborn, 'Circle of Iron': African Colonial 
Employees and the Interpretation of Colonial Rule in French West Africa', JAH 44 (2003), pp. 29-50; 
Sara Berry, No Condition Is Permanent. - The Social Dynamics ofAgrarian Change in Sub-Saharan 
Aftica (Madison, 1993); Jens A. Andersson, 'Administrators' Knowledge and State Control in 
Colonial Zimbabwe: The Invention of the Rural-Urban Divide in Buhera District, 1912-80', JAH 43 
(2002), pp. 119-43. 
107 Michel Foucault, 'Two Lectures', in PowerlKnowledge: Selected Interviews and Other If'ritings 
1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon (Harlow, 1980), pp. 78-108, at pp. 83-5. 
'08 Foucault, 'Two Lectures', pp. 106-7. 
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Mongalla should not be taken to demonstrate the hegemony of the colonial state. 109 
The 'contradictory consciousness' of the people of this region encompassed their 
tacit accommodation to the dominating colonial state (non-nalisation), and their 
simultaneous 'everyday' resistance to its hegemonic worldview. In this liminal 
space, highlighted by the Comaroffs, between explicit ideological resistance and 
unconscious reaction, the colonised recognised and sought to control the colonising 
process through forms of experimental practice with alternative sources of 
knowledge. 110 
The 'normalisation' of chiefly authority should also be viewed in this context, not as 
the result of colonial despotism, but as the outcome of a collective (in between 
conscious and unconscious) conception, and strategy for management, of the 
colonising process. It was a very specific form of Foucault's 'contract power', in 
which people gave up power as an original right, in order to create an institution of 
local sovereignty. "' And therefore, as Foucault also argues, power did not simply 
originate from the state; the latter was instead superstructural, and operated on the 
basis of these power relations at the local level. Power "needs to be considered as a 
productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a 
negative instance whose function is repression". 112 This is a study of 'capillary' 
power in its "local forms and institutions". 113 The chiefs were channels of power, but 
not so much in terms of the application of state force upon the people, as in the 
dialectical circulation of power/knowledge between the colonial government and 
local communities, reflected back and forth through their partial recognition of each 
other. 
109 On Grarnsci's usage of 'hegemony' see Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation, Vol. 1: 
Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa (Chicago, 1991), pp. 18-27; Kate 
Crehan, Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology (Berkeley, 2002). 
"o Comaroff and Comaroff, OfRevelation, Vol. 1, pp. 29-32. For 'everyday resistance' see James C. 
Scottý Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms ofPeasant Resistance (New Haven, 1985). 
' 11 Foucault, 'Two Lectures', p. 9 1. 
112 Foucalt, 'Truth and Power', in PowerlKnowledge, pp. 109-33, at pp. 119-22. 
113 Foucault, 'Two Lectures', p. 96. 
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Knowledge Objectifled 
As Fardon argues, broad theories of knowledge such as Foucault's tend to subsume 
individual agency, rendering power relations intentional yet anonymous, revealed 
only by the analyst, and denying the reflexive awareness and agency of the subjects 
of the analyst. ' 14 This thesis is based on evidence which does not allow for deep 
exploration of the linguistic terms and contemporary concepts of knowledge, but it 
nevertheless suggests that people in coloMal Western Mongalla objectified 
'knowledge', both in terins of the implicit knowledge or culture gained over a 
lifetime by elders, and of the multiple forins of esoteric or professional knowledge 
that earned profit, prestige or power, whether to the benefit or hann of the 
community. 115 The former was expressed, for example, in the Ban word for child, 
which translates as 'one who does not know'; the socialisation of children thus 
involved imparting knowledge, which was inseparable from social relations, as 
Mandari youth 'training' camps demonstrated. ' 16 Elders are described as those who 
'know' history and customs. The latter kind of expertise was similarly expressed in 
the Bari category of those who 'know water'; like the Dinka, people "see a linkage 
between knowledge and religious wisdom". " 7 Political traditions emphasise the way 
in which the political economy rested on popular recognition of certain skills and 
attributes, so that knowledge was a key resource. And there is also evidence of an 
ongoing comparison of local and outside knowledge; the encounter with Europeans 
is often expressed in these terms, involving the assertion of indigenous knowledge 
and at the same time the awareness that it might be judged as inadequate by 
114 Richard Fardon, 'Sociability and Secrecy: Two Problems of Chamba Knowledge', in Fardon, 
(ed. ), Power and Knoii, ledge. - Anthropological and Sociological Approaches, (Edinburgh, 1985), pp. 
127-50, esp. pp. 147-8. 
115 See also Fardon, 'Sociability', pp. 147-8: secrecy is a European term but does describe Chamba 
notions and demonstrates their reflexive awareness. For a discussion of the difficulties of, and need 
for, greater focus on the self-understanding of the "tangible, knowing subject", see James, The 
Listening Ebony, esp. pp. 143-56. 
... Interview With Gajuk Wurriyang Lupaya, 28 Nov 2002, Khartoum; C. G. Seligman, and B. Z. 
Seligman, Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan (London, 1932), p. 262: "the Bari seem to judge 
maturity by stages of ignorance or knowledge". 
117 LeNvis, 'Notes on Bari', SAD 600/7/1-49.; Seligman and Seligman, Pagan Tribes, p. 250; Deng, 
The Dinka, p. 73. 
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outsiders. 118 In the lead-up to Independence, Southern politicians expressed a sense 
of inadequate skills for national political participation and their need for more 
'learning' and 'understanding', in a clear equation of knowledge and 
119 
empowennen. 
The objectification of knowledge more widely in Africa has been highlighted by the 
work of Guyer and Belinga: building on the earlier 'wealth-in-people' theories of the 
value of human capital, they argue for the deliberate and differentiated composition, 
rather than simple accumulation, of multiple forms of knowledge within societies, 
and of the role of knowledge as a primary resource in the political economy., 20 The 
thesis will also treat knowledge as a resource productive not only of power but of 
economic profit; knowledge was accumulated and demonstrated by individuals for 
professional rewards, and multiple kinds of knowledge were incorporated and 
invested in by communities. As Strathern writes, "[k]nowledge was a principal 
medium for social differentiation". 121 But as Berry argues, the production of 
knowledge in Affica, like other forrns of wealth and power, defied concentration and 
generated social process and debate. 122 
118 E. g. Interview with Chief James Josea Ramadalla, Yei, 31.8.04: before Christianity, "we were 
only knowing Nun [God]"; and before the Europeans came, "we knew each other, we knew our 
boundaries"; also G Janson Smith, 'Report on Juba training school Final Examination 1941: Extracts 
from essays', NRO DK3 1/6/29: "My people although good at cultivation, as it is their chief 
occupation, do not know it in the way wanted by the white men". 
"9 'Proceedings of the Juba Conference on the Political Development of the Southern Sudan, June 
1947', appended in Wai The Southern Sudan, pp. 185-205. 
120 Guyer and Belinga, 'Wealth in People'. For earlier wealth-in-people theories see Joseph Miller, 
Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade 1730-1830 (London, 1988); S. 
Miers and 1. Kopytoff (eds. ), Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives 
(Madison, 1977). 
121 Marilyn Strathem: 'Knowing Power and Being Equivocal: Three Melanesian Texts', in Fardon, 
Power and Knowledge, pp. 61-8 1, at p. 68. Michele Wagner shows, for example, that nineteenth 
century caravan trade in Tanzania further inflated the economic value of priestly ecological and 
environmental knowledge: 'Environment, Community and History: 'Nature in the Mind' in 
Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Buha, Western Tanzania', in Gregory Maddox, James L. 
Giblin and Isaria N. Kimambo (eds. ), Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of 
Tanzania, (London, 1996), pp. 175-99, at pp. 190-2. 
122 Sara Berry, Chiefs Know Their Boundaries: Essays on Property, Power and the Past in Asante, 
1896-1996 (Oxford, 2001), pp. xxii-xxxi, 7-8. 
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The Morality of Knowledge 
The evidence from Western Mongalla suggests that people asserted the multiplicity 
of the objects and relations of 'power-knowl edge' in their communities. The thesis 
will demonstrate a key difference here between European and African approaches to 
knowledge. Both clearly valued knowledge as a political and economic resource, but 
in the European and colonial states, knowledge was increasingly being controlled 
and managed by the state, in an attempted centralisation and rationalization of 
knowledge resources. In Western Mongalla, knowledge was instead deliberately 
diversified. The difference between states and stateless or segmentary societies thus 
lies not in the existence or absence of political institutions, nor in the unity or 
separation of ritual and political authority, but rather in the control and management 
of knowledge. 123 Guyer and Belinga highlight something of this difference in 
describing the 'inclusive' and diffuse composition of knowledge in African 
societies, but they do not fully address the complex management of these different 
kinds of knowledge, and particularly the role of secrecy. They thus fail to discuss the 
negative or dangerous aspects of knowledge, which are highlighted by Lambek in 
tenns of the "morality of knowledge". 124 But this is key to understanding why 
knowledge and power in such societies was not centralised; the public perception of 
the potential of esoteric or specialist knowledge to be used in amoral or anti-social 
ways helped to limit its capacity to generate power, or the desirability of 
monopolising it. 125 The cultural moral ambiguity of knowledge thus limited how 
123 Aidan Southall describes segmentary states as made up of small political cores within a wider 
ritually based zone: 'The Segmentary State and the Ritual Phase in Political Economy', in Susan 
Keech McIntosh (ed. ), Beyond Chiefdoms. - Pathways to Complexity in Aftica, (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 
31-38. Such a pattern is partially applicable to Western Mongalla, except that I do not perceive such a 
difference between 'ritual' and 'political' authority. Instead I argue that these different spheres 
represent different forms of knowledge, each of which generated political authority too. As Miller 
writes, just because rain kings or other specialists might not exercise "direct supervision", they 
nevertheless built up 'wealth in people', in tenris of potential labour or tribute, in the pre-colonial 
political economy: Way of Death, esp. pp. 47,60. 
124 Lambek, Knowledge and Practice, esp. pp. 220-26, and also p. 379 for the force of public opinion. 
125 Geschiere shows that in parts of West Affica, the more egalitarian the society, the more that 
wealth and power were linked to forces translated as 'witchcraft'; and that chiefs' handling of 
witchcraft was a measure and reflection of their moral authority: 'Chiefs and the Problem', esp. pp. 
320-23. 
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productive it could be in terms of social relations, and, as the wealth-in-people 
theories demonstrated, it was social relations that were the ultimate locus of Nvealth 
and power. 
126 
Knowledge is also not inseparable from power, but rather exists in opposition to, as 
well as within, power relations. Strathern poses the question: -ývhen a category of 
persons claim particular powers (through displayed knowledge, ritual engagement) 
is it because they have or because they do not have comparable powers in other 
terms (in daily life, in PolitiCS)?,, 127 The thesis will show the ways in which various 
claims to knowledge were made in order to challenge power as well as to produce or 
reinforce it; 'witchcraft' for example could be a weapon of the weak or poor. 128 All 
such claims were subject to constant popular evaluation, both in terms of their 
authenticity and of their morality and positive value to the community. Knowledge 
was therefore intimately linked not only to power relations, but also to social 
relations; popular debates over witchcraft and illness were also commentaries on the 
proper use of knowledge, and how to deal with lack of knowledge. And while 
starting out as gatekeepers with foreign governments, the chiefs increasingly came 
under pressure to obtain other kinds of protection for their communities, either by 
mediating with the experts who could establish the commonly unknown, or by 
guiding the collective uncovering of that unknown. By the end of the colonial period 
the role of gatekeeper would thus come to involve the management of the 
conversion of different kinds of knowledge between the outside and inside of the 
community. Neither political complexity, nor accountability, were lost during 
colonial rule; but rather worked through changing institutions. 129 
126 See also Berry, CIiiefs Know, p. 200: "individual accomplishment is inseperable from interaction 
with others". 
127 Strathern, 'Knowing Power', p. 62. 
128 Geschiere, 'Chiefs and the Problem', p. 313. 
129 Hanson argues that in Buganda, colonial rule and economic change destroyed heterarchal and 
accountable forn-is of authority by eroding personal obligation: Hanson, Landed Obligation, pp. 17- 
18. 
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Sources 
The extent to which these claims and counter-claims to knowledge can be 
illuminated in this study is partially limited by the nature of the sources. There is 
very rarely any indigenous writing in any of the British records, and none elsewhere 
from the colonial period. I therefore rely almost entirely on Europ ean- authored texts, 
with all the attendant problems of viewing societies through a lens that , vas tinted, 
blinkered and short-sighted, when it was not entirely blind. But taking the nature of 
the lens into account, it nevertheless offers recurrent glimpses of the complex 
negotiations over authority and community. The monthly reports and diaries 
produced by D. C. 's provide particularly detailed snapshots of the more mundane or 
minor events and gradual changes within districts, while the bigger or more 
disturbing episodes (such as witchcraft trials or Christian revivalism) generated 
reports that can be surprisingly revealing. Evidence from missionaries or visitors to 
the Province also presents a different angle; sometimes the various distortions of 
these different lenses create a clearer picture when combined. And sometimes 
European amusement or ethnographic curiosity led to more direct reporting of a 
local voice, even if its meaning was not fully comprehended by the reporter. The 
serious ethnographic studies of the area relied on information by missionaries and 
administrators; only the anthropologist Jean Buxton spent any length of time in 
participant observation fieldwork with the Mandan in the 1950s. But ethnographies 
garnered a different kind of information from D. C. 's or missionaries to that of 
official reports, and so provide yet another angle. Finally, one or two D. C. 's also 
wrote down oral histories for the clans or villages of their districts and even 
attempted to date them; these are less useful if taken as chronological histories than 
if interpreted in terms of their contemporary meaning and use as 'traditions' at the 
time they were recorded. 
I also conducted around twenty interviews with individuals from Western Mongalla, 
mostly in Khartoum in 2002-3, and a few in Yei in 2004. Most had been born in the 
1930s or '40s, most were men, and nearly all spoke English and had had university- 
level education. They were in a sense self-selecting, in that they mostly knew each 
other and there was a general consensus among younger people (including my 
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research assistant) that they were the elders who knew about the British time, about 
local traditions and histories, or about local government. They are therefore 
interesting in themselves as representatives of a particular group, thev were mostly 
among the first self-styled 'Intellectuals' or 'politicians' of Southern Sudan, and 
many of them were also prominent in the Southern Regional Goverm-nent in the 
1970s. They have mostly been living and working more recently in Khartoum or 
sometimes elsewhere in East Affica. Though clearly respected and influential, most 
are no longer prominent in the political or military leadership of Southern Sudan; 
their status rests on their historical role and on their claims to be the leading elders, 
with knowledge of history and tradition. In Khartoum they regularly come together 
to formulate and exchange this kind of knowledge, to advise in mantal and financial 
disputes, and generally to impart customs to the communities of migrants or 
reftigees from their home areas. In the case of the Ban at least, they hax, c formed 
councils, usually on an ethnic basis, and hold cultural and community events. 
These informants therefore tend to emphasise ethnic distinctiveness as well as a 
Southern Sudanese identity; they seek to uphold and strengthen a set of moral and 
cultural values in the face not only of the threat of the northern Islamic government, 
but also the perceived homogenising and disintegrating effects on younger people of 
living, studying and working in Khartoum, Uganda, Kenya or beyond. They are also 
presenting themselves as interlocutors with foreigners like me; they often drew on 
the European written ethnographic accounts to tell me about the kind of traditions 
they expected me to be interested in. Their evidence will therefore be treated as a 
body of oral histories which have been negotiated among a certain section of older, 
largely male, Southern Sudanese, and presented to me to explain and justify their 
paradigms of identity. In other words, as Willis writes, they demonstrate "history as 
negotiated identity" and as "recursive" process, edited partly according to the nature 
of the audience. ' 30 1 have used their accounts as straightforward narrative only when 
it is corroborated by written sources; usually they are more interesting in revealing a 
particular set of ideals and interpretations. 131 
130 Willis, 'The Makings', pp. 192-3,207-8. 
13 1 For the difficulty of equating oral histories with chronological narratives see Leopold, 'Roots of 
Violence', pp. 188-9. 
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They are without exception committed to the institution of chiefship, and rarely 
uttered any negative statements about chiefs in the colonial period, which theý- 
naturally look back on as something of a golden age in contrast to what follo, %N-ed. 132 
But although their view of the colonial period has obviously been shaped bý, 
subsequent history, I nevertheless treat some of their evidence as indicative of the 
way that the educated elite of the late-colonial period supported ideas of 'tradition' - 
which included an ongoing role for chiefs, elders and community authorities like 
rain priests - and have continued to invest in such ideas throughout the post-colonial 
period. 133 1 also see this as a reflection of the strong sense of the need to protect and 
defend the local against the state. The inforinants present a repeated depiction of 
certain idealised 'traditions', but these in themselves can reveal something of the 
longer or deeper popular traditions in Western Mongalla upon which they draw. 134 
As Shaw writes, memories cannot simply be reduced to present interests alone; the 
present is viewed through the lens of history as well as vice versa. 135 The informants 
are therefore vital to the attempt to uncover something of the 'traditions' - in the 
sense both of the deep resonant language or the cultural archive of moral knowledge, 
and of the long-term processes of institutionalisation - that underlie political thought 
and action in Western Mongalla. 
Structure 
The relationship between knowledge and government is examined firstly in terms of 
the colonial administration of Sudan, in order to provide the context for the story of 
local government in Western Mongalla. Chapter One argues, with specific 
references to Mongalla Province in particular, that the standard narrative of the main 
phases of Condominium administration has ignored its fundamental continuities: 
132 See also Tim Allen, 'Violence and Moral Knowledge: Observing Social Trauma in Sudan and 
Uganda', Cambridge Anthropology 13, no. 2 (1988-9), pp. 45-66, at p. 50. 
133 Unlike, for example, in French Cameroon or Zande area, where there was more lasting and greater 
hostility and distance between chiefs and the educated: Geschiere, 'Chiefs and Colonial Rule', p. 156; 
Douglas H. Johnson, 'Criminal Secrecy: The Case of the Zande'Secret Societies", Past and Present 
130 (199 1), pp. 170-200, at p. 194. 
134 See also Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp. 321,332, on the problems of accessing unrepresented 
voices but the possibilities for nevertheless recovering some aspects of pre-colonial political thought 
through evocative symbols and language. 
135 Rosalind Shaw, Memories of the Slave Trade. - Ritual and Historical Imagination in Sierra Leone, 
(Chicago, 2002), esp. pp. 12-15,246. 
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pragmatic devolution of functions to local authorities alongside an increasiji, _, ]ý, 
centralised direct control through the colonial hierarchy. Instead the Condominium 
should be periodised in terms of the changing relationship between knowledge and 
colonial governance. Initially the local knowledge of the district official - the man 
on the spot - was elevated in order to justify the pragmatic and expedient local 
alliances formed in the first two decades of colonial rule. By the 1920s and 1930s, 
the loose theory of indirect rule provided the ideology and broad template for 
accumulating and ordering this local knowledge, and justifying greater government 
intervention in local life. From the late 1930s, the central government increasingly 
sought to control the transmission of knowledge to and from the local level through 
its own departments of expertise, to create uniformity and regularity across Sudan, 
and to subsume local specificities in the state-directed project of development and 
modernisation. 
This centralisation of knowledge was never complete; local officials retained a 
degree of autonomy, and they in turn could not exercise hegemony in their districts. 
The next two chapters argue against the simplistic idea of chiefs as colonial 
creations or agents of the state. Chapter Two looks back at local authority in the 
nineteenth century, establishing certain political traditions in the region, and 
focussing on the development of local institutions for mediating with the tilruk. In 
line with the plurality of authonty in the region, a new kind of political office 
emerged alongside existing ones - the chief of the foreigners - which evolved 
through the popular recognition of the necessity for particular kinds of knowledge: 
diplomatic skill, linguistic knowledge, and expenence of working with the foreign 
traders and govenunents as soldiers, interpreters or trading agents. Outward displays 
of trade goods and 'Nubi' culture did not demonstrate economic change and 
commoditisation, so much as symbolise this knowledge of the foreigners; they 
certainly helped to mark out 'chiefs' when the British and Belgian colonial officers 
amved in the region. A recurring motif in the early colonial reports, as in some of 
the nineteenth-century accounts, was that of the 'scapegoat' chief, which I argue 
represents an important local strategy for deflecting government demands, the 
popular awareness of the vulnerability of 'chiefs' as gatekeepers, and the continuing 
multiplicity - and even deliberate separation - of forms of knowledge and authority 
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in the region. The period from c. 1850 to 1920 thus saw the foundation of a pattem 
in which communities sought protection from the turuk through a kind of moral 
compact formed between people and gatekeeper chiefs. 
Chapter Three continues the story of the chiefs, showing that their pov'ýer peaked iii 
the 1920s and early 1930s, as they monopolised relations with the govenu-nent, and 
were invested with some of its coercive force; their authority nevertheless relied on 
continuing recognition of their specialist knowledge of government Nl, -ays, which 
increasingly required understanding of bureaucratic practices and even basic 
literacy, and which reproduced their authority through the repetitive ritual and 
practice of administration. From the later 1930s, however, the chiefs faced 
something of a crisis of authority, due to growing, if limited, competition from other 
interlocutors with the state, and increasing popular resistance to government 
demands. As the utility of their knowledge of government was partially eroded, the 
chiefs appear to have reinvented their role, both to emphasise their knowledge of the 
community and its traditions, and to revive their gatekeeper functions of concealing 
the local realm and simultaneously accessing state resources. In the last decade of 
the Condominium, the identification of the chiefs with their communities became 
more apparent as the newer forms of mediation between state and locality failed to 
win popular trust. 
I then turn in chapters Four and Five to the interaction of state and local, European 
and indigenous, knowledge, by exploring the contested territories of land and 
bodies. Chapter Four demonstrates the resilience of indigenous knowledge of the 
landscape and its uses in the face of largely unsuitable government interventions. It 
also argues that the chiefs did not simply benefit from the colonial coercion of 
labour or control of land. Instead, land issues placed the greatest strain on their 
authority, while their opportunities for accumulation remained limited. Independent 
household economic strategies generated renegotiation of the moral economy, ývhich 
in turn led to debates over history and tradition. The limits of coercion are also 
discussed in Chapter 5, which argues that physical force was not necessarily the 
most threatening sanction; it Nvas the unknown and secret exertion of forces upon the 
body that N,,,, as most feared. Government medical interventions, together with forced 
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labour, were partly experienced as extractions and penetrations, in the face of which 
people also needed means of protection. The authority of those Nvith knowledge of 
the body - in the full sense of its place in the physical, social and spiritual landscape 
- was therefore maintained and even enhanced during the colonial period. Both 
human bodies and the land were the embodiments of social relations, and so claims 
made upon them had to draw upon deeper knowledge of history and society, which 
in turn ensured that elites had to engage in popular debates. 
Chapter Six examines in more detail the internal negotiation of knowledge within 
local communities, through accounts of 'poison' trials and a Christian 'revival' in 
particular. It argues that the chiefs' courts became one arena for community debatcs, 
especially over marriage issues; far from being the vehicle of dominance by chiefs 
and headmen, they became a channel for claims and grievances that could instead 
exert pressure on these authorities. But there were other arenas for such debates, in 
which local intellectuals and knowledgeable individuals defined community ways; 
Christianity and education also formed a new source of claims to moral knowledge. 
Definitions of morality involved evaluation of different kinds of knowledge and 
their use; this was particularly charged when it came to secret practices, which were 
hence morally ambiguous and were categonsed according to their necessity and 
utility to the community. I argue that 'witchcraft' can be treated as a particular - 
changing - category of secret knowledge, forming a discourse that could be used to 
challenge and limit power (either because leaders feared witchcraft attacks or 
because they feared being accused of it or of failing to deal with it), and increasingly 
to enforce norms of social behaviour and personal obligation. Thus political and 
social relations and definitions of the moral community were all shaped by claims 
to, and evaluations of, knowledge. This internal negotiation and management of 
knowledge was in turn vital to the maintenance of local autonomy and the failure of 
the colonial state to impose a hegemonic episteme. 
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Knowing the Native: 
Colonial Governance and Knowledge 
Introduction 
"Knowledge is power, in Aftica as elsewhere", wrote General Wingate in 1918.1 
The centrality to the colonial state of the Foucauldian link between knowledge and 
power has been frequently reiterated: "knowledge was what colonialism was all 
about". 2 The pragmatic need of colonial goverm-nents for infon-nation and 
understanding in order to rule effectively was coupled with more psychological or 
moral desires to 'know' the colonized 'Other' in order to both define and justify 
3 'Self . 
The colonisers assumed that they possessed greater knowledge of an 
objective and 'true' reality encompassing the colonised themselves. " This in turn 
reflected the development in Europe since the Enlightenment of a belief that a true 
reality exists externally, and that knowledge of this reality can be gained through 
empirical, scientific enquiry. 5 The half-century before World War One saw the 
growing utilisation by governments of a rationallsed, systernatised knowledge, 
mastered by bureaucrats and experts. 6 The collection and categonsation of 
inforination was an intrinsic part of government, and was urgently necessary in the 
colonies where administrations had so little knowledge to begin with of their 
territories and peoples. 
1 General Sir F. R. Wingate, Foreword to Sudan Notes and Records (SNR) I (1918), p. 1. 
2 N. B. Dirks, Foreword to Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge. - The British in 
India (Princeton, 1996). 
3 Said, Orientalism; G. Prakash, 'Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World: Perspectives 
from Indian Historiography' in Cain and Harrison, Imperialism, Vol. 3, pp. 230-55; Inden, 
'Orientalist Constructions'. 
4 Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak? '; Inden, 'Orientalist Constructions'; F. Farion, 'On National 
Culture', in Cain and Harrison, Imperialism, Vol. 3, pp. 3-29. 
5 See Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, 'Introduction', in Cooper and Packard (eds. ). 
International Development and the Social Sciences. - Essays on the History, and Politics of 
Knowledge, (Berkeley, 1997), pp, 1-4 1, at p. 5; Inden, 'Orientalist Constructions'. 
6 Feiernian, Peasant Intellectuals, pp. 107-9. 
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Colonial in formation- gathering also naturally followed on from the interaction in the 
nineteenth century between science and empire. Europeans in Africa, NN-hether 
camateurs' or 'experts', sought to increase their individual and national banks of 
'scientific' knowledge through the collection of information and 'specimens'. and 
7 used their belief in the value of such knowledge to justify missions and conquest . 
Knowledge also imparted a sense of control and power over landscapes and 
societies. Studies of geography or cartography and empire for example have showii 
how the science of surveying was utilised in the appropriation of territories bý, 
colonisers. 8 Similarly a study of geology in the nineteenth century demonstrates the 
links between the Geological Society and colonial expansion: "knowledge created 
was also power to be applied for the control of economic, political and ideological 
processes". 9 
The European belief in the existence of a factual truth did not imply the absence of 
disagreement or debate. There were different ways of accessing or acquiring 
knowledge of this single reality, which could lead to very different versions of it 
being promoted. The ranking of these differing versions came down to issues of 
methodology, and here there was room for dispute. All methodology had to be 
shown to be empirical and rational, but it could vary from direct observation or 
experience to the use of proven theories. Bernard Cohn examines the forms of 
colonial knowledge in India through a set of what he terms 'investigative 
modalities', each of which identified the need for, gathered and presented 
appropriate knowledge. 10 These ordered categories of knowledge were used in turn 
to re-order India: "[fln the conceptual scheme which the British created to 
7 j. M. MacKenzie, 'Introduction', in MacKenzie (ed) Imperialism and the Natural World 
(Manchester 1990), pp. 1-14. 
8 J. B. Harley, 'Maps, Knowledge and Power', in D. Cosgrove & S. Daniels (eds), The Iconography 
of Landscape: essays on the symbolic representation, design and use ofpast environments 
(Cambridge, 1988), pp. 277-312; Thomas J. Bassett, 'Cartography and Empire Building in 
Nineteenth-Century West Africa', Geographical Review 84,3,1994, pp. 3 16-3 3 5; Matthew H 
Edney, Mapping an Empire: The geographical construction ofBritish India, 1765-1843 (Chicago, 
1997). 
9 R. A. Stafford, 'Annexing the landscapes of the past: British imperial geology in the nineteenth 
century', in MacKenzie, Imperialism, pp. 67-89 10 Cohn, Colonialism, p. 5. 
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understand and to act in India, they constantly folloNved the same logic. they reduced 
vastly complex codes and their associated meanings to a few metonyms. "' I 
This idea of a constant logic assumes that these modalities vvere static in their 
conception or ranking; instead colonial knowledge was differentiated through time 
as well as by category. Throughout the Condominium, the Sudan Government had to 
reconcile different sets of knowledge, particularly those of 'experts' or theonsts, and 
those of administrators with more practical or direct experience. But the result NNýas a 
changing relationship between different kinds of knowledge and colonial 
governance. The Condominium government has generally been viewed in terins of a 
standard political narrative that characterises the first two decades or so as 'direct 
rule', followed by a period of 'Indirect rule', which was then modified by 'dilution' 
in urban and central areas and more institutionalised 'local government' structures. 
However, while the policy rhetoric of the central govenu-nent might follow this 
pattern, the reality was the broad continuity of a pattern of devolving functions to 
4native administration' whilst increasing central state control. What really changed 
was the conception of the role of knowledge in the working of the colonial state, and 
the prioritisation, transmission and utilisation of that knowledge, especially in 
relation to the fundamental task of managing local specificities within the 
centralising state. The changing rhetoric of governance therefore reflected the 
periodic self-examination by administrators and the contradictions and crises of the 
colonial conscience. 
A more useful periodisation of Condominium rule might therefore see the early 
period (c. 1898-1918) as a time when the training and local experience of officials 
was idealised as the most valuable kind of knowledge, making possible the 
justification of ad hoc, pragmatic local alliances with whichever individuals or 
groups appeared most suitable to the man on the spot. The founding of Sudan Notes 
and Records in 1918, prompting the above quote by Wingate, marked the beginning 
of a turning-point away from prioritising experience alone. Instead there was an 
increasing emphasis on a more systernatised and transmissible knowledge that could 
be accumulated and banked by the colonial state, and that could be used to fit the 
" Cohn, Colonialism, p. 162. 
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eclectic local compromises of the earlier period into a more rationalised and %\ idely 
applicable template. Knowledge was to assist and infon-n local practice and to 
articulate it within a single basic theory of governance, though not to direct or 
homogemse it. By the mid-1930s a second major change was gradually emerging as 
some experts and administrators began to advocate the translation of knowledge 
more directly into practice, and to search for a more comprehensive, uniforin modcl 
of government that would facilitate both the maintenance of colonial control and the 
evolution of modernity. Local particularities were therefore by the 1940s being 
subsumed by systems and standard institutional structures; at the same time 
knowledge was categorised less by locality and more by departments of scientific 
expertise. 
This chapter will discuss these three broad phases of the Condominium, and the 
changing role of different kinds of knowledge in ideas of governance. The 
periodisation was not clear-cut - the individualities and disagreements of colonial 
officials ensured overlaps and continuities - but there were certain landmarks in the 
gradual evolution of thinking. It will also use Mongalla Province as an example of 
the working-out of government theory and policy by administrators at the provincial 
or district level, in one of the most peripheral and confusing regions of the Anglo- 
Egyptian Sudan. Administrators here had to mediate between central government 
directives and the demands of the local situation. They frequently complained about 
the ignorance and lack of interest shown by the Khartoum Government in relation to 
the South, as well as the shortage of resources they were given. The 
incomprehension demonstrated by Khartoum towards the province reflects the 
confusions long experienced by Europeans regarding the environment and 
populations of this region. Mongalla was therefore a particularly vivid example of 
the difficulties of integrating local specificities and wider theories, and of what Cell 
highlights as "the persistent structural tension between centre and periphery" 
throughout the British Empire. 12 
12 John Cell, 'Colonial Rule', in Judith M. Brown & Wrn. Roger Louis (eds. ), The Oxford Histor of 3' 
the British Empire, Vol. IV: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), PP. 232-54, at p. 243. 
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1. Local Knowledge and Experience, c. 1898-1914 
1.1 'Direct Rule' and Decen tralisation 
Early colonial administrations have been described as 'holding operations'; militar\, 
governments concerned primarily with preventing resistance and requisitionille 
taxes and labour. 13 The basic ideology of colonial rule at this stage rested on the 
notion of Pax Britannica and the suppression of perceived cruelty and barbarism 
among Afficans. 14 The administration of the Sudan was initially largely in the hands 
of British and Egyptian military officers, who used considerable force to ensure 
15 submission where necessary, especially in the south . 
Apart from military 
dominance, this was to be accomplished through judicial intervention and the 
administration of law. ' 6 At the beginning of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium of 
the Sudan, the first Governor- General, Kitchener, laid down the aims of goveminent 
as being the establishment of basic law and order, and gaining the respect of the 
population for 'good' government in contrast to 'despotic' Mahdist rule. 17 
Ififfe argues that in northern Sudan the fear of Mahdist loyalties led to reliance on 
Egyptian or Sudanese educated elites known for anti-Mahdist sympathies, until the 
1924 mutiny and assassination of Governor-General Stack forced a reaction in 
18 favour of 'tribal chiefs'. In reality, however, the use of Egyptian army officers and 
some educated northern Sudanese should not obscure the real basis of the early 
Condominium administration. Kitchener, his successor Wingate, and the British 
Consul General in Egypt, Cromer, established a decentralised system of provincial 
administration, intended to be geared to local circumstances, under officers with 
local experience and knowledge. ' 9 The latter in turn relied on local allies or 
13 Iliffe, Africans, pp. 196-8. 
" Bravrnan, Making, p. 83. 
15 Johnson, Nuer Prophets, pp. 8-9. British civilian graduates were also recruited from 1905, but 
remained in the minority until the First World War. 
16 Bravinan, Ethnic Ways, p. 198. 
' Daly, Empire, pp. 71-2. 
8 Iliffe, Africans, pp. 200-1. 
19 Gabriel Warburg, The Sudan under Wingate: Administration in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899- 
1916 (London, 1971), p. 70; Governor-General, Report on the Finances, Administration and 
Condition of the Sudan (GGR), 1904. 
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intermediaries to create a basic administration "suitable to the people". "' There is 
evidence of mistrust of educated Sudanese or Egyptian officials well before 1924, 
and a preference for rural notables as the more natural link between government and 
people. 21 The emphasis on the local reflected the self-awareness of the early colonial 
state of its intrinsic ignorance; perhaps within a small local unit of administration 
knowledge could be obtained and accumulated more easily. This echoed the focus 
on village communities in India as the units through which the people could be 
studied, known, understood and thus controlled and governed. 22 
Decentralisation therefore reflected the limited resources of the early colonial state, 
and also the absence of a centralised body of information about the Sudan: "[t]he 
impoverished Sudan was not in a position to afford highly specialised officials". 23 
The government defended this weakness by emphasising the quality of the officials: 
"[a]ll they require, to supplement any want of knowledge or experience on their part, 
is technical advice on professional subjects". 24 The Sudan Political Service, as it 
later became known, was begun by Cromer to employ civilian administrative 
officials and ensure greater continuity of administration. 25 It became characterised 
by a belief in the superiority in "tradition, taste and training" which equipped its 
members to rule, and "a sense of expertise" heightened by their service in Sudan, 
distinct from the Colonial Office. 26 In reality local experience was limited, as long 
periods of service in one district were rare, especially in the north. This rarity only 
increased the status of veteran officers, thus explaining the misplaced deference to 
the Inspector-General, Slatin, in all tribal and religious affairs: as Cromer explained, 
Slatin's "thorough knowledge of its inhabitants enable him to speak with an 
authority which is altogether exceptional". 27 Thus lengthy experience earned the 
greatest authority in the prefectural system of colomal rule; the belief that the 'man 
20 Warburg, The Sudan, p. 70. 
21 See Holt, and Daly, A History, pp. I 11,114, on the use of Mahdist and Sufi leaders to encourage 
loyalty to government during World War One. 
22 Cell, 'Colonial Rule', pp. 244-6. 
23 Warburg, The Sudan, 79; Sara Berry neatly sums up the colonial "hegemony on a shoestring" In No 
Condition, Ch. 2. 
24 GGR 1904. 
25 Collins, Land Beyond, p. 229. 26 Daly, Irnperial Sudan, pp. 14,238; see also Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 325. 
27 GGR 1903. 
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on the spot' knew best justified the autonomy of individual officials in ldentifýlng 
and utilising local authorities. 28 
1.2 Early Categories ofKnowledge in Mongalla Province 
The first administrators in Mongalla were particularly autonomous and distant from 
supervision; not until 1920 would the Khartoum Government become concerned 
about their methods of administration under the long-serving Governor, O'A-cn. 2() 
They were all military officers until 1929; few members of the political service 
which dominated the central government had any knowledge of Southern Sudan. 30 
The officials in Mongalla were most concerned in this early period with acquiring 
geographical and historical knowledge of the region; the fon-ner to establish greater 
control and the latter to justify the methods of control utilised. The province \vas 
established in 1906, access to the region having been hindered until then by the sudd 
blockages on the Nile. The perceived inaccessibility of the region was emphasised in 
the early reports of administrators, and their most urgent need was to survey and 
map the territory; they frequently drew sketch maps of their districts in the absence 
of more expert surveys. The links between cartography and imperialism have been 
explored by scholars to show not only the obvious utility of maps in the service of 
colonial conquerors and early administrators, but also the relationship between 
European knowledge, as embodied in the map, and colonial power. Triangulation 
surveys seemed to Europeans to provide accurate representation of territory, thus 
making the map a form of scientific 'truth'. Further it was a privileged product of 
European science and thus contributed to and reinforced a sense of superiority and 
difference in relation to the 'natives' inhabiting the mapped territories. The creation 
of maps involved the defining, measuring, ordering and appropriation of territory, 
and was thus an intrinsic aspect of imperialism. 31 
28 B. Berman, 'Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence: Colonial Administration and the Origins of the 
'Mau Mau'Emergency', in Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy f'alley, Vol. 2, pp. 227-64, at pp. 232-51 
Cell, 'Colonial Rule, p. 242. 
29 Daly, Empire, p. 15 1. 
30 Collins, Land Beyond, p. 230; J. Winder, 'Differences between the Northern and Southern 
Sudan 
and the adrninistrative problems these raised', in D. Lavin (ed. ) The Condominium Remembered. 
%'oi- 
l, The Making of the Sudan State (University of Durham, 1991) pp. 17-24. 
31 Hadey, 'Maps, Knowledge and Power'; Bassett, 'Cartography and Empire Building'; Edney, 
Mapping, Worby, 'Maps, Names'. 
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However, as Edney argues, it was not the case that maps did present truth, only that 
Europeans believed them to. Surveys were limited in their accuracy b,,,, the limited 
resources of the colonial state and the flaws inherent in their methodology. In 
addition they were the product of negotiation and contestation with local 
informants. 32 European officials and surveyors found the environment in Mongalla 
very problematic in terms of moving around or mapping the country. They 
consistently complained about the high grass, thick bush and deep valleys, which 
made it extremely difficult to get a view, find any landmarks or "understand the lie 
of the land". 33 And their need to map and name was further confounded by their 
confusions over tribes and place-names. The response of administrators was not only 
to survey the landscape, but also to seek to re-order it. They imposed a variety of 
boundaries, international, provincial and district, and sought to define territorial 
units of administration, thus attempting, as in Tanganyika, to create "a new political 
geography". 34 Their success was limited however and confusions remained. In the 
1940s the central government requested the regulansation of court names for its 
maps of Equatoria, as it was still unclear whether they referred to chiefs, tribes or 
place names. 
As well as accumulating geographical knowledge, colonial officials also sought to 
gain local historical knowledge. Initially this meant constructing a version of the 
region's history which would justify their own presence and intervention. They 
emphasised the destructive effects of slave trading and Egyptian and Mahdist rule on 
a region which had forinerly been densely populated and prosperous. One official 
explained in 1906 that 'Dervish' raiding had left the Ban as, "a small remnant of 
their former strength". 35 The terrible experiences of preceding decades were also 
used to explain hostility or passive resistance, particularly by the Ban, towards 
government and foreigners, allowing the British to express patient and paternal 
32 Edney, Mapping, pp. 25-6. 
33 E. g. 'Extracts from a diary of El Bimbashi Mackenzie, Nile-Congo Railway Survey', SIR 154, June 
1907, PRO WO 106 229. 
34 Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 324 
35 Alwyn Jennings Bramly, 'The Bari Tribe', in AMN 1906, No. 65, p. 101. Such depictions remained 
prevalent, see in 1948: Ferguson, 'Equatoria Province', p. 914. 
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understanding for the traurnatised Africans. 36 They could claim that the 'tribal' 
structures of power had been destroyed, leaving a political void. This gave eark, 
administrators considerable leeway to construct new forms of authority more 
suitable for 'the modem world', which in turn fitted well with Wingate's approach 
to the aims of administration as being a simple establishment of good govemment, 
from which progress would then follow. 
Initially administrators in Mongalla had admitted that they were deliberately 
37 building up the authority of their chosen chiefs. However, from around 1910, it is 
possible to detect something of a shift in British thinking, as officials began to 
justify their reliance on these chiefs in terms of recovering and restoring 'tradition' 
and hereditary authority for people who were perceived to lack knowledge of their 
own history. 3 8This recovery of tradition was especially employed where there were 
no 'large' chiefs, as among the Bari of Rejaf District: "[i]t has been the endeavour of 
the Sudan Government to amalgamate these small communities under a few 
recognised chiefs, by finding out who were the most important in former times and 
actively supporting their present representatives. 39 'Finding out' such information 
was of course a less straightforward task than this statement suggests; the results 
would be shaped by the particular members of communities on whom the colonial 
administrators relied for such information, as later chapters will show. 
The use of dubious historical narratives to legitimise to any higher authorities the 
construction of chiefs by early administrators in Mongalla reflected the general 
hegemony of the local knowledge of the latter in the first two decades of the 
Condominium. There was no one who could question their version of events, and in 
the absence of any other articulate ideologies, their knowledge provided a useful 
justification for expedient and pragmatic methods of establishing colonial rule. 
36 See Governor-General Wingate's speech at Rejaf, 1911, NRO Cl 10/12 53 
37 Eg. GGR 1907. 
38 For comparison see Ififfe, Tanganyika, p. 322 
39 C. H. Stigand, Equatoria, The Lado Enclave (London, 1923), p. 42 
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2. Knowledge and Indirect Rule, c. 1918-38 
In Wingate's introduction to the first edition of Sudan Notes and Records in 1918, 
he admitted that "our knowledge of the country and its people requires to be 
extended in many directions", and he expressed hope that the new journal would "be 
the means of recording and disseminating infon-nation that will conduce to a clearer 
outlook on the country and a better understanding of its natives, their past historv, 
social conditions and future development". 40 This desire to accumulate a more 
centralised bank of knowledge in Sudan reflected wider trends in colonial 
governance, as Berry writes: 
After World War 1, colonial regimes across Africa moved to codify 
customary law and formalize the structures of indirect rule, in keeping with 
the general trend towards rationalization and professionalization of the 
colonial service. 41 
The confusions and variations of decentrallsed government led to the search for 
"common rules by which to interpret customary practices and apply them to the 
business of governance',. 42 Over the next decade and a half or more, the local 
knowledge previously valued for its particularity was increasingly gathered, 
recorded and transmitted in more systematic ways, and used to link local 
administrative practices to wider theories of colonial governance. 
2.1 Indirect Rule 
After the First World War, as Brown writes, "the focus of colonial interest moved 
from the acquisition to the maintenance of control, and the first stiMngs about 
'development' as a consciously induced policy began. ý43 In 1922, Frederick Lugard 
published his Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, which became the first 
handbook of colonial administration. It essentially ideallsed and theorised his own 
pragmatic use of the old emirs of the Sokoto Caliphate in Northern Nigeria as agents 
40 Wingate, Foreword to SNR 1, pp. 1-2. 
41 Berry, No Condition, p. 35 
42 
Berry, No Condition, p. 30. 
43 R. Brown, 'Anthropology and Colonial Rule: The Case of Godfrey NVilson and the Rhodes- 
Livingstone Institute, Northern Rhodesia', in T. Asad (ed), AnthropoloD, and the Colonial Encounter 
(London, 1973) pp. 173-97. 
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of colonial administration. He advocated "a single Government in which the native 
chiefs have well-defined duties and an acknowledged status equall", %vith British 
officials", and argued that all institutions and methods must be deep-rooted III the 
people's 'traditions and prejudices', unless the latter were 'repugnant' to Western 
- 44 morality. As Fields writes, 'direct rule' had in fact never existed; indirect rule was 
a legitimising theory which "aimed to give the present and future actions of the 
rulers consistency and order" . 
45 
Though advanced in idealistic terms, indirect rule was thus essentially a pragmatic 
system of government, which advocated detailed knowledge of local societies and 
institutions of authority. If anything it required a greater degree of power and deeper 
penetration of local societies in order to investigate and organise this information, 
46 revealing the ongoing centralisation by the colonial state . Similarly, though it 
rested on the claim that colonial rulers would act as mere advisors and supervisors to 
native authorities, the institutions created or utilised in indirect rule were in fact 
47 
more like channels than units of government . Chiefs, courts and councils were 
used as a means to communicate policy to the people and to extract information 
about them, so that they were often conduits in a system of, if anything, more direct 
rule by the colonial administrations. It was therefore a system designed to generate 
the production of knowledge to enable greater, not less, control by the colonial state. 
The Government of Sudan was one of the earliest to adopt indirect rule more 
formally as policy and ideology (though generally using the terms 'devolution' and 
later 'native administration'). The 1921 Milner mission had attributed the growth of 
the Sudanese nationalist movement to the failure of paternal British rule, and urged a 
greater promotion of traditional forms of authority, together with the development of 
education and modem councils. Governor-General Stack favoured this dual policy, 
but increasingly it was the development of traditional authority in the form of native 
" F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London, 1922). 
'5 Fields, Revii al, p. 4 1. 
46 See Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 325. See also Peter Pels, 'The PIdginization of Luguru Politics: 
Administrative Ethnography and the Paradoxes of Indirect Rule', Ainerican Ethnologist 23, no. 4 
(1996), pp. 73 8-6 1, at p. 74 1. 
47 This is a criticism made with specific reference to Lugard's own system, e. g. by I. F. Nicholson: 
see Helen Lackner, 'Social Anthropology and Indirect Rule. The Colonial Administration and 
Anthropology in Eastern Nigeria: 1920-1940', in Asad, AnthropoloD-, pp. 123-5 1, at p. 12S. 
55 
Chapter One: Knowing the. Vative 
chiefs which was prioritised. This was exacerbated after Stack's assassination in 
1924, which seemed to finally prove the untrustworthiness of not only Egýptians. 
but also educated Sudanese. 48 Most prominent among the advocates of Indirect rule 
was Reginald Davies, who believed that his experience in Kordofan fitted NN, ell with 
the Nigerian system. Opinion increasingly swung their way, culminating in the 1927 
memorandum by Governor-General Maffey rejecting dual policy by favouring 
devolution over bureaucracy, and urging the division of Sudan into 'compartments' 
within which traditional authority and tribal custom could be protected and 
utilised . 
49 The Powers of Sheikhs Ordinance of the same year, the Chiefs Courts 
Ordinance of 1931 for the south, and the 1932 Native Courts Ordinance for the north 
were designed to provide the formal recognition and enhancement of 'Native 
Administration'. 50 At the same time the 'Southern Policy' was formallsed in 1930, 
following on from the Closed District Ordinances of the 1920s, which excluded 
northern traders from the southern provinces, to protect perceived southern tribal 
systems from outside, particularly Islamic, corruption; the south was thus treated as 
a huge compartment in itself. 51 
2.2. Ethnography and Administration 
In practice, as will be seen in the next two chapters, this legislation did not so much 
mark a fundamental turning-point in policy as another step in a long process of 
incorporating the local authorities who had been relied upon since the beginning of 
the Condominium. But in terms of the relationship between knowledge and 
governance, the adoption of indirect rule as the ideology of the Sudan Government 
marked a more significant shift towards the formal research and recording of 
information as the means by which to mould the locally specific into the general 
template. As Maffey wrote of the Chiefs Courts Ordinance in 1931: "[s]ympathetic 
48 See CS to Governors, 20 Oct. 1924 and 6 Dec. 1924, NRO CS 50/2/10, for removal of mamurs and 
promotion of chiefs. For relations between Egypt and Britain, Egyptian nationalism and the expulsion 
of Egyptians from Sudan, and later negotiations over Independence, see Douglas H. Johnson, 
'Introduction', to the British Documents on the End ofEmpire Project (BDEEP), series B, vol. 5, 
Sudan (London, 1998). 
49 Minute by J. Maffey, I Jan. 1927, NRO CS 1/39/104; GGR 1926. 
50 GGR 1926. The term 'Native Administration' was adopted in the 1930s: Holt and Daly, A History, 
124. 
On Southern Policy see Johnson, 'Introduction' to BDEEP; Collins, Shadows, pp. 165 -96,249-66. 
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study of social organisation and tribal custom will in the course of time enable the 
provincial authorities to fit their local courts into the wide fi7amework provided b-, - 
the ordinance". 52 
Indirect rule also marked a shift from the 'local' to the 'tribal' as the ideal unit of 
administration. An intrinsic aspect of 'devolution' policy in the Sudan (as 
elsewhere), voiced by both Maffey and MacMichael, was the creation of "nicely 
balanced compartments", or "self-contained racial or tribal units". 53 t Tribal custom' 
should then be utilised to form barriers between these units, keeping out corrupting 
influences. The British thus sought to tidy up the political and social geography of 
Sudan to create a 'chequer-board' pattern which was more understandable and 
ordered. 54 
These were also the units within which knowledge was to be collected: "the study 
and interpretation of African custom was becoming institutionalised as part of the 
routine activity of colonial administration". 55 At the same time there was a growing 
belief that the accurate collection and organisation of such knowledge required not 
merely practical experience, but more specialist training. It was here that the 
emerging discipline of anthropology would become significant in the colonial 
project. In particular it concurred with the emphasis on tribal units, by treating each 
local society as "a distinct scientific specimen". 56 Indeed it was the need of colonial 
administrations for specific kinds of knowledge related to native authority, law etc., 
which stimulated the more functional approach of social anthropology under the 
leadership of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown. British African administrations 
57 increasingly began to employ trained anthropologists to conduct surveys . Often 
52 GGR 193 1. 
53 Minute by J. Maffey, 1 Jan. 1927, NRO CS 1/39/104 ; MacMichael, 'Memorandum on Southern 
Policy', enclosed in CS to Southern Governors, 25 Jan. 1930, appended in M. Abdel Rahirn, 
Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and Political Development 
1899-1956 (Oxford, 1969), pp. 244-9. 
54 Paul Nugent, 'Arbitrary Lines and the People's Minds: A Dissenting View on Colonial Boundaries 
in West Africa', in Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (eds), African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and 
Opportunities (London, 1996), pp. 39-40. 
55 Berry, No Condition, p. 3 1. 
56 Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, p. 136. 
57 Lackner, 'Social anthropology', p. 147; S. Feuchtwang, 'The Discipline and Its Sponsors', in Asad, 
Anthropology, pp. 71- 100, at p. 84. See also George W. Stocking (ed. ), Colonial Situations: Essays 
on the Contextualisation of Ethnographic Knowledge (Madison, 199 1). 
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this was to address a particular issue or problem: for example disturbances in 
Nigeria in 1929 led the Secretary of State for the Colonies to instigate a campal ng of 
58 
anthropological research there. In the 1930s, Lugard welcomed the 'modem school 
of Anthropology' and its research into "the social constitution, the beliefs and the 
methods of maintaining internal discipline in the tribes of Africa-, as providing 
"invaluable information and suggestions which the meagre cadre of officials in the 
earlier years had neither the training nor the time to acquire" . 
59 He, Margery Perham 
and Lord Hailey were the most influential links between colonial administration and 
anthropology, promoting the latter as essential to the successful implementation of 
indirect rule. 60 
The administration in Sudan was particularly receptive to the work of 
anthropologists, with a number of leading figures actively supporting it. In 1908 
Wingate had invited Oxford and Cambridge anthropologists to train SPS recruits, 
and in 1918 he further urged research into 'primitive tribesmen', as "contributing to 
that sympathetic comprehension of the people and their mentality which is so 
essential to a successful administrator". 6 1 The Seligmans carried out the earliest 
ethnographic research in the south, published in their huge Pagan Tribes of the 
Nilotic Sudan. Administrators themselves also undertook such research, published in 
many cases in Sudan Notes and Records. However, in 1929 MacMichael urged the 
employment of trained anthropologists, partly in response to the recent Nuer 
'troubles' which he blamed upon "the lack of expert knowledge", especially in the 
South; this resulted in the now-famous work by Seligman's student, Evans- 
Pritchard. 62 In 1938 Nadel was asked to research the Nuba, again a result of 
'pressing problems' there. 63 Anthropological methods of acquiring knowledge were 
thus increasingly valued by the colonial administration, above all because they 
appeared to offer a way to both 'sympathetically' understand specific societies, and 
to integrate them into wider theoretical frameworks. 
58 C. K. Meek, Law and Authority in a Nigerian Tribe: A Study in Indirect Rule, (London, 1937), 
M32. 
F. D. Lugard, Foreword to Meek, Law and Authority. 
60 Brown, 'Anthropology', p. 176. 
61 Wingate, Foreword to SNR 1, pp. 1-2; Feuchtwang, 'The Discipline', p. 82. 
62 Abdel Ghaffer M. Ahmed, 'Some Remarks from the Third World on Anthropology and 
Colonialism: the Sudan', in Asad, Anthropology, pp. 259-70, at p. 267. 
63 1 Faris, 'Pax Brittanica and the Sudan: SF Nadel', in Asad, AnthropoloD,, pp. 153-70, at p. 156. 
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2.3 Local Governance and Expert Knowledge 
Despite this marriage between anthropology and colonial administration, there -vN, ere 
tensions regarding the practical application or use of anthropological knowledge and 
theory. James shows that anthropologists such as Evans-Pritchard were often cnitical 
of administrative policies and attitudes for their ignorance and lack of understanding 
of native society and institutions. 64 In turn administrators could be sceptical or 
derisory towards anthropologists, particularly in response to such criticism. They 
could even view them as a threat, suspecting them (sometimes rightly) of radical 
tendencies and support for African nationalism. This led anthropologists to try to 
defend their work as neutral, detached and above all as scientific, producing 
knowledge that was of value to administrators: "[s]cience represented to the crude 
colonial mind a great achievement of the modem west, and the idea of its application 
to native peoples, as objects, was promising. " 65 Yet 'practical men' could, like P. E. 
Mitchell, provincial commissioner in Tanganyika and later Governor of Kenya, 
question the value of anthropological knowledge if it was that of a 'laboratory 
scientist', lacking implementable uses. 66 
In Sudan there were similar difficulties regarding the practical utilisation of 
anthropological knowledge. Evans-Pritchard complained in 1946 that neither he nor 
Seligman had ever been asked for advice on matters of administration or 
government policy, despite their extensive research in Sudan. 67 MacMichael, whilst 
promoting scientific expertise, also warned of the danger that anthropologists would 
"sink the practical in the recondite and lapse into over-elaboration". 68 In Mongalla 
Province, Evans-Pritchard was criticised by one D. C. for his methods in 1927 of 
acquiring 'confused and inaccurate' knowledge through 'unreliable' local 
informants, thus asserting the continuing belief that long service in one district 
produced the most accurate and useful knowledge. 69 The preference for practical 
experience in the earlier period thus continued alongside the ethnographic research 
64 W. James, 'The Anthropologist as Reluctant Imperialist', in Asad, Anthropology, pp. 41-69. 
65 James, 'The Anthropologist', p. 46. 
66 James, 'The Anthropologist', pp. 53-6. 
67 James, 'The Anthropologist', p. 48. 
68 Ahmed, 'Some Remarks', p. 268. 
69 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/140. 
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in the 1920s and 1930s; the practice of leaving the implementation of indirect rule to 
officials in the provinces and districts ensured that local specificities and pragmatism 
remained the main determinants of the shape and direction of adrninistration. -" This 
was still being reiterated in 1935, when the Khartoum Government Nvarried against 
allowing the substitution of "judgements by 'parrot' lawyers" for decisions based on 
"accurate local knowledge". 71 As Shadle shows in the case of Kenya, there Nvas a 
lasting aversion among British administrators to the rigid codification of customan. 
law and a preference for supervision of courts by district officers who "knew the 
African" . 
72 But the idealisation of 'local knowledge' was also a way of justifying the 
continuing authoritarian role of the British district administrator. As Badal writes, 
native administration and Southern Policy functioned essentially as an amalgam of 
direct and indirect rule in the 1930s, with a paramount D. C. relying on chiefs and 
elders for advice. 73 
In Mongalla Province, Native Administrations were formed on a local basis; the 
1920s saw the development by individual D. C. 's of chiefs' courts. In 1925 the three 
southern governors rejected any idea of regularising these: "as there is a 
considerable divergence in the way they are conducted, due mainly to different local 
conditions, no special legislation ... is at present desirable or necessary. 
, 74 During 
subsequent discussion of the Chiefs' Courts Ordinance, administrators voiced their 
concerns at any prospect of imposing uniformity or codification: 
A very large number of Chiefs' courts are already functioning in a 
satisfactory manner but under a great variety of conditions... It would be a 
thousand pities to impose upon these courts any cast-iron system or indeed 
any attempt at uniformity... the widest powers must be left to the Governor 
to sanction and, where necessary, to control all these varieties of Courts by 
75 
ad hoc regulations which can be easily modified. 
Governor Skrine drew on his observations of chiefs' courts in Uganda in 
formulating the Ordinance in the late 1920s, suggesting that the population there 
70 See Daly, Imperial Sudan, p. 29. 
71 CS to Governors, 25 June 1935, NRO EP I/l/3- 
72 Shadle, 'Changing Traditions', p. 413. 
73 Badal, Origins, p. 15. 
74 Southern Governors Meeting 1925, NRO MP 1/9/61. 
75 'Chiefs Courts Ordinance, explanatory note', 1930, NRO CS 1/ 13/42. 
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were "generally similar in race and mental outlook to the natiN, es of the Southern 
Sudan", thus reflecting the new use of wider theoretical knowledge. But it was being 
used to explain and justify the existing local developments, rather than to direct 
practice: "I should point out that the proposals made out are practically tantamount 
to regularising the system actually in force at present in this Province". 76 Skrine was 
a more vociferous proponent of wider indirect rule theories than his successor, 
Balfour, who was emphatic about the need to preserve local and tribal variation: -I 
think it is most important to keep the new Ordinance as elastic as possible and to 
confine it to legalising the judgements of Courts and laying down rules for guidance 
within the widest possible limits". 77 
The continuing preservation of local variations was also still the result of 
government self-awareness of its ignorance: "[v]ery great difficulty was expenenccd 
in finding out what native custom amongst the various tribes was: so wc gave up the 
idea of telling them what to do, and merely told certain chiefs to go and hold courts 
in their own way. 5ý78 In Mongalla Province, indirect rule proved as problematic and 
contradictory as it was anywhere. Administrators were saddled with the idea that the 
natural and traditional state for the population was to belong to tribes governed by 
tribal leaders and laws, and yet they were increasingly admitting that such a pattcrn 
was not visible in Mongalla. Identity and allegiance did not correspond to the ethnic 
groups identified and delimited. As Governor Nalder wrote of political organisation 
in 1935: 
Here lie our greatest difficulties and our greatest possibilities, we have no 
ready made unit (the shadowy conception of a tribe can hardly be called one) 
such as the Nigeria Emirates or the Uganda Kingdoms and we have to decide 
what we propose to create. 79 
Another administrator later recalled the difficulty of identifying an 'executlvc' 
authority around which to create Native Administration units: "Southern society did 
76 Governor Skrine to CS, 5 Jan. 1927, 'Proposals for Chiefs Court Ordinance', NRO CS l, '39/104. 
77 Governor Balfour to CS, 14 Dec. 1929, NRO CS 1/39/104. See also GGR 1933ý and (anon. ) 'The 
Future: Selection of Chiefs' (1935) in 'Juba District Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6: "it is impossible to 
lay down a hard and fast rule". 
78 Governor MP to Governor UNP, 7 Sept. 1932, 'Notes on native courts', NRO CS 1,12' 42. 
79 Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of Native Adrnmistration inMongalla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 
1/3 1) 110 5. 
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not work on those lines: tribal obedience was due to lineage heads, rain makers, land 
chiefs and so on". 80 
The paradox therefore arose that administrators had to try to construct the ver-', 
traditions and tribes upon which indirect rule relied, a problem which has been 
repeatedly identified by scholars. 81 By 1938, it was admitted, apparently with no 
sense of the irony, that chiefs had had to be taught their own customs: "[m]uch 
propaganda has been done... to educate the chiefs up to dealing fairly with their own 
people according to their own CUStOMS.,, 82 The 1931 Annual Report neatly 
encapsulated the value placed on ethnographic and historical knowledge, the limits 
and uncertainties of it, and the contradictory idea that custom could be rediscovered 
and constructed by the government: 
Deeper study of native institutions... has greatly added to our knowledge of 
the tribes. The disruptive effects of the changes of the past 100 years, slave 
traders, Egyptians, Dervishes, Belgians, Uganda, the advent of the present 
administration, and that of the missions, become increasingly apparent. To 
what extent the old tribal life can be rebuilt and remoulded is still 
uncertain. 83 
Administrators contradicted themselves and each other in trying to explain the basis 
of local authority. For example, Governor Nalder argued that the executive chief 
was an alien idea, and that early colonial chiefs were scapegoats or opportunists, and 
yet he also claimed that the chiefs by the 1930s mostly held 'hereditary or tribal 
claims' to their position. 84 There was a growing emphasis on chiefly families as the 
cnatural' rulers, and yet amalgamations and depositions bypassed some of these. 
85 
In the 1930s, partly in recognition of these confusions, Nalder made a determined 
effort to collect and order ethnographic and general information about the Province. 
The Seligmans had also been working on the former, but Nalder relied on responses 
from administrators and missionaries rather than professional anthropologists or 
80 Winder, 'Differences', 21. 
81 Ranger, 'Invention'; Spear, 'Neo-traditionallsm'; Iliffe, Tanganyika, pp. 323-41. 
82 EPAR 1938, NRO CS 57/25/103. 
83 GGR 1931. 
84 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Sununary of Infomiation', NRO CS 57 /3 5/13 1. 
85 See Pels, 'Pidginization', pp. 742-3 on British preference for hereditary succession. 
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ethnographers. His Tribal Survey and Province Handbook thus embody the 
continuing respect for the local experience and knowledge of the man on the spot, 
together with the developing desire to collect, categorise and transmit that 
knowledge . 
86 It also illustrates the way in which the resulting body of knoNN-ledge 
could be used to translate local administrative practice into more widely understood 
and respected theoretical templates. Nalder strongly subscribed to wider theories 
circulating in the 1930s about the need to preserve 'social solidarity' and 
community, because "the African has an instinctive and essential need of 
'membership"'. 87 He was particularly influenced by the Pyin report on taxation in 
East Africa, which warned that poll tax and resulting wage labour was having an 
individualising impact on society. 88 He therefore announced with excitement that the 
tribal survey had revealed the crucial importance of the clan in indigenous society, 
and that consequently taxation would become a collective tribute payment, to be 
worked out by clan elders. 89 History began to be reinterpreted to emphasise the clan: 
for example Yei district was reported to have "reverted to the indigenous method of 
democratic rule of pre-Belgium days, whereby clan leaders meeting in Council 
exercised jurisdiction over their clans". 90 
Yet the new focus on the 'clan' essentially reflected the absence of 'tribal' units, and 
the recognition by administrators that local authority was plural and varied: it was an 
attempt to come up with a more suitable model of native administration that would 
enable these variations to be encompassed and yet provide a 'system' for 
understanding them. There was confusion as to what exactly a 'clan' was, and in one 
or two districts it was claimed that "the structure of society was so destroyed 
between 1840 and 1900 that the family or clan group has virtually ceased to exist" 
and that a purely territorial village-like community would have to be 
fostered 
instead. 91 Nalder and other administrators were using these theories about clans to 
86 L F. Nalder, Equatorial Province Handbook, Vol. 1: Mongalla (Khartown, 1936); and Tribal 
Survey. 
87 Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of Native Administration in Mongalla', 
5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 
1/39/105. 
88 EPAR 1937, NRO CS 57/24/99; and 1938, NRO CS 57/25/103. 
89 Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of Native Administration in Mongalla', 
5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 
1/39/105; Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', NRO CS 
5 7/3 5/13 1. 
90 Liversidge to Governor, 28 Oct 1938, NRO EP 2/2/8. 
91 EPAR 1938, NRO CS 57/25/103. 
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create an ideology of rule, which camouflaged and idealised the continuing 
pragmatic reliance on native authorities with a wide variety of characteristics, 
methods and origins. The importance of hereditary chiefship also continued to be 
emphasised alongside the newer preoccupation with public opinion and collective 
forms of authority. As in Cameroon, the search by British administrators for new 
policies reflected the chronic uncertainties of 'indirect rule', which unintentional IN, 
also left more room for local authorities to develop in their own ways. 92 
92 Geschiere, 'Chiefs and Colonial Rule', pp. 160-3 
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3. Knowledge and Development, c. 1938-56 
Governor Nalder wrote after completing the Tribal Survey that, "it is no use 
acquiring knowledge unless it is put to use, and the hope is that it can now be made 
the starting point for estimating the lines along which the Native Administration will 
and should develop in this province". 93 Thanks to the word 'estimating', this was 
still a tentative statement, but it reflected a gradual shift in colonial thinking from the 
later 1930s towards viewing information and expertise as more functional and 
seeking to use them more actively and directly. Nalder's survey still elevated local 
knowledge and experience, but increasingly there was less state interest in such 
particularities. Instead there were efforts to lift this kind of knowledge out of its 
local compartment and reorganise it into departments of expertise, which could then 
be drawn upon to formulate more homogenous policies. As Margery Perham wrote 
in a 1946 draft of a handbook on Sudan: 
Govt. aware... of obscurity and variety of indigenous customs - that these 
must be understood before foundation of any genuine IR [Indirect Rule] can 
be laid, but that isolated and casual observations of DO will not suffice. 
Need for a) systematic study by all DCs, and b) help of trained 
anthropologists outside Govt. Importance of scientific method. 94 [My italics] 
As Lewis writes, this belief in the transformatory potential of technical and scientific 
knowledge, together with the growing international pressure to confer the benefits of 
modernity upon the colonised, resulted in a model of development in the colonies 
that was "profoundly state-centric" . 
95 
3.1 From Knowing the Native to Knowing Science 
In the foreword to Lord Hailey's 1938 African Survey, Lord Lothian explained that 
this compilation of information was designed to also contain a review of 
"the extent 
93 NaIder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of Native Administration in 
Mongalla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 
1/39/105. 
94 Perham, 'Native Administration Book, draft chapter on the South', 
RHL MSS Perham 542/5. 
95 Joanna Lewis, Empire State-Building: War and Welfare in 
Kenya, 1925-52 (Oxford. 2000), at p. 
19. 
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to which modem knowledge was being applied to African problems". " As Pearce 
writes, the survey, though still quite conservative in its recommendations, 
highlighted the growing belief that an al I-encompas sing 'African strategy' could be 
developed. 97 The Second World War then generated rapid socio-economic change, 
accelerating the growth of nationalistic politics, and forcing colonial governments to 
seek new justification for their rule, through promises of development. In addition 
by the end of the war the economic crisis faced by Britain, especially in terms of the 
98 balance-of-payments, forced a greater attempt to generate profit from the colonies. 
In 1940, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act was passed, providing funds for 
services, especially for urban workers. 99 But increasingly, with the rise of 
universalistic development economics, planning took on the aim of improving living 
standards more fundamentally through agricultural projects, education, housing and 
health provisions, local industries and so on-' 00 
Cooper argues that the development initiative involved the application of European 
expertise as never before: "[p]ostwar imperialism was the imperialism of 
knowledge". 101 Worby similarly argues that the gap between the production and 
actual use of knowledge closed in the 1940s. 102 But it also involved a shift in the 
kinds of knowledge being prioritised, as well as in the way that knowledge was 
used. The theories of the 1940s marked a fundamental move away from local 
specificities as a starting-point, towards a more teleological vision of an end-point. 
Africa was treated as a static and single object to be developed; Africans were to be 
reconstructed and their lives altered, as they were led from tradition to modernity 
with the aid of advanced Western science. 
' 03 This project involved not only an 
accelerated acquisition of knowledge, but also an increased emphasis on 
Perham's 
'scientific method'. Colonial governments were creating or expanding 
departments 
96 Foreword by Lord Lothian, to Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems arising in 
Aftica South of the Sahara (London, 1938). 
97 R. D. Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy 1938-48, (London, 
1982). 
98 Keith Jeffery, 'The Second World War', in Brown and Louis, The Twentieth 
Century, pp. 306-28, 
esp. pp. 323-7; David Killingray and Richard Rathbone, 
'Introduction', to their (eds. ), Africa and the 
Second World War (London, 1986), pp. 1- 19. 
99 Frederick Cooper, 'Modernising Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the 
Development Concept'. 
in Cooper and Packard, International Development, pp. 
64-92. 
'00 Lewis, Empire; Cooper, 'Moden-iising Bureaucrats'; Cooper and Packard, 
'Introduction'. 
101 Cooper, 'Modernising Bureaucrats', p. 64. 
102 Worby, 'Maps, Names', pp. 384-5. 
103 Cooper, 'Modernising Bureaucrats, p. 65; Cooper and Packard, 'Introduction', pp. 
17-19. 
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of technical expertise within which knowledge could be collected, organised and 
utilised, marking "a redirection from the district administrator who IcneNv Iiis 
natives' to the specialist who knew his science". 104 
District officials were thus being subsumed within a technocratic regime. 105 Van 
Beusekom and Hodgson similarly emphasise this shift towards bureaucracy and 
experts, together with the enlargement of scale of development inten, entions 
following the Colonial Development and Welfare Act: 
A related development was the newfound belief in the organizational and 
administrative abilities of bureaucracies to manage such large projects; the 
days of itinerant district officers haphazardly implementing small projects 
was long gone. Scientific and technical expertise was harnessed to the 
colonial mission through the enlargement or creation of government 
departments... The distinct duties and knowledge of administrators and 
technical experts were brought together through the formation of committees 
and the languages and procedures of planning. ' 06 
Knowledge was to be gathered and organised, and then used directly to formulate an 
overall strategy. Even anthropology, with its focus on the specificities and variations 
of culture and society, was harnessed to the overarching development project. In 
1944 Hailey called for greater government intervention in the economic and social 
life of indigenous communities, assisted by anthropologists. 
' 07 The Ethnographic 
Survey of Africa was launched in the same year by the International Aftican 
Institute in "recognition of the need for collating and making more generally 
available the wealth of existing but uncoordinated material on the ethnic groupings 
and social conditions of African peoples, particularly in connection with plans 
for 
economic and social development". Despite the "unsystematic nature of the 
available information", the Survey's aim was to "present a concise, critical and 
'04 Cooper and Packard, 'Introduction', p. 13. 
105 Worby, 'Maps, Names', p. 387. 
106 Monica M. Van Beusekom and Dorothy L Hodgson, 'Lessons Learned9 Development 
Experiences in the Late Colonial Period', JAH 41 (2000), 29-33. 
107 Feuchtwang, 'The Discipline', p. 87. 
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accurate account of our present knowledge". ' 08 It was unprecedented in terms of the 
standardised format of its volumes and the sections within them, reflecting the belief 
that compartments of knowledge could be created, within which peoples could be 
compared. 
The new development agenda also led to revisions in policies of govemance in 
British Africa. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Creech-Jones, called for 
46systematic arrangements for the compilation and exchange of information, 
including special studies of particular branches of local goverriment". 109 During the 
1930s the tensions and contradictions inherent in indirect rule had begun to generate 
criticism in Sudan and elsewhere. Its critics increasingly argued that Native 
Administration, under conservative European administrators, was preventing 
transformation and progress and instead seeking to preserve a static and backward 
version of Africa. As the rhetoric of development began to be wielded as a tool by 
African nationalists too, a younger generation in the Colonial Office, headed by 
Andrew Cohen, began to advocate rapid constitutional change in the direction of 
decolonisation. 110 Colonial policy therefore shifted gradually in favour of educated 
Africans and more representative politics. The aim of progress and 'modemisation' 
was thought nevertheless to be reallsed most promisingly through a continuing 
reliance on 'native institutions', albeit improved and enlightened ones. '' But the 
model changed in the mid-1940s from the authoritarian and individual 'tribal' units 
of indirect rule to an English 'Local Government' structure, with a greater emphasis 
on elected rural and municipal councils. ' 12 
Yet once again the rhetoric of govenunent policy could be illusory: devolution and 
Local Government masked the continuity of . institutions, and the ongoing expansion 
and centralisation of the state. " 3 'Development' increased central government 
'0' Daryll Forde, Foreword to G. W. B. Huntingford, The Ethnographic Sun-ej, of Africa: East 
Central Aftica, Part VI: The Northern Nilo-Hamites (London, 1953). 
'09 Pearce, The Turning Point, p. 150. 
'10 R. F. Holland, European Decolonisation 1918-1981: An Introductory, Survey, (London, 1985), p. 
66. 
111 Feuchtwang, 'The Discipline', pp. 91-4. 
112 Pearce, The Turning Point, p. 147. 
113 Lewis, Empire, esp. pp. 314-6; Killingray and Rathbone, 'Introduction', pp. 7,10-1 
L 
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intervention and functioned as a "framing device through which colonial regimes 
tried to respond to challenges and reassert control and legitimacy". ' 
This continuity is particularly apparent in the case of Sudan, where the Second 
World War was not a sudden turning point in government. The heydaN, of 
straightforward support for indirect rule theory was already over by 1935 when 
Governor-General Symes led the criticism of present policy as aiming at a 
4stationary condition': "[w]e must be builders, not mere caretakers". ' 15 He promoted 
a policy of 'functional dilution' in recognition of the need for educated Sudanese to 
play a role in administration, especially in 'sophisticated areas'. Fears of Egyptian 
influence or Mahdist revivalism also led to efforts to accommodate the educated and 
politicised Sudanese, fostering the creation of the Graduates' General Congress in 
1938.1 16 The 1937 Local Government Ordinances marked the beginning of attempts 
to regularise native administration in both rural and urban areas, and from 1942 
councils with executive powers began to be created. In 1944 the first advisory 
province councils were formed, as was the Advisory Council of Northern Sudan. 
The 1949 report on local government in Sudan by Dr Marshall was critical of the 
patchy and limited development of local authorities, especially in the south, and his 
recommendations were implemented in the 1951 Local Government Ordinance, 
which established a more uniform system of warranted councils. However, this was 
once again not so much a radical change in the practice of local government, as the 
formalisation of existing trends and the adaptation of earlier institutions: 
The apparent changes of the 1940s in local administration can be seen 
merely as the latest manifestation of the uncertain desire in certain 
governmental quarters for decentralisation, and the latest way to 
accommodate the educated in governmental structures, rather than either as 
some grand departure or natural evolution from previous policy. 
117 
1" Cooper and Packard, 'Introduction', p. 18. 
115 Governor-General Symes to Nalder, Erkowit, 23 March 1935, NRO CS 1/39/105. 
116 Daly, Imperial Sudan, p. 82. 
H7 Chris M. Vaughan, 'The'Great Experiment': Conciliar Local Administration in Late Colonial 
Sudan, c. 1942-1956', M. A. thesis, University of Durham, 2003, p. 9. 
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3.2 The Application ofKnowledge 
In Mongalla Province, the significance of changing government policy in the 194(is 
and 1950s did not lie in the fundamental transformation of institutions or units of 
native administration, but rather in the changing knowledge relationship between 
local government and central departments, as development became the driving 
ideology of the state. This relationship was explained by Marshall in 1949 in terms 
of- 
the impossibility of giving the technical central departments - agriculture, 
education, veterinary etc., elaborate local organisations of their own. They 
must rely upon some generalised local machinery... the central departments 
should continuously place at the disposal of the local authorities expert 
knowledge and the experience of other local authorities. 1 18 
Southern councils, as the head of the Local Govenu-nent Department emphasised, 
were still ultimately where "the professional knowledge, experience and training of 
D. C. 's" was combined with "the leadership, pride and local knowledge of the local 
people". 119 This was always the basic system of colonial governance in Sudan; it 
was a system of pragmatic decentralisation together with steadily increasing 
centralised control through the D. C. 120 But local knowledge was no longer seen to be 
sufficient; it required integration and improvement by central government 
departments of expertise. Native Administration had worked, in the view of 
Marshall and others, for implementing tasks "for which an intimate knowledge of 
tribal life was the main requisite"; it was not considered suitable as it stood for the 
provision of technical services such as education and agriculture. 121 
Daly argues that the British administrators in Sudan hindered development, 
especially in the south, due to their conservative preference for the rural Sudan and 
"8A. H. Marshall, Report on Local Government in the Sudan (1949), pp. 4,16. 
119 LM Buchanan, 'Local Government in the South', (1953) SAD 797/1/51- 
120 E. g. in Upper Nile, plans for Nuer confederacy in the 1940s, with the professed intention of 
devolving legislative powers to councils, entailed the referral of all legislative rulings initially to the 
committee of Nuer district D. C. 's, a committee formed to regularise Nuer law and administration: 
D. 
H. Johnson, 'Judicial Regulation and Administrative Control: Customary Law and the Nuer. 1898- 
1954', JAH 27 (1986), pp. 59-78, at p. 75. 
121 Marshall, Report, pp. 6,44. 
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their deliberate isolation from the rest of the colonial world; only the Civil Secretary, 
Newbold, stood out "for trying to acquaint himself xvith wider colonial thinking and 
practice and applying that knowledge in Sudan". ' 22 Yet this conservatism was also a 
reflection of old tensions between the locally specific and the wider theories, and the 
attempts or failures of administrators in the districts to integrate the two. In fact by 
the 1940s, even in southern Sudan, the local knowledge of administrators was 
increasingly being subsumed by the attempts to impose regulansed structures and 
systems, and by the increase of expert departments and personnel. 
This trend can be seen, for example, in relation to law and local government. Where 
in the 1920s and early '30s administrators had resisted any efforts to impose 
uniformity, by 1937 the Local Government Regulations were passed to consolidate 
Native Administration and to "coalesce in one body of local government law the 
heterogeneous sets of regulations made by governors". 123 And by the 1950s, a Law 
Commission had reorganised the Laws of the Sudan into eleven smaller volumes, 
with the aim of "collecting as far as possible in each volume all, and no more than 
all, the legislation likely to be required by any particular Government Department or 
other person or body". 124 Thus where much government administrative law had been 
formed on a provincial basis, it was now being organised by department, reflecting 
the new compartments of knowledge. 
As well as pushing the consolidation of existing laws and pradtices, the various 
Local Government regulations were also significant in making territoriality the basis 
of local administration. 125 This in turn reflected the difficulties described above in 
identifying suitable group definitions in a region such as Western Mongalla, where 
native authority units did not correspond to any one criteria such as ethnicity, clan or 
village, but had grown up on an ad hoc basis in different 
districts. This was 
increasingly unacceptable to governments seeking a uniform pattern upon which to 
build a regularised hierarchy of administration on the English model. 
Where, under 
the indirect rule model, knowledge could be gathered and utilised within individual 
122 Daly, Imperial Sudan, pp. 29,255. 
123 GGR 1938. 
124 Sir Charles Cummings for the Laws Commission, The Laws of the Sudan (London, 
1956). 
125 Holt and Daly, A History, p. 124. 
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units, now it should be extrapolated to generate uniform structures through which 
development could be directed. The metaphor of building was used not onlý- bý, 
Symes but also by Parr, whose Governorship of Equatoria from 1936-42 bridged the 
transition towards ideas of more regularised Native Administration. Parr was a finn 
believer in the principles of indirect rule, but he also sought to create more uniform 
practice within the Province. For example, in relation to financial devolution: 
I think we should take steps to see that our informal procedure... is put on a 
proper basis. For instance all districts could arrange for direct taxes to be 
collected by Native Administration, also for court fees and fines to be 
retained and all routine payments to Native Administration personnel could 
be made and accounted for by individual B courts [appellate courts 
composed of around six chiefs]. 
His letter was cautious with regard to the development of councils, again advocating 
greater regularisation. of existing institutions first: 
[T]here are I think certain things to be done preliminary even to the 
formation of a council, namely the proper organisation of the village units 
composing each chiefship... In other words we must make sure that the 
bricks of Native Administration are properly prepared before we can start 
building a (considerable) edifice. ' 26 
D. C. 's were therefore working towards the formalisation of such units; the Yel D. C. 
in 1939, for example, began the replacement of 'capricious' and 'uncoordinated' 
lists of population held by chiefs with "one comprehensive register", in order to 
impart 'cohesion'. 127 Such enumerative knowledge was significant in India too, as 
Cohn shows: it categorised and ordered the population, thus increasing the sense of 
power and control of administrators. 128 
By the 1940s, these units were increasingly being described as territorial rather than 
clan, family or tribal: "we are rapidly passing over the stage of tribal organisation to 
territorial and Local Government administration". 129 Yet the units were essentially 
126 Parr to CS, 7 April 1938, NRO EP 2/2/8. 
127 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb 1939, NRO EP 2J2/8. 
128 Cohn, Colonialism, p. 8. 
129 Governor Skeet, 'Notes based on Parr's handing over note to Skeet of 1943', May 1945, NRO DK 
57/1/1; Skeet to DC's and CS, 'Note on Southern Policy', 10 Sept. 1943, NRO EP 1/1! 2. 
72 
Chapter One: Knowing the Aative 
the same as those of Native Administration; territoriality simply provided the latest 
convenient concept by which to describe them and to convey an impression of 
uniformity and order. 130 The structure was therefore not radically changed, but the 
pressure for uniformity began to permeate more into the alms of policy in the 
Province. In 1945, the Moru D. C., Keen, detailed the increasing use of the three B 
courts as "embryo local District councils" but explained that their value was still 
limited, because "decisions taken are ad hoc and not embodied in any code of rules, 
procedures and orders such as the Zande Red Book. 9913 1 Three years later, Governor 
Marwood similarly complained at the unbureaucratic nature of such institutions: "at 
present there is next to no staff available for running really authentic local 
Govt. 9s 99 
. 
132 
Much of the pressure to regularise local government in Southern Sudan was coming 
from the Khartoum and British Govemments by the mid-1940s, as the Civil 
Secretary, Newbold, emphasised: 
[A] policy of more intensive and rapid economic and educational 
development of the Southern Sudan was desirable and should now be 
planned and executed... We have a moral obligation to redeem its 
inhabitants from ignorance, superstition, poverty, malnutrition etc... Lastly I 
must stress that, apart from moral or economic reasons, there are strong 
political reasons to adopt a more positive policy in the South. The eyes of 
Egypt and of the Northern Sudanese are on the South, and our Southern 
Policy (or lack of policy) has been heavily criticised both in Cairo and 
Omdurman. ' 33 
In 1942, Governor Parr argued that the route to development and a higher standard 
of living in the Province lay in "a policy of autarky"; six years later, however, 
Governor Marwood emphasised that "[t]he idea of complete autarky and keeping the 
north at arm's length is dead". 134 By 1948, the future of the south had been decided 
as lying with the north, and efforts were being made to integrate the southern 
130 Vaughan, 'Great Experiment', p. 16. 
131 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
132 Marwood, 'Notes for Mr Nicholson', 20-25 April 1948, NRO DK 57/1 /1. 
133 Newbold to Council, 3 April 1944, NRO EP I/l/2- 
134 Parr, 'Note for Mr Skeet', 20-30 Aug. 1942, NRO DK 57/1/1; and Marwood, 'Notes for Mr 
Nicholson', 20-25 April 1948, NRO DK 57/l/l. 
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provinces, as well as the rest of Sudan, into more uniform patterns of government 
and development. 
There was therefore a growing emphasis on cohesion and on the role of D. C. 's in 
particular in achieving this; by the 1950s one of the neNv 'Local Governinent 
inspectors' argued that only the D. C. could "know the law, be fully in touch with 
central government PoliCY5,5.135 Annual reports, monthly diaries and district reports 
required detailed sections on food and cash crops, weather, public health and 
medicine, well and road building, trade, herds and veterinary medicine, erosion and 
soil fertility, forestry and so on. The proliferation of specialist departments to 
employ experts in these fields did not remove the need for D. C. 's to be able to 
converse on a wide range of such topics. However, increasingly they were also 
acting as the point-men for qualified specialists; for example the 1937 Equatona 
Annual Report began by welcoming the visits of a substantial number of 'experts' to 
the province, including a soil scientist, a soil chemist, an economic botanist, an 
agricultural researcher and a number of medical doctors or researchers. In addition, 
"[m]uch literature has also been received detailing the dangers to which this area is 
liable, soil impoverishment, soil erosion, dessication, over-stocking, forest and grass 
fires, malnutrition. " 136 Conservation was one of the principal justifications for 
increasing government interventions in the lives of Africans in the 1940s and 1950s; 
it also embodied some of the disparities in knowledge and priorities between 
administrators and experts, as Chapter Four will further discuss. 137 
Another area of disagreement was that of education. The Mongalla Province 
Government had left educational provision largely to the Christian missionaries, and 
intervened only to warn them to ensure that the curriculum was suitable for Afficans 
rather than disruptive of community life. 138 Such concerns had persisted, and 
administrators had referred, for example, to the Phelps-Stokes commission in East 
135 McComas, 'Memorandum on Local Government', 11 Jan. 1954, SAD 798/ L'4. 
136 EPAR 1937, NRO CS 57/24/99. 
137 See David Anderson, 'Depression, Dust Bowl, Demography and Drought: The Colonial State and 
Soil Conservation in East Africa During the 1930s', AfTican Affairs 83 (1984), pp. 321-43; NI. Leach 
and R. Mearns, 'Environmental Change and Policy', in their (eds. 
), The Lie of the Land. - Challenging 
Received Wisdom on the Afi-ican Environment (London, 1996), Ch. 1. 
138 EPAR 1937, NRO CS 57/24/99; Hillelson, 'Report on education in Mongalla Province', 22 April 
1922, NRO CS 17/1/2. 
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Africa, which emphasised the need for education to make pupils "useful members in 
their own community life". 139 In 1939, Parr referred to Elspeth Huxley's book on the 
Kikuyu, Red Strangers, to emphasise the importance of preserving "the bonds of 
family and community life" in the face of the potentially "alien and disruptive force" 
of education. 140 As late as 1947-8, administrators were urging the continuing 
necessity of 'protecting' the Southern Sudanese from too much education or 
influence from the north: "it is not customary to expose immature seedlings to the 
fierce rays of a tropical sun". 14 1 But in 1946 a five-year education development plan 
had been drawn up for the south, as it also became clear that both economic and 
political development required a redirection and expansion of educational 
provisions. 142 Thus the protection for the local autonomy of mission education was 
swept away as part of the centralisation and integration of knowledge for 
development. 
"9 Cited in Iliffe, Tanganyika, p. 338. 
140 Governor Parr to Heads of Missions ,8 Nov. 
1939, NRO EP 1/4/17- 
141 Governor Marwood to CS, 2 Jan. 1947, NRO EP 1/10/52. e 142 EPAR 1946, NRO DK 57/10/32; Collins, Shadows, pp. 
231-46; Sanderson and Sand rson 
Education, pp. 256-90. 
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Conclusion 
Throughout the Condominium, the Sudan Government struggled ývlth the need for 
delegation of functions in order to effectively implement administration in diverse 
local areas using a limited number of direct government officers; and its o, *%, n 
centralising momentum to gather and apply knowledge, and to control, exploit and 
develop, based on a Western model of scientific expertise and modernising progress. 
In Mongalla Province, the units of local government grew up haphazardly, and, as 
will be seen, were often shaped by local people more than by the state, but they xN, ere 
conceptually framed within different templates over the Condominium. Those 
templates were in turn the reflection of changing notions of knowledge, from a 
grassroots-driven, experientially-based pragmatism; to an accumulation for the 
purposes of illumination and translation; to a central ly-dri ven re-ordering through 
universal scientific expertise. It was this process of transforming concepts of 
knowledge into the motive and means for central state control which drove changing 
rhetorical systems of local government. It was a process which led ultimately to the 
subsuming of local knowledge to wider categories of expertise, which in turn 
legitimated subordination. According to Spivak, colonial rule involved an 'epistemic 
violence', in which the knowledges of the colonised were subsumed by the 
hegemonic modernising world-view of the colonisers. 143 But the colonisers 
themselves were not a monolithic unanimous body, and the responses of local 
communities to the centralisation of knowledge by the colonial state were more 
complex, and their own knowledge systems more resilient, than Spivak suggests, as 
the rest of the thesis will show. 
143 Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak? ' 
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Knowing the Foreigner: 
The Emergence of the Government Chiefs, c. 1841-1920 
Introduction 
This chapter will trace some of the changes in the nature and basis of authoritv in 
Western Mongalla that occurred between around 1841 and 1920, as a result of the 
interventions of foreign traders and 'governments'. It is also possible to see 
significant continuity which distinguished this period from the years after 1920. It 
was characterised by a substantial degree of violence in the form of wartare and 
raiding, and by the extractive nature of foreign interventions. Local communities, 
particularly along the Nile, were responsive to the opportunities and goods offered 
by trade and employment; trade goods and foreign influences had long been sought 
after in the region. But in the face of the often threatening foreign incursions, they 
also needed to adapt their structures and methods for protecting themselves. The 
difficulties presented by the activities of ivory and slave traders, the soldiers of the 
Turco-Egyptian and Mahdist governments, and later the Belgian and British colonial 
administrators, demanded new skills and strategies: military, economic and 
diplomatic. In turn this generated new kinds of wealth, status and power. This is not 
simply the story of opportunistic individuals gaining power by manipulating 
changing circumstances, but also of communities recognising the value of certain 
kinds of knowledge and leadership. The result of both processes was the emergence 
of the 'chief of the foreigners'. 
This region provides a distinctive model of the political economy compared to other 
models put forward for east and central Africa. Firstly, the idea of 'wealth-in- 
people', though relevant here, is only part of the story. Guyer and Belinga suggest 
that patrons in Affica have generally sought to collect followers or allies witil 
multiple forms of knowledge in order to maximise potential solutions to problematic 
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situations. ' But while their angle on this subject is top-domM, communities also 
sought 'owners' of suitable knowledge to perform certain functions. Secondly, the 
expansion of commodity and slave trades in nineteenth century Africa has been 
shown to have had a profound impact on the political economies of many regions, 
by offering new opportunities for individuals to gain wealth and power through their 
2 control of military and luxury goods. In Western Mongalla, commoditisation did 
not occur to this extent; new trade goods and guns were brought into the region, but 
did not fundamentally shape the political economy. The ivory and slave trades 
ensured that military power was more important than wealth in commodities, though 
the latter did come to symbolise prestige. And that military power was based less on 
the possession of new weapons than on the ability to mediate with external coercive 
force (traders, soldiers and governments), and thus to attract followers with the 
promise of protection. 
The only detailed history of political power in this region is Simonse's subtle and 
complex study of kingship among the peoples east of the Nile, which offers insights 
into the antagonistic relationship between people and rain-king, the dualistic balance 
of power held between them through the mutual threat of violence, and the way in 
which the scapegoat king nevertheless acted as a centralist force of community unity 
and identity. However, he suggests that by the later nineteenth century, especially 
among the Ban, this balance had been lost, and new 'chiefs' had gained power at the 
expense of both rain-kings and people. He thus concurs in this sense with Vansina's 
argument that the colonial period heralded the destruction of political traditions in 
Central Africa. Simonse also argues, following Sahlins' model, for a distinction 
between the power of the rain-kings, which was ascribed, and that of 'Big Men', 
which was acquired by individual endeavour. 3 
1 Guyer, and Belinga, 'Wealth in People'. 
2 Jonathon Glassman, Feasts and Riot: Revelry, Rebellion and Popular Consciousness on the Sivahili 
Coast, 1856-1888 (Portsmouth, NH, 1995); James L. Giblin: 'The Precolonial Politics of Disease 
Control in the Lowlands of Northeast Tanzania', in Gregory Maddox, James L. Giblin and Isaria N. 
Kimambo (eds), Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania (London 
1996) pp. 127-5 1; Lonsdale, 'The Conquest State', pp. 22-25; Ambler, Kenyan Communities, pp. 
102-5. 
3 Simonse, Kings; Vansina, Paths, pp. 245-8: "The equatorial tradition finally died in the 1920s". See 
also Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', p. 200: the "catastrophic impact" of the 'contact period' 
had 
"broken decisively the traditions of the past" in West Nile, Uganda. 
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This chapter does not intend to question Simonse's depiction of the scapegoat-king. 
However, it does argue that there was greater continuity and adaptation of elements 
of this institution, and others, beyond the mid-nineteenth century. Chiefs were a new 
institution of authority, but this did not preclude the transfer to them of aspects of 
the political tradition, including the shifting balance of power between people and 
king. Chiefs emerged from a variety of origins, and thus the extent of their authon'tv 
and status within their communities varied. But more important was their role in 
external relations; they became the gatekeepers of their communities, managing 
relations with outsiders. This was a role that they might have acquired themselves in 
the hope of personal advantage, but it was also a ftinction ascribed to them by their 
people, in recognition of their abilities and in the hope that they would minimise the 
extractive impact of the foreigners. By the end of the period the 'foreigner's chief' 
had become a largely hereditary position, with knowledge embodied in the chiefly 
families. The chiefs had also gained a degree of coercive power, but this was the 
result of a moral compact made between them and their communities. Thus the 
distinction made by Sinionse between kings and Big Men, in ternis of ascribed or 
acquired power, is blurred. 4 
As well as requiring certain kinds of knowledge, chiefship was also about being 
known, reflecting the reciprocal relationship between knowledge and recognition 
that was intrinsic to authority. In selecting chiefs, communities are said to have 
relied on the fact of candidates having been known, observed and evaluated since 
childhood. It was thus not enough to possess expertise, abilities or qualities; these 
had to be displayed in order to earn recognition from people. At the same time, the 
'foreigners' chief had to be recognised by the foreign visitors. While initially this 
might have happened accidentally or mistakenly, individuals soon adopted symbols 
which had meaning to the foreigners, as well as to their own communities; hence the 
significance of the new commodity goods. And the foreigners were easily 
4 Mair also argues that pre-colonial authority was both ascribed and acquired, and th i 
at followings 
could be built up only by the ability to reward and protect. Tentatively she relates this to 
knowledge, 
"Possibly this can be thought of as the possession of a special skill": Lucy Mair, 'New Elites in East 
and West Africa', in Victor Turner (ed. ), Colonialism in Afi-ica, Vol. 3, Profiles of Change. -Affican 
Society and Colonial Rule (Cambridge, 197 1) pp. 167-92, at p. 167. 
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convinced, preconditioned as they were to seek out the 'chief sheikh,. 5 The result 
was that the foreigner's chiefs - known to both foreigners and their own people - 
came to dwell on the boundary or interface between the internal and external xN-orlds 
of their communities. 
In this period, the foreigners' knowledge tended to begin and end with the name of 
the chief-, even the extent of his authority was uncertain. A recurrent motif in the 
evidence is the idea of a 'scapegoat' or 'false' chief, pushed forward to talk to the 
foreigners. This reflects a number of important points. Firstly, authority in Western 
Mongalla was multiple and diversified, so that the person dealing with the foreigners 
might not be the only leader of a community. Secondly, there was a popular 
awareness of the vulnerability, as well as opportunity, inherent in being recognised 
as chief And finally, an appearance of weakness on the part of the chiefs could be a 
useful strategy for deflecting the demands of the turuk. 
5 E. g. 'Extracts from report by Bimb. Headlam of tour from 
Mvolo to Lado Enclave Frontier', SIR 
166, May 1908, PRO WO 106 23 1. In this period, the British used the northern Sudanese titles of 
'sheikh', 'sultan' and 'wakil' interchangeably with 'chief' and 'headman'. 
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1. Rain, Trade and Guns: Changing Authority in the Nineteenth 
Century 
LI Migration and Patronage 
A member of the expedition on behalf of the Egyptian Khedive in 1841, Weme, 
provided one of the earliest accounts of the political economy of Western Mongalla. 
He described meeting the 'King' of the Bari, Logunu, a member of the line of rain 
kings analysed by Simonse, and revealed the extent of trade in the region. The Bari 
exchanged iron for cloth and beads from the east and south, with nearby Lafon Hill 
6 acting as a centre of trade stretching as far as Ethiopia and Bunyoro. Despite the 
subsequent depiction by Europeans of the region as part of the remote and primitive 
heart of Africa, it was thus already engaged in networks of long-distance trade. 
'Foreign' goods and influences were esteemed, as reflected in Logunu's wearing of 
coloured cloth, and the interest shown in the 1841 expedition. Similarly an 
interviewee's account of chiefship in nearby Tokiman emphasises its foreign 
connections: 
It came from a strong man called Magara. This Magara was supposed to 
come from the Ethiopian side... maybe that is why he was strong because he 
brought arms. The main source of arms at that time was from there... He also 
brought a lot of cattle. 7 
Wealth and military strength were generated by, and generated, followers; 'wealth in 
people' was as crucial here as elsewhere in pre-colonial Africa. For example, 
Logunu was reported to visit the Mandari area annually in person to exchange his 
iron for slaves, to use in turn for iron-working. 8 There are Lokoiya traditions of an 
ancestral leader whose followers cultivated extensively, so that even the Bari came 
to get food from him. 9 Simonse focuses on the role of violence in, and the more 
abstract meanings of, the relationship between leaders and people, but a reciprocal 
' Simonse, Kings, p. 45; Ferdinand Weme, Expedition to Discover the Sources of the White Nile, in 
the Years 1840,1841, translated by C. W. O'Reilly (London, 1849) Vol. 1, pp. 338-9. 
7 Interview with Serafmo Wani Swaka, Khartourn, 23 Feb. 2003. 
8 Weme, Expedition, Vol. 2, p. 123. 
9 Interview with Severino Mati, Khartourn, 27 Jan. 2003. 
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balance was also maintained in a more practical sense by their mutual dependence. 
The ability to move and migrate might allow a leader to break away and found a 
new group, thus establishing his own political power, but it also created a sanction 
which people could use to limit the power of a leader and to enforce his obligations 
of patronage towards them. ' 0 
Histories of group origins frequently remember an ancestor who came from abroad, 
usually the east, or from a spiritual plane above. Such histories usually centre on 
'clan' rather than ethnic origins; in fact ethnicity seems to have been linked to place 
rather than lineage, with stories of people moving from Lugbara to Nyangwara to 
Mandari, and a 'tribe' like the Mandari being made up of various groups of 
immigrants to a particular territory. " A sense of movement was intrinsic to local 
traditions, as was the idea of newcomers or foreigners bringing valuable new skills 
or resources. Thus the 'internal frontier', as Kopytoff puts it, was crucial in the 
construction of societies and their political culture. 12 His model may be over- 
simplified, however, especially in the case of an area like Western Mongalla where 
population movements were complex. Stories of migration represented the 
'distillation' of the historical experiences of 'piecemeal' migration and settlement. 13 
They were also more significant as a way of explaining and maintaining the current 
social order, as later chapters will show. Thus subservient groups within a 
community were understood to be either original inhabitants who had been defeated, 
or the descendents of immigrants who came without resources or kin of their own; 
whereas more dominant sections were generally understood to be migrants who had 
brought new skills and resources with them. For example, the elite 'clan' of rain 
priests and later chiefs on the Kajo Kaji plateau in the early 1900s were said to have 
arrived in the area bringing cattle and rain powers, so that they were welcomed and 
given land by the existing inhabitants, and became the political rulers. 
14 
10 See also Hanson, Landed Obligation, pp. 6-7,17-19. 
11 See Buxton, Chiefs, pp. 18-19,32-3. 
12 Kopytoff, 'The Internal', pp. 3-84. For examples of migration stories in Western Mongalla see 
Beaton, 'A short history of Liria', 'A short history of the Luluba Hills', and 'A 
Short History of 
Ngangala' (c. 1934), NRO JI) I/l/2. 
13 Johnson, Nuer Prophets, pp. 50-5 1. 
14 Stigand, Inspector Rejaf, to Governor, 6 March 1911, NRO IN 2/29/239; Interview with 
Barnaba 
Durno Wani, Khartoum, 17 Feb. 2003. 
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The idea of 'clans' was tied up with these ways of explaining relationships. " 
Dominant sections were understood to have begun as coherent kin-groups, to which 
'clients', 'serfs' or even 'slaves' attached themselves. As Chapter One showed, 
Europeans would later be confused by the nature of social formation and kinship, 
often assuming that the clans were defined by blood relationship. But kinship NN, as an 
idiom for describing social relations; clans were defined as much by territory and 
land as by bloodlines. ' 6A clan seems to have been essentially a socio-economic 
unit, within and between which resources were managed, allocated and exchanged 
(though not corporately 'owned'), and relationships of inequality, specialisation and 
reciprocity maintained. Thus certain 'clans' were associated with a specialised 
livelihood such as fishing, hunting or ironworking; but these specialists were also 
recruited or captured by other clans eager to expand their 'wealth in knowledge'. " 
There was also a division within a clan between land- and cattle-owners and poorer 
dependents. These divisions in turn regulated marriage and the accumulation of 
female labour and reproduction, explaining why cattle as the means of exchange for 
marriage remained the most important form of wealth. Taboos on marriages within 
clans or across their internal divisions were partly a means of ensunng that the more 
marginalized sections remained dependent on the elites for the means to marry. 
Clans were not static units, but continued to divide and coalesce. They also did not 
define political or moral communities, though they contributed to debates within 
them. As Tosh writes of pre-colonial Lango, "[t]he political community typically 
comprised several clan sections, bound together by ties of neighbourhood and 
marriage rather than a common clan identity". 18 Members of these communities also 
belonged to wider networks and alliances, including the spheres of influence of rain 
and earth priests or the followings of military leaders. 
15 Evidence on clans is taken mainly from Beaton, 'The Bari'; Huntingford, Ethnographic Sun-e , 1" P. 
46; Beaton, 'Land Tenure among the Luluba and Oxoriok', 22 May 1934, NRO JD 1/1/2; G. 0, 
Whitehead, 'Suppressed Classes among the Bari and Bari-Speaking Tribes', SNR 34, no. 2 (1953), 
pp. 265-80; and 'Social Change among the Bari', SNR 12, no. 1 (1929), pp. 91-97; 
Ernest B. Haddon, 
'System of Chieftainship Amongst the Bari of Uganda', JRAS 10, no. 40 (1911), pp. 467-72. 
16 See also Pels, 'Pidginization', pp. 744-5. 
17 Interview with Chief James Josea Ramadalla, 31 Aug. 2004, Yei: "to have a clan you must 
have 
these people... attackers will try to capture them". See also Guyer and 
Belinga, 'Wealth in People', 
F? 115-6. ýosh, Clan Leaders, p. 242. 
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1.2 Knowing the Rain 
The political economy at the time of the 1841 expedition was expressed through 
rain. Rain was firstly a vital resource and thus the most important obligation of a 
leader, given in return for tribute and status. Gaining a monopoly over control of 
rain was an important route to, or result of, political power; the Bari rain chiefs 
benefited from their home in the Belinian and Sindiru. hills through the increased 
likelihood of rain falling there, as well as from the deposits of iron. Secondly, rain 
was an idiom used to express power, including that derived from spiritual 
connections; rain was believed to come from the divine through chiefs or priests. It 
therefore demonstrated their spiritual and moral authority. The combination of such 
authority with political, military and economic power is emphasised in oral histories 
of pre-colonial leaders throughout this region. The ability to control rain was an 
aspect of political power, but it also entailed a burden of moral obligations, and thus 
encapsulates the flow of power and divine blessing between leaders and people-19 
More will be said in a later chapter on the significance of rain as an expression of the 
internal peace of communities; for now it is important to note that it was the basis 
for measuring the legitimacy of a leader. When 'kings' or chiefs were killed 
collectively by their people for failing to provide rain, they were being removed for 
failing to meet the needs of their community. 
Rain and knowledge were also intrinsically linked. One ancestral Bari rain-king had 
a name meaning 'he knows all and everything'. 20 The Bari were later reported to 
distinguish between "those who know water" and the rest of the community; in 
theory it was the former who would have held political power before the mid- 
nineteenth century. 2' However, knowledge and power were also expressed through 
cownership' of other aspects of the economy and ecology, such as land/soil, 
mountains, rivers and so on, and through divination. 22 These roles were more than 
just ritual; they represented knowledge of how to access and mediate with external 
19 See Simonse, Kings, e. g. p. 40. 
20 A. C. Beaton, 'A Chapter in Bari History: The History of Sindiru, Bilinian and Mogiri', SNR 17, 
no. 2 (1934), pp. 169-200, at p. 170. 
2' Huntingford, Ethnographic Survey, p. 29; Haddon, 'System of Chieftainship'. 
22 Simonse, Kings, pp. 265-9; Interview with Severino Mati, Khartourn, 27 Jan. 2003. 
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and spiritual forces, which in turn reveals an underlying structure that enabled an 
additional 'office' of mediating with the turuk to develop. And, as Chapter Six %vill 
ftirther discuss, such forms of knowledge/power were diversified and restricted to 
particular spheres, by their own moral ambivalence. This was particularIN, apparent 
in the case of other specialists like smiths, hunters and fishermen, who, as well as 
being highly valued, were also partially stigmatised and marginalized. 23 
Power might originate in outside sources, available to those with the knowledge to 
access it, but authority relied upon converting that power into social relations. 
However much scope for patronage and personal power there might be for an 
individual therefore, he would nevertheless have to maintain good relations with 
other powerful figures whose knowledge he might require, and at the same time 
satisfy public opinion as embodied in collective councils. The Lokoiya and Luluba 
monyomiji, or ruling age-set, was the most obvious example of collective 
government, but in general, councils of elders and prominent and wealthy men were 
responsible for settling most disputes within communities. Women were not usually 
24 
members, but are said to have had their own 'councils' and a "strong voice" . Oral 
histories claimed that Bari rain-kings in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
25 
centuries were restrained in their military campaigns by 'public opinion'. The 
example of collective regicide in the case of the Bari rain-kings was only the most 
extreme check on their power; that power rested on their ability to direct and 
maintain a consensus in the community. 
1.3 The Power of Words 
Knowing how to speak was vital to the conversion of knowledge/power into 
authority; this would remain a key to political success through the colonial period 
too and will be discussed in later chapters. The Bari ngutu 
duma or Mandan nutu 
" Whitehead, 'Suppressed Classes% Interview with Barnaba Durno Wani, 17 Feb. 
2003, Khartoum. 
24 Interview with Serafmo Wani Swaka, 20 Oct. 2002, Khartoum. 
2' Beaton, 'A Chapter', pp. 177-8. 
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dun, wealthy and influential elders, were people with "the power of words". 2" 
Through skills of speech, leaders could generate consensus. The Judicial aspect of 
the role of the Bari rain-kings rested on their ability to reflect public opinion in their 
decisions. King Logunu's judgement and execution of criminals was reported by 
- 27 Werne in 1841 to concur with "the unanimous will of the assembly . Simonse 
describes their role as that of a 'dam' or 'buffer' between hostile elements: -[t]he 
King's role can be summarised as one of initiating, facilitating and monitoring peace 
processes". 28 A conflict in the distant past between Bari military leaders was 
remembered to have been resolved in a "grand parley" presided over by the monYe 
putet, literally 'the father of the council', reflecting the recognition accorded to skills 
of arbitration. 29 Similarly the Moru were said to have taken cases to clan arbitrators, 
or vureba. 30 Rhetorical skill was an important aspect of the role of such figures. In 
the 1850s, Bari 'chiefs' were reported to speak to gatherings of their people, 
reminding them of the reasons for a particular action such as war, praising the 
ancestors and so on; according to Vinco, "the chief makes use of all the rhetoric at 
his command". 31 In addition, the ability of rain chiefs to curse - the ultimate power 
of words - formed a powerful sanction, enforcing settlement and adjudication. 
32 
Knowing how to speak was also vital in foreign affairs. In the nineteenth century 
this was one of the functions of the Bari rain-kings and of the Lokolya and Luluba 
monyomiji. 33 Diplomatic skills were reflected in Werne's report that King Logunu 
"had a very sound understanding and contrived skilfully to evade the demand for 
meat". 34 The wide recognition given to the rain-kings may have made them the most 
effective people to negotiate with outsiders; they also controlled the iron trade and 
so had to negotiate commercial relations. In the face of threats though, it was 
" Buxton, Chiefs, p. 79; Seligman and Seligman, Pagan Tribes, pp. 252-3. 
27 Werne, Expedition, Vol. 2, p. 67. 
21 Simonse, Kings, p. 218. 
29 Beaton to Governor, 'History of the Nyori district', 2.11.32, NRO EP 2/34/127. 
30 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
31 Angelo Vinco, 'First Christian to live among the Bari: His Journeys 1851-1852', in E. Toniolo, and 
R. Hill (eds. ), The Opening of the Nile Basin: Writings by Members of the Catholic Mission to 
Central Africa on the Geography and Ethnography of the Sudan, 1842-1881, (New York, 1975), pp. 
74-105, at p. 10 1. See also Mair, 'New Elites', p. 167. 
32 See Evans-Pritchard, Preliminary Draft of an Account of the Moro (n. d., 1930s), NRO DK 
112/14/95; also Johnson, 'Judicial Regulation', pp. 61,72, on curse of Nuer prophets. 
33 Simonse, Kings, pp. 71,79. 
34 Werne, Expedition, Vol. 2, p. 67. 
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blacksmiths and women who were used as messengers or negotiators, as it "ýas said 
to be unheard of for them to be killed even in wartime. 35 This must be the root of an 
oral history recounted today: 
At that time it was not normal for men to meet foreigners. It xvas normally 
women who would see what foreigners wanted... Women are better 
diplomats... They were told to go and listen and study the intentions of the 
visitors... Then they report to the council about the foreigners, and then the 
men prepare a reply to them. Angelo Vinco, when he wanted land in 1849 
negotiated with the women, and the chief just blessed their negotiation. 36 
Vinco himself records direct negotiations with Logunu's son Nyigilo and other 
'chiefs' regarding land, 37 so the interview is not recalling actual events, but rather 
reflecting the ideas which have developed about the particular qualities needed for 
negotiating with foreigners, and the perceived division of power within society so 
that men direct and decide, while women advise and negotiate. The account is 
backed up more by Baker's encounter with the sister of a chief of Belinian, who 
reportedly blamed men for being "hard heads" and declared that the women wanted 
peace. Baker described her as "exceedingly clever... [she] would have made a good 
foreign minister". 38 Such skills of speech, both within community politics and in 
relation to mediating with the turuk, would be integral to successftil chiefship, 
reflecting the way that 'tradition' was evolving rather than being destroyed or 
invented. 
1.4 The Foreigners 
The 1841 Egyptian Government expedition had found a way through the sudd on the 
Nile to reach Gondokoro, opening the way for an influx of Egyptian, European and 
35 Vinco, 'First Christian', p. 84. 
36 Interview with Serafino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
37 Vinco, 'First Christian', pp. 78-81,97. Nyigilo was the biological son of Logunu by a wife 
inherited from his father, according to Simonse, Kings, p. 89, ffi 30. 
38 Baker, Ismailia, vol. 1, p. 33 1. 
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Northern Sudanese traders. 39 By the early 1860s, 120 boats sailed annually from 
Khartoum to Gondokoro to purchase ivory. "(' Between 1850 and 1860, an Austriall 
Catholic mission was also based at Gondokoro, but Nvas eventually abandoned due 
to drought, famine and disease. The traders built up a system of zeribas, or fortified 
stations, with their own annies of free and slave soldiers, who also engaged in slave 
aiding I 1ý rI1 .41 
From the 1870s, the government sought to end the latter activitv, sending 
Samuel Baker to be 'Governor' of the Equatorial territories. Baker and his 
successors, General Gordon and Emin Pasha, established a zeriba-like system of 
government stations across the region. The collapse of the Turco-Egyptian 
Govenu-nent encouraged local resistance, forcing Emin Pasha to withdraw to 
Wadelai by 1885. In 1888 the Mahdist/Ansar forces took Rejaf from the Egyptian 
army remnants, and Arabi Dafa'alla became Emir at Rejaf from 1892. The Ansar 
continued the pattern of raiding and relying on local agents or allies, until they were 
defeated by Congolese troops at Bedden in 1897. The Belgians then took over the 
Lado Enclave, and Colonel Martyr took over the east bank on behalf of the Uganda 
Administration. 42 
The 1840s and '50s saw a period of adjustment to the Nilotic trade and the rise of 
new men based on the prioritisation of new kinds of knowledge. Around Gondokoro 
on the Nile, it was Logunu's son Nyigilo who dominated relations with the foreign 
traders and missionaries, by collecting ivory and selling it to the annual expeditions, 
offering land to the missionaries, and becoming virtually the agent for the trader 
Brun Rollet. Though he had inherited rain powers, this role in foreign relations 
developed more through his knowledge of Arabic and his experience of travel and 
trade; as the missionary Kaufinann put it, "he knew how to win favour by flattering 
39 For the detailed history and Nvider context of the trade and government interventions in nineteenth- 
century Equatoria, see Gray, A History; Simonse, Kings, pp. 87-103; R. W. Beachey, 'The East 
African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century', JAH 8, no. 2 (1967), pp. 269-90. 
40 Collins, Land Beyond, p. 22. 
4' As Hodnebo writes, the numbers of slaves exported from the region may have been around 2,000 
annually in the 1860s; more significant were the effects of the trading and the Turco-Egyptian 
stations on settlement and social patterns, especially in terms of the spread of new diseases, farnine, 
warfare and depopulation of certain areas: Cattle and Flies, pp. 135-7. See also Johnson, Root 
Causes, p. 5. 
42 Narrative taken from Simonse, Kings, pp. 87-103. 
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strangers' 5.43 His brother Subek told Vinco to negotiate xvith _Nyigilo, because 
"having been to Khartoum, he is the white man's favounte". Vinco interpreted this 
as jealousy on the part of Subek, but in fact it may have reflected the origins of a 
pattern whereby people recognised the ability of such individuals to protect them 
from the worst extractions of the foreigners, as represented in the popular fears that 
the traders and missionaries were cannibals or could prevent the rain falling. 44 But 
by the later 1850s, the area was hit hard by famine and the intensifying slave trade. 
and people blamed the traders, the mission and eventually Nyigilo himself, who took 
refuge briefly in Khartoum with Brun Rollet, but was killed by a group of young 
men when he returned home. 45 The ritualistic nature of the killing naturally leads 
Simonse to see this as a typical regicide of a rain-king, but it was also the result of 
the perception that Nyigilo had failed to effectively protect his community from the 
depredations of the foreigners. 46 
More widely in the region, individuals with knowledge of languages, trade and 
travel were gaining prestige. In the west, near the River Yei, the missionary Morlang 
encountered a 'Monye' (translated by him as 'proprietor', later usually rendered 
4master' or 'chief) who was able to translate Ban for him, having come from the 
Ban area as a child, and another who was an elephant hunter and trader, who 
accompanied him back to the Nile in order to see the mission and the boats from 
Khartoum. He also met the Ban bunit (doctor/diviner) Lungasuk, 'a renowned 
traveller', who acted as interpreter to Nuqud, the agent of the Coptic Egyptian trader 
47 Shenuda. The traders generally relied on local interpreters with a little Arabic, 
some of whom had been to Khartoum, known as 'dragomans'. 48 Linguistic 
knowledge thus provided access to opportunities to be employed as agents of the 
43 A. Kaufmann, 'The White Nile Valley and its Inhabitants', in Toniolo and Hill, Opening, pp. 140- 
95, at p. 194. 
44 Vinco, 'First Christian', p. 77; E. Pedemonte, 'A Report on the Voyage of 1849-1850', in Toniolo 
and Hill, Opening, pp. 55-73, at pp. 72-3; Simonse, Kings, p. 92. 
45 Franz Morlang, 'The Journeys of Franz Morlang East and West of Gondokoro in 1859', in Toniolo 
and Hill, Opening, pp. 109-28, at p. I 11; Kaufmann, 'White Nile Valley', pp. 194-5. 
46 Simonse, Kings, p. 93. Gray argues inaccurately that Nyigilo was resented because he had taken on 
functions that were not sanctioned by his traditional status as a mere brother to a rain-maker: Gray, .4 History, p. 43. 
47 Morlang, 'Journeys', pp. 120-26. 
48 Pedemonte, 'Report', p. 62. 
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traders; in the Bari area Simonse describes such middlemen as 'cargo chiefs' . 
49 
Around Gondokoro, the main trader was the Egyptian Aqqad firrn under -kbu Sa'ud, 
which relied on two prominent local agents, Loro lo Lako (Allorron) and Laku lo 
Rundiyang (Abu Kuka). 50 
From the 1870s, the Turco-Egyptian Government established its own zeribas in the 
region, which, together with those of the traders, expanded in population and created 
surrounding concentric areas of raided, and often depopulated, territory. S1 They also 
introduced Arabic and 'Nubi' Islamic military culture and symbols. 52 Many of the 
soldiers and auxiliaries were of local origin, either recruited or enslaved, and many 
remained in the area after Emin Pasha's withdrawal. 53 By 1879, one or two 
dragomans, often ex-slaves, were said to be placed in every village to supervise 
taxation and porterage; a role similar to that of the later government chiefs. 54 When 
Baker visited Lobore, it was the dragoman Wam, an interpreter for the traders when 
a boy, who dealt with the visitors initially and organised porters, rather than the 'old 
sheik', Abbio or his son. 55 The dragomans were perhaps accepted by these 
communities as a way of ameliorating the risk of raids, and may have become 
responsible for 'foreign relations' due to their language skills; Gray perceptively 
describes their growing prominence as "indispensable intermediaries". 56 
The dragomans or other local intermediaries were becoming 'semi-Arabized' in 
their dress and manners, as they established good relations with the Egyptian 
49 Simonse, Kings, pp. 93-7; see also Gray, A History, pp. 95,100-1,142-3, on local agents and 
dragomans. 
50 Simonse, Kings, p. 94. 'Allorron' features prominently in Baker's writings; this name reflected 
Loro lo Lako's role, as according to Gray the Bari referred to the traders as 'Aloron', meaning 
'wicked people': Gray, A History, p. 4 1. 
51 Hodnebo, Cattle and Flies, pp. 21-8; Simonse, Kings, p. 97; Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', p. 158. 
Slave-raiding also continued: Emin Pasha, Emin Pasha in Central Africa, Being a Collection of His 
Letters and Journals, ed. and annotated by G. Schweinfarth et al (London, 1888), pp. 312,4 10. 
52 For the history of the Nubis see Douglas H. Johnson, 'Structure of a Legacy: Military Slavery in 
Northeast Africa', Ethnohistory 36,1 (Winter 1989), pp. 72-88; and in Uganda, Holger Berrit Hansen, 
'Pre-Colonial Immigrants and Colonial Servants. The Nubians in Uganda Revisited', Aftican Affairs 
90, no. 361 (1991), pp. 559-80. 
53 Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', pp. 68-70. 
5' C. T. Wilson and R. Felkin, Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan, 2 vols. (London, 1882), Vol. 2, 
104. 
Samuel W. Baker, Ismailia. - A Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africafor the Suppression of 
thc Slavc Trade, Organized bi, Ismail, Khedive of Egypt, 2 vols. (London, 1874), Vol. 2, p. 48. 
56 oraN, _4 History, pp. 100-1,142-3. 
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stations. 57 Far to the west of the Nile, Emin Pasha met the Baka 'chief Ansea, who 
wore "a greasy fez and long Tibet robe, green with age, as also wide Turkish 
trousers... on account of his light brown skin, exceedingly straight profile, scantý- 
full beard and his classic Sudan Arabic, he gave the impression of being rather an 
1 58 inhabitant of Dar-Mahas or Batn-el-Hajr than an Abaka prince'. It may be that 
Ansea was in fact a former soldier and not a 'Baka' at all. In the Lugware area, 
Nubis settled and often became influential or powerful in local communities, so it 
seems likely that this would also be the case in Mongalla. 59 
The history of collaboration with the traders and governments in the nineteenth 
century is a sensitive matter in light of the subsequent history of Southern Sudan. 
The history of slave trading by northern Sudanese and Egyptians has gained 
enormous significance in the colonial and post-colonial periods, contributing to, and 
reflecting, the Southerners' perception of the extractive and racist attitudes of 
'Arabs' towards them. 60 Informants therefore tended to emphasise histories of 
fighting the Arabs in the nineteenth century. One, however, did recount the story of 
a 'sub-chief in his area who had brought his people to live near the camp of an Arab 
slave-trader, although, as the story emphasises, only because he was blackmailed by 
the capture of his daughter. The story is actually very revealing of the kind of 
reciprocal bargains made with skilful mediators in order to obtain protection. The 
'sub-chief' negotiated immunity from raiding in return for his people moving closer 
to the camp, and presumably supplying it with labour and provisions; as a result he 
was also recognised by the trader as the 'head of his people'. The same informant 
also claimed that there were more Islamic names among chiefly families, because 
57 Gray, A History, pp. 142-3. 
58 Emin Pasha, Central Aftica, p. 382. 
59 Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', pp. 68-70. The term 'Sultan' for a chief has persisted in the Yei and 
Kajo Kaji areas, as in West Nile district, and 'Juba Arabic' is similar to Nubian: see also Yuzbashi N. 
Yunis, 'Notes on the Kuku and Other Minor Tribes', SNR 7, no. I (1924), pp. 1-4 1, at p. 4. 
60 The missionaries would also reiterate the history of slave-trading, as one visitor discovered in the 
1950s at Lui: "We stood under a big tree near the Church and David the headmaster said, 'This tree is 
where the Arabs used to tie up their slaves for market in the old days. ' I said, 'Sh! I thought in the 
modem Sudan you didn't mention such things! ' He said, 'No - we don't - except among ourselves. 
But we shall never forget - and even if they cut the tree down, that still won't remove the 
facts": 
Bewes, East Africa, 1953-4, CMS Tours AFE AD3. 
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Arab slave traders stayed in their homes and named the children, again representing 
the extent of local collaboration. 61 
Trade and government interventions thus altered the basis of authority in Western 
Mongalla, as knowledge of languages, employment in the armies or stations, and the 
ability to pursue military or commercial strategies successfully, generated 
followings of clients or allies keen to gain access to trade goods, but more 
importantly to find safety from raids. The timisi clients among the Mandari, said to 
include destitute Dinka, Moru and Nyangwara, sought the protection of a mar or 
clan head, for example. 62 Near Amadi in 1879, Tak Farre was reported to have 5,000 
men under his authority, and large areas of cultivation, "for anyone who is 
discontented with his chief or other circumstances comes to Tak Farre and receives a 
welcome from him". 63 This number is perhaps questionable, but what is clear is the 
significance of being able to offer protection. Simonse describes the rise of 
'warlords', whose power depended on guns and who gained power after the collapse 
of the Nile trade and withdrawal of government forces. 64 However, the role of trade 
goods, including guns, may have been more nuanced than this. They were symbols 
of new kinds of knowledge and power, rather than the repositories of power in 
themselves; the 'warlords' had generally been middlemen or rain chiefs previously. 
Protection from the depredations of traders or soldiers was more important to people 
than access to the trade goods. It was the ability of leaders to ameliorate these 
depredations through skilful mediation that mattered principally. 65 
1.5 The Ostensible Sheikh 
Gaining a position of authority was as much about being known as about knowing, 
and in this regard the commodity trade was significant. The foreigners who entered 
this region were invariably looking for the 'chief or 'sheikh'; someone with whom 
61 Interview with Lubari Ramba, 31 Aug. 2004, Mitika, Yei. 
62 Huntingford, Northern Nilo-Hamites, p. 63. 
63 Wilson and Felkin, Uganda, Vol. 2, p. 129. See also a similar patron in Emin Pasha, Central 
YA ica, p. 306. r, 
Simonse, Kings, pp. 10 1 -3. 65 Simonse also refers in passing to the protection offered by first the cargo chiefs and later the 
warlords: Kings, pp. 96,101. 
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they could work and who would hopefully be able to meet their demands for food, 
ivory, slaves, porters and so on. They often relied on appearance alone. In 1841, 
Werne unhesitatingly referred to Logunu as 'King': "[flhe dress and coiffure 
distinguish his tall figure from all the others". 66 Baker tended to assume that 
conspicuous warriors at the forefront of battles were 'sheikhs'. 67 It also added to 
prestige in the eyes of foreigners if an individual was recognised by the people, 
especially over a wide area. Baker met a rain-maker, Lokko, who claimed to be a 
great sheikh and to know "the entire country"; he proved to be "perfectly well 
1 68 known... [by] the natives, who received us without fear or suspicion'. Loro lo 
Lako's position rested on his being known, to the foreigners and to his people, who 
had explained to Baker, "that although Allorron had been the ostensible sheik for a 
great length of time, the true sheik by actual descent was a chief named Morbe". 
[My italics] Morbe had lost his cattle in Lokoiya raids, which may also explain why 
he had become less prominent than Loro. 69 But more significantly, Loro's 
recognition by both foreigners and local people was laying the foundations for the 
brokerage role of chiefs. 
New symbols and signs of power or status developed as a result of the processes of 
recognition by foreigners. The latter gave gifts of clothing to the 'chiefs' they had 
identified, which served to further mark them out and make them instantly 
70 recognisable to ftiture foreign visitors or government personnel. Such clothing may 
have only been worn when foreigners visited, thus demonstrating its meaning within 
a particular sphere of authority and knowledge. Nyigilo, for example, wore clothes 
in front of the missionaries, but they were told that, "as soon as we were gone he 
would go about naked like the rest of his people". 71 He also did not possess other 
luxury trade goods, despite his access to them, but was said to live in identical style 
to the rest of his people, suggesting that commodities had not become a forrn of 
66 Werrie, Expedition, Vol. 2, p. 43. See for similar point, Richard Reid, Political Power in Pre- 
Colonial Buganda: Economy, Society and Warfare in the Nineteenth Century, (Oxford, 2002), p. 15. 
67 Sir Samuel White Baker, The Albert Nýanza, Great Basin of the Nile, and Explorations of the Nile 
Sources, 2 vols. (London, 1867), Vol. 2, p. 274; and Ismailia, Vol. 1, p. 393. 
68 Baker, Ismailia, Vol. 2, pp. 41-5. See also Werrie, Expedition, Vol. 2, pp. 109-10. 
69 Baker, Ismailia, Vol. 1, p. 257. 
70 Charles George Gordon, Gordon in Central Africa, from Original Letters and Documents, edited 
by George Birkbeck Hill (London, 1899), p. 49. 
71 Pedemonte, 'Report', p. 64. 
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economic wealth as such. Clothes did not simply demonstrate status therefore, but 
may have been more of a specific uniform to mark out the 'foreigner's chief. 
As Glassman argues for East Africa, as cloth became more widely distributed, elites 
also sought more distinctive or prestigious items. For example, Loro lo Lako was 
reported to refuse to wear any of the numerous presents of clothes he received: "the 
only article of European manufacture which he uses is a large sunshade, and it is an 
amusing sight to watch him strutting about with it". 72 This may haN, c resulted ftom 
the precedent of Gordon, who also carried one; at Moogi, "[t]hey kneý I was the 
chief on account of my umbrella". 73 Trade goods, including guns, came to play a 
symbolic role in the political economy, particularly among the Ban, and Simonse 
argues that the decline of the steamer trade on the Nile led to a 'cargo cult' in which 
guns and steamers gained religious dimensions. This centred on the female prophet 
Kiden, who led successful resistance to the Ansar until her execution in 1893. She 
had gained followers and ivory by preaching a return of the trade and resurrection of 
dead cattle, and by promising that her wooden guns would bring invulnerability in 
the face of real guns. 74 
However, as the emphasis on resurrection of cattle shows, the trade goods had not 
fundamentally altered the economy; cattle and other livestock remained the principal 
means of investment and exchange. Clothes, umbrellas, guns and other items had 
become the trappings of power, not its source; there were only limited quantities and 
patrons did not become the centre of distribution networks. They may have 
controlled ivory and slave procurement, but this was for export, not local trade. And, 
since Kiden's guns were actually wooden, it was her promises of immunity and 
protection that mattered, not possession of guns. 
1.6 Not the Real Sheikh 
The new forms of knowledge and patronage emerged within the continuing 
multiplicity and diversity of authority, and were not always sought after. There were 
72 Wilson and Felkin, Uganda, Vol. 2, pp. 86-7. See Glassman, Feasts and Riot, e. g. p. 37. 
73 Gordon, Central Aftica, p. 107. 
74 Interview with Serafino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum; Simonse, Kings, pp. 100-102. 
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disincentives for people to be distinguished as 'chiefs'; once identified by foreigners 
as such, individuals found themselves first in line for any demands or 
recriminations. For example, in 1879, Felkin reported that in the Amadi area, chiefs 
who did not cooperate fully with the slave-traders had been castrated, tortured or 
75 76 killed. Gordon had had resisting chiefs punished and even sent to Khartoum. On 
the appointment of a new 'government chief at the demand of Baker, Loro lo Lako 
(himself an example of a newer kind of authority) was reportedly, "pleased that he 
had shifted his responsibility upon the shoulders of another". 77 Chiefs' relationship 
with the foreigners could also bring them into conflict with their own communities; 
this was most apparent in the murder of Nyigilo. 78 
There was therefore a period in many areas in the mid or later nineteenth century of 
renegotiating authority, as some leaders sought to avoid these dangers by allowing 
other individuals to deal with the foreigners. Baker, having attacked Belinian, asked 
to meet the 'sheikh of the mountain', but suspected that the man sent to talk to him, 
Ward, was not the 'real sheikh' . 
79 This would be a recurring theme in European 
writing, reflecting both their own confusion and the complexities of changing 
authority in the region. European visitors were frequently frustrated at the apparent 
inability of chiefs to get them the porters they required . 
80 Baker expressed this 
confusion and exasperation when the 'great sheikh' Bedden claimed that his people 
refused to carry: 
This is the regular African diplomacy when work is required. The people 
say, 'We must receive orders from our sheik'. The sheik says, 'I am willing, 
but my people will not obey me'. It is this passive resistance that may ruin an 
expedition. 81 
Such 'passive resistance' would be a feature of the colonial period too; the 
foreigners' uncertainty as to the authority of chiefs was frequently manipulated to 
avoid their demands. 
75 Wilson and Felkin, Uganda, Vol. 2, p. 128. 
76 Gordon, Central Aftica, p. 72. 
77 Baker, Ismailia, Vol. 1, p. 257. 
78 Simonse, Kings, p. 93. 
79 Baker, Ismailia, Vol. 1, p. 338. 
80 E. g. Ernin Pasha, Central Africa, pp. 358,360. 
81 Baker, Ismailia, Vol. 2, p. 23. Gordon was also later conftised as to whether Bedden held 'real 
power': Gordon, Central Africa, pp. 78-9. 
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These confusions also reflected the continuing authority of other forms of 
knowledge/power alongside the new skills of foreign interlocution. The abilit" to 
mediate with the rain was still important; sometimes the new mediators might 
include rain-makers, as in the case of Bepo at Belinian who alternately worked with 
or fought against the traders and governments. 82 But \vhereas in the past their 
knowledge of rain had been widely-enough recognised to guarantee their influence 
and make them the most effective managers of external relations with surrounding 
communities, it was of less value in relation to the foreign powers. As a result, rain 
knowledge was increasingly intemalised within communities and protected from 
foreign intrusion. But it continued to represent the most potent moral authority: the 
"respect and veneration for the dispensers of rain are greater than those felt for the 
chiefs of the country". 83 
Some of these processes are illustrated in an oral history from the Bari area. '-' One of 
the most prominent local agents of the Aqqad trading finn had been Lako lo 
Rundiang, or Abu Kuka, who was apparently killed fighting the Mahdists. His son 
Lukaja was still young, and it was his brother Lado Kirimin who became chief, but 
his reliance on 'torture' to maintain his power is said to have antagomsed the elders 
of the community. Meanwhile his and Lako's nephew, Boreng, had been sent by 
Arabi to Khartoum for education in 1893, and now returned in 1897, with 
knowledge of Arabic and Islam. He won the support of the council of elders in 
ousting Lado Kirimin, who left to launch raids further west with his military 
followers. The story asserts that the family also had rain powers, but that they were 
now separated from the functions of chiefship, with Lako's son Lukaj a becoming the 
matat lo lori, the chief of the staff, while Boreng remained 'chief'. The story is 
striking in terms of its depiction of the council choosing an individual perceived to 
have the right kinds of knowledge and experience to perforin chiefly functions in the 
best interests of the community, as Lado Kiriman had failed to do. At the same time, 
the division between rain and foreign affairs was being made, perhaps partly to 
82 Simonse, Kings, p. 10 1- 
83 G. Casati, Ten Years in Equatoria and the Return with Emin Pasha, Vol. I (London, 189 1), p. 304. 
84 Interviexv with Serafino Wani Swaka, 20 Oct. 2002, Khartoum. 
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protect the rain, and perhaps also to prevent too much power being concentrated in 
one individual. 
Conclusion 
The idea of an all-powerful single ruler in Mongalla was alien. Even the apparently 
most powerful patrons, warlords or rain chiefs had to share influence with other 
experts or elders and maintain their legitimacy in the eyes of their communities. This 
legitimacy rested on their success in knowing how to accomplish certain functions, 
such as military raids or defence, trade, rain control and so on. Over the nineteenth 
century, individuals with certain kinds of knowledge or ability clearly benefited 
from the changes to the political economy wrought by the influx of trade goods or 
the opportunities for employment and raiding, and were able to maximise on the 
chance to gain client followers from among the displaced populations of the region. 
But their success relied on skilful management of 'external' affairs above all, 
particularly if rain control or other offices were held separately by other individuals. 
This interlocutory role was a burden as well as a source of prestige, and was 
increasingly taken on by new men rather than established community authorities; 
their co-existence led to the fon-ner sometimes being depicted by outsiders as 
scapegoats. But by the end of the century it was a role that was becoming more 
defined as an office or institution: as well as the master of the land, or rain, or 
mountain, there was now in some cases the 'administrative' chief, or 'chief of the 
foreigners' (the Bari matat lo gela). This figure was still vaned, though it was 
frequently a former soldier, trading agent or dragoman. But their functions were 
beginning to be distinct, and the associated forms of knowledge were given 
recognition by communities, who needed skilful or strong 'gatekeepers' to offer 
some security from external depredations. These individuals would now be the 
obvious people to mediate with the incoming colonial governments. 
85 
85 Lamphear describes a similar minor war-leader in northern Kenya in the 1880s. "His abili 
i 
ty to 
speak Kiswahili and his familiarity with outsiders gave him valuable skills needed to deal with the 
white administrator at Baringo": John Lamphear, The Scattering Time: Turkana Responses to 
Colonial Rule (Oxford, 1992), p. 79. 
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2. The Lado Enclave, 1897-1909: Patronage and Protection 
Johnson emphasises the degree of apparent continuity in the "fabric of authorit', "' in 
the South, from the Egyptian and Mahdist governments into the colonial period, so 
that Europeans, Egyptians and northern Sudanese alike were classed as 'Turks' by 
most Southerners. 86 The Belgian military administration of the Lado Enclave 
certainly bore many resemblances to its predecessors, though run by a handful of 
European commanders together with Congolese troops. 87 Their rule was reported by 
the British, and is remembered since, as being harsh, arbitrary and violent. 88 It may 
be that the temporary nature of their occupation encouraged a more brutal 
exploitation than the similarly military administrations of Sudan and Uganda. British 
reports, based on visits to the Enclave or conversations with Belgian officials, were 
confused as to whether the administrative system was based on large or small chiefs, 
perhaps reflecting a gap between the theory and practice of administration in tile 
Enclave. The result was a disruptive and harshly extractive regime, under which 
communities had to further develop their strategies of survival and defence. 
The Belgian administration appears to have made no pretence of seeking 
'traditional' chiefs, preferring to 'appoint' individuals perceived to be useful . 
89 They 
also sought to limit their power, according to British reports: "Sheikhs who claimed 
authority over several villages now only control their own, and small Sheikhs in 
each village are recognised equally with them". 90 The aim was to divide the 
population into small, regular settlements under a levelled stratum of 'small' chiefs. 
Adult men were given tax discs and were recorded in registers under the names of 
their chiefs, who would then be sent demands for porters or taxes. 
91 There were only 
ever a few Belgian commanders in the entire Enclave; the administration relied on 
86 Johnson, Root Causes, p. 10. 
87 For the international diplomatic history of European imperialism in the region, see Robert 0. 
Collins, King Leopold, England and the Upper Nile, 1899-1909 (New Haven, 1968); Collins, Land 
BcYond, pp. 2-15,95-129, and, for the Lado Enclave administration, pp. 134-61. 
88 E. g. Logan, Mongalla, to Assistant Director Intelligence, Khartoum, 25 Dec. 1905, NRO MP 
1/8/50; Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
89 Shaw, 'Trek No. I (Lado Enclave 3 rd Jan -3 Oth Jan)' (n. d., 1911), CMS Acc. I 11, 
F 1. 
90 Newcombe, 'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO NVO 106 23 1; see also 
'Information on Lado Enclave from a Greek agent of Angelo Capato', SIR 115, Feb. 1904, PRO WO 
106226. 
91 Newcombe, 'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO WO 106 23 L 
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the Congolese troops to forcibly requisition food. taxes and labour. The role of' 
ýchier was thereflore a hazardous one, it placed an individual first in the firing, line if 
the Belgian or Congolese soldiers were displeased. One Ugandan official witnessed 
a 'sheikh' in the Enclave being beaten simply in order to find out "here pme was, Z-- 
and he was reportedly killed later for refusing to carry a soldier over a khor. 92 Others 
were flogged until they accepted Belgian sovereignty. 93 Whole communities moved Z-- -- 
94 
across the Enclave boundaries to try to escape the raids by the Congolese troo ps. 
In the face of such a threatening outside force, communities continued to develop 
their means of defence. Even a British observer comprehended that -little is known 
of any government except that from time to time either carriers or gram are 
demanded". and that this had the effect of enhancing the position of the 
sheikhs', "as these were the only people they [the government officers] ever saw or 
In other words. the sudden, unpredictable dernands of' the had any dealing with". : _1 
'), Newcombe. 'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO WO 106 23 1: also SIR 155 
June 1907. 
Wood, Bahr El Ghazal Intelli-gence Report, 30 April 1904, NRO IN 8/2119. 
Q4 E.,,. SIR 138. Jail. 1906. PRO WO 106/228. 
, )ý . Notes on the Lado Enclave by the Lado Commission, 1910'. NRO MP 1 8,151 
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colonial government required communities to have a recognised and effective 
negotiator to manage these exactions. Another British report also described the fear 
shown by the population towards the Congolese soldiers, and the uneven, irregular 
and uncertain demands of the latter for grain or porters. 96 
In one oral history from the northern Enclave, the Belgians are remembered as 
having demanded tusks and other goods from Mandari villages, and then killed the 
chiefs to remove the evidence, so that the Mandari started 'giving' the chiefship to 
slaves, or people whose lives were less valued. It is said, though, that, "those 
owners, the real bosses who have gone underground because of fear of being killed 
by the Belgians, were still in command in as far as religious and xý'ar issues were 
concerned. So the chiefs who got themselves appointed under the Belgians restricted 
themselves to the ordinary affairs of the people". 97 This recurrence of the motif of 
the scapegoat chief thus reveals the continuing emergence of the chief of the 
foreigners. Many of those recognised as chief had been soldiers or employees of 
previous governments; they tended to speak Arabic at the very least. Some had also 
gained cattle through trading ivory with Greek merchants. 98 It was therefore usually 
no accident that they came forward to speak with the foreigners, and nor were they 
simply scapegoats; they were seen to know how to avert the worst of the 
unpredictable government attacks. 
In return for mediating with the unknown power of the colonial government, these 
early chiefs were able to build up their prestige and authority. The Belgian- 
appointed chiefs are often remembered as having been 'harsh'; for example a Moru 
chief who ruled until 1927, is remembered by the name 'Mokoto Mabe', which is 
Lingala for cruel or harsh chief (Lingala, or Bangala, was the language used by the 
Congolese administration in the Enclave). 99 Those chiefs who met the demands of 
the administration were rewarded with cattle and guns, and a blind eye was turned to 
their other activities. Examples of chiefs who profited from raiding include Kape, a 
former soldier, and Lukudu, near Lado, who may be the same Lukudu remembered 
96 Newcombe, 'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO WO 106 23 1. 
97 Interview with Gajuk Wurnyang Lupaya, 28 Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
98 Newcombe, 'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO WO 106 23 1. 
99 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
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in Fajelu oral history as having led a migration from near the Nile, using guns to 
defeat the local inhabitants. 100 Another case is that of Aluma, a Kakv. 'a reportedly 
appointed as chief of the Kaliko to prevent their resistance; many years later as an 
old man, Aluma told a British official that there had been no chiefs before the 
Belgians came. ' 01 
Military symbols were adopted to signify chiefship, perhaps to both the Belgians 
and their own people. Certainly they impressed later British observers, who reported 
that the chiefs had been given 'great power' over their people by the Belgians, citing 
their anned retinues as evidence. 102 The coercive power of these chiefs, liowever, 
rested less on their guns, which were mostly old muzzle-loaders, than on their 
effectiveness in protecting people from the government soldiers. 103 Those chiefs 
who were supported, rather than raided, by the troops naturally attracted followers; 
in return they were able to coerce and bully people. 
A Bari oral history from Loggo West encapsulates the way in which a potentially 
illegitimate degree of coercive power was tolerated by communities in return for 
effective protection. The 'great' chief Kirba Lado is said to have 'robbed' the 
chiefship by using Belgian support to defeat his maternal uncle. Kirba Lado's 
authority is said to have been unusual in overruling all the sub-chiefs of the area, due 
to the 'weakness' of the people. This is explained by the combination of his cattle- 
wealth (which may have been added to by the Belgians and later the Ugandan 
administration), which he used as bribery and to help resolve disputes, together with 
his military prowess in various factional wars, and the fear of being enslaved by his 
raids. There is also a report that he had been to Omdurman and met the Khallfa, 
which reveals that he had the kind of knowledge of the turuk that would have left 
100 'Information supplied by a Greek merchant recently arrived from the Lado Enclave', 27.3.10, 
NRO Cl 10/12/5 1; Newcombe, 'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO WO 106 231 
SIR 155, June 1907; Shaw, 'Trek from Rejaf to Loka', March 1911, CMS Acc. 111, F3, Interview 
with Charles Taban Lupai, 5 Sept. 2004, Yel; Discussion with Yei Boma chiefs and sub-chiefs, 30 
Aug. 2004, Yei. 
101 Gibson, Yei, 18 Dec. 1918, CMS G3 AL; EPMD Feb. 1953, NRO CS 2 30/3/6- 
102 Davis, 'Notes on the Lado Enclave'SIR 184, Nov. 1909, PRO WO 106 232, NIPIR t\Iarch 1904, 
NRO IN 8/2/12. 
103 Owen, 'Occupation of the Lado Enclave' May-June 1910, and Owen to Percival. Senior Insp. 
Loka-Kagulu District, I July 1910, both NRO MP 1/8/5 1. 
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him well-placed to manipulate the colonial presence and be tolerated as 'chief by 
the people. ' 04 
The Belgian administration continued and intensified changes in the political 
patterns of the Lado Enclave since the mid-nineteenth century. The interesting thing 
is that the qualities sought by the Belgians in chiefs were also those recognised by 
communities as useful to their own interests. Individuals with experience of service 
with foreign governments, or knowledge of trade or languages, or military prowess, 
were likely to be able to defend people more effectively in the face of government 
demands and continuing raiding and instability. Such figures were also developing 
their own symbols of authority, notably their European military regalia. The Enclave 
administration offered opportunities to those who could gain influence by force of 
character and shows of strength, both in the eyes of their own communities and the 
Belgians. But their success relied on more than force or opportunistic agency alone. 
Their communities recognised the value of having a 'government' or 'foreigners" 
chief, and so entered into a kind of moral compact with them, tolerating a degree of 
bullying and personal profiting in return for protection. 
Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum; Simonse, Kings, p. 104. 
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3. Chiefs and British Administration, 1898-1914: Sudan and 
Uganda 
Meanwhile, north of the Enclave and east of the Nile, British officials were 
administering Mongalla Province (so called from 1906) of the Anglo-Eg" yptian 
Sudan, and the Nile district of the Uganda Protectorate. In both areas, military 
administrators were largely concerned at this stage Nvith preventing Nvarfare and 
disorder, and with attempting to find 'chiefs' or 'sheikhs' who could provide labour 
and tribute on demand to meet the needs of the nascent governments. The British 
vision of establishing proper government ensured that they went beyond the pure]y 
pragmatic approach of the Belgians in their dealings with 'sheiUs', by emphasisin- 
their role in relation to the 'government', and also by limiting their military strengtli 
and raiding. In practice though, a similar pattern to that in the Lado Enclave 
emerged in British territory: a small number of warlords or opportunistic ex-soldiers, 
traders or dragomans succeeded in manipulating the colonial presence to expand 
their capacity to act as patrons, and, most importantly, to earn popular recognition as 
useful intermediaries. 
3.1 Divided Authority: Uganda territory 
In 1898, the Uganda goveniment took over the territory east of the Nile, including 
the Southern Bari, Luluba and Lyria. Administrators described this area as the most 
remote and 'backward' in Uganda, still feeling "the effects of the rule of Emin 
Pasha's mutinous soldiers followed by the Dervishes". 
' 05 The administration 
recognised as chiefs the most obvious 'strong men' in the region, who tended to be 
individuals previously involved in trade or warfare, and who made themselves 
conspicuous to the foreign administrators. Kwajo and Boreng, the sons or 
descendents of the 'cargo chiefs' Loro lo Lako and Abu Kuka, Nvere recognised as 
chiefs in Gondokoro and Tokiman respectively. Modi Adum, who had started out as 
a dragoman and become an Emir under the Mahdists, sought out Colonel Martyr and 
'05 Report by Sadler on Nile Province, Uganda, 31 March 1903, cited in J. P. Barber, 'The Moving 
Frontier of British Imperialism in Northern Uganda, 1898-1919', Uganda Journal 29, no. 1 (1965), 
pp. 27-43, at p. 29. 
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succeeded in convincing him that he was the chief of the Bari. 106 In Luluba, Lualla, 
who had allegedly met the Khalifa in Khartoum, impressed administrators bý, his 
willingness to supply their garrisons with food and building materials. Kirba of 
Loggo is remembered as having gained the chiefship because he was "exceptional ly 
gifted"; he "proved himself to the British administration during the course of time 
that he was an able man, so he was installed as the great chief of the area". His 
brother Lako Lado however was "responsible for the village matters" and acted as 
cguide' to Kirba, suggesting that Kirba's role was defined largely in relation to 
foreign and military affairs. 108 Thus these chiefs clearly decided it was to their 
advantage to gain recognition and backing from the Uganda administration, which in 
turn saw them as having useful qualities for chiefship. 1 09 At the same time their 
communities recognised them as 'gifted' when it came to war and external relations. 
Their claims initially led to a period of conflict and adjustment with, and between, 
the various rain controllers in the area. In the end Leju and Bombo became rain 
chiefs of Sindiru and Belinian respectively, though both were also made into 
mukungus, or headmen, under chiefs Kirba of Loggo and KwaJo of Gondokoro. 
1 10 In 
fact they remained far more than headmen, as they continued to derive wide-ranging 
power from their rain control. Even the Sudan administrators were concerned by the 
extent of their power and the tribute paid by Sudan subjects to them: 
[T]he Baris, on the eastern bank, have long been terrorized by the rain- 
makers of Sheikh Bembo, of Jebel Belinian (near Gondokoro, in the Uganda 
Protectorate), who have made a most businesslike use of their powers, and 
exact tribute of sheep and, in a few cases, even cows from the Sudanese Ban 
villages on the east bank, as far north as the boundary line with the Bor 
Dinkas, for services rendered in this respect. ' I' 
'0' Simonse, Kings, pp. 103-4; Martyr, 'Report on the Nile District of the Uganda Protectorate', 15 
April 1899, PRO FO 2/201; Beaton, 'A Chapter', p. 181. 
10 Sinionse, Kings, p. 128. 
'0' Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
109 See Geschiere, 'Chiefs and Colonial Rule', p. 154. 
110 Simonse, Kings, p. 106. 
1" SIR 182, Sept. 1909, PRO WO 106 232, MPIR Aug. 1909, NRO IN 8/2/13. 
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The division between rain and government chiefs was particularly striking in the 
Uganda territory, perhaps because of the long history of a foreign presence at 
Gondokoro. An Assistant D. C., Haddon, made a study of the Ban political systems 
in 1909-10, and concluded that as well as the clan leaders, there were two kinds of 
chiefs: the mata or rain chief, and the bongun or district chief Bongun simply means 
commoner, or person without rain, but had come to refer to the governinent chiefs. 
who did the 'political' work and were also war-leaders. Modi Adum was an example 
of the latter; he was respected for his leadership qualities, but his son was reportedly 
less popular, so that people took their cases more to the rain chiefs for settlement. 112 
In Tokiman where Boreng was government chief, the rain had gone to his cousin 
Lokoj i. 1 13 In 1903, a huge meeting in Luluba between the British official and flie 
monyomyi agreed to make Lualla the government chief and give the rain powers to 
his rivals, an arrangement still in place today, according to Simonse. 114 Lualla also 
held rain powers, but his principle role was recognised as being the management of 
relations with the government. 115 
Lyria was at this stage less affected by the presence of the colonial administration, 
and the Lokoiya tended to resist its demands. They were able to take advantage of 
the local geography; for example in 1906 the Uganda administrator reported the 
failure of a punitive expedition against a Lokoiya chief, "owing it is said to the 
difficulty of the country he inhabits which is very hilly". 116 Even here though, the 
rain and government functions became separated within the rain chief family. Lojing 
lo Rugang was responsible for rain while Jada Rugang was in charge of government 
relations, though with more difficulties than elsewhere due to the resistance of the 
powerful mon. voiniji. 117 The distinct institution of the government chief was thus 
already formed in this area before incorporation into the Sudan in 1914. 
112 Simonse, Kings, p. 107; Haddon, 'System of Chieftainship', p. 471-2. 
"' interview with Serafino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
114 Simonse, Kings, p. 129. 
115 Simonse, Kings, p. 134. 
116 MPIR March 1906, NRO IN 8/2/12. 
117 Simonse, Kings, p. 134: Beaton, 'A short history of Liria' (c. 1934), NRO JD 1/ 1 2. 
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3.2 Nominal Sheikhs: Sudan territory, 
Such processes were less obvious in the Sudan territory north of Uganda and the 
Enclave, where the scapegoat motif of the weak or false chief was instead stronger 
in British reports. Indeed, one administrator even bemoaned the lack of a powerful 
rainmaker in the Sudan and the resulting tribute paid to Bombo and Leju, w1lose 
spheres of authority transcended, and thus undermined, the colonial boundaries. 118 
This was a region in which the Sudan government encountered little threat of anned 
resistance, and yet was continually frustrated by the more 'passive' resistance 
behind refusals to supply grain and labour. Administrators saw the solution in 
finding sheikhs who would be both powerful and cooperative enough to meet 
goverm-nent demands; their failure and the reported 'weakness' of the sheikhs is 
revealing of the strategies of communities in the face of those demands. In arousing 
the suspicion of administrators that they lacked genuine authority, or in being 
blamed personally for failures to comply with government orders, these indiNiduals 
were playing a role of defence or deflection for their communities. 119 At the same 
time of course, they may have seized opportunities to gain personally from the 
process. 
The Sudan inhabitants seem to have accepted in principle the idea of paying tribute 
to the government; indeed a large number who crossed into Sudan to avoid the raids 
of the Belgians expressed great willingness to pay tax in the hope of gaining 
protection, suggesting that the foreign governments were seen as potential 
patrons. 120 But administrators in practice encountered much resistance and evasion 
of both tribute and labour requirements. In 1903, early treks by the Inspector found 
, 121 Ban sheikhs 'suspicious' and 'distrustful , while the 
following year they were 
reported to be complaining that the birds had eaten their dura so that they could not 
118 Jennings-Branily, A/Gov, 'Report of a tour among the Baris of the East Bank', 27 Aug. 1906, NRO 
IN 8/2/12. 
119 See Fields, Revival, p. 256: "equivocation and a certain duplicity were a chief s most practical 
choices. In order to get by, many a sharp-Witted chief must have cultivated a reputation 
for absent- 
mindedness". 
120 SIR 140, March 1906, PRO WO 106 228. See Collins, Land Beyond, p. 234: the Nuer saw tribute 
as protection money and viewed the state as a patron. 
121 SIR 110, Sept. 1903, PRO WO 106 225. 
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provide tribute. It was also reported that only a quarter of the numbers of porters 
requested by the government were actually ever provided. 122 Sheikh Bathi ývas 
described as the "biggest Nyarnbara [Nyangwara] sheikh" north of the Enclave 
border, yet he claimed that his 'wakils' [headmen] would not obey his orders to 
supply tribute. 123 One of the 'biggest' Ban sheikhs, Ladokanga, simply disappeared 
in advance of visits by the Inspector, until he was arrested and imprisoned. 1 24 In 
1907, a report complained that, "if a Sheikh is called on to parade his follo\N-ing, he 
is not only unable to do so, but is also suspicious of one's reasons for Xvishing to 
count them". 1 25 The British reaction vaned between frustration and derision at the 
apparent lack of authority of sheikhs, and suspicion that they were simply making 
excuses and evading demands. 
It is likely that the extent of authority of these 'sheikhs' was in fact varied. In some 
cases they seem to have been military leaders, such as Marenga of the Mandan who 
moved out of the Enclave, or Sheikh Dei, also Mandari. 126 But in many other cases, 
their authority may have been more 'nominal', as the British put it. 127 A large 
proportion of the Bari sheikhs listed in British reports were said to be between the 
ages of twenty and thirty, which seems too young to be wielding real power over 
community elders. 128 In a few cases, officials reported that 'sheikhs' turned out to be 
mere 'representatives' or 'Interpreters' for the 'real' sheikh, reflecting the continuing 
multiplicity of authority and the recognition of the utility of linguistic and 
diplomatic skills. 129 
The British administrators, however, having identified certain 'sheikhs', were 
determined to build up their authority and hence usefulness. They reported that the 
sheikhs welcomed presents, particularly clothing, but also tobacco and other trade 
122 MPIR March 1904, NRO IN 8/2/12. 
123 SIR 177, April 1909, PRO WO 106 232. 
124 MPIR March 1904, NRO IN 8/2/12. 
125 GGR 1907. 
126 SIR 138, Jan. 1906, and 140, March 1906, PRO WO 106 228; SIR 177, April 1909, PRO WO 106 
232. 
'2'GGR 1907. 
128 MPIR March 1904, NRO IN 8/11 12; Jennings-Bran-dy, AI Gov, 'Report of a tour among the Bans 
of the East Bank', 27 Aug. 1906, NRO IN 8/2/12. 
129 Jennings-Bran-dy, A/Gov, 'Report of a tour among the Bans of the East Bank', 27 Aug. 1906, NRO 
IN 812/12 -1 MPIR May 1906, NRO IN 8/2/12. 
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goods. 130 Officers also handed out Remington rifles, describing them as 'a badge of 
o ffi. c e'. 13 1 As in the Enclave, clothing and military symbols were being adopted to 
signify the 'government' chiefs. Their prominence also enabled them to benefit from 
trade; sheikhs were frequently reported to possess ivory for, or cattle from, trade. ' 32 
They also took advantage of their guns, or of the assistance of government soldiers, 
to exact tribute in grain or labourers from neighbouring settlements. 133 The position 
of 'wakil' or headman, was reported to be unpopular, and in one case was held by a 
half-paralysed elderly man, perhaps because they were bullied by the chiefs. 134 
The British policy of establishing the sheikhs as 'representatives of government' 
may have increasingly fitted with both individual ambitions and community 
strategies. According to British reports, by 1907, even the "more independent 
tribesmen... were not slow to recognise that the Sheikh being virtually approved by 
Government as its agent... it was more desirable to be on good terms with him than 
in opposition". 135 As in the Lado Enclave, the threat of the violent power of the 
colonial governments made people turn to the individuals who had been gaining 
recognition over the nineteenth century for their knowledge in relation to external 
powers. The moral compact thus formed would lead in turn to the chiefs being 
invested with a little of the coercive force of the colonial state. But their authority 
rested more on their ability to keep that state at bay. 
130 SIR I 10, Sept. 1903, PRO WO 106 225; Cameron, 'Inspection tour in the Southern Mandari 
country', SIR 140, March 1906, PRO WO 106 228. 13 1 GGR 1907. 
132 SIR 110, Sept 1903, PRO WO 106 225; Cameron, 'Inspection tour in the Southern Mandari 
country', SIR 140, March 1906, PRO WO 106 228. 
133 Dove, 'Tour of inspection through country occupied by Mandari Nyambara tribes between the 
Nile and the Bahr El Ghazal', Dec. 1908, SIR 177, April 1909, PRO WO 106 232; SIR 85, Aug. 
1901, PRO FO 78 5167; SIR 178, May 1909, PRO WO 106 232. 
134 Jennings-Bramly, A/Gov, 'Report of a tour among the Baris of the East Bank', 27 Aug. 1906, NRO 
IN 8/2/12. 
135 GGR 1907. 
108 
Chapter Two: Knowing the Foreigner 
4. Building up the Chiefs, 1910-1921 
In 1910 the Mongalla Provincial Govenunent took w, ýer the former Lado Enclave 
territories, and four years later also gained the Nile district of Uganda in exchange 
for the southern Enclave district of Mount Wati. 136 The period 1910-21 thus 
witnessed the consolidation of the province, occasional military patrols to subdue 
unrest or raiding, and efforts to register the population and establish regular 
administration. The continuity from previous administrations was apparent in the 
reliance on Egyptian mamurs or junior administrative assistants, who, like their 
British superiors, were military officers. ' 37 What little coverage the mamurs received 
in British reports tended to be negative, and by 1920 they were being blamed for 
"oppressive and illegal acts" throughout the province; a reflection of the militar-\, 
style of administration in this period. 138 But they were also settling cases as third- 
class magistrates and were generally in more direct contact with chiefs and people 
than the British Inspectors until well into the 1920s. 1 39 
However, the limited government personnel in the province (especially during the 
war) ensured that the inhabitants had room to continue to adapt and shift their 
strategies for dealing with government, and their political institutions. In some cases, 
the chiefs already recognised by the Belgians or British retained and expanded their 
wealth, influence or authority, taking advantage of opportunities to benefit from 
government backing or rewards. In other cases the British administrators struggled 
to find 'useful' chiefs, as powerful figures resisted government demands, or as they 
and their communities continued to rely on negotiators lacking in real authority. 
However, the sporadic use of force and punishment ensured that govemment, and 
those most prominent in dealing with government, had to be taken more seriously. 
And as the diverse chiefs came into more contact with the administrative centres. 
and adopted government or military rituals and regalia, so their roles came to be 
more distinct, and even prestigious. 
136 For the British administration of Southern Sudan up to 1918, see Collins, Shadows, pp. 228-56. 
137 See Douglas H. Johnson, 'From Military to Tribal Police: Policing the Upper Nile Pro"rice of the 
Sudan', in David M. Anderson and David Killingray (eds. ), Policing the Ernpire: Government, 
Authority and Control, 1830-1940 (Manchester, 1991), pp. 151-67; and Nuer Prophets, pp. 8-9. 
138 MPIR June 1920, NRO rN 2/48/408. 
139 See later reports on the courts: NRO MP 1/1,2. 
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4.1 Uncertain Authority 
As the British took over the new territories, they encountered some difficulties in 
terms of inherited 'chiefs'. In parts of the Enclave, they reported in 1910 that ivakils 
or even heads of families were trying to 'break away' from their sheikhs and set 
themselves up as independent chiefs, often by returning 'gifts' of cattle or guns to 
their former patrons. 140 This reinforces the idea that chiefship under the Belgians had 
been a short-terrn form of patronage and protection, and the arri,., al of the British 
appeared to offer opportunities for relationships of dependency to be renegotiated. 
Some sheikhs expressed concern to the British that they would be replaced, 
admitting that they themselves had been appointed by the Belgians, and that their 
wakils were eager to gain independence. 141 The opportunism and contingency of 
chiefship at this time was reflected in one story told by a British administrator: 
A certain one Sali, posing as a Kakwa chief, came into Yei shortly after the 
Sudan occupation and complained of being raided by the Lugware, 
demanding help against them. It was found that Sall lived on the Belgian side 
of the border, and so he was sent back. Shortly afterwards I... found this 
same Sali some two or three days from his village, levying a tax of flour 
amongst the Lugware, no doubt persuading them that they would be 
punished by the Government if they did not comply. It then appeared that he 
was not even a chief, but a renegade Lugware who had adopted Kakwa 
customs and was living with the chief Loji. 142 
The story is also revealing of the disparity between the flexible local, and the rigid 
British, understandings of ethnic identity; the latter demonstrated by the assumption 
that Sali must be a 'renegade' if he was living as a Kakwa. 
There was particular uncertainty regarding the authority of the early chiefs in certain 
areas. The west-bank Bari, for example, were said to have no significant chiefs at 
all, though they acknowledged the authority of Kwajo at Gondokoro. 
143 The British 
140 SIR 193, Aug. 1910, PRO WO 106 234; Owen to Percival, Senior Insp. Loka-Kagulu District, I 
July 19 10, NRO MP 1/8/5 L 
141 Owen, 'Occupation of the Lado Enclave' May-June 19 10, NRO MP 1/8/5 1. 
142 Stigand, Equatoria, p. 88. 
143 Owen to Percival, Senior Insp. Loka-Kagulu District, I July 19 10, NRO MP 1/8/5 1. 
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had to literally create chiefs here, and try to amalgamate villages under them. 144 
Similarly in the Fajelu areas, a missionary visitor In 1911 reported that the chiefs 
were all weak, having been put in place by the Belgians. 145 Today Fajelu chiefs are 
said to have had diverse origins, but to have been appointed under the British or 
Belgians without indigenous precedent. One story traces them to the building of 
roads and moving of villages onto them, when the British appointed road overseers 
146 or headmen, who became the 'chiefs'. Another account suggests that it xvas the 
wealthiest households, who could entertain 'government visitors', whose leading 
members were recognised as chiefs. 147 Further north, the 'scapegoat' or client 
Mandari chiefs accepted during Belgian rule were, according to one infori-nant, 
increasingly resented for their slave origins, as they sought to impose and implement 
government demands. One community is said to have taken their case to the British 
D. C. and explained the lack of legitimacy of their Dinka chief, but the D. C., no 
doubt reluctant to risk change, refused to allow his deposition, supporting the chief s 
own argument that he had earned his position by risking his life under the 
Belgians. 148 The scapegoat motif also continued in reports of sheikhs as 'half-witted' 
or 'practically imbecile'. 149 Chiefs sometimes hid on the arrival of the British 
Inspector, adding to the impression that their recognition by the government was not 
necessarily desirable. 150 
The original role of many of the 'sheikhs' as interpreters or spokesmen was also 
apparent after 1910. They were frequently reported to speak Arabic, suggesting the 
continuing importance of linguistic knowledge in their selection. 151 More generally, 
links to Nubi culture and previous experience of the turuk remained significant; for 
example, the Makaraka of Meridi District were reported to be living "under a man 
144 Stigand, Equatoria, p. 42. 
145 Shaw, 'Trek No. I (Lado Enclave 3 rd Jan - 30'h Jan)' (n. d., 1911), CMS Acc. I 11, F 1. 146 Interview with Simon Wani Ramba, 10 Jan. 2003, Khartoum. 
147 Interview with Festo Lirni Sominda, 14 Jan. 2003, Khartoum. 
148 Interview with Gajuk Wurnyang Lupaya, 28 Nov. 2002, Khartoum; Buxton, Chiefs, p. 40, ffi 1. 
149 Owen, 'Report on Tour of inspection in Moru and Niambara districts', June 1911, SIR 205, Aug. 
1911, PRO WO 106 6224. 
150 SIR 213, April 1912, PRO WO 106 6224. 
15 1 Owen, 'Notes on Enclave', 19 10, NRO MP 1/8/5 1; Owen, 'Report on Tour of inspection in Moru 
and Niambara districts', June 1911, SIR 205, Aug. 1911, PRO WO 106 6224; SIR 195, Oct. 1910, 
PRO WO 106 234. 
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repatriated from Khartoum". 152 Chief Madreggi, a Moru, had been one of Arabi 
Dafalla's jehadia, and was known as a 'great linguist'. 153 Similarly, members of 
Chief Ramadalla's family in Yei were Muslims; his sister had lived in Omdurman, 
and her brother-in-law claimed to have been in Darfur with Ali Dinar and later to 
have fought under Arabi. 154 Thus the 'chiefs' assumed by the British to be 
'traditional' authorities embodied the local adaptations to the foreign incursions of 
the nineteenth century. 
4.2 Patronage and Force 
Not all chiefs had such origins however; the varied contingency of early colonial 
chiefship was also reflected in an example like Kajo-Kaji, where the rain priests 
became chiefs while the powerful land custodians became sub-chiefs. 155 According 
to one interviewee, the colonial governments found it easy to reinforce the authority 
of the Kuku rain chiefs, because of the 'cattle culture'. They were already wealthy in 
cattle (as Chief Kajo-Kaji's name reflected), and appear to have retained or rebuilt 
their herds at a time when most were being wiped out by disease. The area was well- 
situated to dominate trade between the Yei area and Uganda: the Kuku were 
reported to have bought ivory from the Lugbare and Kakwa with sheep and goats 
and then sold the ivory to Ugandan traders for cattle. 156 As elsewhere, the early 
chiefs tended to dominate such trade in ivory, and they were also given cattle by the 
colonial governments. 157 Wealth in cattle enhanced their power by giving them 
influence over the marriages of their dependents. 
Other chiefs - often inherited from the Belgian regime, which had rewarded useful 
chiefs with cattle and guns - also played a role as patrons or 'big men'. Their wealth 
enabled them to gain followers, which could then enhance their military strength, 
and gain them further clients. They retained alliances with 'wakils' by giving them 
152 SIR 201, April 1911, PRO WO 106 6224. 
153 EPMD July 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53. 
154 Richardson, A/Governor to A/D. C. Yei, 24 Sept 193 1, NRO EP 2/23/86. 
155 SIR 201, April 1911, PRO WO 106 6224; Stigand, Inspector Rejaf Merkaz, to Governor, 6 March 
1911, NRO IN 2/29/239; Interview with Barnaba Durno Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
156 Vanden Plas, cited by Huntingford, Northern Nilo-Hamites, pp. 44-5. 
157 Newcombe, 'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO WO 106 23 1. 
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guns or livestock. 158 Lukudu, Bengali and Kape were some of the most prominent 
examples in the former Enclave, and all succeeded in remaining recognised as chiefs 
under the British, and being succeeded by their sons. 159 
However, while patronage relationships might involve the performance of certain 
obligations by clients, this would not extend to all the labour and tax demands made 
by the government. Administrators in some cases therefore had to use government 
soldiers to enforce the authority of a chief. For example when Bengali died in 1914 
and his son succeeded him, Lugware clients living in his community rose up under 
their own leader Debbe and refused to supply porters to the mamur, reportedly 
seeking to escape from 'government supervision'. The government sent a patrol, 
which burnt Debbe's villages and left behind soldiers to 'protect' Bengali's 
successor. 160 Similarly in the Kuku area, Inspector Stigand and his mamur led 
patrols against resisting Kuku villages in 1912, who were led by "a man of some 
standing, but not a chief, by name Kazwali", who was 'giving trouble' to the local 
chief 16 1 The takeover of the Lado Enclave had also involved deliberate displays of 
the military force of the state. 162 While force alone could not have conferred lasting 
legitimacy, it may have further convinced people of the value of the protection that a 
government-recognised chief could provide. 
Force was also employed in Lokoiya country east of the Nile. When the Sudan 
Government took over the area from Uganda in 1914, it recognised Jada lo Rugang 
as chief of Lyria. By the following year however, he had 'resigned' as chief, handing 
over the role to a Latuka man named Lokidi. The records suggest that Jada returned 
in 1917, but he was clearly uncomfortable as government chief 
163 Simonse argues 
that in this area the ruling monyomiji made it difficult for chiefs to cooperate with 
158 Owen to Percival, Senior Insp. Loka-Kagulu District, I July 19 10, NRO MP 1/8/5 
1. 
'59 Bangali had 100 rifles and raided neighbours: 'Notes on the Lado Enclave 
by the Lado 
Conunission, 19 10', NRO MP 1/8/5 1; Lukudu "was much used by the Belgians to raid other chiefs, 
and possesses a large herd of cattle (about 2000), most of which were captured 
by Belgian order from 
the Madi tribe to the south": Shaw, 'Trek from Rejaf to Loka', March 
1911, CMS Acc. I 11, F3. 
160 SIR 238, May 1914, PRO WO 106 6225. 
161 SIR 213, April 1912, PRO WO 106 6224. 
162 Owen, 'Occupation of the Lado Enclave' May-June 1910, NRO MP 
1/8/5 1. 
163 'Tribal no. 20, Liria', NRO JD I/l/2. 
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the government. 164 In 1918, Lokoiya from Ilangari attacked a police patrol, claiming 
that the police Onbashi, who they killed, had been too heavy-handed in demanding 
carriers. They went on to attack mail carriers and merchants in the area, until a 
company of the Equatorial Battalion was sent, resulting in the deaths of 48 
Lokoiya. 1 65 Further unrest over carriers was reported from the area in 1920.166 In this 
area then, people adopted outright resistance to the colonial govenunent, rather than 
following the strategy of relying on a 'chief to negotiate in their interests. This was 
partly because of a stronger institution of collective authority in the monyomiji, and 
partly because the demand for porters had exacerbated hostility, especially among 
the junior men of the age-set below the monyomiji. 1 67 
4.3 Division ofPowers 
Where government demands were particularly excessive, the role of government 
chief was thus bound to have been a difficult one. This may have resulted in further 
community or individual decisions to separate functions and powers, as had already 
often occurred near the Nile. ' 68 Fajelu traditions recall the 'splitting' of powers in 
the early colonial period: "the administration was given to neutral people. They 
could be from the same family, so they would say so-and-so you become responsible 
for rain and for witchcraft, but this man we are keeping him for a special case which 
is administration". 169 In 1914 the new Belinian rain chief Molodiang declared 
himself unable to perform "the two onerous roles of Rain Chief and Government 
Chief', and requested that his relative Logunu take on the latter, a division which 
would remain permanent. 170 It appears that Jada of Lyria was also trying to pass the 
burden of the administrative role to Lokidi, whose Latuka ancestry may indicate a 
client status. Similarly at Lumer, the headman Faragalla was a Moru who had been 
seized by Arab raiders as a child and sold to the rain chiefs family: "today at 
164 Simonse, Kings, pp. 134,176. 
165 MPIR Aug. 1918, NRO IN 2/48/408. 
166 Latuka DMIR, Jan. and April 1920, NRO MP 1/4/27. 
167 Simonse, Kings, pp. 176-7. 
168 Interview with Serafino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
169 Interview with Simon Warn Ramba, 10 Jan. 2003, Khartoum. 
170 Beaton, 'A Chapter', p. 192 
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Lumer, the true son is Rain Chief and the bought but later adopted child Faragalla is 
headman". 171 
A distinction was thus being made between the administrative ftinctions of 
government chiefs, and other forms of power which continued to exist, a process 
encouraged, though not fully understood, by the colonial administrators. Their 
invented notion of a 'chief or 'sheikh' was appropriated and reshaped by the people 
of the region as they sought to get the best deal out of their relations with the 
colonial administration, and as the 'chiefs' themselves forged greater prestige for 
their position. They were pushed or drawn increasingly into acting as intermediaries 
at the interface between government and local society, a role which required a 
growing degree of specialist knowledge or experience. 
4.4 Displays of authority 
As part of these processes, chiefs were coming into contact more with the foreign 
administrators and their centres. They were invited to attend rituals and ceremonies, 
such as meeting the Governor at ReJaf in 1910, when they all had to take part in a 
dance. The following year the chiefs of Lado District returned to ReJaf to meet the 
Governor-General Wingate at a lavish ceremony in which they were presented with 
gifts of clothing or decorations. 172 Soon after, a group of chiefs and relatives of 
chiefs, including Kape of the Makaraka, Ramadalla of Yei district, and the son of the 
Moru chief Niari, were taken on a visit to Khartoum, for which they had reportedly 
volunteered enthusiastically. 173 Chiefs on a more routine basis had to come in to 
district headquarters, and were even encouraged to have 'town houses', where they 
could stay while on 'government business' . 
174 They seem to have enjoyed bringing 
cases to the administrators to be settled, seeing it as an opportunity to meet and talk 
with each other, and gain news which they could then bring back to their 
communities. 175 
171 'Tribal no. 20, Liria', NRO JID I/l/2. 
172 SIR 193, Aug. 1910, PRO WO 106 234; SIR 199, Feb. 1911, PRO WO 106 6224 
173 Owen, 'Report on Tour of inspection in Moru and Niambara districts', June 1911, SIR 205, Aug. 
1911, and SIR 207, Oct 1911, both PRO WO 106 6224. 
174 Shaw, Yei, 25 July 1917, CMS Acc. I 11, F4. 
175 Owen, 'Occupation of the Lado Enclave' May-June 19 10, NRO MP 1/8/5 1. 
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Partly as a result of these experiences, chiefs were increasingly adopting ntuals or 
badges of their office. The practice of wearing European military outfits and having 
cretinues' or 'bands' with rifles or older guns, and bugles and drums, remained 
particularly common in the former Enclave territory. 176 It also spread beyond 
though, with Moru sheikhs reported to be wearing khakis and busbies presented 
them by the Governor-General. 177 In addition, tables and chairs, tobacco pipes, 
papers, and even a metal boat bought with ivory from a Khartoum merchant, Nvere 
displayed by chiefs, with a symbolism beyond their practical use. 178 It may be that 
the government demands for tax and labour forced chiefs to make new demands on 
their people, and that they therefore turned to new outward displays and badges of 
authority in order to underline their right to make such demands. 179 On the other 
hand they may have used these displays more to impress the governilient visitors 
than their own people. 
Finally, by 1920 there were also signs of the development of new forms of expertise 
and ritual within the chiefly sphere of knowledge. Towards the end of this period, 
the first Christian missions began to set up schools in Yei and then Juba. They 
requested chiefs to send their sons, and some chiefs began to associate themselves 
more with the missions, and to welcome assistance from the first graduates of the 
mission schools. ' 80 There is little evidence regarding the judicial role of chiefs at this 
time, but there is occasional mention of them settling cases. ' 81 More significantly, it 
was reported in 1915 that "the local chiefs are said to copy in their courts all the 
procedure and formalities of a Government office". ' 82 Thus chiefs were not only 
bringing back physical badges and news from their visits to governinent centres, but 
176 Storrar, 'Letters From the Sudan, vol. 5', 15 April - 17 June, 1917, SAD 53/l/1-536. 177 Owen, 'Report on Tour of inspection in Moru and Niambara districts', June 1911, SIR 205, Aug. 
1911, PRO WO 106 6224. 
178 Owen, 'Occupation of the Lado Enclave' May-June 19 10, NRO MP 1/8/5 1; Shaw, 'Trek No. 2 
(West into Bahr El Ghazal Province and then South returning through the Lado Enclave) 4 April - 25 
June, prob. 1911, CMS Acc. I 11, F 1; Gwynne, 'Diary June-July 191 V, CMS Acc. 18, F 1/49; Spence 
to mother, Yei, 15 July 1915, SAL D12/202/1-19. 
179 See Hanson, Landed Obligation, p. 188. 
Gibson, Yei, 18 Dec. 1918,5 Dec. 1921, Sept. 1922, CMS G3 AL. 
Spence to mother, Yei, 29 May 1915, SAL D12/202/1-19. 
182 Crowfoot, Director of Education to Governor-General, 'Education in MP', 14 June 1915, CMS G3 
so. 
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were beginning to display their knowledge through the new ntuals and mystenes of 
administration. 
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Conclusion 
The period up to about 1920 has been characterised by historians of Southern Sudan 
as a period of military administration. 183 By 1920, the Khartoum Govemment was 
expressing concern at the extent of force being employed by the \Ioii-galla 
administration on a regular basis, both in terms of corporal punishment, and punitive 
patrols. 184 The following year, a rising by sections of Mandan and Aliab Dinka in 
retaliation for the extent of force employed by the govenu-nent, especiallý, the 
mamur, resulted in further use of military force to subdue it., 85 This was the last 
serious confrontation or patrol in Western Mongalla, so that it could be seen to mark 
the end of a period of 'conquest' or 'pacification'. 
However, such depictions obscure the complexity of the processes of adjustment 
already going on before 1921. Force was a significant element of relations between 
the colonial government and the chiefs and people in this period, but it was not the 
only story. It is also possible to see the evolution of the government chiefs, from 
very diverse origins, into something akin to an institution, N-vith more homogenous 
functions and appearances. Whether they had seized their position through their own 
endeavours, or been pushed into it by their communities, or by accidents of British 
identification, their role increasingly demanded forms of knowledge and experience 
that were distinct from other kinds of power. In some cases this led to a clear 
division of functions by communities, while elsewhere rain chiefs or big men took 
on the administrative functions with varying degrees of success. But what is 
apparent overall is the recognition by communities themselves of the need for 
someone suitable to play the role of 'chief, however they translated that concept, in 
order to manage relations with 'government' in their best interests. New symbols or 
objects of authority had also evolved, such as clothing, guns and other trade goods, 
and were perhaps beginning to replace rain as the most potent expression of political 
power, even if the latter remained a crucial component of moral authority vvithin 
communities. 
183 E. g. Daly, Empire, pp. 396-7. 184 Daly, Empire, p. 15 1. 
185MPIR May 1918, June 1920, NRO rN 2/48 408, Governor Willis, UNP. to CS, re 'The Future of 
the Marnour', 16 March 1921). NRO CS 1/11/36; NIPIR Oct. -INov. 19-11, NRO IN 2130ý 25L 
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From the 1920s, the British administrators would become increasingly concerned (in 
theory) with how 'true' or 'traditional' the chiefs of Mongalla were. They would 
also seek to make their authority more defined and permanent. But it is important to 
recognise the fluidity and dynamism of 'tradition', as the changes of the nineteenth 
century demonstrate. By 1920, the 'chiefs' were neither the product of a timeless 
tradition of hereditary rulers, nor were they a novel and despotic form of authoritý., 
imposed by colonial governments and heralding the destruction of all previous 
political tradition. Instead they were emerging as an institution which combined 
elements of longer-standing traditions of authority with newer forms of knowledge 
that had developed to meet the needs of the changing situation in Western Mongalla. 
From the 1920s, their role would continue to adapt and develop, particularly as the 
managers of relations with a government that would increasingly seek to inten, clic 
in the lives of the people of this region. 
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Chapter Three 
Knowing the Government: 
The Ascendancy, Crisis and Domestication of Chiefship, 1921-56 
Introduction 
By 1921, a diversely derived and loosely defined institution of chiefship had 
developed in Western Mongalla through the interactions between communities and 
foreign influences and governments since the nineteenth century. As the previous 
chapter showed, the role of the chiefs had been largely shaped by their knowled,,, c 
and abilities in relation to foreigners and external 'government', as recognised b%, 
their communities. Their actual authority varied according to their access to other 
kinds of expertise and power, notably rain, as well as to the capacity of the colonial 
government to back up their authority. From the 1920s however, their role and 
authority were increasingly defined through their knowledge and experience of 
government institutions, rituals and symbols. The government was intent on buildim, 
up the power of chiefs through policies of devolution, which invested their courts 
and police with some of the coercive force of the colonial state. In many cases, the 
chiefs were therefore appearing to be the agents or employees of the government, 
using their courts to enforce obedience to their own authority, in a pattern 
documented elsewhere in colonial Africa, and described by Mamdani as 
'decentralised despotism'. ' 
However, from about the mid-1930s the increasing power of the chiefs would be 
checked by a number of factors. Firstly they lost some of their monopoly over 
knowledge of government, as mission education and government bureaucracy 
produced other interlocutors and generally diluted the prestige of such knowledge. 
Secondly, popular resistance became increasingly disabling, especially during the 
war years, forcing chiefs to accept their inability to force people to comply with their 
orders, and encouraging them to rely more on consultation and persuasion. Thirdly, 
1 Nlamdani, Citizen and Subject, especially pp. 23,43-48,54. 
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the provincial government underwent a fundamental shift in its thinking. partly as a 
result of the wider theoretical changes outlined in Chapter One, and partly through 
observation of this resistance and of the maintenance or development of more 
collective kinds of authority. The colonial discourse of local governance shifted 
from building up the chiefs to favounng a more 'democratic' and 'clan'-based 
system. This in turn may have reflected an increasingly vocal competition with the 
chiefs from those claiming to be 'clan-heads' or sub-chiefs. 
Caught between the contradictory and yet partially converging expectations and 
pressures of the government and their people, the chiefs were thus under 
considerable pressure from the late-1930s. Their responses varied, but the majority 
seem to have adapted their role through both innovation and recourse to elements of 
local political tradition. They increasingly developed their role in adjudication and 
arbitration and emphasised their skills of consensus-building in the community. 
They also re-emphasised their ability to be gatekeepers, concealing and defending 
their communities. Some of them found new ways to demonstrate the value of their 
knowledge of government, especially if they were literate and had been employed in 
the administration previously. They used a newer language of development, 
modernity and rights to depict themselves as the spokesmen for the interests of their 
people. The real test of the effectiveness of these various strategies, however, would 
come in the last decade of colonial rule, when the authority of the chiefs would 
come under new pressures as a result of the sudden shift to elected political bodies 
and engagement with national politics, and the emergence of the first 'Southern 
politicians'. 
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1. The Ascendancy of the Chiefs 
LI Devolution 
As Chapter One showed, the 1920s saw the formal adoption of indirect rule by the 
Sudan Government. 2 The Governor of Mongalla, Brock, voiced the changing 
rhetoric in 1924: 1 think in the past there has been too great a tendency to support 
the people against the chiefs", preventing them exerting "a useful author] t V". 3 11, 
fact, changes in local governance had already begun, through the institution ot' 
government-recognised courts. First introduced in Ugandan terntory before 1914, 
these 'Lukikos', made up of six to eight chiefs, were set up by distnct officials in 
Western Mongalla between 1921 and 1924.4 The actual court procedures vaned 
between distncts, but the overall pattern was for cases to be heard by the court and 
then their decisions reported to the D. C. or Mamur for recording and, if necessary, 
sentencing with magisterial powers. 5 
An integral accompaniment to the development of the courts was the creation of 
chiefs' police: "the natural concomitant of chiefs courts". 6 Each chief was to have 
three or four retainers to enforce his orders and the decisions of the court, and to 
arrest criminals. They were exempt from poll tax and their clothes and 'old' guns 
were to be paid for by the court fees and fines; an early step towards financial 
devolution. 7 The policemen were also to help chiefs in their tasks of building or 
repairing roads and rest-houses, but their pnmary role, in government eyes, was to 
,8 uphold the authority of the chiefs: "[t]hey will see that the Chief is respected' . 
2 For the details of government policy, see Collins, Shadows, pp. 52-84. 
3 Brock, Dep. Governor, to CS, 7 Oct. 1924, NRO MP l/l/2. 
4 Barber, 'Moving Frontier', p. 32; Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 
1933, NRO CS 57/35/13 1. In Buganda, a lukiko was the term for a council, but in northern Uganda it 
evolved into a meeting of government appointed chiefs... held largely to try judicial cases and to 
ass information and orders from higher to lower levels": Burke, Local Government, p. 37. 
Brock, Dep. Governor, to CS, 7 Oct. 1924, NRO MP I/l/2; (anon. ) 'Notes on Chiefs Courts in Yei 
and Loka' (1924), NRO MP 1/1 /2. 
6 Brock to CS, 27 June 1924, NRO MP I/l/2. 
7 D. C. Holland, 'Lukiko district order no. 2: Chiefs Police', 21 Sept. 1923; D, C. Central District to 
Governor, 25 Nov. 1926, both NRO MP I/l/2. 
8 D. C. Holland, 'Lukiko district order no. 2: Chiefs Police', 21 Sept. 1923, NRO Morigalla Province 
I/l/2. 
12 
Chapter 7hree. - Knowing the Government 
The 1920s also saw the removal of mamurs, from the Province, making the direct 
relationship between D. C. 's and chiefs more significant. As the previous chapter 
noted, the mamurs received scant or negative coverage in reports, but thev were 
often the principal supervisors of the early courts and the main executive and 
judicial officers, under the D. C. 's. 9 Yet British reports were contradictory. Mamurs 
were seen on the one hand as insensitive to local culture, and on the other hand as 
conniving with the chiefs: "[t]he usual type which is sent south Is not desirable, 
when touring a District they drink Merissa with the Chiefs, and generally at some 
time or other, break the Game laws and arrange with the Chiefs to conceal it". 10 The 
Aliab Dinka rising of 1919, in which Major Stigand lost his life, was blamed on the 
4malpractices' of the Mamur, and by 1924-5 all Egyptian mamurs were being 
evacuated from the Province. " Administrators seized the opportunity to deprecate 
the possibility of their being replaced by Sudanese sub-mamurs, who might seek to 
'lord it over' the 'native chief, and so between 1921 and 1931 the number of 
mamurs or sub-mamurs in the Province were reduced from around twenty to just 
one. 12 In welcoming their removal, Governor Skrine in 1929 emphasised that such 
'liaison officers' were not necessary in order to gain "insight into native feeling". 
Instead "[a] method of improving touch which may often succeed is to enlist in the 
police a native of the tribe to be administered (preferably a son of the chief) and in 
later years to make use of him in the administration of his tribe. "' 3 
Skrine was clearly a major proponent of indirect rule, and (apparently 
unintentionally) revealed the ironies of the doctrine: "[a]mong primitive natives who 
are not naturally subject to an orgamsed tribal discipline... obedience to the 
reasonable orders of their tribal chiefs is one of the first essentials to be 
inculcated". 14 He directed the drafting of the 1931 Chiefs' Courts Ordinance, which 
9 Holland, 'Lukikos District order No. 1: The Formation of Lukikos in the Moru Aliab district', 15 
Sept. 1923; Brock, Dep. Governor, to CS, 7 Oct. 1924; and Mamour Mongalla, 'Bar, -Mandans 
Habits and Laws of Legislation together with adopted rules for Mongalla district chiefs court', II 
Sept. 1924, all NRO MP I/l/2. 
'0 Maynard, enclosure in Governor Balfour to CS, 're The Future of the Mamour', 2 May 1929, NRO 
CS 1/11/36. 
11 Governor Willis, UNP, to CS, 're The Future of the Mamour', 16 March 1929, NRO CS 1/11/36. 
12 CS to Governors, 'Sudanese sub-mamur system and decentralisation', 20 Oct. 1924, NRO CS 
50/2/10; Reffern to Nalder, 29 Jan. 193 1, NRO CS 50/16/65. 
13 A. W. Skrine, 'Notes on current topics in Mongalla Province', March 1929, NRO CS 1/39/104. 
" Skrine to CS, 5 Jan. 1927, NRO CS 1/39/104. 
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marked the formalisation of the system of courts that had developed locally under 
the direction of individual colonial administrators. The Ordinance gave legal 
sanction' to the Lukikos, now termed 'B' Courts, and allowed sentences of 
imprisonment, fines or lashes, granting head-chiefs third-class magisterial powers. It 
also provided for the creation of 'A' Courts, consisting of just one chief, with 
headmen or elders appointed by him, which were intended to deal with the bulk of 
cases, so that the B courts could become more like appeal courts. 15 At the same time, 
salaries were introduced, or formalised, for chiefs, which gave further incentive to 
administrators to carry out 'amalgamations' of smaller chiefdoms under 'head- 
chiefs', to reduce the numbers of chiefs drawing salaries, and to create what they 
saw as 'viable' units of administration. 16 By 1929 the numbers of chiefs in Yei 
District had already been reduced from 56 to thirteen. 17 The rest of the chiefs were 
reduced to 'sub-chiefs', and received remuneration for tax collection rather than 
salaries. 18 Chiefs were made responsible for paying their own police and other staff 
by the mid-30s, and they were increasingly expected to supervise a range of 
activities, from maintenance of roads, resthouses, court houses and jails, to the 
introduction of new crops. 19 
The shift fTom a military to civilian administration during the 1920s also meant that 
Inspectors, or D. C. 's as they became, tended to spend longer periods of service in 
the province. The Southern D. C. 's, or 'Bog Barons' have attracted the attention of 
historians for their idiosyncratic and authoritarian styles of government . 
20 An 
example of such a long-serving administrator was Major Maynard, who attended 
court sessions in Yei district and "Intervened authoritatively in the hearing of 
cases". 21 He also welcomed the development of the courts as a channel of 
communication, asserting that "a D. C. in the South can now feel the pulse of his 
15 Governor MP to Governor UNP, 'Notes on native courts', 7 Sept. 1932, NRO CS 1/13/42. 
16 Governor Balfour to FS, 5 May 1930, NRO CS 1/39/104; (anon. ) 'Juba District Handbook', NRO 
JD 1/2/6. 
17 Sleeping Sickness Annual Report 1919, NRO MP 1/6/39; Nalder, Province Handbook, p. 60. 
18 Governor Balfour to FS, 5 May 1930, NRO CS 1/39/104. 
19 Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of Native Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 
1935, NRO CS 
1/39/105. 
20 E. g. Collins, Shadows, pp. 15-16,176. 
21 Davidson (LS), 'Note on Chief s Court at Yei', 15 May 1929, NRO CS 1/ 13/42. 
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people much better than he could before, through the Native Courts- 
. 
22 The 
depiction of Southern D. C. 's as exercising virtual direct rule in their districts should 
be tempered by an awareness of their limitations and inability to supervise such huge 
areas closely; hence their desire to centralise authority in fewer chiefs and to use the 
courts as a source of information. They built up personal relationships Nvith the 
chiefs, who were thus established as the principal interlocutors between government 
and people. 
1.2 Chiefs' Courts and Police 
Initially in the 1920s, some of the chiefs seem to have viewed the new courts as an 
unwelcome government imposition. In Mongalla District, Lukiko rules included 
fines for chiefs who failed to attend, and in 1926 it was suggested that paying chiefs 
by the session might encourage them to try to be selected for the court, and increase 
their 'interest' in it. 23 The novelty of a judicial role for some chiefs was hinted at in 
the Governor's wish for the courts to "inculcate" in the chiefs that they should be 
settling cases. 24 However, the chiefs also began to take advantage of the 
opportunities for enhancing their own prestige and authority. Administrators had this 
intention when they laid down rules for the court buildings and furniture which 
f 25 spatially and physically demonstrated the status of the chie S. Presidents of courts 
were given "a badge of office", and chiefs were also given rifles and bicycles, with 
emphasis on the need for them to move around among their people and supervise 
road maintenance. 26 Thus foreign clothing, badges and objects continued to 
symbolise the role of the 'foreigners" or 'government' chief. 
" Maynard, enclosure in Governor Balfour to CS, 're The Future of the Mamour', 2 May 1929, NRO 
CS 1/ 11/3 6. 
23 Mamour Mongalla, 'Bari-Mandaris Habits and Laws of Legislation together with adopted rules for 
Mongalla district chiefs court', II Sept. 1924; D. C. Central District to Governor, 25 Nov. 1926, both 
NRO MP I/ 1 /2. 
24 Brock, Dep. Governor, to CS, 7 Oct. 1924, NRO MP I/l/2. 
25 E. g. Holland, 'Lukikos District order No. 1: The Fonmtion of Lukikos in the Moru Allab district', 
15 Sept. 1923, NRO MP I/l/2. The spectacle of the chief's court was of sin-fflar significance in the 
Nuba Mountains: Willis, 'Violence, Authority', p. 107. 
26 Brock, Dep. Governor, to CS, 7 Oct. 1924, NRO MP I/l/2; Governor Balfour to FS, 16 Aug. 1929, 
NRO CS 1/39/104; SIR 365, Dec. 1925, PRO WO 33 999. 
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An increasingly central aspect of court and government ritual xN, as the use of Nvnting 
and the recording of court cases, in the vernacular and/or English. With limited 
numbers of literate clerks, this initially ensured the invol%, ement of D. C. 's or 
Mamurs, but gradually knowledge of writing would become increasinglý, valued by 
chiefs themselves. The Yei B Court president was chosen not because he was the 
, 27 'bigger' chief, but because he was "the only one that can read and write'. in 
general though, most chiefs were still illiterate and therefore the written court record 
was more a symbol than a skill . 
28From 1931, the court procedures were also more 
regulated, requiring trained clerks, and further imbued with ritual and symbols. For 
example, each court received a warrant, "a notable and ornate document, adomed 
with a seal... [to] be framed and hung in the Court House". 29 In 193 1, a murder 
enquiry by Amadi court resulted in "a voluminous document in Moru, the first of its 
kind", reflecting the increasing prominence of the written record in government 
procedures. 30 Even the A courts were each supposed to keep their own records. II 
As well as defining their role and sphere of knowledge more through 'government' 
rituals and symbols, the courts also offered chiefs the opportunity to gain wider 
information to take back to their homes. Just as administrators welcomed the courts 
as channels of communication, no doubt the role of chiefs as disseminators of 
information enhanced their status and value in the eyes of their communities. "The 
native is an inveterate gossip and no surer means of spreading a government order 
and the reason for it can be adopted than by explaining it to all assembled at a 
Chiefs' Court and allowing them to discuss it". 32 Courts were also an opportunity to 
meet with other chiefs and cement a distinct sense of identity. 
27 Davidson (LS), 'Note on Chief s Court at Yei', 15 May 1929, NRO CS l/ 13/42. 
28 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2'8. 
29 (Anon. ) 'Note on Southern Governors' views regarding draft chiefs courts ordinance', 13 Jan 
193 1, 
NRO CS 1/13/42. 
'0 'Extract Mongalla diary', March 193 1, NRO CS 1/39/104. 
31 Governor MP to Governor UNP, 'Notes on native courts', 7 Sept. 1932, NRO CS 1/ 13/42. 
32 Brock, Dep. Governor, to CS, 7 Oct. 1924, NRO MP l/l/2. See similar function of court as chiefs' 
meeting in Simon Roberts, 'Tswana Government and Law in the Time of Seepapitso, 
1910-1916', in 
Mann and Roberts, Law in Colonial Africa, pp. 167-84. 
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In the common pattern in colonial Affica outlined by Chanock then, the chiefs' 
courts became the means of enforcing the authority of the local authorities. 33 In 1924 
the proceedings of the Amadi court reported that more than a third of cases related to 
'tribal discipline', including refusals to perforrn labour or pay tax, and moving frorn 
one chief to another. 34 The early court regulations further emphasised the authority 
and rights of chiefs, including claims to a tusk or leg of hunted game, to labour in 
the chief s cultivation "to enable him to entertain guests, soldiers, other chiefs etc", 
and to absolute obedience to their orders; "[a]ll men under a chief are to be entirely 
under his control". Even fines for adultery were higher if it was an offence against 
the chief s family. 35 The courts will be discussed further in Chapter Six, but it is 
clear that there were opportunities for the chiefs to manipulate the initial recording 
of 'tribal laws' to their own advantage. 
In light of the novelty of producing written laws, and the extent of control and 
direction exercised by the D. C. 's, it is hardly surprising that these so-called 'native' 
courts were regarded by the people as "purely Government institutions", as a 
Governor of Mongalla would later complain. He added that the early courts were 
characterised by "an aping of what they thought were our ideas and our laws; and a 
tendency on the part of the chiefs police to push people about, make them stand at 
attention and so forth. ýiM As the previous chapter showed, the early colonial 
govenu-nents had been largely experienced as extractive and violent; now the chiefs 
were appropriating some of that coercive force and using the courts to display it. At 
the same time, the government was seeking to regulate the chiefs' own coercive 
resources through the recognition and appropriation of chiefs police. As the 
previous chapter showed, many chiefs had already had their own 'retinues' or 
'bodyguards', as one D. C. explained in 193 1: 
The Chiefs have what are known as 'shirkeli' and called Govemment police 
and BASINGARI, who are known and called the Chiefs police or retainers. 
33 Chanock, Law, Custom, esp. pp. 113-23. 
34 (Anon. ) 'Arnadi District Notes on Chiefs Courts', 1924, NRO MP 1/ 1 /2- 
35 Maynard, D. C. Opari-Yei district, to Governor, 'Lukiko regulations', 2 Jan. 1924, NRO MP 111/2.; 
Marnour Mongalla, 'Bari-Mandaris Habits and Laws of Legislation together with adopted rules for 
Mongalla district chiefs court', II Sept. 1924, NRO MP I/l/2. 
36 Governor MP to Governor UNP, 'Notes on native courts', 7 Sept. 1932, NRO CS 1/ 13,42- 
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It is likely that these are really more powerful than what we call Chiefs 
police. You will try to get the better BASINGARI to become Chi 1 37 iefs pol ce. 
These linguistic terms are interesting: 'shirkeli' or 'Serikali' was used widek. in East 
Africa to mean 'government', and in Uganda to mean 'soldiers' . 
38 'Basingan' 
derives from bazinqir, the private slave-soldiers of the Khartoum traders in Southern 
Sudan. 39 Their meeting in the idea of the chiefs' police symbolises the pulling 
together of different historical experiences of extraneous power in the region. In an 
attempt to make the chiefs' police more regulated and official, they were given 
uniforms, shipped from Britain, and badges as "outward signs of their authonty". 'o 
Yet this is likely to have only added to the impression that they and the courts 
belonged to the external domain of the government. 
1.3 The Government Chief 
The association of the chiefs with government may have invested them with a 
degree of force and power, but it also restricted them to one sphere of knowledge 
and authority. Other kinds of authority therefore continued to function, as a report 
from 1931 revealed: 
[I]nvestigations have elicited the existence of indigenous Chiefs' Courts 
generally under the big rain chiefs assisted by tribal elders... It also appears 
that in the native mind our chiefs' courts are regarded rather as Government 
than as Native Courts. 41 
This was particularly true for the Bari area, where: 
[C]ases have continually been heard by Rainmakers and headmen in 
council... [and] villages have always had a 'putet' to decide local cases. A 
further complication is that in some cases the Rainmaker is not the chief, but 
37 Richardson, D. C. HQ, to D. C. Moru, 26 June 193 1, NRO EP 2/23/86 - 
38 Personal conunent by Justin Willis; see also Brett L. Shadle, 'Patronage, Millenarianism and the 
Serpent God Mumbo in South-West Kenya, 1912-34', Aftica 72, no. 1 (2002), pp. 29-54, for 
reference to Serikah in Kenya. The term 'Sirikali' is still used today in Sudan for the chiefs' police: 
Nasiwa, 'Baseline Survey'. 
39 Collins, The Southern Sudan, p. 14. 
40 Brock, Dep. Governor, to CS, 7 Oct. 1924, NRO NIP I/l/2; Governor Balfour to FS, 16 Aug. 1929, 
NRO CS 1/39/104. 
41 'Diary', April 193 1, NRO CS 1/39/104. 
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continues to hold his local 'putet'. More investigation of the function of 
Monyekak and Rainmaker are essential before the courts can be said to be 
42 founded on a purely native basis. 
As these reports reflect, there was clearly a division of powers between 
'government' and other kinds of authority, especially rain chiefs, who retained 
primary judicial functions while the chiefs' courts simply enforced administrative 
orders. The previous chapter showed that there was a tendency since the nineteenth 
century to split the functions of rain/political power and foreign relations, but it 
seems to have become more prevalent in the 1920s and 30s, occurring even in areas 
where the chiefs had previously also retained rain powers. 43 There were a number of 
reasons for this. 
Firstly, despite their emphasis on 'traditional' authorities, administrators were 
increasingly hostile to rain-makers and 'ritual' authorities acting as chiefs. This was 
partly a prejudice against what one D. C. called "[a] useless lot of old scoundrels 
who play on the superstitious beliefs of the simple native", and partly a belief, based 
on experience, that rain chiefs did not meet the needs of government and were 
44 innately 'conservative'. In other words, rain chiefs had an authority independent of 
governinent backing which generally made them less amenable to administrative 
45 demands. In one case the D. C., Cooke, became so exasperated with the rain family 
as chiefs in Lyria that he imprisoned them and imposed a headman, Lolik Lado, as 
chief He explained that the rain chiefs had been respected for their rain powers, but 
were (unsurprisingly) not seen as the 'representative of Government'. 
46 The same 
D. C. led a policy in the 1930s of encouraging the replacement of older chiefs by 
their educated sons or relatives, though Lolik was the only one forcibly installed. 
The exception was the most prominent rain chief of all, Pitya Lugor, who refused to 
resign as chief, and whose people resisted amalgamation. 
47 
42 (Anon. ) 'Juba District Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6- 
43 E. g. 'Diary', April 193 1, NRO CS 1/39/104.: "The death occurred of 
Yokni Kerri a Bar, rain 
chief.. His son, who was educated by the Church Missionary Society, 
has succeeded him as chief 
but will not 'have the rain'. " 
44 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/3 5/13 1; 
(anon. ) 
'Juba District Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6. 
45 See also Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, p. 123. 
46 (Anon. ) 'Tribal no. 20 Liria', NRO JD 1/ 1/2. 
47 Nalder to CS, 2 April 1936, NRO CS 66/9/84. 
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The government was painfully aware of the authority of rain chiefs, and of its o%vn 
belief in maintaining a hereditary chiefship; it was therefore ideal if an educated 
relative of the rain chief could be appointed as chief A perfect example was the 
mission-educated chief of Belinian, Alessandro Muludiang Logunu, a member of the 
rain family, and allegedly able to trace his descent back for fifteen generations: "so 
here we have rain, hereditary [sic] and education on our sides! , 48 Chiefs themselves 
were clearly also using history to assert their own claims to hereditary authority; 
thus Pitya Lugor declared, "my chieftaincy is not new, it is an old state. Long ago 
when the Govt. came in this country, all the power was in the hand of my ancestors". 
He succeeded in being recognised as the only chief with "an ancient history" in the 
district. 49 
But secondly, many rain chiefs themselves were delegating the role of 
administrative chief to a (usually educated) relative, "whose ralson d'etre is to 
relieve him of the growing burden of secular affairs". 50 As another official put it, the 
rain chiefs did not want to be bothered by "undue preoccupation with mundane 
matters". 51 Rain chiefs retained "the respect and confidence of the people" more 
52 effectively by remaining "the power behind the elected chief'. This suggests that 
the 'mundane' or 'secular' functions of the chief did not carry much status: "this is 
exactly why when you are a chief you do not have a lot of power... people expect 
you to do the work that they want". 53 Even in the courts - supposedly the arena of 
chiefs' expertise and power - it was reported in 1929 that, "the Chief s authority is 
not sufficiently established to enable him to keep order in the Court if the public are 
admitted" . 
54 
Senior elders in general were unlikely to want to become chief, seeing the fussing, 
ordering and deference to Europeans entailed as ill-befitting the dignity of their 
48 (Anon. ) 'Juba District Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6. 
49 Chief Pitya Lugor to Governor-General, Sindiru, 4 Jan. 1936, NRO CS 66/9/84; (anon. ) 'Juba 
District Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6. 
50 'Diary', April 193 1, NRO CS 1/39/104. 
51 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/35/131. 
52 EPMD Dec. 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53. 
53 Interview with Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, Khartourn. 
54 Davidson (LS), 'Note on Chief's Court at Yei', 15 May 1929, NRO CS 1/ 13/42. 
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position . 
55 A younger man with sufficient energy, and useful education. was often 
preferred. 56 One "elder statesman" thus refused a chiefship in favour of his educated 
nephew, because "the position could not sensibly increase his prestige and 
influence". 57 Such evidence challenges the idea of colonial chiefs as despots, with 
unlimited opportunity for profit and power. The chiefs' lack of authority withill their 
communities may have undermined their ability to demand obedience, which in turn 
suggests that their reliance on coercive force was in fact a sign of weakness. 
Thirdly, the people themselves seem to have retained a certain amount of control 
over the selection of chiefs, and were encouraging the division of powers: "[tlhere Is 
a tendency among the people themselves where a rainmaker's son becomes chief to 
give 'the rain' to his brother". 58 This may have been partly, as the Tonj D. C. 
suggested, "because a traditional chief had to be obeyed, and there were some 
government orders the people did not wish to obey. "59 But it also reflected the 
continuing popular recognition that certain kinds of knowledge enabled and 
equipped chiefs to deal more effectively with government. Increasingly this meant 
literacy and experience of government or mission employment. For example, in 
Tokiman on the death of Chief Lako Boreng in 1936, his half-brother Sambnno 
Soka, a hospital clerk, was "unanimously elected by the Bari elders". 60 These cases 
also reflect the apparent control over the succession maintained by communities, or 
at least by elders: "[t]he people themselves while tending to select within the family 
by no means regard the succession as passing necessarily to the son". 
61 Even the 
Bari rain chief, Pitya Lugor, was unable to secure his son's succession in the face of 
opposition from both his people and the Bari Council of Chiefs; his educated 
62 nephew was chosen instead . 
55 Bravrnan, Making, pp. II 1- 16. 
56 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
57 Moru District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
58 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/35/13 1. 
59 Hawkesworth, D. C. Tonj, to Governor Equatoria, 17 July 1939, RHL MSS Perham 548/4. 
60 Harrison, Asst. D. C. Central District, to Senior Medical Inspector Equatoria, 16 Spet. 1936, NRO 
DK3 1/6/32. Other examples: EPMD Sep 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29; Interview with Serefino Wani 
Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
61 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/35/13 1; EPAR 
1939, RHL MSS Perham 548/4. 
62 Juba District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
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Chiefs themselves were aware of the need to maintain an exclusi, -ýe sphere of 
knowledge in order to maintain any legitimacy In the community: "[N-%-]here they 
have no personal prestige and function merely as a result of Govenu-nent backing 
they can hardly be expected to succeed" . 
63 This explains their generally favourable 
attitude towards the first missions, who in turn courted them; their sons Nvere among 
the first pupils of the mission schools . 
64 By 1924, Aluma, a prominent chief since 
Belgian days, had a village school run by his own educated son. 65 In Yei, chiefs 
were said to have "become most keen on education", to the extent of building 
schools and teachers' houses, and paying their salaries. 66 As well as training these 
teachers, the missions also recognised the potential need of chiefs for educated 
assistants: "some boys now know enough to be able to return to their homes and act 
as interpreters and write letters in English for their chiefs, and so save their fathers 
long journeys through the bush to and from Government posts". 67 The illiterate 
68 
chiefs were even reported to be taught some reading and writing by their sons. In 
Kajo Kaji, the chiefs are remembered as having requested the first mission station 
themselves, so keen were they on the idea of education: 
The story was that they got a meeting, a border meeting between the chiefs 
of Uganda and the Sudan. During this meeting our chiefs were impressed by 
the educated Ugandans who took the minutes of the conference, the clerks. 
So the chiefs asked the District Commissioner of Yei that they want a 
mission to come there... [and] our first educated children came from the 
families of the chiefs. 69 
The mission focus on training the next chiefs also led to the mimicking of 
government procedures in schools, for example by electing schoolboy chiefs and 
holding courts, thus adding to the idea that they were accessing an exclusive 
government sphere of knowledge. 70 
Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of Native Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 193 5, NRO CS 
1/39/105. 
64 Shaw, Yei, 25 July 1917, CMS Acc. I 11, F4: "The Chiefs seem to really want their boys to learn to 
read and write". For narratives of Christian mission activity in Southern Sudan, see 
Collins, Shadows, 
pp. 197-48; Sanderson and Sanderson, Education. 
65 Director of Education, 'Report on education in Southern Sudan', I May 1924, CMS 
G3 SO. 
66 Finch, Yei, 5 May 1932, CMS G3 AL. 
67 Lea-Wilson, Juba, Nov. 1923, CMS G3 AL. 
68 Selwyn, Kajo Kaji, Oct. 1932, CMS G3 AL. 
69 Interview with Barnaba Durno Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Khartourn. 
70 Selwyn, Loka, 1930, CMS G3 AL. 
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The ascendancy of the chiefs in the 1920s and '30s thus relied on their continuing 
monopoly of knowledge of the government, as well as their investment by the latter 
with a degree of coercive force. This period saw them using the courts to display and 
enforce their authority in a manner which at certain times and places may have 
approached despotism. They were always constrained by the continuing authonty of 
rain chiefs and other powerful figures (who will be discussed more in later chapters), 
and by the collective conceptualisation of the government as an external domain. 
Yet this period also witnessed the consolidation of hereditary chiefship in Western 
Mongalla. Administrators, with typical unintended irony, welcomed this "evolution 
ý 71 of the ruling families' . But this was not entirely a change wrought by 
administrators; it also drew on an apparent popular belief that knowledge could be 
embodied in family lines, as in rain priesthood. Hereditary chiefship also brought 
greater immunity from government intervention in selection, and communities could 
at least exert some choice over which relative succeeded. Nevertheless, the 
entrenched position of the chiefly families may have begun to arouse some jealousy 
and clan or family rivalries, contributing to tensions from the later 1930s. 
71 Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of Native Administration in Mon i 
galla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 
1/39/105; Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei Districtý Equatoria', 15 Feb. 19391 NRO EP 
2/2/8. See also Tosh, Clan Leaders, pp. 181-218; Chanock, Law, Custom, P. 112. 
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2. Competition and Resistanceg 1930s-40s 
2.1 Losing the monopoly of knowledge 
Knowledge of Arabic had often been key to the recognition of the early chiet's b% 
both people and colonial administrators; for example, one chief in Yei district with 
no rain powers was said to have gained his position simply through his -xvide 
knowledge of bastard Arabic". 72 However, by 1930, it was decided that the language 
of the government should be English, not Arabic, as part of the Southern policy 
discussed in Chapter One. Many chiefs also remained illiterate, and so the 
government increasingly employed clerks and accountants at all levels to fulfil the 
bureaucratic functions of administration. 73 At the same time education xvas 
becoming more widely available beyond the chiefs' families: "when they saNN' that 
these children of chiefs and sub-chiefs were bringing home presents and that thcv 
were able to read and write and all this, they were encouraged and pupils began to 
rush' . 
74 
The relationships between the chiefs and the educated Christian staff of government 
and missions will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. The chiefs saw them as 
potential rivals, particularly as they had a tendency, reported with concern by one 
missionary in 1925, to "strut about with an air of superiority because they could read 
and write and were 'men of Jesus"'. 75 By the 1930s it was reported that, 
"[c]onstantly, troubles are ansing between chiefs and teachers; the former 
tremendously jealous of the power and present popularity of the latter, continually 
plotting and working against them". One chief resorted to tyrannical means of 
crushing this competition, by declaring that "he would flog everyone in his village 
who was a believer. 1976 More generally, though, chiefs were not alone in resenting 
the arrogance of teachers, and could rely on the support of other community 
authorities: "[floo often a young boy in this position seeks only to make himself an 
72 EPMD Dec. 194 1, NRO CS 57/14/53. 
73 In 1939 only 6 out of 16 Yei district chiefs had even basic literacy: Tracey, 'Note on NatiVe 
Adryunistration, Yei District, Equatona', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2/8. 
74 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
75 Fraser, Lui, 9 Nov. 1925, CMS G3 AL. 
76 Riley, Maridi and Yei, 30 Aug. 1934, CMS G3 AL. 
135 
Chapter Three: K? zoi4,, i? zg the Government 
important person in opposition to the local headmen or elders". In the long run, 
teachers seem to have been respected for their education, but did not gain authorivy 
within the community. By 1941, as a candidate at the Juba training school %NTOte, 
"[n]owadays the majority of the people do not think much of the teachers' work". 
Relationships with the chiefs were better where "the teachers respected the chiefs, 
, 79 they paid allegiance to them and showed their work to them'. InYei district, even 
though most chiefs were not Christian, "[t]he presiding chief will in some of the 
courts call in the local teacher to open the court with prayer and a short Gospel 
message .,, 
80 In such cases, the chiefs may have been co-opting the teachers to 
demonstrate their own link to the knowledge of the missions. 81 
Clerks on the other hand were much more intimately involved in the work of 
government and of the chiefs. By 1928, the Moru D. C. was recommending that 
chiefs' clerks be paid a salary; "[t]hey allow all communications from the District 
Commissioner to Chiefs to be sent in writing and assist in the collection of poll 
tax". 82 Especially when chiefs were still illiterate, they therefore had opportunity for 
financial gains; more than one court clerk was fired and imprisoned for embezzling 
tribute money. 83 According to interviewees, the chief s clerk was "the spokesman of 
the chief, the go-between between the chief and the people, explaining what the 
chief wants done to the people, and reports back to the chief about the people. So in 
that case he had a certain social status, he was given a special respect". 
84 But status 
was not the same as power, as informants are keen to emphasise; the educated were 
respected and had a 'special place' in society, but were not powerftil. 
85 The 
government was even less impressed by them: chiefs' clerks in Yei district were 
86 described as "very crude products", lacking in accountancy skills . Indeed, -[t]he 
77 EPAR 1937, NRO CS 57/24/99. 
78 Janson Smith, 'Report on Juba training school Final Examination, 194 V, NRO DK3 1/6/29- 
79 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
go Gibson, Yei, 1939, CMS G3 AL. 
81 See similar alliance between chiefs and educated Christians in Lango: Tosh, Clan Leaders, pp. 
192-8. 
82 Brock, Dep. Governor to FS, 25.8.28, NRO CS 1/39/104. 
83 E. g. EPMD March 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53; Interview with Serefino Wani Swaka, 
23 Feb. 2003, 
Khartoum. 
84 Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, 11 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
85 Interviews with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, and Serefino Wani Swaka, 20 Oct. 2002, 
Khartoum. 
86 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 212/8. 
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post of court clerk is not a career, it is not non-nally suitable for a grown man with 
, 87 wife and family'. People often disliked the clerks for their role in unpopular 
administrative measures, such as the issuing of passes to go to Uganda, and felt that 
they behaved arrogantly as a result. 88 In such cases the clerks may have been 
associated with the most unpopular aspects of the chiefs' work, and therefore been 
the first target of resentment. 
More powerful than teachers or clerks were the provincial and district police. The 
police often had similar origins to the chiefs; many had previously been soldiers. 89 
Increasingly they also had a degree of literacy, and were taught some basic English. 
They were also being given greater responsibilities and powers of criminal 
investigation. A complicated divorce case in Kajo Kaji in 1939, for example, was 
investigated and recorded by the Yei police sergeant, who also translated for the 
D. C. in the subsequent court case-90 But the police were situated firmly in the 
government arena; those who reported matters to them rather than to the chiefs were 
seen as informers. 91 
The written record continued to gain in prominence in government procedures, 
especially in the courts; for example by 1946 administrators declared "the aim of 
substituting eventually the simple production of a written record for this mass of 
verbal evidence" in matrimonial court cases. 92 Increasing opportunities were 
emerging for educated men, especially in the district and Province headquarters, 
where 'Station Officers' were beginning to be recruited for administrative and police 
duties, usually drawn from the high ranks of the police or clerks. 
93 Great emphasis 
was placed on their knowledge of English and they were expected by 1945 to keep 
station diaries, registers of information and records of police enquiries . 
94 In 1938, 
the Juba training school opened to train Intermediate School graduates in clerical 
87 'Minutes of District Commissioners' meeting, Juba', Jan. 193 9, NRO CS2 1/2/5; (anon. ) 'Juba 
District Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6. 
88 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham. 
89 John Winder, 'Fifty Years On: Service in Mongalla Province, 1930-33', (1979) SAD 54 1 71-32. 
90 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham, p. 
3 1. 
91 Interview with Serefino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
92 EPMD Sept. 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
93 E. g. EPMD Dec. 1944, NRO CS 57/20/78. 
94 Parr, 'Note for Mr Skeet', 20-30 Aug. 1942, NRO DK 57/1/1; also Cave, to 'Sir Hubert', 27 May 
1945, NRO EP 1/1/2; (anon. ) 'History of Station Officers', 23 Oct 1948, NRO EP 1/6/34. 
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skills and English. 95 Govenunent work was becoming more respected and soueht 
after, particularly in relation to mission employment, largely because it was better- 
paid. In 1947 Station Officers were granted third-class magisterial powers (equal to 
chiefs), and the following year their title was changed to 'Administrative Assistants'. 
Also in 1948 Southern candidates were eligible for the first time to sit exams for the 
newly reopened School of Administration in Khartoum, which trained mamurs and 
sub-mamurs. 96 
However, up to this point the influence of such people in the villages was limited; 
they were operating more in a distant government domain, though their x,,, ages might 
be welcomed. In contrast, the increasingly literate (to a basic extent at least) chiefs 
were being further installed as central figures in the community through written 
records. They were required to keep detailed and up-to-date registers of the 
population, which in Yei district involved the creation of chiefs' registries: "[s]uch 
little offices are really an intrinsic necessity to the reorganisation and control of the 
Tribal documents which operate administrative action', 97 [my italics]. Not only were 
chiefs being treated by administrators as the primary repositories of knowledge 
about their people and customs, but also that knowledge was increasingly embodied 
in records and registers. 
The opportunities for clerks, policemen and teachers to gain authority or compete as 
interlocutors with government were limited; the chiefs held on to their position in 
this regard. But the effects of education nevertheless undermined the monopoly of 
chiefs over certain kinds of knowledge. In addition, the rituals of administration and 
the courts were also becoming more public and accessible, thus reducing their 
mystery and power. The chiefs' courts appear to have become more popular, partly 
for their very performance. In 1937 there were reported "signs that taking cases to a 
court might become a cheap recreation akin [to] free cinemas in England", "all and 
sundry" were said to be attending the A courts. 
98 Knowledge of their procedures 
gradually became more disseminated; in 1938 a man appealed to his 
B court, 
95 Sandison to Morrison, Deputy Governor UNP, 21 Dec. 1938 and 9 Jan. 1939, NRO DK3 1/6/29. 
9' Beaton, Dep. Governor EP to CS, 22.9.48 and 4.12.48, NRO EP 1/6/34. 
97 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO 
EP 2/2/8- 
98 EPAR 193 7, NRO CS 5 7/24/99; (anon. ) 'Juba District Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6. 
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because the chief in the A court had sentenced him to more lashes than the court 
warrant allowed. 99 Many chiefs and policemen were prosecuted in the B courts for 
unfair or illegal activities, and the use of the B courts as appeal courts seems to have 
been increasingly understood. 100 In 1945, the President of Kajo Kaji B court %vas 
fined by his own court for "favouritism towards a relative" in his A court, and this 
prompted a number of other complaints about him to be voiced, relating to financial 
misappropriation. 101 The growing popular manipulation of the courts will be 
discussed further in chapter 6, but it is important to see it as another way in which 
the mystique or power of chiefs' knowledge of government ritual was being 
gradually undermined and diluted. 
2.2 Changing Government Discourse: The Clans 
At the same time, from the mid-1930s, the rhetoric and policies of the Provincial 
government were also favouring the chiefs less. ' 02 As Chapter I showed, the 
production of a Tribal Survey and a Province Handbook by Governor Nalder 
prompted a revision to ideas of tradition and native authority: 
The idea of the executive chief, completely foreign to their own conceptions, 
was fathered on the tribes by the incoming Egyptians and Europeans... One 
fact which has only recently emerged is the extreme importance in the social 
structure of many tribes, of the clans... the African of these parts is 
essentially democratic. ' 03 [My italics] 
In 1938, there was therefore a change from individual poll tax assessment to a clan 
tribute, which was supposed to be allocated and collected by the clan heads 
according to wealth and age within the clan; the intention was to encourage a sense 
99 EPMD Nov. 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29. 
100 E. g. YDMD March, Sept. 1942 and Dec. 1945, NRO EP 2/24/87; EPMD Feb. 1939, 
NRO CS 
57/11/42; Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
101 YDMD March 1945, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
102 For the wider British rhetoric from the 1930s emphasising 'public opinion' and the 
danger of 
autocratic chiefs, see Shadle, 'Changing Traditions', p. 428; Tosh, Clan Leaders, p. 143. 
For the 
British preference for clan heads as a more effective means of recruiting labour, see John 
Lonsdale, 
'The Politics of Conquest in Western Kenya, 1894-1908', in Bennan and Lonsdale, Unhappy 
Valley, 
Vol. 1, pp. 45-74, at p. 7 1. 
103 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/35/13 1. 
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of "corporate responsibility". 104 A year later however, the Yei D. C. was reporting Z") 
difficulties: "[t]he collective Idea has not yet been revived". 105 The effects of clan- 
based agricultural and land policies will be discussed in Chapter 4, but these agaill 
assumed a communal social structure. 
There was some confusion in relation to the definition of a 'clan'. In Juba district the 
Bari clans were dispersed over the area, with sometimes only a few members in each 
village. 106 The government policies rather conceptualised a clan as a 'family group' 
within a village or chiefdom. In Moru district, this caused problems because many 
'clans' had only two or three members; in the end it was agreed that "the territorial 
'mukongo' [headman] basis is the only one that offers any prospect of the successful 
implementation of the tribute PoliCyqý. 107 Administrators sought the 'original' clan 
heads from pre-colonial times, but in the past such a position is unlikely to have 
been so political or hereditary. ' 08 One D. C. hoped that the chiefs' registers of 
population would "impart a sense of cohesion to the family groups themselves", 
again revealing the disparity between government ideology and local realities. 109 
The greater government focus on communality and democracy led to some damning 
indictments of chiefship, summansed in 1938: "[t]he Chiefs have been so far the 
mouthpiece through which government orders have been issued to the people; the 
courts have been regarded as the government's way of settling cases. "110 Moru 
district was reported to be one of the worst examples: 
There appeared to be an absence of unity and mutual cooperation between 
chiefs and people; an absence on the part of the chief of a spirit of unselfish 
service towards his people, a lack of obedience and voluntary allegiance on 
the part of the people to their chiefs. The chiefs looked to their District 
104'Central District Information Book', NRO JD I/l/5; Governor Parr, 'Note circulated to D. C. 's on 
20 Dec. 1938 on Taxation', NRO EP 2/2/8. 
105 Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
106 Beaton, 'The Bari', p. 110; Lewis, 'Notes on Bari', SAD 600/7/1-49, pp. 6-20. 
107 EPMD Feb. 1939, NRO CS 57/11/42; Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97; Philip Yona 
Jambi, written reply, 2003, Khartoum; Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
'08 Liversidge, Asst. D. C. Yei to Governor, 28.10.38, NRO EP 2/2/8. See also Tosh, Clan Leaders, 
pp. 143-5: clans in Lango had not played a political role and the 'clan leaders' chosen as headmen or 
sub-chiefs were simply prominent or wealthy men. 
109 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2/8. 
110 EPAR 1938, NRO CS 57/25/103. 
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Commissioner for instructions and support in their dealings \-%-Ith the people. 
The people's point of view did not secure adequate presentation and all 
parties in consequence suffered. "' 
The government, therefore, while still relying on the chiefs to carry out its demands, 
was also increasingly trying to ensure that they were effective as channels of 
representation for the views of 'the people'. It emphasised the danger of the chief 
becoming an 'autocrat', and it also pressed for fewer sentences of corporal 
punishment, welcoming "a sensible diminution in the number of men flogged" in 
1939.112 Symbolically, Governor Parr ordered the removal of chiefs' uniforms and 
badges to try to ensure that they were no longer seen as 'Government' chiefs. ' 13 
While the British concern with 'democratic' structures of local government reflected 
wider colonial rhetoric from the 1930s, it may well have also resulted from an 
increasingly vocalised set of claims within Western Mongalla. As the chiefly 
families had become entrenched, other prominent men may have emphasised the 
'traditional' importance of clans and clan heads in order to make rival claims to 
authority. 114 The individuals in Western Mongalla designated as clan leaders, sub- 
chiefs and headmen are rarely prominent in the government records, but they must 
have played a significant role in the lower-level mediation between chiefs and 
people. In 1939, for example, the majority of cases in Yei district were reported to 
be handled initially by the unofficial sub-chiefs' courts. 115 It may well be that such 
people were responsible for the sudden government awareness of 'clans' in the 
1930s; such competing claims to historical status or identity will be explored more 
in Chapter Six. 
111 Moru District AR 193 9, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
112 Nalder tQ D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of Native Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO 
CS 1/39/105; Yei and Moru District AR's, 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
113 Margery Perham, 'Native administration book: draft chapter on the South' (1946), RHL MSS 
Perham 542/5. 
114 See Tosh, Clan Leaders, pp. 215-6; Lonsdale, 'Conquest State, p. 38; 'Moral Economy', p. 330. 
See also Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, p. 124: peasants "fondly recalled alternative traditions of 
rule by lineage elders". 
"5 Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94; also Interview with Lubari Ramba, 31-8-04, Mitika, Yei. 
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2.3 Crisis and Resistance 
The years of the Second World War marked something of a crisis of confidence in 
the chiefs on the part of both government and people. The war effort, together NN-ith 
further policies of devolution, greatly increased the functions required of the chiefs 
by the government, especially in terms of requisitioning labour and food crops. 
Labour had previously been obtained largely by the province police, but in 1938 it 
was decided that chiefs should have "their own road foremen, their own paid road 
gangs and will themselves be responsible for the maintenance of roads". ' 16 Chiefs 
were also made the focus for sleeping sickness inspections and (usually unpopular) 
agricultural interventions and projects, which will be discussed more in Chapter 
Four. 1 17 Concern at the effect of implementing these measures through the chiefs led 
the Yei D. C., Tracey, to produce a scathing attack on the system of requisitioning 
forced labour: 
On the administrative side he [the chief] has to be - of inevitable necessity - 
the odious tax collector... Otherwise he is simply a tulba-driver, forcing his 
people to perform on behalf of government services, which... they do not 
consider a duty but an impost... They are performed by the recalcitrant at the 
additional cost of beatings and imprisonment. For the chief has to reinforce 
his personal influence with discipline; and he is the more effective 
disciplinarian when his people do not dare to disobey. This is as direct as 
indirect rule can be... He inevitably has to appear as a government employee 
and against his own side. ' 18 
Such a depiction evokes Mamdani's idea of despotism, but it may represent an 
extreme; the D. C. was trying to get across a point to the Governor about the harmful 
effects of forced labour. Nevertheless, it contains important indications of the 
coercive behaviour of some of the chiefs over the previous two decades, and the 
danger they were facing by 1939 in appearing to be on the government 'side'. The 
result was an increasing inability to fulfil government demands, despite the use of 
physical force. 
116 EPAR 1938, NRO CS 57/25/103. 
117 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2/8; 
Juba District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
1'8 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2/8. 
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By 1945, British administrators had become concerned that conscript labour and 
forced sale of grain in particular had 'undermined' and "stralned the authority of 
chiefs severely". ' 19 One of the results was increased movement of people from one 
chief to another, or migration to the towns or beyond the Province; "Its effect was to 
teach the people that it paid handsomely to be truculent and as far avý, ay as 
possible". 120 Juba district reported "a spate of complaints from chiefs that their 
subjects have run away". 121 "Their people don't want to work and in most chiefships 
there exist hostile elements who are only too glad to find an opportunity to work up 
dissatisfaction". ' 22 In parts of Moru District, "police have to be despatched 
repeatedly to assist the chief and arrest delinquents". 123 One chief here was attacked 
in 1940 by "a number of disgruntled labourers who refused to go to work on the 
Wau road"; in another case a chiefs' policeman was stabbed by a resistant road 
worker. 124 Other attacks on chiefs took the form of 'witchcraft' or Christian 
revivalism. 
125 
The tensions of this period and the meaning of witchcraft and revivalism will be 
discussed in more detail in later chapters, but they had the cumulative effect of 
putting the chiefs increasingly on the defensive. The difficulty of their position 
resulted in at least one case where, "the chosen chief for a long while refused to take 
up his natural responsibilities as chief, but was finally induced by his subjects to do 
5 126 so'. This statement reflects an ironic convergence of government and popular 
discourses in relation to one aspect of chiefship: the idea of their 'natural 
responsibilities'. The hereditary chiefs had not simply gained coercive force; they 
had ended up in a position in which they were subject to the expectations of both 
government and people, which were frequently at odds. Their use of coercive force 
was more a reflection of their inability to command, and one which was increasingly 
119 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97; Juba District AR 1945, NRO EP 2/27/98; EPAR 1946, 
NRO DK 57/10/32. 
120 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
121 Juba District AR 1945, NRO EP 2/27/98. 
122 EPMD Aug 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
123 Moru District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
124 EPMD Aug 1940, NRO CS 57/12/46; YDMD, June 1943, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
125 EPMD March 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53; EPMD April 1944, NRO CS 57/20/78; reports in NRO 
EP 1/5/26. 
126 EPAR 1939, RHL MSS Perham 548/4. 
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ineffective in the face of popular resistance and changing government ideology. 
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3. Adaptations and Traditions, 1930s-50s 
The tensions of the war years exposed the potential or actual illegitimacy of the 
chiefs and the danger that they could be seen to be part of government rather than of 
their own communities, as seem to have been the case Ný,, 'ith the neighbouring Zande 
chiefs. 127 This was too risky: chiefs, especially if they Nvere young men, had to be 
careful not to damage their own prospects within the community, in terms of 
marriage, wealth and social networks, by antagonising the elders. 128 The coercive 
force of the colonial state was limited; chiefs who requested its backing too often 
risked removal by government for their own ineffectiveness. There was therefore a 
need for chiefs to maintain a degree of support within the community if they '. N'ere to 
be able to profit at all from their office in terms of wealth and prestige. Their 
strategies varied according to their own personalities and local specificities, but by 
the late 1930s-1940s they were increasingly drawing on deeper political traditions of 
arbitration and adjudication, as well as re-emphasising their gatekeeper role. 
3.1 The Cutter of Cases 
From the 1930s, the Provincial government increasingly reported an image of the 
chiefs' courts, which reflected the new colonial ideology of collective and 
'democratic' authority, and which is echoed in the testimonies of infon-nants today. 
These depictions emphasise the chief as 'head Juryman' or 'spokesman' rather than 
judge, whose role was the effective summing up of the collective opinion of the 
court. 129 Court procedures were and are described as 'democratic'; decisions resulted 
from discussion and reflected a 'consensus'. 130 
These depictions clearly represent an idealised scenario, especially in light of the use 
of force by chiefs outlined above, and the criticism by the Moru 
D. C. that "no 
127 Reining, The Zande, p. 27. 
128 Bravman, Making, pp. II 1- 16. 
129 Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
130 Governor Parr, Report to CS, 5 March 1942, SAD 817/3/1-88; Margery Perham, 'Native 
administration book: draft chapter on the South' (1946), RHL 
MSS Perham 542,15; Interviews with 
Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Francis Bassan, 18 Nov. 2002, and Paulino Wadn Lado. 
II Feb. 
2003, Khartoum. 
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opinion but that of the chiefs is represented" in the B courts. 13 1 But increasingly the 
ideal appears to have been translated a little into reality. This partly involved a subtle 
manipulation of illusion by the chiefs. In appearing to reflect collective opinion in 
their decisions, they were also engaged in shaping or directing it, as one report 
unintentionally illustrated: "it is rare and often impossible for a judgement to be 
given which is directly contrary to public opinion; where there is no public opinion, 
it can be and has been formed by the decision of the courts, eg - magic, witchcraft, 
and 'poison' cases generally are handled by 'B' Courts,,. 132 The absurd idea that 
there could be no public opinion in relation to such emotive issues as 'witchcraft' 
will be contradicted in later chapters, but the Governor's misunderstanding reflects 
the success of the chiefs in convincing administrators of their 'democratic' methods. 
Yet this was not entirely an illusion either. The reports suggest two popular cultural 
desires or expectations in relation to justice and governance. One, already 
mentioned, was the "desire for a wide panel of jurymen"; this was not just about 
obtaining a fair decision, but also reflected the enduring importance of speech and 
discussion. As one of the first Southern sub-mamurs remembers, the only way to 
solve major difficulties was by mass meetings of chiefs and people, and long 
discussion until a consensus could be achieved. 133 Chiefs are remembered as having 
called people to talk for a long time and "explain and explain". 134 The importance of 
long discussion was also expressed in "the fine sense of leisurely deck chair justice" 
said to characterise the courts of the Province. Deck chairs had remained since the 
Belgian time as "an integral part of the Court House ftimiture"; they can be seen as 
symbols of the discursive style of court proceedings. 
' 35 The management of such 
discussion required great skills of arbitration and mediation, and the use of 
"persuasive language". ' 36 
Secondly, there was a need and desire for adjudication: for resolution and for 
definite decisions that would be accepted, so that consensus could be maintained or 
131 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
132 Parr, Report to CS, 5 March 1942, SAD 817/3/1-88. 
133 Interview with Venansio Loro Lado, 11 Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
134 Interview with Daniel Jurrý Tongun, 10 Sept. 2004, Yei. 
135 EPAR 1942, NRO CS 57/28/114. 
136 Johnson, 'Judicial Regulation', p. 60. 
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rebuilt within the community. Colonial courts may have been initially instruments of 
control from above, as Chanock has shown, but they vvere also shaped over tinie bý 
popular needs, as Chapter Six will further demonstrate. 137 The chiefs appear to have 
- successfully in most cases - sought to transform their courts from being the means 
by which government orders were enforced and coercive power was displayed, to 
becoming more accepted arenas of judicial settlement for the community; a shift 
ftorn functions of administration alone to those of adjudication also. One definition 
given by an informant of what used to make a good chief or headman is s*mpl\' II 
"justice at settling disputes". ' 38 The Yei D. C. may have reflected the way in which 
chiefs and people annexed what had been government courts and made them 
community arenas: "it is only in the courts that the chief is in fact and deed the 
leader and representative of his people". 139 Mandan courts by the 1950s were 
referred to as toket, the old term for meeting-tree councils, and sessions were 
informal and "crowded with ordinary people". 140 
The courts were, as a result, also increasingly subject to rigorous public evaluation. 
This was apparent in a report from 1945: 
It has been interesting to watch how the number of cases increase in the A 
courts with the better chiefs. A bad chief has a bad court and few cases 
appear. A good chief replaces him and cases immediately increase as the 
litigants find they can now get satisfaction. 141 
Where chiefs failed to win the confidence of the people in their judicial skills, the 
courts remained unpopular government institutions reliant on the backing of the 
province police, as reported at Tall and Terakekka. 142 hi Yei district, Chief Sasa 
Gindalla is remembered as "somebody who was rushing decisions, he could change 
his decision anytime". This may have explained his resort to force to seek respect in 
137 Chanock, Law, Custom. 
138 Philip Yona Jambi, written reply, 2003, Khartourn. 
139 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2/8. 
140 Buxton, Chiefs, pp. 128-9. 
141 Juba District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. For an example see EPMD Oct. -Nov. 1940, NRO CS 
57/12/46. 
142 EPMD Feb., Aug. 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5; EPMD Jan. 1948, NRO DK 57,1513. 
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his own court: "we used to be told stories of how he used to get up and try to cane 
the people in the court, chase people"143 
In the Bari area on the other hand, the death in 1939 of Chief Lukak Leg"'i Logo, 
President of the Juba B Court, was reported as a great loss, "as he ýN, as looked on by 
the Bari as a 'Cutter' of cases". The report highlighted the tendency of people to 
vote with their feet to express their opinion of individual chiefs and courts: "litigants 
will always take their cases to a court where they know they will get satisfaction... 
in the 'cutting' of their cases". 144 This idea of 'cutting' cases was a neat expression 
for effective and decisive adjudication. Chiefs thus had to display both their ability 
to listen and arbitrate between opposing views, and their wisdom and authoritative 
judgements, reflecting a popular desire for discussion, but also for the ability to tum 
discussion into decision. 
3.2 The Gatekeeper 
At the same time as expanding their skills as adjudicators and arbitrators, chiefs 
were also resorting to their original role as gatekeepers in the "defence of the area": 
"the go-between between his people and the government". 145 This role involved the 
management of the flow of knowledge and information between the two, and 
increasingly chiefs seem to have manipulated this by concealing the activities of 
their people from government, whilst using rhetoric to convince the latter of their 
own good intentions. As Hatt writes, the chiefs needed to master the bureaucracy of 
government, and at the same time understand the 'backstage' world of local politics 
in order to distance themselves from government policies, by advising communities 
as to "what a minimal acceptable level of compliance is likely to be". 146 
As the earlier motif of the scapegoat chief had demonstrated, part of the role of a 
gatekeeper was to deflect government blame on behalf of his people. 
147 British 
143 Interview with Festo Limi Sominda, 14 Jan. 2003, Khartoum- 
144 Juba District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
145 Interview with Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, Khartoum; (anon. ) 'Juba District 
Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6. 
146 Hatt, 'Establishing Tradition', p. 135-8. 
147 See also Reining, The Zande, p. 36. 
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administrators consistently complained at failures to provide taxes and labour, 
148 blaming the chiefs for 'slackness' or 'negligence'. Similarly cultivation could be 
greatly improved, "[flf the chiefs and headmen would be more energetic and 
interested in what is grown". 149 In addition they noted in 1944 that there may have 
been "a disinclination on their [the chiefs'] part to make what might be unpopular 
decisions" regarding labour and taxation. 150 This tendency was even more apparent 
when it came to some of the regulations, notably regarding araki, hashish and 
hunting, all of which ran "entirely counter to public opinion", and earned "the 
obvious sympathy of chiefs" for offenders. ' 51 
In addition, the role of gatekeeper was also evolving new aspects in relation to 
obtaining (limited) state resources and defending rights. Chiefs were able to request 
schools, bush shops, medical facilities, and agricultural inputs, as well as grain 
during food shortages. 152 In 1947, the Yei chiefs protested that if tax was to be 
raised, then the grain prices received by their people should also increase. 153 By the 
1940s, some of them seem to have been using a language of 'development' to 
persuade their people to carry out agricultural or sanitary projects. 154 They were also 
increasingly defending community rights, for example by protesting at land 
reservations, something which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four. 
In the process the chiefs seem to have become associated more closely with 
community identity and autonomy; and the institution of chiefship became more 
valued. Communities reportedly insisted on having their own A courts, thus 
defending their local distinctiveness. 155 There were increasing protests over past or 
148 EPMD Dec. 1940, NRO CS 57/12/46; EPMD Feb., Nov. 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
149 Juba District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
150 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
151 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2/8; 
Juba District AR 1945, NRO EP 2/27/98. 
152 EPMD June 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13; EPMD July 1950, NRO DK 57/9/24. 
153 EPMD Dec. 1947, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
154 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartourn. 
155 Governor MP to Governor UNP, 7 Sept. 1932, NRO CS 1/13/42. Buxton also emphasises the 
opposition to amalgamation among Mandari communities in the 1950s: 
Chiefs and Strangers, e. g. pp. 
34-5. 
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future amalgamations, partly due to conflicts and rivalries over chiefship. 156 But the 
cumulative effect of internal competition for political authontv was neý-ertheless to 
emphasise the meaning and rights of chiefship, which in turn resulted from the 
"sense of self-hood" of neighbourhood communities, and the consequent need for a 
gatekeeper to defend and promote that self-hood. 157 
The government was also still employing its rhetoric of the hereditary chiefs as the 
4natural' rulers of their communities. This even played a part in the selection of 
candidates for administrative training: Gordon Bull was favoured over otlier 
candidates because his father was a Kajo Kaji sub-chief, so he came from "an 
administrative family". 158 These families appear to have become synonymous Ný, -Ith 
the 'administration' of their communities in the eyes of both goveniment and people, 
though each had different expectations of them. Their authority rested upon their 
ability to both mediate effectively with governinent, and at the same time build up 
their personal reputation and knowledge of their people, in order to speak within the 
community "in the voice of a 'member', confronting the state system as an external 
phenomenon". 1 59 
But in the last decade of colonial rule, as the British administrators and sections of 
Sudanese society promoted democratic elections and modermsing development, 
wider changes had a greater impact than ever before on the communities of Western 
Mongalla. The various strategies pursued by chiefs since the 1930s to enhance their 
authority within their communities would therefore be tested out in the face of rapid 
political change and new ideas of leadership and representation. 
156 EPMD March-May 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5; 'Juba District Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6. See Berry, 
Chiefs Know, p. 196: the endless debates and conflict over Asante chiefship "attest both to the 
continued salience of chieftaincy as an institution, and to its dynamism". 
157 Lonsdale, refening to nineteenth-century Kenyan settlements, 'The Politics', pp. 50-1. 
'58 Governor to CS, 26 Jan. 1949, NRO EP 1/6/34. 
159 Hatt, 'Establishing Tradition', p. 148. 
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4. Representing the Community, 1946-56 
4.1 Councils and Assemblies 
The last decade of colonial rule in Southern Sudan, as has frequently been observed, 
witnessed rapid political change as the govenu-nent belatedly sought to prepare 
Southerners for a role in the higher levels of administration and for participation in 
national political institutions. 160 The courts were increasingly treated by government 
as advisory and consultative bodies. Particularly in Juba and Yel districts, B courts 
or even unofficial 'councils' were used for discussion of important local issues, so 
that chiefs were being treated not simply as the 'mouthpiece' for government orders, 
but as spokesmen or representatives of their people, and of public opinion. 16 1 The 
language of political 'representation' may have been novel, but it seems to have 
corresponded with the evolving institution of the chief as the 'go-between' ýN, Ith the 
state. Similarly ideas of 'citizenship' appear to have reflected the transfer of ideas of 
patrimonial obligations to the state itself, the payment of taxes was seen to entail the 
right to state resources. 162 
From the mid-1930s a Bari Council had existed, made up of chiefs and their chosen 
councillors; by 1944, it was reported to be "showing a sense of responsibility", and 
bringing forward "ideas of their own", as well as forming a sub-committee of chiefs 
to discuss district education. 163 The following year it discussed such matters as "the 
spread of poisoning, the shortage of clothing and high prices charged, and the 
difficulty of supplying conscript labour during the cultivation season". 164 The Yei B 
Court or council of chiefs was similarly discussing topics like labour supply, 
sleeping sickness inspections, cross-border migration, adultery fines and village 
schools. 1 65 Chiefs and other court members seem to have enjoyed the regular 
meetings as a chance to meet and talk: "it helps the chiefs who live far apart to get to 
160 For details of the national and international political developments and the debates about the 
South, see Johnson, 'Introduction', to BDEEP; Collins, Shadows, pp. 412-56. 
161 E. g. EPMD Nov. 1939, NRO CS 57/11/42. 
162 E. g. Bertram, Lui, Sep. 1948, CMS AF AL. 
163 EPMD Dec. 1944, NRO CS 57/20/78. 
164 EPMD Dec. 1945, NRO CS 57/23/89. 
165 YDMD June 1944 and March 1945, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
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know each other and serves the purpose of bringing to notice matters in which chief's 
and their people feel strongly". 166 By 1945 these two bodies were being described as 
"not far off formal constitution as administration units ". 167 In 1951-2, the existing B 
courts or advisory councils were given new formal status as elected rural counci 1S. 168 
Thus it was the existing institutions based on the chiefs that were developing into the 
new councils and expanding their remit as legislative and executive bodies. These 
developments in local government corresponded to wider political developments; in 
1948 the first Province Council was established, with members elected by the B 
courts. It was at this level in particular that a new kind of spokesman was emerging: 
educated senior government or mission employees. In Yei District, two chiefs, Tete 
and Modi, were chosen: "at Yei however many speakers suggested that the selective 
net should be cast more widely, and that a local teacher might be as good a 
representative as a chief'. 169 The Province Council then elected members to the 
Legislative Assembly (LA), including two educated chiefs with experience of 
mission or government employment for Moru and Juba districts, and a CMS teacher, 
Benjamin Lwoki, as member for Yei district. He spoke to the Yei B Court, 
emphasising that he was not a chief or leader, but rather had been chosen as a 
6messenger' and 'servant' of the community. 170 This new idea of 'representation' 
was a striking usurpation of what had been the original role of some of the chiefs, as 
spokesman or negotiator with the outside world. 
In general there were increased opportunities for educated people, who were seen by 
communities as more equipped to operate in the new institutional framework. By 
1950, the B courts were also electing representatives to new district education 
councils. In one of the Juba District elections, an ex-soldier, the only literate 
candidate, was elected rather than one of the three chiefs standing: "[11iteracy won, 
clan heads mun-nuring as they cast their votes 'because he reads', for fear of 
166 Juba District AR, 1945, NRO EP 2/27/98. 
167 Governor Skeet, 'Notes based on Parr's handing over note to Skeet of 1943', May 1945, NRO DK 
57/l/l. 
168 EPMD June-Dec. 195 1, NRO DK 57/9/24. 
169 EPMD March 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
170 EPMD Nov. 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
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reprisals from their chiefs". 17 1 The administrator reporting this assumed that there 
was hostility or tension, but it was becoming more normal for educated people to be 
elected to such positions. 172 Similarly, as an interviewee explained, -vvhen this 
political process happened, it was the teachers who became election officers because 
they commanded respect, and they were also considered to have a popular role in 
society. " 173 In 1951, seven policemen or soldiers, seven sub-chiefs and three 
teachers were elected to the Meridi Advisory Local Council. 174 
4.2 Politics and Politicians 
In 1947, the now infamous Juba Conference was held, ostensibly to gain the views 
of Southern Sudanese on the future of the South. Members were drawn from among 
the chiefs and the higher ranks of the police, administration and church. The reports 
of the conference reveal a "distinct cleavage of opinion" between 'tribal leaders', i. e. 
the chiefs, and the 'educated community', as to how, and how quickly, unity could 
be achieved. 175 The former repeatedly depicted Southerners as children - reflecting 
the traditional link between maturity and knowledge - in relation to the northemers, 
emphasising their need for "political education". 176 The contrasting impatience of 
the 'educated community' may have reflected their growing knowledge of wider 
political activity in the north and outside Sudan, which gave them a sense of 
superiority towards the 'tribal' leaders. 177 
During the war years, the educated employees of both government and missions had 
begun to display a sense of identity and a nascent wider 'political' awareness-' 
78 By 
1945, the Civil Secretary was writing that: 
171 EPMD Jan. 1950, NRO DK 57/9/24. 
172 EPMD Nov. 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
173 Interview with Barnaba Dumo Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
174 EPMD June 195 1, NRO DK 57/9/24. 
175 EPAR 1947, NRO CS2 30/10/32. 
176 'Extract from Sudan Star, 16.6.47', NRO DK 1/2/5; 'Proceedings of the Juba Conference on the 
Political Development of the Southern Sudan, June 1947', appended in Wai The Southern Sudan, pp. 
185-205. 
177 Hilary Paul Logali, 'Autobiography', SAD 890/l/1-80. 
178 Equatoria Grade Clerks to CS, 20 Feb. 1940, Marwood to CS, 26 April 1940, NRO DK3 1/6/3 1. 
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There is probably no class of Sudanese with whom the government is least in 
touch with or least knowledgeable about [sic] as the educated Southem 
Sudanese. But there are indications - from petitions, letters and 
conversations with individuals - that many of them are puzzled and resentful 
about the backwardness of the S. Sudan. 179 
The following year, a missionary reported "rather a 'Bolshie' element amongst the 
more educated", and their growing criticism of "the white man". ' 80 in 1947, 
Southern officials had joined a strike by government labourers over wages: "[i]t XN, as 
the culmination of a feeling of dissatisfaction which had been growing over the past 
two years, in a hot house atmosphere of political propaganda and unrest, at the 
allegedly inferior position of the southern government servant vis a vis his northern 
confrere". 1 81 The result was an immediate wage increase for government employees, 
and the following year Southern staff were transferred to the Northern wage scale. 
Strikes continued to occur among educated government and mission staff, usually 
over wages. ' 82 
Two teachers fired after one such strike left for Khartoum, where they formed links 
with the Graduates Congress. ' 83 Following the 1947 strike, Southern officials and 
mission employees formed their own 'Southern Intellectuals Organisation', which 
would become the Southern Party of the 1950s, later the Liberal Party. According to 
Hilary Logali, the son of a leading member, the party were strongly influenced by 
wider African nationalism, which had been introduced to the province by demobbed 
soldiers after the war. They initially saw alliance with the Graduates Congress as the 
route to gaining independence for the Sudan. 184 
The party leaders and LA members (MLA) toured their districts, reportedly seeking 
to publicise political developments and improve their own knowledge of the 
179 CS to Council, 3 Feb. 1945, NRO EP I/l/2. 
180 Sharland, Loka, Aug. 1946, CMS AF AL 1940-9. See also Willis, 'The Nyamang', p. 52. 
181 EPAR 1947, NRO CS2 30/10/32. 
182 EPMD May 1948, July 1949, NRO DK 57/5/13; Bertram, Lui, Sept. 1948, Crabb, Mundri 
Divinity school, 17 June 1949, Earl, Loka, 21 Aug. 1947, and Guillebaud, Yei, Aug. 1947, all CMS 
AF AL; 'Application of the Southern Sudan teachers and Dressers to Governor and Bishop of 
Southern Sudan', 29 May 1944, NRO EP 1/4/17. 
183 Tiernay, Dep. Governor to all D. C. 's and heads of dept., II July 1946, CS to Governor, 24 July 
1946, NRO EP 1/4/17. 
184 Hilary Paul Logali, 'Autobiography', SAD 890/l/1-80. 
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districts. 185 From 1949, growing public interest in local government and wder 
politics was reported. 18' In Meridi, "large crowds attended the council elections and 
everyone professed to understand what they were about", and speeches Nvere made. 
"thanking the government for this forward step in the administration of the 
country". 187 Even in the Mandari area of Juba District, long regarded as 'backward' 
by the government, it was reported that there was "an awakening interest in other 
than purely local affairs". ' 88 The news of the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in 1952 
furthered this "quickening of interest", and people began to hold "both fortnal and 
informal meetings" and "take a lively and enthusiastic interest in the constitution 
and the elections". 189 Government employees who returned to visit their villages 
were welcomed because they brought news of "developments in government 11 . 
190 
However, in November 1952, it was reported that the announcement of self- 
determination within three years had "caused a stir amongst the local people... the 
lack of good communication and the absence of any newspapers resulted in many 
unfounded rumours". The following month, an "unusually large number of political 
visitors to the Province" aroused excitement, apprehension and a "sense of 
insecurity" throughout the Province. 191 This atmosphere was exacerbated by the visit 
of an Egyptian delegation led by Major Saleh Salem, seeking to form a pro- 
Egyptian/NUP Southern party. They met with Chief Jambo in Moru District, and 
convinced him and his son to sip a document allegedly giving up the idea of British 
safeguards for the South. This led to widespread hostility to Jambo, and the refusal 
of his B Court to accept his continuing presidency; he was especially criticised for 
failing to consult his people first. ' 92 According to an interviewee from his chiefdom, 
Jambo claimed he was convinced into signing because he wanted independence, and 
185 EPMD July, Sept. 1949, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
186 EPMD June 1949, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
187 EPMD June 195 1, NRO DK 5 7/9/24. 
188 EPMD Oct. 195 1, NRO DK 57/9/24. 
189 EPMD Feb., April, July, Sept. 1952, NRO CS2 30/3/6. 
190 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
191 EPMD Nov. -Dec. 1952, NRO CS2 30/3/6. 
192 Public Relations Officer to Sudan Agent London, 3 April 1953, PRO FO 371/102754, File 
1051/493; Sarnwele Kajivora, Mundri, Moru District, to Governor-General, 28 Jan. 1953, PRO FO 
371 102747, File 1051/293; EPMD Dec. 1952 - March 1953, NRO CS2 30/3/6. 
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so "he would appreciate anyone who could help, even if it Nvas the devil himselt'. " 
The reported effect at the time was nevertheless that, "people were disinclined to 
meet any more visitors as many declared that they had been betrayed by those who 
had been elected to represent them". 194 This is particularly interesting in revealing 
the evolution of ideas of elected representation, but it also reflected the historical 
obligations upon chiefs to consult, and defend the interests of, their communities. 
4.3 Local Knowledge 
This crisis involving Jambo was revealing in a number of ways. Firstly, it further 
exposed the existence of underlying criticism of the chiefs. In the later 1940s and 
the 1950s, an increased number of cases of misappropriation of taxes or general 
corruption by chiefs and clerks had also been reported. 195 This was particularly 
disturbing when it involved a 'politician', as in 1951 when Chief Korokangwa 
Hassan, MLA for Moru District, was convicted for stealing tribute money; "[t]he 
conviction... shocked tribal opinion and upset the educated Moru in the district". 196 
The first Christian chief to be elected in the same district, Luka Jambin, lauded at 
the time by missionaries, was also convicted for the same offence around this 
time. 1 97 
However, such appropriations may have been less shocking to people than the 
government reports suggest; chiefs were expected to maintain a degree of wealth 
and patronage capacity, a point which will be discussed more in Chapter Four. It is 
more likely that people had realised the effectiveness of accusing a chief of 
corruption as a means of attacking him; one informant referred to certain 'reporters' 
in the village who liked to inforni the government of such matters. 198 The 
convictions thus reflect the ongoing hidden rivalries within communities. But at the 
same time, the growing importance of chiefship as a community institution was 
193 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. Jambo went on to visit Egypt 
gTeatedly: 
EPMD July 1953, NRO CS2 30/3/6. Collins, Shadows, pp. 445-6. re 
19 EPMD Dec. 1952, NRO CS2 30/3/6. 
195 EPMD Jan. 1947, NRO DK 57/2/5; EPMD Feb. 1952, NRO CS2 30/3/6. 
196 EPMD May 195 1, NRO DK 57/9/24. 
197 EPMD May 1950, NRO DK 57/9/24. 
'9' Interview with Serefino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. See Spear, Mountain Farmers, p. 
196. 
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apparent when a Meridi chief was also imprisoned for embezzlement: 
cc amalgamation with a neighbouring chiefship was recommended but the people's 
strong desire for independence manifested itself in the collection of the mone", 
embezzled". This action convinced the government to allow the appointment of a 
relative of the chief rather than amalgamate the chiefdom-199 Similarly in Yei 
district, people are remembered to have consented to the replacement of the eldefly 
Chief Lorniteng - who had also been convicted of stealing poll tax - with his younger 
educated brother Lupai, because they did not want to be divided amonG other 
200 chiefs. 
The explanation for the real root of the problem in the Jambo incident offered by the 
interviewee from his chiefdom was that, "the Southerners at that time were very 
confused, we did not have enough educated people, politicians" . 
20 1 Another 
interviewee stated that there were no 'politicians' in the south, only government 
employees, suggesting that the latter may have been seen to belong to the domain of 
the government rather than of the people. 202 Hilary Logall admitted that the Liberal 
Party "did not have a strong grassroots base, except for the town of Juba". He also 
claimed that Chief Andarea Gore, who had been an MLA, quit politics because he 
was too "affected by rural life" and "became rustic and faded into political 
oblivion". 203 This reflects an interesting perception of the distance and dichotomy 
between the rural grass-roots and the small new class of Southern intelligentsia or 
'politicians'. The chiefs were seen by the latter, and perhaps even viewed 
themselves, as being in general not equipped with the knowledge to operate 
confidently in the arena of national politics, hence the emphasis at the Juba 
conference on the need for political education. 
Yet the chiefs were also more trusted than the politicians to know and understand 
the interests of local communities, despite this incident with Jambo, and their 
propensity to siphon off funds. It was Chief Modi of Yei, who exhorted Benjamin 
'99 Moru District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
200 Although this is according to Lupai's son: Interview with Charles Taban Lupai, 5 Sept. 2004, 
Yel; 
also EPMD March 1952, NRO CS2 30/3/6. 
201 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
112 Interview with Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, Khartoum. 
203 Hilary Paul Logali, 'Autobiography', SAD 890/l/1-80. 
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Lwoki to "speak firmly" f 204 or his constituency in the LA. Crucially perhaps, one 
informant claimed that Lwoki Was popularly thought to be too weak to stand up 
effectively for local interests, partly because he was the son of "an ordinary person" 
and so more vulnerable to bribes from the northern politicians. People therefore later 
wanted Ellya Lupe to represent them instead, because he , vas the son of a chief as 
well as the Chief Police Inspector. 205 This obviously reflects the informants' general 
advocacy of chiefs, but it may also reveal a popular belief that chiefs Nvere more 
immune to outside influence and thus were trusted more to defend community 
206 interests 
. 
This belief is borne out at least in the evidence of the Juba Conference, 
in which chiefs Lolik Lado and Cir Rehan repeatedly emphasised their need to 
consult further with their people in order to adequately represent their views. 207 
Also at the conference, Clement Mboro emphasised the need for southem 
representatives to study the "art of government" at the national, not just local, 
level. 208 In many ways, the 'state', in terms of central government, rather than local 
or provincial administration, began to impact on the lives of the people of Western 
Mongalla for the first time in the 1950s, and negatively in the eyes of some: 
Juba district Mandari tribesmen attribute the lack of rain during the last few 
years to the greater interest taken in their affairs by the government. 209 
The local institutions for mediating with government had developed to suit the 
small-scale communities of the area, and so this enlargement of scale caused 
something of a crisis. Chiefs might have had opportunities to exercise a degree of 
arbitrary power, but overall they remained answerable to their people, and to long- 
established alternative sources of power, in a way that the distant government in 
Khartoum was not. One Southern writer remembers the cheers given to Benjamin 
Lwoki in Loka when he had promised to request that Southerners be allowed to "ran 
204 EPMD Nov. 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
205 Interviews with Lubari Ramba, 31 Aug 2004, Mitika, Yei, and Elder Daniel Jumi Tongun, 10 Sept 
2004, Yei. 
206 See Spear, Mountain Farmers, p. 196: "the more wealth and power chiefs accumulated the more 
they were able to stand up to the colonial authorities to protect their own and their clients' interests". 
207 'Proceedings of the Juba Conference on the Political Development of the Southern Sudan, June 
1947', appended in Wai The Southern Sudan, pp. 185-205, at pp. 194-5,198-9. 
208 'Proceedings of the Juba Conference on the Political Development of the Southern Sudan, June 
1947', appended in Wai The Southern Sudan, pp. 185-205, at p. 193. 
209 EPMD Jan. 195 1, NRO DK 57/9/24. 
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their own local affairs" . 
210 The importance of the local and relatively autonomous 
nature of authority in Western Mongalla, partly a result of deliberate government 
policy over the last forty years, became particularly apparent in this decade. 
Government might have become more interventionist, particularly from the late 
1930s, but in general it had still intruded relatively little into the daily lives of 
people. Elders, headmen and chiefs sought to settle most matters before they had to 
come to the attention of government. 211 
The chief sat at the interface between state and people, but his was a very local, and 
knowable, face. Informants argue that the authority of the chiefs in fact rested on a 
kind of mutual knowledge. They had been observed and evaluated by their 
communities since their childhood; the courts in particular were "where the chiefs 
are known". 212 In turn, an important aspect of the chiefs' ability to settle cases and 
make just decisions rested on their knowledge of their people: "chiefs know the 
213 people one by one and know who is good and who is troublesome". While this 
picture of mutual knowing is rather idealised, it nevertheless encapsulates a central 
aspect of legitimacy in Western Mongalla, an aspect which could not be easily 
transferred to large-scale representation, national politics or a 'modem' state 
bureaucracy. There was reported to be "widespread apprehension" that the Southern 
representative in the national institutions in Khartoum would be isolated from "his 
people" and therefore vulnerable to corruption. 214 
On the other hand the arrival at the same time of growing numbers of Northern 
government officials represented the influx of an alien government force into the 
local community: 
The spread of information was very difficult in the south. We were closed up 
with no information of the outside world... Southerners suddenly reallsed 
2 10 Albino, The Sudan, p. 30. 
211 Interview with Francis Bassan, 18 Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
212 Interviews with Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, Severino Mati, 27 Jan. 
2003, Margaret 
Keji Loro, 18 Feb. 2003 and Sijrnon Wani Ramba, 10 Jan. 2003, Khartoum 
213 Interview with Venansio Loro Lado, II Nov. 2002, Khartourn. 
214 Beaton, 'Report on the effects of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Southern Sudan', 
17 
March 1953, (FO 371/102753), in BDEEP Sudan, Part H, no. 302, pp. 228-33. See also Johnson, 
Nuer Prophets, p. 298: Southern politicians were removed ftom daily contact with their people 
by 
national politics. 
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that they had new masters who entered into the shoes of the British but who 
didn't know how to treat with them... They... never gave the Southerners 
the feeling that it was their government. 215 
In 1954, Chief Modi Baraba wrote to MLA Benjamin Lwoki, on behalf of the 'Yei 
citizens', an interesting new appellation in itself He complained at the 'bullying' by 
northern merchants and senior officials in the town, and blamed the latter for 
6secretly' planning the sudden transfer of the new Southern Mamur to Yambio: "we 
should like him to work in Yei here for at least 2 years officially in order that we 
have to study his behaviour towards the people and watch how he carries his duty 
forward". 216 This not only reflects the sense of helplessness and lack of knowledge 
of the governmental changes taking place, but also the cultural importance of 
knowing the local authority figures and studying their behaviour, as had long been 
the way with chiefs. The breakdown of the system of mutual and reciprocal 
knowledge was thus resulting in a growing lack of confidence in the mediation 
between local communities and the state. 
In 1955ý the tensions of the preceding years burst into violent unrest and attacks on 
Northerners in Yei and Amadi, following the Torit mutiny, only put down in the end 
by Northern Sudanese troops. 217 The official inquiry into the trouble emphasised the 
power of rumour in generating the atmosphere of fear and apprehension beforehand, 
as well as criticising the behaviour of some northern traders and officials. It also 
tellingly pointed out that to Southerners, government politics and administration 
were all the same, and D. C. 's and ministers alike were 'hukuma'. 
21 8A missionary 
observer highlighted the "lack of trust" in the Southern politicians, "for seeking only 
self-gain". 21 9 Some chiefs had been prominent in trying to prevent Northerners being 
killed, and afterwards they were under pressure to arrest the rebels, and yet unlike 
the Zande chiefs, they do not appear to have become seen as supporters of the 
colonial and then northern governments: 
2 15 Hilary Paul Logali, 'Autobiography', SAD 890/1/1-80- 
216 'Yei Citizens Chief Modi Baraba' to Sayed Benjamin Lwoki, Yei 2 Dec. 1954, SAD 761/7/1-56. 
217 On Torit mutiny see Collins, Shadows, pp. 453-8. 
218 Sudan Government, Report of the Commission ofInquiry into the Disturbances in the Southern 
Sudan During August 1955 (Khartoum, 1956). 
2 '9 Allison, Annual letter, 31 Aug. 1955, SAD 817/6/1-118. 
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It seems reasonably certain that the chiefs are 'cooperating' with the 
Administration. They are running the Tribal Courts, bringing in mutineers 
and guns, looters and loot. But... their cooperation is with the mouth rather 
than with the heart. They have been badly ffightened. They have been made 
personally responsible for producing the mutineers coming originallý, from 
their area. To some extent therefore their cooperation is obtained by duress... 
Probably a dozen chiefs and sub-chiefs are in prison on various charges 
ranging from murder to looting. 220 
Thus those chiefs who had not joined in the rising were still acting as gatekeepers, 
trying to satisfy the goverriment, but maintaining their identity ultimately with their 
communities. 
g, The Zande, p. 220 Colin Legurn, 'Report on Southern Sudan', Nov. 1955, 
SAD 817/8/1-119; Reinin 
34. 
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Conclusion 
Chiefs know their communities and their way of life. 221 
In the negotiations preceding Independence the chiefs emerged as a 
politically important force. The network of government chiefs was one of the 
rare, if not the only, genuine southern Sudanese interlocutor with the colonial 
government in the preparations for Sudan's independence. 222 
The role of the chief as the 'genuine' interlocutor between government and people 
had not been an automatic outcome of colonial governance or of 'tribal tradition'. 
Many of the chiefs of the early colonial period had originated as translators, soldiers 
or traders. Their relationship with the colonial governments brought them limited 
access to resources, including some of the coercive force of the colonial state, which 
they demonstrated for a period in the 1920s-30s through their courts and police. But 
that relationship also risked their rejection by their communities for being the 
servants of government, a risk made more real by the increasing demands made by 
the government from the later 1930s. The resistance of these years, together with 
changing colonial discourses and the loss of their monopoly of knowledge, led the 
chiefs to pursue strategies intended to demonstrate their membership of, and 
authority within, their own communities. But even during their most coercive era in 
the 1920s and earlier 1930s, the chiefs were constrained by the plurality of 
community authorities and the limited effectiveness of force in generating status and 
command; they were rarely, if ever, despots, though they might be opportunistic. 
So the position of the chiefs in the run-up to independence was the result of 
struggles, balancing acts and adaptations. Their efforts to continue to adapt to the 
new political and representative institutions and arenas met with mixed results, 
especially again if they were seen not to be defending the interests of their 
communities. But strikingly they became publicly perceived to be more likely to 
understand and defend those interests than any other interlocutor was. They had 
221 Interview with Venansio Loro Lado, II Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
222 Simonse, Kings, p. 138. 
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started out with power resulting from knowing the government; now their authority 
rested on knowing their communities. In the face of greater external interventions, 
those communities were increasingly defining and defending their own local 'ways', 
in processes described elsewhere as the creation of ethnicity. 223 Chiefs had long been 
assumed by British administrators to be the repositories of knowledge of such 
community ways, as embodied in their registries and courts. But as the next three 
chapters will show, local knowledge-holding was contested and multiple: it not only 
resisted colonial hegemony but also concentration in the chiefs. 
What the chiefs had always been valued for by their communities, however, was 
knowing how to defend the local autonomy of knowledge and authority in relation to 
external threats and the state. And increasingly they had also become valued for 
traditional skills of arbitration and adjudication, which, though they had been 
reshaped by the colonial institutions of local government, remained crucial in 
maintaining the cohesion of the local community. In at least one case, these 
combined skills were transferred after independence to new kinds of community: 
Chief Lolik of Lyria has a heroic reputation for not only defending his own 
community during the conflicts, but also for intervening in the first Anyanya rebel 
movement to maintain unity. His appointment as their 'Supreme Arbitrator' perhaps 
marks the height of the success of the chiefs in reshaping and adapting their role in 
response to popular pressure over the colonial period. 224 The result was the 
increasing identification of the institution of chiefship with local ways, rights and 
interests. 
223 E. g. BraNmian, Making. 
221 See Simonse, Kings, p. 138. 
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Knowing the Land: 
Spatial and Economic Resistance 
"My people although good at cultivation, as it is their chief occupation, do not know 
it in the way wanted by the white men". ' 
Introduction 
In a statement encapsulating the importance of local authorities being known, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, Governor Skrine also highlighted a powerful form 
of local resistance: 
The native population is tractable and easily led so long as the right methods 
are employed and they know the people with whom they are dealing; it is 
however quite easy to frighten them into a state of sullen apathy when they 
will take to the bush and give a considerable amount of trouble before they 
can be brought back again to resume their normal form of life. 2 [My italics] 
The landscape of Western Mongalla, and its organisation and use, formed a 
contested and crucial territory of knowledge and power. Colonial officials, on the 
one hand, claimed that the 'natives' did not 'know their own country', and believed 
that Western scientific knowledge could order, reform and develop the landscape. 3 
But on the other hand, their own efforts to know the country were frequently 
frustrated by the environment itself, which also formed a major tool of resistance for 
its inhabitants; the ability of the latter to find refuge and concealment in the 'bush' 
remains vital to this day. 4 Government and missionary efforts to impose a European 
version of order upon what one D. C. called "all their tangled jungles, spiritual as 
1 Janson-Srnith, 'Report on Juba training school Final Examination, 1941', NRO DK3 1/6/29. 
2 Governor to FS and CS, enclosing 'Report on the economic situation and possible developments of 
Mongalla Province', 27 March 1925, NRO EP 2/23/86. 
3 E. g. Newcombe, 'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO WO 106 23 1. Gordon had 
claimed the same thing: Central Aftica, p. 127. 
E. g. EPMD Sept. 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53; Beaton, 'A Chapter', p. 174. Informants nowadays refer 
to joining Anyanya or SPLA as "going to the bush". 
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,, 5 well as vegetable, were thus inevitably subverted. In addition, colonial officials 
and experts were divided over the priorities of agricultural and ecological policies. 6 
The Europeans' claim to superior knowledge was never accepted by people who had 
their own experts and their own bank of knowledge and experience relating to 
agriculture, hunting, livestock and settlement, and for whom the landscape had 
additional layers of spiritual and historical meaning. They were keen to assimilate 
new kinds of knowledge to add to this bank, but only if it was deemed useful or 
meaningful, and not at the price of rejecting existing proven expertise. This was 
therefore a particularly contentious subject area, which illustrates both the ambitions 
and limitations of the colonial state, and the resilience of local knowledge. 
Land issues also demonstrate the contradictions and limitations of Native 
Administration, particularly the disparity between government and community 
expectations, and the strategies that the chiefs employed to try to satisfy both. The 
control of 'customary' land tenure and the 'extra-economic' coercion of 'peasant' 
labour by all-powerful chiefs are central to Mamdam's argument for 'decentralised 
despotism'. 7 In Western Mongalla, chiefs could partially benefit from territorial re- 
organisation and greater controls on population movement and labour resources 
through the enforcement of agricultural directives. But these impositions could also 
arouse serious opposition and resistance, and at times damage the livelihoods of the 
chiefs as well as their people. This was becoming particularly apparent from the late 
1930s onwards, as resistance mounted to the coercive enforcement of agricultural 
policies during the preceding years. Land issues thus provide some of the best 
examples of the ways in which chiefs were pressured by their people to act as 
gatekeepers, following the peak of their coercive power in the 1920s-30s, and 
demonstrate that they remained first and foremost members of their communities, 
not of the government. 
The defensive role increasingly played by the chiefs, and their claims to speak for 
tradition, would result in them becoming more associated with communal land rights 
5 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perharri, p. 26. 
6 Such divisions were particularly apparent in the planning and implementation of the Zande Scheme: 
see Reining, The Zande. 
7 Mamdani, OtLen, esp. 23,56,138-65. 
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by the end of the colonial period. But while claiming to know custom might offer 
opportunities to chiefs, it also forced them to engage in processes of negotiation and 
8 debate, in which they were far from hegemonic. Land had not yet become an asset 
in itself separate from social relations, and so ritual land custodians retained much of 
their authority through their knowledge relating to the fertility of the community. 
Cattle were more important in building the capacity and authority of chiefs as 
patrons, but even this resource seems to have become both scarcer and more 
vulgarised over the colonial period. Chiefs' own ability to accumulate and exploit 
access to labour was also limited by popular resistance; individuals and households 
retained considerable autonomy over their labour and economic decisions. This 
chapter is a story of limited change in the political economy, and continued 
constraints on the ability of either state or chiefs to control it. 
Berry, Chiefs Know, pp. 7-8,26-7,50. 
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1. Contested Geographies 
The settlement patterns encountered by the early European colonialists in Western 
Mongalla reflected the changes of the later nineteenth century. The systematic 
raiding from the zeribas had depopulated some areas and led to more concentrated 
and defensive settlements, particularly in the Bari and Kuku areas v%, here cattle were 
kept inside fenced compounds. 9 The 1890s saw the spread of nnderpest into the area 
and huge cattle losses to add to the effects of previous raiding, and in the early 
1900s, reports suggested concerted efforts to cultivate large areas, perhaps to make 
up for this. 10 The population in many cases also adopted more scattered and shifting 
settlements. " The arnving colonial officials attributed this to the traumas of the 
nineteenth century, suggesting that it was a defensive strategy to minimise the 
impact of raids. 12 However, it was of course more a reflection of extensive systems 
of agriculture and mixed fanning; settlements moved within clearly 'circumscribed' 
areas, and ground was cultivated for two to three years before being left fallow for 
longer periods. 13 In areas of more fertile land, such as along the Nile, villages were 
more static and pen-nanent, and plots demarcated more rigidly. 14 
Territorial settlements might be clearly defined then, but their inhabitants also 
observed wider spheres across the region. Anderson and Johnson emphasise the 
importance of flexible livelihoods and wide-ranging networks to the survival of 
communities in North-East Africa. 15 The indigenous geography of Western 
Mongalla was shaped by such strategies, as people maintained trade networks, 
9 SIR 144, July 1906, PRO WO 106 228; SIR 156, July 1907, PRO WO 106 229. 
10 SIR 110 Sept. 1903, PRO WO 106 225; SIR 154, May 1907, PRO WO 106 229; Newcombe, 
'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO WO 106 23 1; Owen, 'Report on Tour of 
inspection in Moru and Niambara districts', June 1911, SIR 205, Aug. 1911, PRO WO 106 6224; 
Owen, 'Occupation of the Lado Enclave' May-June 19 10, NRO MP 1/8/5 1. 
" Gibson, Yei, Sept. 1922, CMS G3 AL; Hewitt, 'Extract from The Problems of Success: History of 
the CMS', SAD 84/10/1-136. 
2 Jennings-Bran-dy, 'Notes on the Mandan Tribe', 20 Sept. 1906, NRO IN 8/2/12. 
3 Shaw, 'March 1911: Trek from Rejaf to Loka', CMS Acc. I 11,173; Stigand, Equatoria, pp. 3 1, 
128; J. R. Catford, 'Katiri Cultivation in the Moru District of Equatoria', SNR 32, no. I (195 1), pp. 
106-12. 
14 E. g. J. N. Richardson, 'Bari Notes', SNR 16, no. 2 (1933), pp. 181-6, at p. 184; Jennings-Bran-dy, 
'Report of a tour among the Baris of the East Bank', 27 Aug. 1906, NRO IN 8/2/12; Interview with 
Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct 2002, Khartoum. 
15 Douglas H. Johnson and David M. Anderson, 'Introduction', to their (eds. ), The Ecology of 
Survii-al (London, 1988), pp. 1-24. 
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consulted distant experts, and absorbed new skills and crops in order to maximise 
their survival potential. The large grain harvests of the early 1900s vvere traded, for 
example, with people in Uganda in return for iron hoes, which could be used to 
purchase cattle and formed part of the marriage payment. ' 6 Even networks formed 
through conflict and subservience could be drawn upon in times of need; for 
example, the Makaraka leader Kape defeated the Moru-speaking Miza in the 1890s, 
and their 'chief Warangwa submitted to Kape: "when these same Miza were 
suffering severely from famine for several years in succession... Ch. Warangwa 
apparently made some arrangement to buy quantities of seed grain from the 
Makaraka. , 17 
Connections were also maintained with various specialists in hunting, fishing, iron- 
working and so on; they had an ambivalent status in society, which preserved their 
distinct livelihood and maintained a diversification of economic niches. 18 Access to 
alternative patrons and protectors was also cultivated in order to maintain sanctions 
on their behaviour; 'chiefs' who failed to fulfil their obligations to their dependents 
could be, and were, deserted. 19 The picture is one of movements and multiple 
networks, but across a geography that was also marked by focal points of sacred and 
historical meaning, and which was clearly mapped by the inhabitants. 20 
16 SIR 371 June 1925, PRO WO 33 999. There were also reports of Bari obtaining cattle from Dinka, 
and Mandari exchanging ivory for sheep with which to buy cattle: MPIR, Oct. 1903, and Jennings- 
Branily, 'Report of a tour among the Baris of the East Bank', 27 Aug. 1906, NRO IN 8/2/12; SIR 
177, April 1909, PRO WO 106 232. 
17 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/140. 
" Whitehead, 'Suppressed Classes'. On specialised ecological knowledge, see Paul Richards, 
'Ecological Change and the Politics of African Land Use', Afirican Studies Review, 26,2 (1983), pp. 
1-72, p. 27. 
19 E. g. SIR 177, April 1909, PRO WO 106 232; Keen, 'The tribes of Meridi Sub-district', 1946, NRO 
DK 112/14/95; Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of Native Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 
1935, NRO CS 1/39/105. 
20 For evidence of mapping and clear boundaries, see Stigand, Equatoria, p. 3 1. The idea that 
geographical boundaries did not really exist in African thought has been overturned by more recent 
work: see Paul Nugent, 'Arbitrary Lines and the People's Minds: A Dissenting View on Colonial 
Boundaries in West Africa', in Nugent and A. I. Asiwaju (eds), African Boundaries: Barriers, 
Conduits and Opportunities (London, 1996), pp. 35-67; David B. Coplan, 'A River Runs Through It: 
The meaning of the Lesotho-Free State border', African Affairs (2001), 100, pp 81-116. 
168 
Chapter Four: Knowing the Land 
LI Boundaries, Resettlement and Villagisation 
The British colonial officials naturally understood little of these indigenous 
geographies, but attempted to reshape the human geography of Mongalla Province, 
through the imposition of boundaries and the re-ordering of settlement patterns, The 
rationale used to justify their policies would change from disease control initially, to 
an administrative and ideological desire for villagisation, to concerns over erosion 
and reserves. The earliest resettlement took place in Yei and Kajo Kaji districts as 
part of the sleeping sickness campaign. As Bell shows, the whole approach to 
sleeping sickness in the Sudan was based on the belief that it was a foreign import 
from Uganda or the Belgian Congo, and that it was territory rather than people 
which needed to be defended against it. 21 The campaign therefore centred on 
identifying and isolating infected areas. Cases were first discovered in the Lado 
Enclave in 1909, and from 1910, the British launched their campaign of inspections, 
bush clearance, sleeping sickness camps and relocation of villages away from 
streams and infested areas. 22 
The Ugandan boundary adjustment in 1914 was largely justified on the grounds that 
sleeping sickness controls would be more effective if both sides of the Nile were 
administered by the same government. 23 In 1922 it was decided that "nothing short 
of complete stoppage of indiscriminate movement across the frontiers would prevent 
the introduction of further cases of sleeping sickness into the Sudan". As a result all 
the frontier districts were declared closed districts, with special passes being 
required to leave or enter them. 24 The following year villages began to be cleared to 
create an uninhabited belt of seven to ten miles either side of the Uganda and Congo 
boundaries, and a 40-mile wide uninhabited border between Moru and Yei 
districts. 25 Special border policemen or 'Terebai' were employed to patrol the 
boundary, and in the early 1930s villages were moved north of the Aba road 
2' Heather Bell, Frontiei-s of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1940 (Oxford, 1999). 
22 Mathias, 'Sleeping sickness report', SIR 209, Dec. 1911; Dove, 'Tour through Kaliko country', 15 
May 1911, SIR 205, Aug. 1911; both PRO WO 106 6224. 
23 See R. 0. Collins, 'Sudan-Uganda Boundary Rectification and the Sudanese Occupation of Madial, 
1914', Uganda Journal 26, no. 2 (1962), pp. 140-53. 
24 Sleeping sickness AR 1922, NRO MP 1,6139. 
25 Sleeping sickness AR 1923-4. NRO MP 1/6/39; Spence to mother, Yel 16 April 1915, SAL 
D 12/202/7. 
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following further outbreaks of sleeping sickness across the Congo border. 26 Even as 
late as the 1940s, sleeping sickness was still being cited as a reason to relocate 
people: "[t]he local authority at Luolo Kajo Kaji is enforcing the concentration of 
the scattered village within reasonable limits to facilitate administrative and sleeping 
sickness control. 1127 
While sleeping sickness was in itself a very real concern for officials, it also 
provided an opportunity to resettle people in the interests of the administration. They 
were concerned generally by the scattered nature of the population in small and 
often inaccessible settlements, as much for reasons of administration and taxation. In 
the 1910s, the government was seeking to build up the power of the designated 
chiefs, as Chapter 2 showed, and it used the pretext of sleeping sickness to force 
people to move closer to them. 28 For example, people were moved away from rivers 
and the Uganda frontier to be concentrated near the 'prominent' chiefs on the KaJo 
KaJi plateau . 
29 During the 1920s, sleeping sickness continued to be the primary 
justification for the concentration of the population into villages: 
Evasion of inspection was found to be simple where natives were scattered in 
the bush... Villagisation was found to be the only method to cope with this. 30 
This was part of a wider response to sleeping sickness by colonial administrations; 
Kjekshus and Hodnebo have shown that the policy of concentration actually 
contributed to the spread of the disease by increasing the areas of abandoned bush in 
which tsetse thrived. 31 
The newly-built roads were increasingly the focus for these sleeping sickness 
resettlements. 32 In fact the roads became key in the British vision of the ordering and 
development of Western Mongalla, as a report on Loka and Yei districts reflected: 
26 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/35/13 1. 
27 YDMD Feb. 1945, NRO EP 2/24/87. For details of the villagisation and isolation measures see 
Hodnebo, Cattle and Flies, pp. 94-9. 
28 Spence to mother, Yei 15 Dec 1914 and 31 Dec 1914, SAL D 12/203/2 and D 12/200/8. 
29 Nalder, Province Handbook, p. 5 1. 
30 pMO to CS, 28 Aug 1927, NRO CS 44/10/44. 
31H. Kjekshus, Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History: The Case of 
Tanganyika 1850-1950 (London, 1977); Hodnebo, Cattle and Flies, pp. 97,10 1. 
32 Sleeping sickness AR 1923-4, NRO MP 1/6/39- 
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It is unfortunate that the mass of the population lives at a considerable 
distance off the road, and there are at present no side roads fit for motor 
transport. This year a few Chiefs have been moved down onto the road but 
side roads are an essential for the development of the country. 33 
Road settlements reflected administrative expediency, but also the desire to create 
more obvious 'villages'. In 1939, the Yei D. C. extolled the virtues of a new 
geography of village communities centring on the roads, courts and chiefs' 
registries: 
The settling of people along the roads introduced a new and companionate 
element into native life, which their life scattered about the valleys never 
possessed... The road has become the spine of the community. The courts 
have certainly become the heart; and if offices or registries are provided, the 
broken down tribal elements may well regroup themselves into a new and 
vital village life, comprised of family groups... A further development may 
lie in congregating the bush shops into these centres. 34 
Thus a new government ideology of the 'village' justified the continuation of 
resettlement policies in areas not yet 'concentrated'. A similar link between roads, 
villages and good administration was made in the case of Nyamusa country in Moru 
district: 
Here the people are wild and untamed. They live away ftom the roads in 
small isolated communities. The road leading to their country has fallen into 
disrepair and the orders of the District Commissioner and the chief for its 
repair have been completely ignored... At the other end of the scale the small 
chiefship of the Borimba (Chief Jambo) presents a picture of pleasing 
orderliness. The cultivation is the cleanest and most forward, the homesteads 
are neat and surrounded with fruit trees, the taxes are promptly paid, the road 
is always in good repair. 35 
33 Governor to FS and CS, enclosing 'Report on the economic situation and possible developments of 
Mongalla Province', 27 March 1925, NRO EP 2/23/86. For a strilcing illustration of the new 
settlement pattern along the roads by c. 1930, see Map 4 in Hodnebo, Cattle and Flies, p. 98. For 
similar villagisation on new roads in Cameroon, see Geschiere, 'Chiefs and Colonial Rule', p. 153. 
34 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb, 1939, NRO EP 2/2/8. 
See also Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
35 Moru District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
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Villagisation thus became seen as key to successful local government and 
development by the 1940s: 
Progress towards resettlement of the people around village centres has been 
meagre. Until this is done there will be no basic unit with a corporate feeling 
36 
of unity on which any real system of self-government can be based . 
Villagisation was also intended to tidy up the 'tribal' geography, as in "the 
regrouping and resettlement" of Chief Dokolo's "large and unwieldy" chiefdom in 
Moru district, to separate three "tribal remnants". 37 Pressure from the Civil Secretary 
in Khartoum to produce a map of tribal boundaries in Equatona in 1940 may have 
added to this concern to separate 'tribes' and make them territorial . 
38 In Mendi sub- 
district, however, the impossibility of enforcing such a geography was emphasised 
in one report: 
[T]he subjects of different subchiefs are inextricably mixed, and 
subchiefships are no longer territorial or tribal. They are just a mess. 39 
Nevertheless, attempts were made to at least enforce Mendi sub-chiefs' boundaries 
and the registration of the population within them, and by 1940, the new road from 
Yei to Mendi had been completed and people were also being relocated alongside 
1 40 
A further idealisation of the village community came from the Christian 
missionaries in Western Mongalla, though they sought to centre it on the church and 
school rather than the court or chiefs' registry. They had always welcomed 
villagisation, as aiding their own access to communities for purposes of 
evangelisation .41 As elsewhere, they rejoiced in the real and symbolic impact of their 
mission stations on the environment: 
Less than a year ago this was a grass and bush covered wilderness with 
nothing but the tangled remains of earlier gardens and habitations to be seen. 
Now it has been transformed into a neat and delightful little village... The 
36 Moru District AR 1945, NRO EP 2/27/98; see also EPMD April 1947, NRO DK 57/2,15. 
37 EPMD Oct. 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
38 CS, Buchanan, to Marwood, 7 Dec 1940, NRO CS 1/2/5; Nugent, 'Arbitrary Lines', p. 39. 
39 Keen, 'The tribes of Meridi Sub-district', 1946, NRO DK 112/14/95. 
40 Tothill, 'Report, 1940', NRO EP 2/3/10. 
" Hewitt, 'Extract from The Problents of Success: Histwý, of the CMS', SAD 84/10/1-136. 
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hillock on which we raised this little House of praver is of solid ironstone, 
and in order to lay the most shallow foundations, we had to chisel into the 
red rock itself - perhaps, or so we hope, a symbol pregnant Nvith another 
meaning. 42 
Lui missionaries were particularly focussed on reshaping the sacred landscape, both 
through the main mission station - modestly described as the "hub of the universe" 
for the entire Moru tribe - and through a system of dispensaries and schools at 
regular intervals throughout the distri Ct. 43 Thus both the missionaries and 
government had an interest in creating villages, re-ordering the human landscape 
and imbuing it with new moral values. 
1.2 Indigenous Geographies 
The resistance of the people to the erasing of their own geographies was consistent, 
but their methods shifted over the colonial period. In the 1910s, the first sleeping 
sickness relocations were only achieved through government patrols, as people 
simply refused to move. The language of the British reports implied that they could 
be herded like animals: "[t]he people show a natural disinclination to move from 
their villages and a few have not yet been rounded Upi5.44 In the Kaliko area of Yei 
district, the Sleeping Sickness Inspector encountered more resistance from both 
chiefs and people, including threats of poisoned arrows, and responded by flogging 
the former and burning down villages. In the face of this force, people also tried to 
hide in 'the bush' from the inspection visits, but to little avail: 
One village in which the chief himself hid... had to be severely dealt with. 
The chief is a prisoner, my men are searching the bush, all the huts have been 
bumt. 45 
The strong arm of the state was thus hard to evade or oppose when it came to the 
clearing of villages, but this did not mean that the government was able to entirely 
42 Crabb, Yei Divinity school, 1946, CMS AF AL. 
43 Mrs Fraser, 8 Aug 1935, CMS Acc. 168, F2; 'Mission share plan: introductory letter for Lui 
Hospital' (n. d. ), CMS G3 Sg6; Fraser, 'Pioneering medical work in the pagan Sudan', The Mission 
Hospital. - A record of inedical missions of the CMS, Vol. 29,1925, pp. 32-6. 
" SIR 248, March 1915, PRO WO 106 6225. 
45 Spence to mother, Yei, 31 Dec. 1914 and 15 Dec. 1914, SAL D 12/200/1-28 and D 12/203/1-24. 
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impose a new geography. Some chiefs and people sought to assert their own 
knowledge of the local geography, although at this stage their claims were dismissed 
by officials, confident of their own superior expertise. For example in 1906, 
Inspector Cameron reported on the undemarcated northern boundary of the Lado 
Enclave: "[t]he natives profess to know the frontier and say it is marked by a khor, 
but it is impossible that they can have anything but the roughest idea of where it 
,, 46 runs . 
After the takeover of the Enclave, the southern boundary Nvith the Congo 
was also uncertain, being based on the Nile-Congo watershed, and one chief claimed 
that he was definitely on the Sudan side, because the streams in his area flowed into 
the Yei River. The Government Geologist dismissed this as "an absolute 
impossibility", but it does reveal the way in which chiefs' knowledge of the ways 
and (even geographic) language of government was a tool by which communities 
could try to defend themselves or exercise some autonorny. 47 It also shows the way 
that local people quickly sought to manipulate, and benefit from the imposed 
boundary. People and chiefs were united in ignoring the prohibitions on cross-border 
movement; indeed they used the 'no-man's land' of the frontiers to hide from tax 
48 collections and punishment . 
The chiefs actively sought to profit from ivory 
poaching: "[e]ach poacher has an excellent system of paid intelligence with the 
native chiefs who give him timely information of the approach of an official' 49 
Congo traders also bought ivory illegally and obtained porters from chiefs in Yei 
district, as reported in 192 0.50 In 1923, the Medical Officer reported with frustration 
the ability of people to make hidden paths across the frontier: 
The natives do not appreciate nor understand what we are doing for them. 
The most intelligent and those who might be expected to understand are only 
the smartest at evading the regulations. Communication with Uganda had 
been reduced but is still taking place. Two sultans found not only facilitating 
but encouraging it have been removed. 51 
46 Cameron, 'Inspection Tour in the Southern Mandari Country', SIR 140, March 1906, PRO WO 
106/228. 
" Grabham, 'Geological Traverses in the Southern Lado', SIR 223, Feb. 1913, PRO WO 106 6225. 
48 SIR 302, Sept. 1919 and SIR 321, April 1921, PRO WO 33 997. 
49 SIR 2 10, Jan. 1912, PRO WO 106 6224. See R. 0. Collins, 'Ivory Poaching in the Lado Enclave', 
Uganda Jow-nal 24, no. 2 (1960), pp. 217-28. 
50 Yei DMIR, Nov. 1920, NRO, MP 1/4/27. 
51 Sleeping sickness AR 1923, NRO MP 16 39. 
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In general social and trading networks thus continued to operate across these 
boundaries throughout the colonial period; inhabitants of the border zones 
maintained their 'Informal' trade and even profited from the boundary. 52 They also 
continued to migrate across it, especially in times of food shortage. 53 
People also continued to seek recourse to various kinds of knowledge or expertise 
across these boundaries. For example, Adeftiye has argued that Kakwa of Yel 
district continued to visit sacred sites now in Uganda, especially the rain chiefs and 
shrines at Koboko. 54 The appearance of a secret 'Maney' society in the Yei area was 
attributed by the British to a trader and ritual practitioner from the Congo. 55 The 
most reported case however was that of 'Allah Water' or 'Water of Yakan'. In 1919, 
two men from Yei District, Lugara and Rembe, were found to have been selling 
'Allah Water' to Lugware from Uganda in the villages of two Sudanese Kakwa 
chiefs Bengali and Lokudu, where there were also some Lugware living. The water 
was said to offer immunity against death or wounds from government guns, the 
resurrection of ancestors and their cattle, German help to throw out the British, and a 
promised shipment of rifles along the Kaia and Nile rivers. 56 The Uganda 
administration - wrongly according to Leopold - blamed Yakan for unrest in Arua in 
1919, and the Sudan administration sent a company of the Equatorial Battalion to 
Yei district, arrested Lugara and Rembe and fined the chiefs in whose village they 
had been operating. 57 
52 Trade and smuggling increased fin-ther when bicycles became widely available later in the colonial 
period: Interview with Lubari Ramba, 31 Aug. 2004, Mitika, Yei. 
3 YDMD Feb. 1944, May 1945, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
54 Ade Adefuye, 'The Kakwa of Uganda and the Sudan: The ethnic factor in national and 
international politics', in Al Asiwaju (ed), Partitioned Afiricans: Ethnic relations across Aftica's 
International Boundaries 1884-1984 (Lagos, 1985), pp. 51-69, at p. 57. 
55 Yei DMIR Dec. 1919, NRO IN 2/48/408. 
56 John Middleton, 'The Yakan or Allah Water Cult among the Lugbara', Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute 93 (1963), pp. 80-108, at pp. 92-3; Bardwell to Governor Mongalla, I 
March 1919, NRO, MP 1/4/27. 
57 Bardwell to Governor Mongalla, I March 1919, NRO, MP 1/4/27; MPIR Feb., May 1919, NRO IN 
2/48/408. Leopold argues that evidence from a Nubi informant convinced paranoid administrators 
and subsequent scholars (Middleton, 'Yakan'; Collins, Shadows, pp. 260-63) that the movement was 
anti-colonial and pan-Nilotic, when it was more Nubi-influenced and protective; the 1919 unrest was 
a largely unrelated response to tax and labour demands: 'Roots of Violence', pp. 124-9. On the 
general dislike of British administrators for pan-ethnic or cross-border ritual movements, see Douglas 
H. Johnson, 'Criminal Secrecy: The Case of the Zande 'Secret Societies", Past and Present 130 
(199 1), pp. 170-200, esp. pp. 179-8 1; and Nuer Prophets, pp. 27-9. 
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The Yakan movement illustrates the way in which networks and ritual communities 
transcended the colonial boundaries and ethnic definitions; as in northwestern 
Zimbabwe, this was "a place where colonial subjects persistently refused to be 
located in a determinate cartographic space -a place x, ý'here they refused... to be 
5 58 named'. It may also have been partly a response to outbreaks of cattle and human 
disease in the forrn of rinderpest and sleeping sickness. Adefuye argues that the 
Kakwa blamed the sleeping sickness outbreak on their failure to visit the ancestral 
rain shrines at Koboko in Uganda, and that the Yakan water empowered them to 
resume such visits. 59 It may have also met a general need for protection after the 
forced relocations of villages. 
In 1935, sleeping sickness was again the government pretext for attempting to 
suppress the continued observance of these wider economic, social and spiritual 
networks operating across the colonial boundaries: 
In spite of a large no-man's land separating the Kuku country from Uganda, 
our Kakwa people have been secretly visiting their Uganda relatives via the 
elephant tracks through the bush and so have brought the infection back with 
them. As a punishment the chief was put in prison and the whole Kakwa 
tribe made to move to a new site some 40 miles inland from the Uganda 
border. Before leaving some of the men burnt down the building which had 
been their Church and school - it is said out of resentment. 
60 
In the same area, resistance to the territorial separation of clans to facilitate the new 
clan-based tax collection also resulted in the burning down of huts by the 
government. It was not only the boundary enforcement which aroused such 
resistance, but the relocation of villages away from ancestral graves and the streams 
where ancestors and spirits dwelt. 61 The continuing significance of this kind of 
sacred geography was increasingly imposed on the awareness of administrators, as 
for example in the Mendi area: 
58 Worby, 'Maps, Names', p. 371. See also Berry, Chiefs Know, pp. 1-34, for 'elusive boundaries'. 
59 Adefuye, 'The Kakwa'. 
60 Finch, Kajo Kaji, 10 July 1935, CMS G3 AL. 
61 Winder, 'Fifty Years On: Service in Mongalla Province, 1930-33', (1979) SAD 541/7/1-3 2; 
Stigand, Equatoria, p. 74, Jennings Bran-dy, 'Report of a tour among the Baris of the East Bank', 27 
Aug. 1906, NRO IN 8/2/12; Yunis, 'Notes on the Kuku', pp. 2,25; Interview with Barnaba Durno 
Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Khartoum; Reining, Zande Scheme, p. 4. 
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Before the people were moved on to the roads the area in question was the 
home of most of the number mentioned above and the graves of their 
ancestors, of course, are there and to these the people naturally expect the 
62 right of access . 
Local people were not indifferent to "rootedness in physical space" as Kopytoff has 
suggested of Africans in general, any more than they were unable to comprehend 
physical boundaries. 63 
The government and missionary attempts to alter the local geography were thus 
particularly resented if they involved an assault on sacred sites. 64 One documented 
example occurred in Moru district, when a roadmaking party cut down a sacred tree 
belonging to an old rain-maker, Labi, who told Evans-Pritchard that this was a 
"sacrilegious action" which would have "serious consequences in connection with 
the rainfall". He continued to keep his rain pot on the site, but was disapproving of 
the grass burned along the edge of the road to keep it cleared: rain pots needed to be 
kept away from fire. 65 Later he seems to have abandoned the site, and strikingly it 
was appropriated by the Lui missionaries: 
In March the new dispensary and school were built at Chief WaJos... My 
husband had chosen the site last year, and the people think it very remarkable 
that this was the spot on which an old rainmaker used to live and carry on his 
healing art. He now lives about a mile away, his name is Labi and he... 
speaks in a very lordly way to the people and seems to have a good deal of 
influence over them Still. 66 
62 Clark, D. C. Moru, to Governor, 29 Feb. 1940, NRO EP 2/17/66. 
63 Kopytoff, 'Internal African', p. 22; Coplan, 'A River', p. 85; Nugent, 'Arbitrary Lines', p. 36. 
64 For comparative struggles over the sacred landscape, see Terence Ranger, Voicesfrom the Rocks. - 
Nature, Culture and History in the Matopos Hills of Zimbabwe, (Oxford, 1999), and 'Taking Hold of 
the Land: Holy Places and Pilgrimages in Twentieth-Century Zimbabwe', Past and Present 117 
(1987), pp. 15 8-94; Cherry Leonardi, 'Laying the First Course of Stones: Building the London 
Missionary Society Church in Madagascar, 1862-1895', International Journal ofAfirican Historical 
Studies 36, no. 3 (2003), pp. 607-33. 
65 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14/95; also 
Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
66 Mrs Fraser, 8 Aug. 1935, CMS Acc. 168, F2. This was reversed in 1942 in Yei district when a rain 
priest chose the site of a new medical post from which to practice: YDMD Oct. 1942, NRO EP 
2/24/87. 
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Labi's rain shrine represented an alternative focal point in the local geography to 
that of the new village centres, churches or schools, and one '%N-hich Nvas directl\- 
challenged by the government and missionary reshaping of the human landscape. 
Trees remained the most significant focal points within communities all across 
Western Mongalla: 
Atoromong is a place of interest. All underneath its branches are black stones 
very smooth and shiny and worn into the shape of seats. It is some distance 
from the village houses but is used as a general meeting place for the days 
gossip, which accounts for the shininess of the stones. Smiths also work 
here... Under the tree were several burmahs and pots and I was told that no 
one ever removed anything which was not his own, so like other trees of this 
kind it is considered a safe depository. 67 
68 Similarly, the toket meeting-trees remained the centre of Mandari communities. 
Thus the new centres ostensibly dominated by the government chiefs were not the 
only loci of community or authority; powerful landscapes were not altered so easily. 
New meanings may also have been added on to existing ones; for example, in 1931 
Chief Ramadallah agreed to have a bush school in his village: "[h]e has chosen the 
site of the school under a sacred tree called Roronon and is very keen to get it 
started. "69 The depth of older layers of geography was emphasised in relation to the 
newer and temporary European impositions, including the town of Juba; locals were 
reported to say that it was no more likely to remain permanent than previous 
European towns had: 
[I]ndeed it has got all the appearance of permanence, but... all the others 
looked the same to us and where are they now? On the other hand our small 
villages are on the same sites as they always were and what will cause them 
to change? It is better from our villages to watch Juba grow up and fall down 
again, and not to take any more notice of it than we did of Gondokoro, Lado, 
Rejaf and Mongalla. 70 
67 Reiland [? ) 'Note on Lyria', June 1933, JD I/l/2. See also Johnson, Nuer Prophets, pp. 42-5. 
6' Buxton, Chiefs, pp. 77-9. 
' '9 Richardson, A/Govemor to A/D. C. Yei, 24 Sept. 193 1, NRO EP 2/23/86. 
70 Richardson, 'Bari Notes', p. 184. 
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Older geographies also remained imprinted on the socio-political patterns of the 
people, as emphasised in the detailed description of earlier settlements by one Moru 
D. C.: "[r]ecollection of this original tribal map is often invaluable as a guide to local 
&politiCSi. iq7I Yet the new government-imposed geographies also had an impact on 
local politics, placing the chiefs once again in an ambivalent position. 
1.3 Chiefs on the Borderline 
From the 1920s, the government policy of villagisation on the roads had offered 
some advantages to the chiefs around the time at which their power was at its peak. 
The government reliance on them to lead the movement of their people and to 
enforce the sleeping sickness restrictions placed demands on them, but also 
enhanced their control of their people. It reduced the possibilities for traditional 
recourse to alternative chiefs if people were dissatisfied, and made tax collection, 
labour requisition and supervision easier for both chiefs and administrators. 72 Chiefs 
were also keen to construct centres to display their authority, such as the court- 
houses and registries. From the late 1930s however, they faced increasing resistance, 
as people themselves moved away from the roads again. This movement coincided 
with the growing uncertainty of government policy, as agricultural officers criticised 
the roadside settlement pattern. 
As Chapter One showed, concerns about soil erosion had become prominent among 
agricultural experts and in the Colonial Office during the 1930s. 73 In Equatona, as 
early as 1933, the Director of Agriculture, Cameron, warned that the resettlement on 
roads could have adverse effects: 
It is natural that road alignments where possible follow the high ridges where 
ironstone is near the surface and the soil is usually shallow... This has 
resulted in their choice of lands for cultivation being limited to land 
adjoining the road which is not usually the most fertile land available in the 
district.... [and] naturally becomes impoverished through overcropping.... I 
71 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
7' Reining, Zande Scheme, pp. 16,24-5. 
73 See Anderson, 'Depression, Dustbowl'; Richards, 'Ecological Change', p. 23. 
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am under the impression that a reduction in productivity has already resulted 
from the migration to the roads. 74 
By 1940, his successor Tothill was arguing that there were "the strongest possible 
objections on the agricultural side" to the 'ribbon development' along the roads, and 
75 
urging that the population should be moved away from the roads where possible . 
The administrators attempted to overcome these criticisms and concerns by a 
compromise: 
Chiefs were informed that applications for their people to move off the main 
roads to better cultivable land... would be sympathetically considered. It was 
however made clear that this was not a general invitation for everyone to 
take to the bush and reduce local and district administration to a state of 
anarchy. The proposal is to link up off-the-road settlements by bicycle paths 
so that all departmental officials can easily visit and supervise their various 
activities. 76 
In Yei and Juba districts by the early 1940s a number of chiefs led the resettlement 
of villages on land from which they had previously been removed. 77 However, the 
governrnent stipulation that they must build new roads, in addition to the labour 
entailed in building new homes and clearing land for cultivation, discouraged many 
communities from obtaining government permission. Instead, they began to simply 
move, either with or without the approval of their chiefs. In the Kala area of Kajo 
Kaji, one example of this involved a sub-section breaking away from Chief 
MOjumurie under an old chief- 
Ex-chief Mulukwat and some of his people have deserted Kala and returned 
to their old haunts near Kandin Hill south of Kala, where there is excellent 
ground for cultivation. They were moved thence to Kala some eight years 
ago for sleeping sickness reasons. 78 
74 Cameron, in Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 
57/35/131. 
75 Tothill, 'Report, 1940', NRO EP 2/3/10. 
76 EPMD Dec. 1940, NRO CS 57/12/46. 
77 EPMD March 194 1, NRO CS 57/14/53; Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26ý 94. 
78 YDMD Feb., April 1944, NRO EP 2/24 87. 
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In the face of this fait accompli, the go-, -ernrnent simply ordered the building of a 
short road to link up the new settlement, demonstrating the effectiveness of such 
collective action. 
It was in Moru district that the movement off the roads was most widespread, and 
seems to have occurred independently of the chiefs, who struggled to maintain 
control of their increasingly scattered people. Throughout the early 1940s, 
administrators and missionaries reported the dispersal of 'the people of such-and- 
such a chief, and often 'some', or 'sections' of the people, suggesting that 
communities may have been re-establishing the right to move away from chiefs, as 
well as reacting to the exhaustion of the ground on the roads. 79 According to the 
D. C., the chiefs responded negatively to these autonomous resettlements: 
Die hard chiefs still pine for the rigid regimentation of the past and would 
like to see everyone forced to live on the roads again. The matter is raised in 
every discussion by the Moru chiefs, who do not appear ever to have 
admitted the principle that people might live away from the roads if they 
wish, though considerably more than half the population already do so. It 
seems probable that those who have moved away from the roads are under 
the impression that they have done so against governinent wishes. 80 
This is particularly interesting in that it suggests that the act of resettlement was a 
quite deliberate act of resistance to the government and perhaps also the chiefs. The 
latter continued to push for re-concentration in the 1950s: 
The Amadi B court resolved 'That no economic progress or advance towards 
local governinent was possible for the Moru unless they abandoned their 
present habit of living in scattered hamlets'. To implement this resolution the 
Court directed that each chief, on his return to his country, should visit his 
sub-chiefs, collect the elders of the sub-chiefship and agree on a suitable area 
for concentration of the people. 
81 
79 EPMD April 1940, NRO CS 57/12/46; EPMD March 1944, NRO CS 57/20/78; Lui station 
newsletter 1943, report 1944, CMS G3 Sg6; Yei central school report, 1941, 
CMS G3 Sgll; Lul 
hospital report, 1942,1943, CMS G3 Sm2; EPMD Nov 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. According to 
Tosh, 
migration was one of the few clear acts of peasant resistance to unpopular chiefs: 
Clan Leader. ý, p. 
212. 
80 EPMD April 1943, NRO CS 57/19/74. 
81 EPMD Jan. 1950, NRO DK 57, "9, '24. 
181 
Chapter Four: Knowing the Land 
It is not known if this resolution was successfiffly implemented, but it seems that in 
this area the chiefs viewed the scattering of the population as a threat to their 
authority, and yet were unable to prevent it. In the Mendi area, people had aINN-ays 
maintained their right to move between chiefs and sub-chiefs, despite government 
disapproval: "[i]t follows from this that subchiefs have little or no authority. and 
there is unlimited scope for playing one off against another". Yet despite this 
administrator's perception of 'chaotic' organisation, he had to admit that the people 
9 82 seemed "tractable and contented'. In 1944, people were officially allowed to move 
between chiefdoms, provided they registered the transfer: 173 moved between 
chiefs, and 258 between subehiefs in that year. 83 It may be that the people of Moru 
and Kajo Kaji districts were seeking to restore this kind of fluid geography, as well 
as searching for more fertile land. 
At the same time as chiefs in some areas were facing the dispersal of their 
communities, the continuing popular resistance to boundaries and movement 
restrictions was also pushing the chiefs into hiding contraventions from the 
government as much as possible. Chiefs thus used their position as interlocutors of 
information between government and people to conceal illegal practices; frequently 
during this period the government reports had to admit a lack of knowledge, or 
misinformation, demonstrating the limits of the colonial state in the bush. In the 
1940s, the Congo authorities complained about Sudanese poachers in the Garamba 
National Park, and the Moru D. C. had to admit that he was already aware of such 
trespass: 
This matter was brought to my notice early in the year in a chat I had with 
Chief Ngamunde about fishing possibilities in the neighbourhood. He told 
me that the River Naam was a poor fishing river but that in the River Aka 
across the border excellent fishing was available and the Mundu caught 
many fish there. My reception of this remark told him he had been a little too 
forthcoming. 84 
82 Keen, 'The tribes of Meridi Sub-district', 1946, NRO DK 112/14/95. See also Nalder to D. C. 's and 
CS, 'The future of Native Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 1/39/105. 
83 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
" Clark, D. C. Moru to Governor, 16 Jan 1940, NRO EP 2/17/66. 
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The chiefs were increasingly adept at withholding such information: five years later 
the D. C. 's successor declared, I consider that my chiefs are bona fide when they 
say they have no knowledge of this poaching whatsoever". A few weeks later, 
however, he retracted this: 
I am not now so sure of the good faith of my chiefs... I now consider that the 
chiefs are not cooperating with us in attempting to stop poaching in the 
Congo. It is difficult to suggest a solution in view of the conspirac. 1, of 
silence on the part of the chiefs... it is possibly too great a strain on their 
authority. 85 [My italics] 
In fact, these chiefs were following a long tradition of concealing poaching and 
cross-border movement from the hakuma. 86 Similarly in Yei district, the chiefs along 
the frontier "all expressed complete ignorance of any violations thereof "87 and yet 
Chief Lita was punished for "condoning the passage of natives for trade purpose 
between the Belgian Congo and the Sudan". 88 The chiefs were never able to prevent 
the movement of their people, and in recognition of this sought instead to conceal 
the migrations from government. Similarly the governinent might have employed 
force to try to resettIc people and prevent boundary crossing, but it too had to face 
the limits of its knowledge of, and control over the population. 
85 McCargow, D. C. Moru to Governor, 26 Sept. 1945 and 8 Oct 1945, NRO EP 2/17,66. 
86 Simson to Governor Stigand, 15 Sept. 1919, NRO IN 2/48/408. 
87 Cullen, D. C. Yel to Governor, 3 Oct. 1945, NRO EP 2/17/66. 
88 YDMD July 1942, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
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2. Agricultural and Ecological Knowledge 
This region never saw large-scale agricultural development projects such as the 
neighbouring Zande Scheme. But there were various attempts to introduce new 
crops, produce food surpluses, train agricultural staff, and remedy erosion. There 
was a persistent British belief that the area was one of the most fertile in Sudan, and 
that its failure to profit from this was the result of the ignorance or laziness of the 
inhabitants. This justified the use of compulsion in the 1930s and into the 1940s to 
try to expand agricultural production, but as the concerns over erosion grew and 
agricultural experts criticised compulsion, policy changed to one of trying to impart 
knowledge. At the same time people had increasingly resisted government 
agricultural directives in recognition of the lack of profits to be gained. They 
rigorously evaluated and selected new kinds of agricultural knowledge, and 
continued to acknowledge the authority of their own experts in relation to land, 
cultivation and hunting. It is hardly surprising that they rejected much of the 
agricultural expertise of the government, whose policies forin a catalogue of largely 
unsuitable interventions. 
2.1 Cash Crops 
The basic development 'plan' pursued by the colonial administration in Western 
Mongalla involved trying to introduce partial monetisation by requesting that the 
Poll Tax introduced in 1925 be paid in cash, and promoting cash crops in order to 
raise the money. 89 The main hope was that cotton could become the primary cash 
crop, having been grown in the region back in the nineteenth century, and initially it 
met with some success. The early years of cotton cultivation, 1927-31, coincided 
with high prices, so that in the 1929-30 season, Kajo Kaji cultivators received a total 
of fE 1823 for their cotton; this must have been very welcome in light of efforts to 
purchase cattle and rebuild herds. The sudden drop in prices in 1932 however, 
caused a complete abandonment of the crop in most areas, and increasingly only 
"considerable administrative pressure" could persuade people to grow cotton. "It is 
89 , Hut and Poll Tax Ordinance, Mongalla', Govermnent Gazette No. 466, Dec. 1925, PRO FO 
867,41. 
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most important on material and psychological grounds to keep cotton growing alive. 
It is so far the only visible money crop for this Province". 90 
In 1937, the Yei D. C. sought to bring in Uganda buyers to obtain higher prices in the 
Kajo Kaji area, only to be disappointed by the coincidence of further 'unfortunate' 
price drops. In the same year, compulsion was dropped in Zande and Moru districts, 
resulting in a rapid decline of cotton cultivation. Yet alternative cash crops were also 
unpopular. For example, sunn hemp was very labour-intensive: "[a] general feeling 
amongst the natives is that the labour and time required for retting is more than the 
crop is worth". Coffee was also promoted, with seedlings given to chiefs, in the hope 
that it would be grown on communal plots. Yet 1937 was also a year of drought and 
food shortages, and it was reported that people were labouring on their food crops, 
determined to avoid another shortfall in 1938; it is hardly surprising that the casli 
crops caused resentment. 91 Two years later, reports conceded that cotton cultivation 
had greatly declined, that sunn hemp was a failure as a cash crop, and that coffee 
had made little progress. The organisation of cotton cultivation was criticised in 
Mendi district, where every tax-payer had had to grow at least half an acre under 
'careful' supervision: 
[B]ut this constant 'prodding' of the people evoked a general distaste for the 
whole crop which has not yet been outgrown. To the people's mind cotton is 
a govemment 'forced labour'. 
Yet these reports also emphasised the continuing desirability of a cash crop: pressure 
to come up with money for tax in Kajo Kaji was reported with concern to be causing 
increased labour migration to Uganda since the decline of cotton cultivation. 92 Local 
market trade in grain was also reported to be less in 1939 than it had been in 1924, 
thanks to increasing labour migration and government demands to grow other 
crops. 93 
In 1939, the Govenu-nent 'Economic Botanist', Myers, produced a report on 
Equatoria, which was highly cntical of the use of compulsion to grow cotton: 
90 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Sununary of Infonnation', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/35/13 1. 
91 EPMD Jan. -April, Sept. 1937, NRO CS 57/4,17. 92 Yei and Moru District AR's 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
93 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/18. 
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This unpopularity is due to 'big stick' methods in the past; to the conviction 
that cotton is grown purely for the hakuma and not for themselves, since in 
bad years at least it does little more than pay the poll-tax; to the irksome 
labour of 'clean cultivation' demanded; to the fact that the picking season 
coincides with the height of the hunting season. 94 
Despite Myers' criticisms, the needs of the government during the Second World 
War ensured that cash crops together with new food crops were still being pushed in 
the early 1940s, though administrators were increasingly aware of their 
unpopularity: "[flt is doubtful whether the native cultivator will ever love the potato, 
its introduction to the district having been accompanied by so much travail and 
labour". 95 Similarly the poor cotton crop at Kajo Kaji in 1944 was explained by "the 
prolonged drought and the apathy of the people who naturally are uninterested in a 
, 96 cash crop when even their food crops have failed two years in succession'. 
2.2 Agricultural 'Improvement' 
Although Myers' criticisms were not immediately addressed, the 1940s did see a 
resulting shift in government priorities from trying to use the land more profitably to 
trying to protect and improve the land itself, and from compulsory cultivation, to 
education and dissemination of agricultural knowledge. But the statement by one 
administrative staff trainee in 1941 - "[m]y people although good at cultivation, as it 
is their chief occupation, do not know it in the way wanted by the white men" - both 
asserted the existing agricultural skills of the people, and expressed 
incomprehension at government agricultural directives. 97 The Agricultural Bush 
School near Kajo Kaji was reported in 1939 to have "died owing to the permanent 
truancy of all the pupils": "[t]he idea of an agricultural syllabus was not consonant 
,, 98 with the native idea of education. In 1945 it was again reported that educated 
boys did not want to go into agriculture as a profession, preferring higher-status 
94 Myers, 'Provisional Report of the Economic Botanist on Yei, Meridi, Yambio districts', 1939, 
NRO CS 115111. 
95 EPMD Oct. 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53. 
96 YDMD March 1944, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
97 Janson-Smith, 'Report on Juba training school Final Examination, 194 1', NRO DK3 1/6/29. 
98 EPMD March 1939, NRO CS 57/11/42; Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
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government employment. 99 Despite Myers' belief that education was the way to 
improve agriculture in the Province, the agricultural expertise of government 
officials was clearly not seen to be of value. 
People measured cultivation practices in terms of their cost-effectiveness and returns 
on the labour entailed; when cotton prices were high they were naturally more 
enthusiastic about the crop. 100 But generally they made the rational choice, since the 
hunting and cotton-picking seasons coincided, to pursue the former: "[a]nd they 
certainly need meat much more than the money for cotton". ' 01 Some new crops were 
eagerly adopted; for example in Yei district, cassava and sweet potatoes were being 
widely grown by 1940.102 When a free grain market was introduced in 1949, 
growers responded to the higher prices by producing more surplus for sale. 1 03 But 
there was resistance to crops and practices that did not provide sufficient returns. 
The Agricultural Demonstrators, or coffee and cotton 'boys', were seen as 
agricultural police rather than as useful experts, and without the use of compulsion 
their advice was ignored. 104 The posting of Agriculture Department 'Intelligence' 
staff to the villages "for the purpose of keeping an eye and rendering a report on the 
harvest", would only have added to this impression. 105 
Often there must have been complete incomprehension as to what the aim or value 
of the new practices actually was. After all, there is repeated evidence in government 
reports to suggest that goverm-nent knowledge was not in any way superior to 
existing expertise. The crop yields at the Agricultural Department farin at Kagelu, 
for example, did not "compare favourably with those of native crops". 106 The 
99 EP Agriculture Department AR 1944-5, NRO EP 2/29/104. 
100 E. g. when the Zande scheme was being developed in the early 1950s: "Cultivators along the 
Maridi road in Yei district are agitating that they too should be allowed to grow cotton... They view 
the Zande scheme with green eyed envy", EPMD May 1952, NRO CS2 30/3/6. See also John Tosh, 
'Lango Agriculture During the Early Colonial Period: Land and Labour in a Cash-Crop Economy', 
JAH 19, no. 3 (1978), pp. 415-39. 
101 Myers, 'Provisional Report of the Economic Botanist on Yei, Meridi, Yambio districts', 1939, 
NRO CS 115111. 
")2 Tothill, 'Report, 1940', NRO EP 2/3/10. 
103 EPMD Aug. 1949, NRO DK 57'513. 
104 Tracey, D. C. Yei, to Governor, 15.6.39, NRO EP 1ý5/18. See Mamdani, Citizen, p. 164, for 
examples of this elsewhere. 
105 YDMD July 194 5, NRO EP 2 24S 7. 
106 Ferguson, AR of Inspector of Agriculture, Kagulu for 1944-5. SAD 753/3/1-129. 
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attempt in 1939 to demonstrate a new cassava squeezer in Juba district was 
undermined when local women produced their own version which they had long 
been using, and which had "many advantages over the more elaborate and expensiVe 
imported squeezer". 107 More disastrous was the inoculation of cattle in Kajo Kaji 
against rinderpest, which resulted in the deaths of 353 cattle from tetanus 
infections-108 The apparent contradictions of government policy were amusingly 
highlighted in relation to the profitable crop of hashish: 
One addict made an official complaint after his arrest saying that the Turuk 
had introduced bafra (cassava), bambe (sweet potatoes) and bangi (hashish). 
He thought them all excellent and wholesome commodities and was 
bewildered at the flighty inconsistency of a government which now 
prosecuted people for the cultivation and consumption of hashish. 109 
2.3 Erosion 
The greatest popular incomprehension occurred over the restrictions on grass- 
burning. The wider concerns over erosion led officials to believe that practices of 
shifting cultivation and the annual burning of the grass for cultivation and hunting 
were causing erosion: "[t]he soil impoverishment at Kajo Kaji appears so acute that 
in the so-called 'dust-bowl' area it will probably be advisable to prohibit burning 
altogether". ' 10 Hunting using 'native' methods was allowed, but the government 
increasingly sought to ban the use of fire. "' However, it was later reallsed that 
leaving the grass unburned heightened the risk of more devastating fires later in the 
dry season, and so the policy was abruptly adjusted to promote controlled burning 
early in the year instead. Administrators admitted that this change was 'bewildering' 
for the people: in Moru district, "the people have quite made up their minds that the 
new D. C. likes fires whereas the old one hated them! ". ' 12 But this policy meant that 
the areas which were too damp to be fired before the set date of Ist January became 
107 EPMD Oct. 1939, NRO CS 57/11/42. 
108 EPMD Feb. 1949, NRO DK 57/5/13; Nicholson, 'Notes to Mr Tiemay', 16 March 1949, NRO DK 
57/l/l. 
109 EPMD Nov. 1940, NRO CS 57/12/46. 
110 EPMD May 1947, NRO DK 57/2/5; Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Sununary of Inforniation', Nov. 
193 3, NRO CS 5 7/3 5/13 1. 
111 EPMD March 193 8, NRO CS 5 7/7/29. 
112 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97; EPMD Oct. 1943, NRO CS 57/19/74. 
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sanctuaries for wildlife, and, as most watering places were in these areas, threatened 
people and livestock. ' 13 There were also increasing complaints that game was 
damaging crops; cassava in particular attTacted elephants, a fact initially discounted 
by officials as merely an excuse for not growing it. 114 Hodnebo shows that the 
protection of game helped to assist the spread of tsetse and hence sleeping sickness, 
undermining local knowledge and strategies for controlling wildlife and 
vegetation. 11 5 Not surprisingly the chiefs joined their people in illegal grass- 
burning. 116 
The assumption that burning, hunting and shifting cultivation were harming the land 
was challenged by the report of the Agricultural Inspector in 1943: 
Shifting cultivation is universally practiced... Erosion is not encouraged by 
native methods and is nowhere very serious in the area. Activities of Govt. 
depts and missions often cause local cases of severe erosion. ' 17 
There was also evidence that locals had developed their own anti-erosion methods, 
as a description of the remains of settlements in Juba district revealed: "[t]he Ban 
had used to terrace their fields to prevent erosion". 118 The main cause of erosion was 
the concentration of the population, especially in Kajo Kaji and Kala, where 
"overcrowding owing to sleeping sickness regulations is causing hunger and 
discontent". ' 19 In response, administrators ordered the inhabitants to build dams in 
khors and gullies to try to prevent further erosion; the following year however the 
poor design of many of the dams led to them being washed away, so this must have 
seemed like yet more unremunerative labour for the government. 120 Finally, it was 
decided that the inhabitants of Kala should be relocated to a resettlement area at 
113 EPMD March 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
114 Juba District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94; Yei District AR 1944 and 1945, NRO EP 2/27/97 and 
EP 2/27/98; Simpson, D. C. Yei River District to Governor, 17.8.36, NRO EP 2/17/67. 
115 Hodnebo, Cattle and Flies, pp. 118-20. 
116 Interview with Dr Rubena Lumaya Wani, 22 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
117 Ferguson, 'Note on Equatoria crops and agriculture', SAD 753/5/1-69. 
118 EPMD March 1940, NRO CS 57/12/46. 
119 EPMD April 1947, NRO DK 57/2/5; Myers, 'Provisional Report of the Economic Botanist on Yei, 
Meridi, Yambio districts, 1939, NRO CS 1/5/11. In other areas land pressure was leading cultivators 
to move further into the forest, but in Kajo Kaji this was unwelcome because it meant leaving the 
cattle behind: YDMD May-June 1942, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
120 EPMD Sept. 1947, NRO DK 57/2/5; EPMD Nov. 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. See Anderson, 'Dust 
Bowl', p. 334, for failure of such anti-erosion measures elsewhere. 
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Livolo, where they would be given surveyed 30 feddan farms. HoNvever, the reasons 
for Livolo being uninhabited soon became apparent: 
It is considered that parts of the area, though abandoned for many ý, ears, have 
suffered a process of continuous degeneration and so, to the original 
objective of resettling the over crowded Kala community, has been added the 
complementary objective of regenerating those parts of the area now 
insufficiently fertile to carry cultivators. 121 
2.4 Agricultural Expertise 
It was clearly unsurprising that the crops and agricultural regulations introduced by 
the government were often seen as another kind of forced labour or taxation, with 
few apparent benefits. If anything these interventions made it more necessary for 
people to turn to their own experts and agricultural knowledge. The 'owners' of the 
rain, land and hunting or fishing grounds retained their central role in the community 
through their authority in relation to land, cultivation and hunting. In the Lyria area, 
the rain chief or the monyekak (earth chief) was responsible for blessing the harvest 
and hunting, while in the Moru area the Bori rain controller's importance in 
connection with cultivation was emphasised by one D. C.: "his approval is usually 
obtained before cultivating a new piece of ground and he presides at ceremonies in 
the time of sowing and harvest". ' 22 One Bari informant remembers how the women 
in particular honoured the rain priest, carrying him high around the village, because 
he was responsible for guaranteeing the food for their households. 123 Experts were 
also needed for success in hunting: 
There are specialists who deal in medicines for different animals. These are 
men, experienced and successful themselves in hunting, who sell various 
medicines and charms... [and] receive payment partly in hoes and partly in 
division of the spol 1.124 
12 1 EPMD March 1949, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
122 Mynors [? ], 'Notes on Evans-Pritchard's Draft Account of the Moru tribe', NRO DK 112/14195. 
See also Ferguson, 'Equatoria Province', p. 890. 
123 Interview with Serefino Wani Swaka, 20 Oct. 2002, Khartoum. 
124 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14 95. 
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Rain experts in particular profited from their profession, but all the specialists in 
agriculture, fertility and hunting played a key part in the local poll I economy, 
rewarded for their services with labour and tribute. 125 
There also seems to have been a growing popular belief that chiefs should mediate 
with such experts to ensure the fertility of the community. People complained to the 
chief for example if a rain-maker was believed to be holding up the rain, and the 
chief might imprison or punish him, which was perhaps in line with Simonse's 
accounts of the torture of rain chiefs by their people during droughts. 126 On the other 
hand, in 1938, the Terrakekka chiefs "presented a combined petition that an Allab 
Dinka... whom they said was a noted rainmaker in his own country, should be 
allowed to reside among the Mandari". 127 There are parallels with the idea that 
another obligation of the chief was to ensure protection from disease, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. But this exhorting of rain experts did not mean that the 
chief himself had any respected agricultural knowledge, only that he was 
representing and defending the needs of the community. 
The claims of European officials to be introducing superior Western expertise in 
relation to the land were undermined by their own divisions and discrepancies, and 
by the proven failure or flaws in many of their policies. Their knowledge gained 
little status, and indigenous agricultural and hunting experts retained greater 
prestige. However, the colonial impositions did have significance for the role of the 
chiefs in particular, and for the economic strategies pursued by communities. 
125 Yuzbashi N. Yunis, 'Tribes on the Upper Nile: The Bari', JRAS 4, no. 14 (1905), pp. 226-3 1; 
(Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham, p. 2; Philip 
Lomodong Lako, Lokoya ofSudan. - Culture and Ethnic Government (Nairobi, 1995), p. 7 1. 
126 Interview with Simon Wani Ramba, 10 Jan 2003, Khartoum; Simonse, Kings, esp. pp. 345-73; F. 
S ire, 'Rain-Making in Equatorial Africa', JR, 4S 5, no. 17 (1905), pp. 15-2 1. T 
12 EPMD Oct. 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29. 
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3. Land and Labour 
The agricultural and infrastructural projects of the colonial government placed huge 
demands on the labour of local people. This, together , vith Independent changes 
such as cattle losses, led to adjustments in the economy of Western Mongalla, and 
consequently in the political and social relations within communities. As studies of 
Tanzania in particular have shown, colonial land and conservation policies thus had 
a fundamental impact on the moral economy. 128 But because claims made on land 
and labour had to draw on histories of social relations, knowledge continued to be 
the key resource in the political economy. 
3.1 Bridewealth and Cattle 
According to ethnographic reports and interviewees, there were well-established 
indigenous systems of land organisation. When communities moved to new sites, 
the bush was burned and the land allocated by the monyekak and/or the clan heads. 
Newcomers or non-clan members could gain access to clan land, either through a 
small payment for hoeing rights, or by a larger payment to buy into the non-nal clan 
member's rights to land; this was reportedly arranged by the clan head. ' 29 Land was 
not, however, communally owned by the clan, but on an individual basis once 
assigned. 130 Women were the focus for land 'ownership': plots on new land were 
assigned to each woman in the clan in Moru district, while in more pennanent Ban 
settlements, each wife had her own plot, which would be inherited on her death by 
her son, even if her husband was still alive. 131 
128 Thomas Spear, 'Struggles for the Land: The Political and Moral Economies of Land on Mount 
Meru', pp. 213-40; Michele Wagner, 'Environment, Community and History: 'Nature in the Mind' in 
Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Buha, Western Tanzania', pp. 175-99; Monson, 'Canoe- 
Building', all in Maddox, Giblin and Kimambo, Custodians of the Land. 
129 Beaton, 'Land Tenure among the Luluba and Oxoriok', 22 May 1934, JD 1/1/2; Beaton, 'The 
Bari', pp. 128-3 1; Huntingford, Northern Nilo-Hamites, p. 46; Catford, 'Katiri Cultivation'. 
130 Ferguson, 'Equatoria Province', p. 890. 
131 Catford 'Katiri cultivation'; G. 0. Whitehead, 'Crops and Cattle among the Bari and Bari- 
Speaking Tribes', SNR 43 (1962), pp. 131-42, and 'Property and Inheritance among the Bari', SNR 
3 1, no. 1 (1950), pp. 143-7; Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
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As the focus for land ownership, and as the main cultivators of that land, Nvomen 
were therefore a crucial resource. As Shadle shows in Gusiiland, Kenya, the increase 
of cash cropping and the return of wealthy demobbed soldiers heightened the value 
of land and labour, and thus fuelled the rapid inflation of bride"vealth prices in the 
1940s and 50s. 132 In Western Mongalla, where there was not such a sudden 
expansion of profitable cash cropping, this development was more gradual, but 
nevertheless significant. It was fundamentally related to control of cattle, as the main 
form of currency with which to acquire human resources. 133 As Chapter Two 
showed, the conflicts, displacements and trade of the nineteenth century had 
generated networks of patronage, in which military and trading elites gained 
followings and cattle wealth. From the latter decades of the century, rinderpest and 
raids wiped out many of these cattle herds, and in 1906, the Bari were paying 
bridewealth in goats and cloth, not cows. 134 In the early colonial period, the chiefs 
in particular often took advantage of their relationship with colonial governments, 
together with trade and raiding, to rebuild their herds. 135 Further outbreaks of disease 
reduced cattle herds repeatedly; in 1938 only Chief Nderago had any cattle in Moru 
district, though the herd numbers of the Kuku and Mandari nevertheless continued to 
increase. 136 
Over time, individuals who might have formerly been dependent on patrons were 
able to earn the means to purchase cattle themselves, through wage labour in 
particular. According to one missionary, VAtitehead, this had the effect of levelling 
former divisions between land and cattle-owning 'freemen' and their non-cattle 
owning clients or 'serfs', and gave the latter independence in marriage. 137 This in 
turn led to an increase in the bridewealth prices, or at least an insistence on payment 
in cattle, perhaps to try to maintain the older political economy of dependency on a 
patron for access to cattle and marriage. Cattle-bridewealth marriage was thus held 
132 Shadle, 'Bridewealth', pp. 246-7. 
133 Interview with Margaret Keji Loro, 18.2.03, Khartoum: wealth was measured in cattle. 
134 Captain Alwyn Jennings Bramly, 'The Bari Tribe' MAN 65 (1906), pp. 10 1 -3. 135 Newcombe, 'Report on the Lado Enclave', SIR 162, Jan. 1908, PRO WO 106 23 1; Interview with 
Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. In 1904-6, chiefs along the Nile apparently owned a 
considerable proportion of the village cows, but not necessarily the majority: Hodnebo, Cattle and 
Flies, pp. 40-4 1. 
136 EPMD Jan. 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29; Huntingford, Northern Nilo-Hamites (quoting Vanden Plas), 
Pp 44-5,59. 
Whitehead, 'Social Change', 'Suppressed Classes', and 'Crops and Cattle'. 
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up by elites as being ftindamental to the moral economy, as Chapter Six NN-111 
discuss. 138 
The scarcity of cattle, however, began to lead to the bridewealth being equated Nvith 
cash, which in turn encouraged young men to seek wage labour in order to earn 
money, either to buy cattle or to pay the bridewealth directly. 139 As elsewhere in 
colonial Africa, young men thus had new opportunities to achieve greater 
independence in marriage from parents and elders. 140 But the latter stood to lose 
labour resources as a result of the migration to Uganda or Juba, and so may have 
responded by pushing up the bridewealth amounts even further. In one part of Yel 
district, a survey of labour in 1941 showed that 47% of adult men were employed 
away from their villages. 141 It was in this context of heightened competition for 
labour resources that the government demands for crops and labourers were being 
made. 
3.2 Workingfor the Hakuma 
The chiefs' responsibility for enforcing government agricultural directives meant 
forcing or convincing people to provide labour. The relationship between tax 
collection and cash crops ensured that chiefs shared something of administrators' 
motives for promoting the latter, particularly as they were invariably blamed for 
failure to produce sufficient cash for taxation. In Moru district, compulsory cotton 
cultivation was abandoned in 1937, but "many cultivators did not realise they need 
not sow cotton and in some cases the chiefs forced them to do so, to facilitate head 
tax collection, for deficiency in which the chief is blamed". 142 The continued success 
of cotton in the Lyria and Luluba area was attributed to the energy of Chief Lolik, 
138 Whitehead, 'Crops and Cattle', pp. 140-4 1, shows that most cattle were classed as kisuk yemesi, 
brideweath cattle, and that claims upon them were embedded in complex familial social relations. 
139 Whitehead, 'Crops and Cattle', p. 14 1; Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', 
Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/3 5/13 1: "the Kakwa have equated cattle with cash on the basis of a cow 
being equal to U, a bull to f V. 
140 Bravman, Making, pp. 116-3 0. 
14 1 EPMD Aug., Oct. 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53. 
142 Myers, 'Provisional Report of the Economic Botanist on Yei, Meridi, Yambio districts', 1939, 
NRO CS 1/5/11. 
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who must have persuaded people that it was an easier way to earn their taxes than 
other options. 143 The courts were also increasingly used to enforce cultivation more 
generally, for example in Yei in 1945: "[c]hiefs courts on their own initiative have 
been passing sentence on persons who have failed to cultivate sufficient grain". 144 
However, the role of the chiefs in agricultural interventions was rationalised as part 
of their government work, because people made a distinction between hakunla crops 
and labour, and their own. People were said to view the sale of their crops to 
government as another form of taxation. 145 Similarly, 'demonstration gardens' failed 
because "the attitude generally was that these were 'Hakuma' plots and therefore 
only to be cultivated under compulsion being obviously a new form of labour 
tax". 146 It seems that such labour, though obviously resented, was understood as a 
labour tax imposed by the government through the chiefs, not by the chiefs 
themselves. The latter obtained labour through the clan heads or age-group 
organisations, and had to try to persuade people to meet government agricultural 
demands by emphasising community interests, and the benefits of cash and new 
crops. 147 Chiefs remembered now by interviewees as successful appear to have 
convinced at least some of their people that there were advantages to be gained from 
'development' and new crops; "the lazy people do not like him, but everyone else 
loved him". 148 They were also becoming a channel of access to government 
resources, for example demanding bean and groundnut seeds from the 
government. 149 
The chiefs also had to be careful however to avoid being linked too closely to 
govern-ment agncultural authority and knowledge when it was so often unpopular 
and unsuitable. The same chief mentioned in this interview faced outright refusals to 
work on cultivation or road maintenance during the Christian 'revival' of 1938.150 In 
another Moru chiefdom people simply reftised to grow cotton despite exhortations of 
143 Tothill, 'Report, 1940', NRO EP 23/10. 
144 YDMD Aug. 1945, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
145 Juba District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
146 Ferguson, AR of Inspector of Agriculture, Kagulu for 1946, SAD 753/3/1-129. 
147 See also Clough, Fighting, p. 86. 
148 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
149 EPNID Oct. 1937, NRO CS 57/4/17. 
'50 Harrison, A/D. C. Juba, to Governor, 8 Sept. 1938, NRO EP 1/5/26. 
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the D. C. and chief 15 1 By the 1940s, the chiefs were seeking to deflect government 
demands through careful rhetoric. They "painted a gloomy picture" of the state of 
their crops to the government, leading one official to "Nvonder how much some of 
these rather pessimistic reports have to do with government buying of surplus crops, 
which does not appear to be popular". ' 52 In 1950, the Juba district chiefs' meeting 
told the D. C. that people were reluctant to grow cotton because it was not 
profitable. 153 The President of the Yei B court gave a "long harangue" on the evils of 
grassfires, but while occasionally culprits were caught and "dutifully punished" by 
D the chiefs, it was "apparent that their sympathies are with the accused". ' ý-' In 194 
Chief Daudi complained to the government that his people were being prevented 
from cultivating near the Kinda saw-mill; two years later he was fined for 
threatening to call a strike after a foreman at the mill was dismissed. 155 Chiefs were 
thus clearly acting as a new kind of gatekeeper with the hakunia. 
This role could also involved taking the blame for the general resistance of their 
people to agricultural interventions: "Chief Lita is obstructive and slack with regards 
to experimental sowings of potatoes and cotton in his area, despite several 
warnings". ' 56 One informant recounted the story of Chief Lado Kirba of Loggo East 
in Juba district, who unsuccessfully tried to persuade his people to grow cotton: 
"when that was not done he got into trouble with the District Commissioner and was 
accused of being weak". Apparently as a result, he was 'demoted' and Loggo East 
amalgamated under Loggo West. The people were "very bitter", because they "had 
the feeling that they had been deprived, robbed of what they should have", and their 
protests eventually led to the restoration of Lado Kirba as chief at the end of the war: 
"the people came to like him more, they were very sympathetic and they always 
treated him with much respect... they didn't want to utter anything which would 
hurt his feelings. "' 57 People believed that the chief had been punished as a scapegoat 
for their own refusal to grow cotton. More importantly perhaps, they associated him 
151 EPMD June 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29. 
152 YDMD Dec. 1942, NRO EP 2/24/87; Dick, 'Trek Diary', 17 Aug. 1944, SAD 74S 10 1-7 1. 
153 'Extract from proceedings of Juba District Chiefs Meeting, Feb 1-4.1950', NRO EP 29 32. 
154 EPMD Jan. 1943, NRO CS 57/19/74; YDMD Feb. -Marchl942, NRO EP 2/24 87. 
155 YDMD May 1942, July 1944, NRO EP 2,24 ST 
156 YDMD July 1942, NRO EP 2/24 87. 
157 Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
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with their own autonomy and identity as Loggo East; a territorially defined 
community symbolised by their own chief. 
3.3 Economic Strategies 
Resistance to the labour demands of the government was also expressed through the 
increasing labour migration of young men to the towns and the Ugandan plantations: 
"[i]t still appears that these migrations are stimulated not only by the need to earn 
tax money but also by the desire to avoid the numerous unremunerated services 
which are required of them by the government". ' 58 Similarly in Juba district: 
Investigations are being made into the movement of Chief's subjects into 
neighbouring Chiefs territories and neighbouring districts to avoid 
Government demands for labour and grain in Juba. The number of Mandan 
who disappear into Allab country is becoming a serious nuisance. ' 59 
But the labour migration was not only about resistance or evasion, or the aspirations 
of young men; it was also a strategy decided partly by household and cOmmunity 
heads, which reflected the general failure of government agricultural interventions. 
In central Africa, Vaughan suggests that people made a deliberate decision to 
channel family labour into cash crops, but in Western Mongalla labour migration 
often proved a more viable means of earning cash, together with infon-nal trade in 
crops like tobacco. 160 The Bari were reported to be abandoning their cotton plots in 
favour of work in Juba. ' 61 According to one interviewee from Kajo Kaji, the only 
profitable cash crop in the colonial period was tobacco; wealth came from owning 
cattle and goats, from 'petty' trade in goods like tobacco, and from waged 
employment. 162 Tobacco was also reported to be grown in Moru district in the 1940s 
because it was one of the few items for which the Dinka would trade their cattle. 163 
Individual households made their own decisions as to which of these avenues to 
158 Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94; Interview with Lubari Ramba, 31 Aug. 2004, NI itika, 
Yei. 
159 EPMD Jan. 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
160 Megan Vaughan, 'Food Production and Farnily Labour in Southern Malawi: The Shire Highlands 
and Upper Shire Valley in the Early Colonial Period', JAH 23, no. 3 (1982), pp. 351-64. 
161 F PMD Aug. 1937, NRO CS 57/4/17. 
162 Bamaba Dumo Warn, NNTItten answers, 2003, Khartoum. 
163 EPMD Jan. 1947, NRO DK 57,2 5. 
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follow; for example, one detailed account described a family in Kajo Kaji deciding 
to sell their tobacco crop in Juba for beads, which they could then sell on at a profit 
in Uganda. 164 
However, government policies were increasingly promoting a communal and 
collective idea of Affican society and economy. The 'clan'-based tribute introduced 
in the 1930s added to the need for the recognised clan heads to retain control of the 
wages of younger men, and led later to complaints about paying tax on behalf of 
absent labourers. 165 In addition, cash crops were often introduced on a communal 
basis, ignoring the fact that all cultivation was individually owned and managed, 
though work parties might also be employed on a reciprocal or rewarded basis. In 
Yei, the attempt to introduce coffee through clans failed: "[t]he planted plots have 
not been maintained as a family affair - but the trees apportioned to each member. If 
one member of the family has been away, the others have left his piece". 166 A 
similar tendency was observed in Juba district: "[t]he people of Lyna have now 
asked to be allowed to cultivate ground-nuts in their own cultivations and not in 
communal areas as they say that some work hard and some don't". Administrators 
blamed such absence of "the collective idea" on "the powerful influence of years of 
individualisation". 167 Yet land, crops and cattle had always been individually 
controlled, as well as playing a key role in networks of reciprocity and 
dependency. 168 As labour had become more valuable than ever, it was instead ideas 
of communal obligation that were being emphasised in novel ways. 
164 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham, pp. 3-5. 
165 Governor Parr, 'Note circulated to D. C. 's on 20 Dec. 1938 on Taxation', NRO EP 2/2/8. 
166 Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
167 Juba and Yei District AR's 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. Nalder even asserted that there was no 
individual wealth or economic differentiation in pre-colonial societies, and that "as cattle were only 
used for marriage purposes it did not amount to 'wealth"': Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of 
Native Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 1/39/105. 
168 Compare Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/35, '131 - 
clan tribute relies on clan ownership of cattle or other 'perrn. assets' - with interview With Major- 
General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, Khartoum and Huntingford, Northern Nilo-Hamites, pp. 44-5 - 
cattle were individually owned - and Logan Gray, D. C. Yei, to Governor, 22 June 1938, NRO EP 
2/2/8: the 'agricultural tribes' of Yei district have no communal property. 
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3.4 The Moral Economy 
Ideas of the moral economy were always contested; it was the existence of this 
tension that prevented the total hegemony of an ell les were ite. But various strateg' 
pursued by certain sections of society in order to try to create or maintain situations 
of dependency and subordination of labour, while at the same time other sections 
emphasised patronage obligations and limited their oppression. The morality of 
wealth was complex and is significant to understanding the position of the chiefs. 
The chiefs were most obviously in a position to exploit the colonial situation to their 
own advantage. In the 1930s it was reported that chiefs frequently covered tax 
deficits by foregoing the 5% remuneration to which they were entitled, and then 
recovering it in 'kind' later from defaulters; the official reporting this was concerned 
that it could lead to 'oppression'. 169 With only partial monetisation in the region, 
cash was of limited value beyond meeting demands for tax; the chiefs may well have 
preferred to gain labour instead. 170 When coffee was introduced in some areas, it 
was reported that only the chiefs and headmen were making a profit, because only 
they could afford to employ labour. 17 1 There was also some concern among officials 
that the agricultural demonstration plots brought profits only to the chiefs, and that 
the government was thus backing the chief conscripting labour in what was 
essentially his 'mini estate'. ' 72 Prison labour was also often used by the chief for 
either government works or his own cultivations. 173 
Mamdam sees the coercion of labour from tax defaulters as an indicator of the 
despotism of the chiefs. 174 But it may have been more legitimate, even if unpopular, 
than he suggests. One interviewee explained that the defaulter "will be a person who 
cannot pay, who does not have his own resources, so he provides his own labour". 175 
169 'Central District Information Book', NRO JD I/l/5. 
170 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
71 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2'8. 
72 Extract from Yei District AR 1940, and Governor to D. C. Yei, 16 Aug. 1939, NRO EP 2/5/1 SI Yei 
and Moru District AR's 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
173 Interviews with Bamaba Dumo Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Serefirio Warn S"vaka. 20 Oct. 2002. 
Severino Mati, 27 Jan. 2003, Khartoum; and Charles Taban Lupal, 5 Sept. 2004, Yei. 
174 
Mamdam, Citizen, p. 56. 
175 Interview with Festo Limi Sominda, 14 Jan. 2003, Khartoum. 
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This probably followed an older pattern of patronage; in fact, as Chapter Three 
explained, it was expected, and even preferred, that the chief should be wealthv, in 
order to render him more immune to outside bribery. As Lonsdale argues, Nvealth 
and leadership were equated: "fertile power fed clients". But "private ambition must 
serve the collective good"; greed was condemned, as the discussion of the idiom of 
witchcraft in Chapter Six will show. 176 Thus the chief was required to redistribute 
wealth through providing beer parties in return for labour, and by providing help 
during food shortages. 177 Interviewees also suggest that cultivating for the chief Nvas 
accepted because he was busy with his government work; this adds to the impression 
that the chief was seen to be performing a job for his community, in return for which 
they would provide a limited amount of labour. 178 In addition, chiefs would organise 
labour for public works that benefited the community, and would provide food 
during public meetings or court sessions. 179 
According to one D. C., people had tolerated the demands for grain or labour from 
chiefs, because there was "nothing new" in offering such services to a patron. It was 
the introduction of a cash tax which was novel and not easily translated into these 
older patrimonial exchanges. It also forced young men to earn cash, so that they 
became increasingly resentful of unpaid labour; it was, he suggested, not "surprising 
that since they have been purposely taught that personal labour is a commodity, they 
should shirk the imposition and exaction of such labour unremunerated". This 
resentment then stimulated further labour migration to avoid the demands of the 
chief, contributing to the beginning of the "erosion of personal obligation" that 
occurred in areas of greater urban migration in East Africa. 180 
176 Lonsdale, 'Moral Economy', pp. 337-9; Berry, Chiefs Know, p. xxxi. See also Leopold, Roots of 
Violence, p. 207; Scott, Weapons of the Weak, pp. 186-98. 
177 Interviews with Chief James Josea Ramadalla, 31 Aug. 2004, and Elder Daniel Jumi Tongun, 10 
Sept. 2004, Yei; Whitehead, 'Crops and Cattle', p. 135. See also Rathbone, Nkrurnah, p. 15. 
178 Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. See also Hatt, 'Establishing 
Tradition', p. 135. 
179 Interview with Daniel Jumi Tongun, 10 Sept. 2004, Yei; Nasiwa, 'Baseline Survey'. See also 
Fields, Revival, p. 67. 
180 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2/8. 
See John Lonsdale, 'East Africa', in Brown and Louis, Twentieth Century, pp. 530-44, at p. 537; 
Hanson, Landed Obligation, p. 235. 
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Chiefs, headmen and elders thus faced the problem of hoxv to retain labour within 
communities and to meet government demands. One chief, Mod' of N'ei, resorted to 
sabotaging the labour lines of the Haggar coffee firm, "because he fears that he Nvill 
lose their services on road maintenance". ' 81 But a more common strategy seems to 
have been to re-emphasise social and moral obligations, by asserting versions of 
history and tradition. Whitehead suggested that as the Bari clients gained 
independence in marriage, so the chiefs had to try to reinforce 'traditional right' as 
the basis for labour demands: "[m]y children, although I have not assisted you in 
marriage, you will work for me because you are the 'dupi [slaves or non-kin 
dependents] of my grandfather". 182 In the 1950s, Buxton observed host/client 
relations in the Mandari area and claimed that the duty of clients to work for their 
hosts was not rewarded with beer in the way that other non-kin labour would be. 
Thus the idiom of 'kin' relations was being used to enforce such obligations. Yet she 
also observed the strength of a publicly endorsed "standard of behaviour" of the 
chief or notable towards his client, which ensured the reciprocity of this 
relationship. 1 83 
It was not just the chiefs who needed to enforce mutualities and socio-economic 
obligations. There was also general resentment and complaints about the preference 
of young, especially educated, men for wage labour rather than household 
cultivation. 184 The elders as well as the chiefs increasingly criticised "this new craze 
of going to Uganda in search of wealth, which they consider to be a delusion, to the 
detriment of their own country and its well-being. " 185 In Moru district, "prominent 
elders continue to express their concern at the increasing exodus of young men ftom 
the country". 186 As opportunities for work in Juba also expanded, there was similar 
deprecation of the "drift of young men" in that direction: "[t]he effect on their 
morals is causing considerable concern to some of the chiefs". 
187 The use of the 
word 'morals' is significant here; this issue went to the heart of the moral economy, 
181 YDMD Jan. 1942, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
182 Whitehead, 'Social Change', p. 95. 
183 Buxton, 'Clientship', pp. 103,106. 
184 Juba District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. 
185 Finch, 193 9 Diocesan Review, CMS G3 S 1/7-9; EPMD March 193 8, NRO CS 5 7/7/29- 
186 EPMD Sept. 194 1, NRO CS 57/14/53. 
187 Juba District AR 1945, NRO EP 2/27/98. 
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because as younger men gained more independence, both monetarily and in outlook, 
so their obligations to families and communities were threatened. Chiefs and elders 
developed a discourse about the value of hard work, and also argued that migrant 
workers should bring their wages back to their families and communities, especially 
to contribute to taxes. 188 
By the 1950s, it appears that work parties were beginning to be hired and paid in 
cash by those who could afford it, such as government employees. 189 In 1948, the 
Moru were reported to refuse to work on dispensary buildings without payment. 190 
In recognition of the changing local economy, together with the influence of 
government ideas about modem development, administrators and chiefs increasingly 
had to accept the shift to waged labour. In 1952 the Moru Council, for example, 
"agreed that compulsory labour should give place to voluntary labour, and that an 
increase in wages should act as an incentive to this end". 191 Thus the independent 
economic decisions of younger men in particular had forced something of a change 
in the political economy. 
3.5 Land Rights 
Another strategy for controlling labour was to emphasise land ownership and thus 
gain rent or labour from non-land owners. The British officials assumed that land 
was owned commurially by the clans, and in making this assumption they may have 
contributed towards its realisation. VVhitehead stated that access to land at this time 
was easy to obtain from the monyekak or clan heads, and this is also remembered to 
be the case in Moru district. ' 92 However, it seems that this system may have become 
rather more contentious in some areas by the later colonial period. This was 
particularly the case when government reservations of land for forestry or national 
parks forced people off the most fertile areas. 193 In Yel district, there were protests 
188 EPMD Nov. 195 1, NRO DK 5 7/9/24. See Bravman, Making, p. 12 1. 
1'9 Interview with Margaret Keji Loro, 18 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
190 EPMD April 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
191 EPMD April 1952, NRO CS2 30/3/6; also EPMD June 1949, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
192 Whitehead, 'Crops and cattle'; Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
193 EPMD April 1948, Nov. 1949, NRO DK 57/5/13; Governor Parr to CS, 30 March 1940, and 
Forbes, A/Game warden, to Governor, 4 March 1946, NRO EP 2/17/66. 
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to government at this loss of 'tribal' agricultural land and persistent demands for 
compensation. As a result, administrators became convinced of the 'ancient' rights 
of the landowning clans, and agreed to provide financial compensation. 194 
The social changes outlined by Whitehead, which were blurring the distinctions 
between free landowners and their former clients, may have meant that the 
landowners needed ways to reassert their status. If so, the recognition by the 
goveniment of the 'ancient rights' of the landowning clans in the cases above would 
be significant in granting them a novel and distinct legal status. 195 As Chapter Three 
showed, certain people saw the value from the 1930s of asserting the historical 
rights of 'clans'. As settlement patterns changed, and as younger people or 
dependents increasingly failed to observe obligations as articulated through idioms 
of kinship, so elders sought to strengthen lineage-based land control by referring to 
history. 196 This is particularly apparent from the evidence Buxton gained from the 
Mandari in the 1950s, where grazing land was an increasing source of conflict: the 
Bora clan here "know that they have a special title to their land". 197 Claiming direct 
descent from the first settlers in an area, or from settlers who had been welcomed by 
earlier inhabitants, was a way to assert land rights and social status. Elsewhere in 
regions of land shortage this could become a critical justification for excluding 
others, but in Western Mongalla land was generally plentiful. 198 In Juba district, 
however, the most fertile land was found on the river banks and islands, and here 
more land disputes are remembered by interviewees. 199 More crucially perhaps, they 
suggest that the chiefs may have been gaining greater control over land. One 
194 EPMD Oct. -Nov. 1948, Dec. 1949 NRO DK 57/5/13; EPMD Jan. 1950, April 195 1, NRO 
DK 
57/9/24. 
'9' For debates over whether 'conimunal' land control was being created by 'landowning' clan 
leaders, see Mamdani, Citizen, pp. 138-41; Richards, 'Ecological Change', p. 55. 
196 One informant reflected this ongoing process in explaining that land was controlled by 'tradition' 
and clan history: Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19.2.03, Khartoum. See similar process in 
Lango: Tosh, Clan Leaders, p. 216. 
'9' Buxton, Chiefs, p. 33. The Bora 'clan' name was widely used across the region, associated with 
special land rights and often rain powers: for the possible Lwo linguistic connection of the name see 
Simonse, Kings, pp. 54-6. Stigand had also speculated that it referred to original inhabitants of the 
land, Equatoria, p. 48. 
198 On clan histories of first arrival, see Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', pp. 183-6; and Kopytoff, 
'Internal African'. For cases where cash-crops made competition for land much greater, see Lonsdale, 
'Moral Economy', pp. 361-3; Spear, Mountain Farmers; Berry, Chiefs Know. 
'99 Interviews with Serefino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003 and Venansio Loro Lado, II Nov. 2002, 
Khartoum. 
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claimed that the chief had the power to punish offenders by taking their land away 
from them, while another stated that land disputes were settled by the chief, based 
on his knowledge of the history of the area . 
200 These trends laid the foundations for 
the chiefs to become the focus for 'tribal' land claims more recently, as the 
movements of internally displaced people have turned land into a scarcer 
resource. 
201 
In certain areas then, there may have been opportunities for chiefs to gain or 
manipulate control of land as a resource in itself, while more widely the use of 
courts to discuss land rights provided further opportunity for certain clans to 
establish more legalistic claims. But generally the role of the monyekak in land 
allocation remained paramount; for example in the Kajo Kaji area, the power of the 
chiefs is said to have been limited by the fact that they were dependent on the land 
202 custodians for their own access to land . As Mamdani argues, the proprietary land 
rights of such 'earth chiefs' may have been more ideological than concrete. 203 
Nevertheless the power of such ideology should not be underestimated; chiefs' 
legitimacy rested on their visible deference to such figures, as the principal 
mediators with powerful external forces other than the government. In addition, 
recalling the traditional rights of the 'owners' of hunting, fishing and cultivation 
lands was yet another way to re-emphasise patterns of reciprocal cooperation. 204 
Despite the laws recorded in the 1920s granting the chiefs a share of hunting spoils, 
it was the owner of the hunting ground who in practice received this share, 
according to informants. 205 Historical and 'customary' knowledge was certainly key 
to land rights, but such knowledge was never monopolised by chiefs. 206 
200 Interview with Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, and Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, 
Khartoum. 
20 1 Mampilly and Branch, 'Winning the War'. 
202 Interview with Barnaba Durno Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
203 Mamdani, Citizen, p. 140. 
204 See Jamie Monson, 'Canoe-Building under Colonialism: Forestry and Food Policies in the Inner 
Kilombero Valley, 1920-40', in Maddox, Giblin & Kimambo, Custodians of the Land, pp. 200-12, at 
F65207. 
Interview with Elder Daniel Jumi Tongun, 10 Sept. 2004, Yei. 
206 See also Berry, Chiefs Know. 
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Conclusion 
Mamdam describes the decentralised despotism of the colonial chiefs in Africa as 
regime of extra-economic coercion, a regime that breathed life into a whole range of 
compulsions: forced labor, forced crops, forced sales, forced contributions, and 
1 207 forced removals'. All of these compulsions were practised by the colonial state in 
Western Mongalla, as it sought economic viability and the hegemonic imposition of 
Western scientific knowledge. Officials in a basic sense "abstracted into the state, or 
bureaucratised, the coerced appropriation of African resources". 208 But at the level 
of the chiefs, coercion does not provide a sufficient explanation for the complc-\ 
long-term task of persuading people to meet govenunent demands. Nor could this 
often be done on the basis of the benefits of governinent policies; people must have 
rarely perceived useful knowledge to be gained from colonial agricultural 
interventions. Instead, the chiefs seem to have succeeded only in convincing people 
that they could keep the state at bay and satisfied by meeting certain minimum 
requirements. Where the hardships entailed in meeting those requirements became 
excessive, people resisted them anyway. 
The chiefs gained certain limited rights to demand labour, but their authority and 
ability to accumulate were constrained by a number of factors. It was their 
ownership of cattle and control of labour which gave them the greatest opportunities 
to dominate the political economy, but even this was unden-nined by the loss of 
cattle and the increasing access to money and marital autonomy, the effects of which 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. The chiefs do not seem to have 
gained control of the allocation of land, except perhaps if there was a dispute to be 
settled. They also did not control the economic decisions made by households, 
including labour migration and informal trade. And recognition of their knoýOedge 
was confined to a certain sphere, so that multiple other sources of expertise retained 
authority in relation to the land, agriculture and the human geography. Land issues 
illustrate the thin line the chiefs had to tread between government and people, and 
the effectiveness of community resistance to the state and to any despotic tendencies 
207 Mamdani, Citizen, p. 23. 
20' Berman and Lonsdale, 'Coping', p. 95. 
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on the part of the chiefs. Above all they reveal the basic disregard shown towards 
state intervention, wherever possible, and the preservation of indigenous 
geographies, knowledge and networks. In order to further explore the limits of 
6extra-econornic coercion', the following chapter will focus in more detail on 
understandings of the body and of physical force. 
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Knowing the Body: 
Medicine, Force and Punishment 
Introduction 
One interviewee, when asked if there was much resistance to colonial government 
demands for labour, crops or taxation, gave the following response: 
The taxes were poll tax, and D. C. Cooke gave people a number, a number on 
a medal like a dog! They... go from village to village and every headman has 
to bring his people, the young ones, and then you are undressed to see if you 
have become big, like a man. This was under a tree. And then when they 
think you are a mature man, whether 20 or 18, most important you are a 
grown man, then you are given a number. I saw it being done, we were just 
enjoying laughing. 
And the second time this kind of thing was being done was during the war, 
1943/44/45, when there was a fear of plague from lice in the hair. People 
were shaven by force, everything in their houses were brought out and 
DDT'd, and then even the clothes they were living in, they were undressed 
and all these things were put in pots of hot water and DDT'd and everybody 
was shaven, all their hair. 
This was the only force I saw. I 
It is striking that the emotive memories of colonial force that stood out for the 
interviewee were not those of corporal punishments or forced labour, but cases of 
invasion, humiliation and degradation of the body by government. These were also 
cases where the British personnel seem to have been more prominent than the chiefs 
or headmen, and therefore demonstrated more directly and powerfully the coercive 
power of the state. Knowledge of the body and understandings of physical hann 
1 IntervieNv with Serefino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. See also 'Central District 
Information Book', NRO JD I/ I/5: "At the first session of each Native B Court in the year, the chief 
parades the youths for adn-ussion to the tax list". 
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demonstrate the differences in belief and epistemological categories bet-ween the 
Europeans and the people of Western Mongalla; understanding this distinction Is 
crucial to understanding the limits of power of both the colornial state and the chiefs, 
despite their apparent monopoly of physical force. 
Especially in the earlier colonial period, the main contact local people had with 
white officials was in relation to medical campaigns. What those officials might 
depict as sanitary or even humanitarian interventions were experienced more as 
controlling and invasive impositions. On the other hand, some of the medical 
treatment offered by the missions was received more favourably, although the 
hospitals were always partly associated with government too, and mistrust continued 
in some areas. But Western treatment and prevention never addressed all the 
implications of 'medicine' in terms of knowledge of the wider issues surrounding a 
physical ailment or injury, understanding of it as a symptom of unresolved 
interpersonal, social or spiritual problems, and the need for holistic psychological 
and social, as well as physical, healing. Lambek defines 'medicine' as essentially 
knowledge put into practice. 2 Physical ailments were in a sense a symptom of the 
unknown; their treatment involved gaining knowledge not only of how to cure them, 
but also of why they had occurred to that particular person at that time. 
Just as the physical was not necessarily a distinct category of experience, nor was 
force simply about actual bodily coercion. Mamdam's argument for the power of the 
colonial chiefs rests partly on the assumption that their police held a monopoly over 
the threat of force. In Western Mongalla, the use of physical punishment was indeed 
a prominent aspect of the enforcement of chiefly authority, but it seems to have been 
routinised and normalised within certain limits. It was also known and recognisable; 
it was the unknown possibilities of power to harm held by others that aroused the 
greatest fear. If bodies were contested territories, they were conquered more by these 
mysterious powers than by all the potential or actual physical force of the colonial 
state, ensuring that neither the state nor the chiefs acquired a monopoly of coercive 
capabilities in the eyes of the people. In addition, as the state rendered local bodies 
' Lambek, Knowledge, p. 16. 
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more helpless against external physical force, so recourse to other sources of 
personal protection and power may, if anything, have gained in importance. 
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1. Colonial Disease Control 
In the sleeping sickness designated areas, the force of the early colonial state was 
experienced largely in relation to the disease, although this connection mav not 
always have been understood by the inhabitants. The use of the sleeping sickness 
registers of population for tax purposes served to further associate the 'medical' 
campaign with the general imposition of colonial government. As Lyons writes of 
the sleeping sickness campaign in the Belgian Congo, "many Afficans perceived 
colonial medical practices as part of the conquest of their societies". 3 The territorial 
implications of the campaign against sleeping sickness have already been discussed 
in the previous chapter, together with the force employed to move villages and 
punish the absentees from inspections. But the inspections themselves were also 
invasive, involving the palpitation of cervical glands by white medical officials. One 
Sleeping Sickness Inspector, Spence, explained the mistrust of inspections in 1914: 
The men don't like it, and still less do they like their women and children 
being seen. Consequently they tell the women that the messenger is coming 
to take them away and eat the children. Some of the women I think really 
believe this and fly into the bush when you come near their village. Then you 
have to sit down and send men out in all directions to hunt for them. Once a 
village has been done several times it is not so bad; they get accustomed to it, 
though they still hide the budding women (aged about II or 12); this is a 
result of the Belgian occupation; they were not as scrupulous in the matter of 
women as Englishmen are. 4 
This reluctance to allow women to be examined was also common in the Belgian 
Congo, although Lyons does not really offer an explanation beyond male efforts to 
control women. 5 Spence of course seized the opportunity to criticise the Belgians, 
but his reference to the fear of children being eaten suggests that the mistrust had 
deeper roots in the history of this area. Yei had been a major slave market in the 
mid-nineteenth century, and foreigners had long been associated with slave raiding 
3 Maryinez Lyons, The Colonial Disease: A Social History of Sleeping Sickness in Northern Zaire, 
1900-1940 (Cambridge, 1992), p. 183. 
Spence to mother, Yei, 31 Dec. 1914, SAL D12/200/1-28. 
Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 187-8. 
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and trading. 6 The idiom of 'eating' people cropped up repeatedly in the eark, 
colonial reports, and was assumed by the Europeans to Indicate the prevalence of 
cannibalism, but it was of course a powerftil expression of the vulnerabilm, and 
commoditisation of bodies, especially with the expansion of the slave trade in 
central Affica. 
The removal of infected sleeping sickness cases to the quarantine centres no doubt 
confirmed some of these fears; despite government self-congratulation on the 
general contentment of patients, they were essentially imprisoned for a number of 
7 years. Many only developed the symptoms of the disease after being quarantined, 
which would obviously have added to the suspicion of the centres. The atoxyl 
injections used to treat sleeping sickness until the mid-20s also had the frequent 
side-effects of blindness and even death. 
These threats, together with the penetration and pain of the gland punctures, which 
were carried out following initial detection by palpitation, led to some extreme 
methods of evasion during a new outbreak of sleeping sickness in Kajo Kaji in 1937: 
These people got local surgeons to excise their cervical glands so as to avoid 
gland punctures as a test for sleeping sickness. The Senior Medical Inspector 
retaliated with lumbar punctures to which the local surgeon had no retort. It 
is not understood why so much expense (and pain) was incurred to avoid the 
normal test. ) 
Despite the puzzlement of the officials, the deliberate removal of glands was an 
obvious attempt to subvert the inspections, and an indication that the latter were 
perceived as a threat. No doubt the retaliatory resort to lumbar punctures only served 
to confirm the association of Medical Inspectors with force and punishment. 
The other disease which prompted a rigorous campaign was Cerebro-Spinal 
Meningitis (CSM), also largely in Yei district. In 1933 the Governor confidently 
6 Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', pp. 167-8. 
7 The camps are described in G. K. Maurice, 'The History of Sleeping Sickness in the Sudan', SYR 
13, no. 2 (1930), pp. 211-45. 
8 Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 198. 
9 EPAR 1937, NRO CS 57/24/99. 
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predicted that, "[n]ow that the old practice of immediately burning at least the 
infected huts and perhaps the whole village has ceased, the people wIll lose their fear 
of notifying an outbreak". 10 The campaign shifted to quarantines and movement 
restrictions, together with isolation and treatment of infected cases; it Nvas 
emphasised that 80% of cases could be saved by treatment. Yet "vell into the 1940s, 
people remained reluctant to inforin the authorities of cases: "[t]he high death rate is 
entirely due to the persistence of the people in giving local treatment first and onl-y 
bringing the sufferer to hospital when that has failed and the patient's condition 
worsened". " In 1942, the Yei D. C. held a 'long discussion' with chiefs and 
headmen, and discovered that the suspicion and resentment of CSM treatment 
resulted from the new stomach injections and lumbar punctures, the compulsory 
burial in the quarantine centres, and the heavy fines for not reporting suspected 
illness. A year later the proposed solutions - 'propaganda' and home burials - had 
clearly not succeeded; the people were reported to be convinced that CSM was the 
result of poison, which should be treated with herbal remedies. 12 
Both the sleeping sickness and CSM campaigns were experienced largely as 
punitive and invasive inspections and quarantines - the state injecting and stealing 
bodies - rather than as a source of healing. Similarly the outbreak of relapsing fever 
in the 1940s led to a delousing campaign by medical dressers with police help, 
hailed as a general success: "[t]he chiefs responded well to our calls for cooperation 
and taking into account that it was a strange disease and that they did not like the 
regular shaving and the disinfecting of their clothing, the people played up well". 
13 
Yet reported absentees, together with the resentftil memories of the interviewee cited 
at the beginning of the chapter, suggest that once again the medical campaign was 
experienced more as a coercive and humiliating imposition than as a positive 
intervention. 
10 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/35/13 1. 
11 EPAR 1947, NRO CS2 30/10/32; also SMI EP to D. C. 's, 9 Oct. 1939, D. C. Yel to SMI Juba, 9 
Feb. 1942, and D. C. Yei to PMI, 15 Nov. 1943, NRO EP 2/21/78; EPMD Feb. -June 
1944, NRO CS 
57/20/78; EPMD Jan. 1947, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
12 YDMD July 1942, Nov. 1943, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
" 'Central District Infori-nation Book: boundaries, geographical features, history', NRO JD III 
EPMD Jan. 1943, NRO CS 57/19/74. 
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The vulnerability of bodies was perhaps most vividly expressed in the stones of 
Kulia Batu, if the latter are read as accounts of the experience of colonial rule, as 
White does other vampire and cannibalism rumours. The term, presumably a Lingala 
one, reportedly referred to a belief that at dusk or in the night, "European, Arab or 
even Indian cannibals" come across the Uganda or Congo frontiers in saloon cars 
"and carry off the local people for the sake of their meat". 14 The mention of Indians 
suggests that this was linked to the recruitment of local men to work in Uganda, and 
the loss this represented to local communities, discussed in the previous chapter. 15 
When the body of an alleged victim was discovered, one rumour claimed that the 
man's tongue had been cut out, perhaps reflecting a sense that the colonial state 
suppressed the voices and autonomy of its subjects. 16 These stones were thus an 
expression of a sense of the extractive threat posed by the colonial government, but 
they also drew on the long history of foreigners enslaving or coercing local people, 
as the general fears of children being 'eaten' show. There is debate over such 
vampire/cannibal stories as to whether they were, as White argues, a "new idiom for 
new times", 17 or whether they reflect longer histones. 1 8 Shaw overcomes this by 
emphasising the power of memory even in meeting new threats: "[u]nderstandings 
of relationships of extraction can both be new stories and draw upon prior 
relationships involving the 'consumption' of human beings". 19 
Such stones in Western Mongalla might therefore also reflect something of the 
colonial campaigns against sleeping sickness and CSM. Extraction will be shown to 
be an important aspect of removing harm from the body, but it could also be 
threatening. The removal of blood or lymph fluid for testing by the medical 
authorities, especially in cases where the sickness was not yet visible, aroused fear 
and mistrust. 20 It may have evoked, or been evoked in, the Moru description of the 
cmato': 
14 EPMD Feb. 195 1, NRO DK 57/9/24; EPMD Jan. 1953, NRO CS2 30/3/6- 
15 See White, Speaking, pp. 279-80. 
16 EPMD Jan. 1953, NRO CS2 30/3/6. See again White, Speaking, p. 107: "many Affican concerns 
about the power of European therapies were about what they did to African speech". 
17 White, Speaking, p. 29. 
18 Maia Green, Priests, Witches and Power: Popular Christianity after Mission in Southern Tanzania, 
(Cambridge, 2003), p. 73. 
19 Shaw, Memories, p. 11. 
20 Lyons, Colonial Disease, pp. 184,188-9. 
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[T]he mato is essentially a non-corporeal being, although it may reside 
during the daytime in a human body. The mato is said to suck people's blood 
whilst they are asleep, thus accounting for any strange lethargý- or sickness 
which may be found to afflict them suddenly one morning. 21 
The association with lethargy might even indicate a comparison with sleeping 
sickness: the blood and lymph tests may have become suspected as a cause of it, 
especially as many cases would only display symptoms after being detected. The 
combination of the government medical and tax inspections and the forcible 
treatment, together with the coercion of labour, ensured that people experienced the 
power of the colonial state through attempted invasions and appropriations of their 
own bodies, which in turn evoked the longer history in the region of the 
consumption of human bodies by slave traders. 
2' Anon. (prob. Mynors), 'Notes on Evans-Pritchard's Draft Account of the Moru tribe', 
NRO DK 
112/14/95. 
214 
Chapter Five: Knowing the Body 
2. Government and Mission Medicine 
Medical treatment, apart from the epidemic campaigns, was initially offered larue1v 
by the missions, especially at the Lul station run by Dr and Mrs Fraser. Their svstem 
of dispensaries run by locally trained staff was adopted more widely in the Province, 
and from 1930, 'dressers' were also attached to each chief to treat small wounds and 
generally promote government and mission medical work. Government hospitals 
were also opened in the 1920s and 1930s at Yei, Kajo Kaji and Juba . 
22 As with 
agricultural knowledge, medical skills were selectively assimilated; there was also a 
distinction between voluntary requests for treatment, and forced diagnosis and 
hospitalisation. 
Dr Fraser reported 1,500 patients attending the hospital during its first year in 192 1, 
and an increase to 2,223 in 1922 . 
23 The local chief, Yilu, worked initially as his 
anaesthetist, and operations attracted large audiences: 
In those early days, the magic of chloroform, and the greater magic of the 
knife that could cut down to bone or bowel without pain, and xvitli no undue 
loss of blood, left them quite speechless, but they soon got used to it, 
although even now many of them believe the magic to be in my knife. 
24 
Surgery, dressing and drugs were soon in demand, especially as the latter two 
became accessible through the dispensaries. One visitor In 1933 described the 
apparent success of the mission hospital: 
One case of leopard mauling came in last night... The man's brother was 
present while they operated. It was interesting to note how completely the 
brother realised the importance of the treatment for he pointed out each 
wound on the man's body so that it might be cleansed by anti-septic 
dressing 
22 Gibson, Yel, Sept. 1922, and Giff, Kajo Kaji, 20 Aug. 1930, CMS G3 AL. 
23 Fraser, Lui, 27 Nov. 1922, CMS G3 AL. 
2' Fraser, 'Pioneering medical work in the pagan Sudan', The Mission Hospital, Vol. 29,1925, pp. 
32-6. 
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It was very interesting to watch the African orderlies giVing out medicine, 
and also giving injections. These latter the people love ha ýi "ing! Also theY 
think that the nastier the medicine the more potent it IS! 25 
The dislike of the sleeping sickness and CSM injections was clearly specific 
therefore, and did not reflect an intrinsic African aversion to needles . 
26 The potency 
of Fraser's knife and of the medicines and injections were translated into local 
9 27 meanings; one patient referred to pills as "spirits' eggs' . At the same time, 
knowledge of the need to dress wounds no doubt preceded the arrival of the 
missionaries. Another explanation of the popularity of the mission medical work 
was inadvertently expressed by Fraser in describing the hostility of the local 
'witchdoctors' to the dispensaries: 
They may well feel anxious when they see an educated boy, perhaps the son 
of a chief or headman, cheerfully ministering all the morning to the sick, 
invoking only the help of the Great Physician, giving a simple reason for 
every dressing and dose of medicine, performing for strangers those menial 
tasks which normally only relatives undertake, and all for eight shillings a 
month, the price of two goats, which is the sorcerer's usual fee for one 
case. 28 
The low cost of treatment, together with the claim of the dispensers to know a great 
healing power, whether this was understood as the distant white missionary doctor 
or as the divine 'physician', resulted in substantial numbers of people using the 
dispensaries and mission hospital. Yet the 'menial' and low-paid medical work may 
also have reduced its status, as later dissatisfaction on the part of the dressers would 
reveal. 
The Lui mission's early medical successes also rested substantially on the 
personalities of the Frasers and their relationship with the local chief and people, 
together with their training of local staff for the hospital and dispensaries. The Yei 
25 Baring-Gould, 6 Feb. 1933/4, Lui, CMS Acc. 21, F7B. 
2' Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 189. White also highlights the profound and contradictory 
understandings of the ability of Western medical techniques to penetrate the skin: Speaking, p. 99. 
27 Mrs Fraser, 'The New Hospital, Yilu', The Mission Hospital, Vol. 31,1927, pp. 244-7. 
28 Fraser, 'Progress at Lui (formerly Yilu)', The Mission Hospital, Vol. 35,193 1, pp. 294-7. 
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Civil Hospital, in contrast, was viewed with mistrust as a government institution: it 
was hoped that chiefs' dressers would bring people in who would not otherwise go, 
and as late as 1940, the admission of the first patients from Kala was heralded as a 
milestone in winning greater trust. 29 Even patients at the mission hospital at Loka 
were reportedly afraid of being sent to Yei hospital, because the orderlies were 
government rather than mission trained . 
30 The connection between hospital and 
hakuma was underlined in one account of a man beaten for suspected poisoning, 
who was taken to the Kajo Kaji hospital; the case was then reported to the D. C. bý, 
the hospital staff . 
31 In Yei and Kajo Kaji, the sleeping sickness and CSM campaigns 
could have added to the fear of government hospitals, but also in Juba district, one 
official reported that, "[w]hen I first came to this Province in 1928 the natives were 
very shy and nervous of the hospitals and it was with the greatest difficulty one 
could persuade a sick person to go to hospital". He suggested that the introduction of 
chiefs' dressers since 1930 had helped to overcome this mistrust by spreading 
knowledge of the value of medical work, and claimed that on average each dresser 
saw 1725 patients p-a- 32 However, a report from 1940 from the same district 
indicated less success: 
The Chiefs Dressers are satisfactory but require a lot of watching. One is 
largely dependent on the chief whether they are really active or otherwise... 
Dressers need quite a lot of attention as it is found that they enter fictitious 
attendances in their books... Dressers do not patrol their areas as they 
should. This depends on chiefs. Chiefs are also very negligent at seeing that 
medicines are kept up to requirements. 33 
Once again, the chiefs were expected to play a central role in the introduction of new 
kinds of knowledge, placing them in a difficult and ambivalent position. Their 
enforcement of sleeping sickness and CSM regulations and sanitary measures such 
as anti-guinea worm wells associated them further with state coercion. But as Lyons 
notes, their role as chief entailed an obligation to protect the people and their 
29 Tracey, 'Note on Native Administration, Yei District, Equatoria', 15 Feb. 1939, NRO EP 2/2/8; 
EPMD Dec. 1940, NRO CS 57/12/46- 
30 Mrs Selwyn, Loka, 12 Aug. 1930, CMS G3 AL. 
31 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perharn, p. 17. 
32 'Memo on Chiefs' Dressers', 193 8, NRO JD 1/2/6. 
33 'Central District Information Book', NRO JD 11115. 
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34 health In the nineteenth century, 'chiefs' were apparently forced to pay tnbute to 
the female prophet Kiden in order to obtain her protection from disease for their 
communities. 35 Some colonial chiefs similarly sought to obtain western medicine; 
for example, Chief Yilu at Lul, or Chief Morbe Kenyi in Juba district, who was 
reported to like being in hospital and to be "influencing his people to follow his 
example". 36 The fact that some of the new generation of chiefs from the 19-1 30s had 
been employed in the government medical service no doubt also made them 
encourage their people in this way. Chief Korokangwa in Moru district, for example, 
had been a Public Health Overseer, and in 1946 he provided "able and active 
cooperation" and "Invaluable work" in building a system of pit latrines as a 'Village 
Sanitation Experiment' directed by the Lui mission. 37 But at the same time the chiefs 
needed to be seen to maintain good relations with respected indigenous doctors. For 
example, one Dokolo Galaya was taken to court in Moru district after he "threatened 
an ex-patient of Lui CNIS hospital with death if he returned there for treatment". The 
case for once revealed some of the differentiations among indigenous medical 
practitioners, which will be discussed further below: 
No evidence was adduced on which any criminal charge could be framed. He 
appears to be one of the many local Kujur practitioners who enjoy a certain 
local reputation as a healer by the laying-on of hands but does not exercise 
any of the anti-social influence exercised by evil witch-doctors. His Chief 
Luka Jambiri gave him an unexpectedly good testimonial. 38 
This support of Chief Luka, himself educated and Christian, for Dokolo as a doctor 
thus indicated the balancing act required of chiefs in obtaining and maintaining both 
goverriment/mission and indigenous resources for the health of their communities. 39 
The idea of a chiefs obligation to protect his community from disease was also 
extended to the government, in its incarnation as a kind of patron. Medical resources 
played a significant part in the development of ideas of rights of citizenship, and of 
34 Lyons, Colonial Disease, p. 194. 
35 Richardson, 'Bari Notes', pp. 181-2. 
36 EPMD Dec. 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29. 
37 EPMD Jan. -Feb. 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5. 38 EPMD March-April 1940, NRO CS 57/12/46. 
39 Chiefs nowadays play an important role in disease prevention and vaccination campaigns: Nasi%% a. 
'Baseline Survey'. See also van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal and van Dijk, 'Introduction', p. 7: chiefs 
mediate between Western and indigenous concepts of illness. 
218 
Chapter Five. - Knoii ing the Bodv 
anti-colonial feeling, from the 1940s. Even those who became qualified in Nvestern 
medicine had an ambivalent relationship with the mission doctors and government 
medical officials. By the 1940s, the orderlies in Lui hospital were striking to demand 
higher wages, and showing a general lack of 'discipline' and 'Communistic' ideas. -I() 
The daughter of a medical assistant remembers her father fighting N'6th the British: 
"he liked the way they trained people, but he used to complain that these people 
dictate too much, do this, do that' 9.41 Something of a shift also seems to haN-c 
occurred towards associating the government rather than the missions ýN, ith medical 
work, and to a more definite belief that treatment was a duty of the government, as 
demonstrated when the Lui mission hospital introduced fees for the first time in 
1948: 
Fees... emptied the hospital, which is looked on as a government one, which 
should therefore give free treatment... They look on it as their right, since 
they pay taxes. 42 [My italics] 
The idea of a government medical duty was also emphasised in a report by the Moru 
district D. C. in the same year: 
Various complaints were heard by District Commissioner Amadi, whilst he 
was on trek, that many people had died and why had not the 'Hukuma' done 
something about it. Enquiries revealed that most of the deaths (and there 
were only a few) were due to pneumonia and that the sick persons had 
neither visited the local dispensary nor sent for the dresser. 
43 
Thus medical interventions had been partially transformed, from an aspect of 
colonial conquest, to a state resource to which people expected access in return for 
their taxes. 
The net result of mission and government medical work was an ambivalent and 
contradictory public attitude to Western medicine. The apparent efficacy of 
dressings and drugs encouraged people to acquire them, but their association with a 
government whose intentions were never ftilly trusted would have only increased the 
need for simultaneous recourse to other kinds of protection. By the 1940s, people 
40 Bertram, Lui, Sept. 1948, CMS AF AL. 
41 Interview with Margaret Keji Loro, 18 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
42 Bertram, Lui, Sept. 1948, CMS AF AL. 
43 EPMD Feb. 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
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expected the government to provide treatment and prevent deaths, and yet there was 
a reluctance to attend hospitals and a general lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
dressers, chiefs and people towards medical activities. Just as hospitals remained 
suspect, so other sanitary interventions could be tainted by their association with 
government officialdom: 
A deputation of local inhabitants petitioned to be allowed to abandon the 
anti-guinea wonn wells dug at Lyria last year. The reason given was that the 
wells being 'official', evil-minded persons were tempted to poison their 
waters. 44 
The missionaries in particular were desperately eager to eradicate such beliefs in 
'poison', 'witchcraft' and the 'evil eye'; the campaign to build pit latrines launched 
by a CMS nurse in Moru district was intended to prevent intestinal parasites, and "to 
demonstrate to the people the fallacy of the idea of the evil-eye causing these 
1 45 diseases' . But while people were willing to obtain dressings and drugs, they 
generally needed resolution and protection beyond the scope of such remedies, as 
will be explored below. As a result, the missionaries found themselves frequently in 
conflict with indigenous medicine, as the following account from the Loka mission 
suggests: 
We had one interesting case of a baby with a large deep-seated ulcer in its 
knee. The smell was very foul as the cavity had been plugged with manure 
and decayed leaves... After cleaning it and dressing it, I told the mother to 
bring Baby again tomorrow. She came, and round the baby's foot I saw the 
dreaded lion's mane fetish of the witch doctor! My dressings had been 
removed and more manure applied. Sick at heart, I told her God loved her 
baby and wanted to heal him, but He could not work while she was going to 
the witch doctor. If she gave him up, God would heal her baby... Next 
morning she came again, the bandages intact! The wound was as clean as if it 
had had a weeks dressing. It was a miracle indeed. 46 
44 EPMD Nov. 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29. 
45 Miss Read, Lui, 3 April 1946, CMS AF AL. 
46 Mrs Selwyn, Loka, 12 Aug. 1930, CMS G3 AL. 
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The pragmatic recourse to more than one kind of expert was in contrast to the 
missionary concept of good and bad medicine; it would be interesting to know if the 
mother attributed the healing to the same source of nuracles as the missionary. 
Medicine was a contested field of knowledge, as reflected in the account of one 
schoolboy at Lainya in the 1940s: 
I dare not show my parents that I airn ill. I am baptised, but they are not. I 
must escape and try to reach the local dispensary so that I may be treated 
correctly. If my parents find out about my illness they call the local 
witchdoctor and he makes me very 111.47 
Women played a particularly prominent role in supporting indigenous medicine. 
One interviewee remembers conflict between her parents, because her father was a 
trained Medical Assistant, but her mother continued to take the children to the 
'witchdoctor'. 48 Similarly, when another interviewee and his schoolboy fiiends 
accused an old female doctor of fraudulent methods, it was the women of the village 
who turned on the boys and chased them out of the village. 49 
The direct attacks by missionaries on 'witchcraft' beliefs entangled them in those 
same beliefs. One illustration of this was the methods of a Miss Langley at Lui in 
the late 1920s: she dealt with a suspected case of the 'evil eye' by promising "to heal 
him with God's good Eye which was more powerful than all 'evil eyes', and in two 
days his fear had vanished and he was cured". She also discovered that two Dinka 
men in the leper village had been using 'charms of wood' to threaten the other 
lepers: I held these charms in my hands to show the lepers their powerlessness". 
The subsequent illness of Miss Langley, which led to her rapid departure, may 
instead have served to display her own powerlessness in these contests. 50 Her 
language also reflects the way that missionaries more generally found themselves 
using African idioms, like the power of the eye, rather than imposing their own, 
resulting in a translation and vernacularisation of epistemologies and discourses. 51 
47 Williams, Lainya, 15 Oct 1949, CMS AF AL. 
48 Interview with Margaret Keji Loro, 18 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
49 Interviews with Serefino Wani Swaka, 20 Oct. 2002 and 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
50 Miss Langley to Miss Nugent, Yilu, 17 Aug. 1928, CMS Acc. I 11, Fl/14-24. 
51 See Birgit Meyer, Translating the Devil: Religion and Modernity aniong the Eive in Ghana 
(Edinburgh, 1999), esp. pp. 55-82; andlk%te, Speaking, p. 95: African "epistemologies of causation 
and cure" altered colonial medical practices. 
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Despite this idiomatic creolisation and the employment of local dressers and medics. 
the medical resources of both the government and missions remained external to 
communities: something to be selectively acquired, and later demanded as a right, 
but only in conjunction with continuing practices of diagnosis and healing by 
indigenous doctors. Only the latter could know the deeper implications of disease for 
the community. Greene argues that understandings of sacred sites, including the 
body, were fundamentally altered during the colonial period in relation to their 
spiritual nature, but in focusing on the emerging distinction between material and 
spiritual worlds, she pays less attention to the social and moral meanings that also 
permeated bodies and the landscape. 52 Yet these are crucial to understanding why 
Western medicine was selectively and partially adopted, as the Comaroffs write of 
the Tswana: 
European medicine... did not address the social bases of their ills. But it 
could be absorbed into their repertoire of responses to misfortune - without, 
as they understood matters, challenging the foundations of their world. 
53 
in Western Mongalla, the human body and its place in the landscape could not be 
understood without continuing reference to epistemologies that defied the hegemony 
of missionary or government medicine. 
52 Sandra E. Greene, Sacred Sites and the Colonial Encounter: A History of Meaning and 
Memory in 
Ghana (Bloomington, 2002) 
5' Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation, Vol. 2, pp. 60-61. 
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3. Indigenous Medicine 
The missionaries tended to categorise all indigenous practitioners as 'witchdoctors' 
and indigenous medicine as superstition: 
The people consider that all illness is due to the anger of an evil spirit, or to a 
curse put on them by someone, and this makes them both fatalistic in outlook 
and futile in their treatment, which is based upon the advice given by the 
local witch doctor. 54 
Of course, medicine was far more complex, and the expertise of doctors more 
specialised and differentiated, than this depiction suggests. There was a distinction 
between certain common forms of sickness or injury for which doctors had specific 
remedies, and other kinds of illness that required a deeper or wider diagnosis of the 
cause, which could often include some form of ill-will on the part of a known or 
unknown enemy. 
In Bari, the term 'bunuk' conveyed the meaning 'doctor', but, according to 
interviewees, it referred both to the "herbalists [who] specialise and identify certain 
herbs for the clan", but who had "only expertise in traditional medicine... [without] 
hereditary or supernatural powers"; and also to the "people who will detect what is 
wrong with you", and who might "do some witchcraft". 55 In Moru, the foriner kind 
of practitioner was said by one D. C. to be called 'Kozo': 
If sickness is not attributable to the more serious fonns of bewitchment, 
attempts may be made to cure it either by home-made remedies or by 
summoning the local doctor (Kozo)... The Kozo is usually an old woman. 
56 
The bunuk could be men, but one interviewee described a gender differentiation in 
terms of functions: 
They have traditional plants for everything, like malaria, stomach pains... 
They were more often women, but also men. But the men kujurs or 
witchdoctors, they are supposed to be protectors of the people, they perform 
certain rituals, put certain roots around the village to keep away these 
54 'Mission share plan: introductory letter for Lui Hospital', CMS G3 Sg6- 
55 Interviews with Barnaba Durno Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 
2003, Francls 
Bassan, 18 Nov. 2002, Khartoum; Barnaba Durno Wani, written answers, 2003, Khartoum. 
56 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru', 1935, SAD 777/3/140. 
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warriors from attacking the village... It is the men usually NN-ho practice that, 
but the women are more concerned with curing. 57 
According to a Mandari interviewee, "the spiritual health is also liked with the 
physical health, because these things are interrelated... and therefore you must get 
cleansed up appropriately". But "otherwise you may be given medicine or their own 
herbs". 58 These accounts all suggest therefore that there was a distinction between 
spiritual or supernatural kinds of affliction, and common sickness which could be 
treated with herbs and medicines, and that some experts, especially women, were 
restricted to the latter. 
Some doctors relied on their exclusive possession of substances or objects, as a 
missionary observed in relation to leprosy cures: 
There are some native medicines for leprosy but their owners, who make 
much profit through them, guard their secrets with even more care than the 
producers of proprietary medicines do in England. I have a bulbous plant 
which a man brought to me with great stealth, which I want to get analysed 
one day; a man with quite a wide reputation uses it. 59 
As the missionary realised, secrecy was integral to the political economy of 
medicine: one interviewee also explained that, "these people don't tell you what the 
things are because if everybody knows then they will lose their profession or their 
support". 60 
The perforinative techniques of doctors also relied on a degree of secrecy and 
mystery; another informant explained that fertility treatment would not be "done in 
the open". 61A common element of their rituals involved the extraction of an object 
from the body of their patient: "[t]here are medicine men among the Moro who 
extract various things out of people's bodies to cure them of sickness". 
62 The doctor 
57 Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
58 Interview with Gajuk Wurnyang Lupaya, 28 Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
59 Lui Hospital Report, 1944, CMS G3 Sm2. 
60 Interview with Francis Bassan, 18 Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
61 Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
62 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14 /95; Yunis, 
'Notes on the Kuku', p. 28; John Middleton, 'Oracles and Magic among the Lugbara', in 
Mary 
Douglas and Phyllis M. Kaberry (eds. ), Man in Aftica (New York, 197 1), pp. 262-78, at p. 
27/ 1. See 
also White, Speaking, p. 99 on extraction treatment. 
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'discovered' by one interviewee and his school-friends as a 'fraud' had a ball of hair 
and oil, which she chewed in her mouth and then 'sucked' out of the chest of her 
patient. 63 For the boys who watched this and then found the hair aftenvards. the 
substance was proof that her technique was fake, and yet for the women Nvho chased 
them from the village, it was perhaps the performance of extracting the disease that 
mattered, not whether the object had actually come from within the body. A similar 
practice for sorcery extraction is described in Mayotte by Lambek, in N-, -hich a sair. 111, 
or small bundle of substances like hair, is removed from the body or home of the 
sick person: 
The cure is based on the clients reaching certainty that any harmful influence 
sent by a sorcerer that was recently within their bodies has been removed... 
the construction of acceptance that one has been cleansed. The sairy is the 
chief prop of the conventional performance through which acceptance is 
produced, the focus around which it can be socially enacted. 04 
The act of extraction of a harmftil influence may have been replicated in surgery, 
helping to explain the reported popularity of Fraser's operations. Injections, on the 
other hand, particularly those administered forcibly in the epidemic campaigns, 
could have been seen to implant and invade rather than extract sickness. This was 
certainly suggested in the case of CSM, when there was "suspicion that the new 
treatment of injections in the stomach and lumbar punctures have caused the high 
mortality". 65 
Neither the rituals nor the medicines of indigenous doctors were entirely external 
objects of knowledge. The accounts by Evans-Pritchard of Moru doctors expresses 
some of the complexities of local medicine. The odraba were said to have originated 
as a profession when one man brought a medicine from people to the west, possible 
a syphilis cure, and it was passed from father to son. The nephew of a present owner 
of it "became very ill with sores", but his uncle failed to cure him: 
63 Interviews With Serefino Wani Swaka, 20 Oct. 2002 and 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
' Lambek, Knowledge, pp. 292-3. 
65 YDMD July 1942, Nov. 1943, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
Chapter Five: Knowing the Bo4v 
His uncle then asked him 'Do you want to die? You had better take over 
knowledge of the medicine and become an odraba yourselF. His nepheNN- 
followed this advice and became cured. 66 
This suggests a symbiotic relationship between disease and cure; the disease itself 
could signify possession of the knowledge to cure it. In the same area, the bori i-ain- 
makers also acted as doctors, especially in cases of illness resembling spirit- 
possession by 'Lu'. The prominent bori Labi explained his techniques: 
In the early morning Labi takes a pot with some water in it, kills a fowl over 
it, and with his hands throws some of the water on to the sick man. The 
illness leaves him, he rises, pays his fee, and departs. But the illness having 
left this man now comes into Labi who shortly afterwards becomes sick iii 
his place. However he takes an old spear-head from one of his pots and rubs 
his flanks with it so that his sickness will soon pass away... 
I asked him whether a tall son of his who was standing near Nvould inherit his 
powers and practice his craft. He replied that he had already taught his son 
much of the technique, but that when the youth cured someone afflicted by 
Lu and as a result became sick himself, he suffered too long and too severely 
to relish the position. A younger boy, the son of one of Labi's brothers, was 
now learning the craft. 
In this case, the extraction of the sickness carried the threat of the extractor taking 
the sickness into his own body. This embodiment of medical knowledge could also 
endanger anyone who came into close contact with the bori; they were thus a source 
of infection in themselves. 67 This was similarly expressed in the belief that the Bari 
rain chiefs at Sindiru possessed "large earthenware pots believed to contain various 
kinds of contagious diseases like smallpox, chicken pox, scabies, rinderpest which 
could affect humans and animals alike". These gave the rain chief the ultimate threat 
or sanction; he "would not release any of the epidemics or curse the tribe unless 
there had been a gross disobedience to his orders by the people". 
68 Lugbara rain 
priests were also responsible for preventing epidemics; the role of the rain priest in 
66 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14,95. 
67 Evans-Pritchard, 'Prelm-iinary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 11214,95. 
68 Venanzio Loro Lado, written answers, Jan. 2003, Khartourn. 
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guaranteeing the well-being of the community therefore included collectiVe 
protection from disease as well as the threat of it. " 
Knowledge of cures thus implied knowledge of causes, and so the odraba and other 
professional doctors could also be paid to cause disease. This often gave them a 
judicial role in the community, which will be discussed more in Chapter Six. 
According to Evans-Pritchard, if a man became ill with syphilitic sores, it ývas 
known that an odraba had probably been paid to afflict him as punishment for 
adultery, and the sick man would have to visit the same odraba for treatment. In 
general, an element of confession was a common part of any cure: 
One of the odraba, told me that when a sick man came to one of his 
profession to be cured he often has to ask the ill man what he has done and 
will be told by him that he had committed adultery with someone's wife or 
had stolen someone's goods. 70 
Illness could thus be the result of the crimes or omissions of the individual or their 
family, punished by ancestral spirits or divinities, as well as of a deliberate curse by 
an enemy; doctors therefore often needed to be diviners. 
71 Illness could be read as a 
72 
sign of the inversion of the moral or social order. It is for this reason that Lugbara 
doctors and diviners were counted as 'ba rukuzu (prominent men), because, 
according to Middleton, they needed much the same kind of skills: "the knowledge 
of local 'politics' and the ability to help resolve their problems, whether by giving 
oracular statements or acting as mediators". 73 
Buxton documented the Mandari reports in the 1950s thatjok, "new forces affecting 
health and well-being... illness from a foreign source", had appeared recently in 
SiS. 
74 
their country, requiring new forms of diagno Jok were perhaps both a means of 
69 Middleton, 'Oracles and Magic', p. 263; Seligman and Seligman, Pagan Tribes, p. 254. 
70 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14/95. 
71 Bari diviners were bunuk kagubak, as distinct from bonok kadumak (doctors who extract), and 
ýIayed an important role in 'social cohesion': Seligman and Seligman, Pagan Tribes, p. 251-2. 
Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation, Vol. 2, pp. 343-4. 
73 Middleton, 'Oracles and Magic', pp. 272-3. The equivalent of 'ba rukuza were the Bari nglitu 
duma: Seligman and Seligman, Pagan Tribes, pp. 252-3; or Mandari nutu dun: Buxton, Chiefs, p. 79. 
74 Buxton, Religion, pp. 64-113. Jok is a widespread Nilotic term for divinity. 'Free-divinities' also 
appeared among the Nuer and Acholi in the late nineteenth-century: Johnson, Nuer Prophets, pp. 
65- 
70; Heike Behrend, 'Power to Heal, Power to Kill: Spirit Possession and War in Northern Uganda 
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expressing the effects of socio-economic relations with the Dinka in particular - an 
incarnation of 'outside' forms of knowledge - and a general way for practitioners to 
claim new methods of curing, thus establishing themselves as mediators with 
external knowledge and power, alongside chiefs, diviners and other experts. Far 
from being 'fatalistic' or 'futile', indigenous medicine was relevant, adaptiN, e and 
dynamic. It entailed reading physical symptoms as signifiers of the state of social 
and spiritual relations in a family or community, and with the worlds beyond, and it 
was about protection of the body, as well as curing. It was also significant in the 
strategies pursued by local people in the face of the appropriation of violence by the 
colonial state. 
(1986-1994)', in Heike Behrend and Ute Luig (eds. ), Spirit Possession, Modernitv and 
Power in 
Aftica (Madison, 1999), pp. 20-33, at p. 22. 
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4. Force, Violence and Punishment 
4.1 State Violence 
In the earlier decades of the Condominium, the violence of the colonial state Nvas 
displayed directly and visibly through punitive patrols and floggings. In 1925, a 
Public Works Department official photographed and reported the flogging of a 
young boy of about ten years old at the district headquarters in Rejaf, prompting 
something of a political storin which reached Parliament and the British press. A 
report in the periodical John Bull drew attention to the fact that the boy had been 
tied up to a British flagpole, with the screaming headline: "Blot on the Union Jack - 
Lash and Torture for Black Boy - Bound under the Symbol of Freedom". The 
accounts given by the various officers involved were often conflicting, but the local 
police officer admitted that he had flogged the boy with a corbag (hide w1i1p). 75 The 
incident was used as an excuse to remove the Egyptian mamur who was made the 
scapegoat in place of the D. C. But the early provincial administration in general 
relied on a substantial use and display of force and violence. 
The establishment of 'native administration' involved the attempt by the state to 
centralise and control violent force, as embodied in the chiefs' police. Physical 
punishments were an integral part of the functioning of local government, and the 
force of the colonial state was in a sense channelled through the lilerarchy of the 
local authorities, as the following account of road maintenance shows: 
Each clan Chief had a piece of road to look after, but they had to be forced to 
do it, especially during the rainy season... The District Commissioner 
worked through the chief and then the sub chief and then the clan chief... If 
that particular piece was always not kept clean, the owner of the piece, the 
clan chief, would be given a flogging, a corporal punishment, and sometimes 
a fine. The fine would be imposed on the Chief, maybe a goat or a cow. I 
remember once the sub-chief Lado Kose was given fifteen strokes because 
he had not been forceful enough in forcing people to go out and clean the 
" Correspondence and reports in 'Alleged flogging of boy at Rejaf, 1925, NRO CS 41 25- 
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roads. He and then the clan chief, both of them were flogged b" the Chief s 
man, the policeman. The Chief had someone - each chief of a localitY had 
one or two - for collection of poll tax and forcing people to work: the Chic Fs 
policeman would go and supervise the work, carry out the Chief s orders. -() 
In discussing court regulations in 1932, the Province Governor asserted that, 
"beating is apparently traditional, and we think should be allowed, up to say twenty 
lashes". 77 This idea of tradition has survived, and was echoed by another 
interviewee: 
Corporal punishment... of course there are these traditional issues or crimes 
in society, and some of them are punished by lashing. But of course society 
accepted it as a punishment. 78 
The idea that 'society' accepted the traditional legitimacy of corporal punishment is 
highly questionable; the idea of a measured, prescribed dose of non-lethal pain as a 
tariff for a particular offence was a novel introduction. 79 This claim does however 
represent the development of a definition of when such flogging was appropriate, 
and therefore also when it was not. The value of having a chief who could enforce 
court decisions and punish anti-social behaviour was recognised, even as his 
coercions might be resented. This quidpro quo is evident in the account of the fear 
felt by people towards the chief s policemen in the village of an interviewee, 
together with the concession that they were necessary for preserving order: 
In their absence there would be a sort of jungle. But if there was any 
resistance given to these police, then in the absence of the Chief or District 
Commissioner, then they would set up a sort of summary court and punish 
people, so people had to be very, very careful for fear of any reprisals. They 
were never liked by people of the village. Because some of them were 
dishonest and corrupt. For instance if they had to go and collect a fine, 
maybe a few goats, they would go and add one or two for themselves. So 
they were usually never liked. 80 
76 Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
77 Governor MP to Governor UNP, 'Notes on native courts', 7 Sept. 193 2, NRO CS 1/ 13/42. 
78 Interview with Barnaba Durno Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
79 See Simonse, Kings, pp. 223-7: nineteenth-century punishments took the form of fixiesl- physical 
force was instead used to demonstrate the power of the king or to take personal revenge. 
go Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartourn. 
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This account suggests that it was the dishonesty of these policemen which aroused 
dislike, not necessarily their use of force, which was tolerated in the interests of 
stability. Another interviewee disputed their corruption, describing the sirkalis or 
chiefs' police as 'honest', and explained that force was part of their work: 
They were ok but when you see the policeman coming for you being sent by 
the chief, you know he is coming to collect you for what you have done, you 
must have done something. So people were afraid of them. 81 
The continuing use of this linguistic term, as discussed in Chapter Three, is also 
revealing of the historical connection between government and military force. 
4.2 Age and Violence 
However, the chiefs usually had only three or four policemen, and could only seek 
recourse to state backing occasionally if they were to be useful to administrators; 
they could therefore not afford to exist in opposition to the entire community. Their 
position relied not only on their access to violent force, but also upon both their own 
alliances with sections of society, and the existence of other antagonistic or 
oppositional relationships, into the midst of which they could insert themselves as 
peacemakers or balancers. One of the most obvious antagonistic divisions in society 
was between the young men with peak physical power, and the elders, as the 
previous chapter showed in relation to labour control. The latter needed the labour 
and physical protection of the former, and so sought to use ritual, age-sets, 
patronage, cattle-exchange and marital systems to maintain control over them. In the 
past the younger men might have asserted themselves through warfare, fights and 
hunting. Among the Lokoiya and Luluba, the generation-set system involved the 
overthrow of the ruling monyemiji every twenty years or so, through the critical and 
often violent attacks of the younger generation on the retiring one, which Kunmoto 
and Simonse describe as a form of "oppositional dynamism". 
82 Throughout Westem 
Mongalla, once retired from warfare or active community government, the elders 
relied on ritual threats - and blessings - to maintain their authority. 
83 
81 Interview with Dr Rubena Lumaya Wani, 22.2.03, Khartoum. 
82 Kurimoto and Simonse, 'Introduction', to their Conflict, pp. 1-28, at p. 7. 
83 For examples of such rituals see Beaton, 'A Luluba Burial', 22 May 1934, and Reiland, 'Note on 
Lyria', June 1933, both NRO JD I/l/2. Willis highlights the importance of ritual and practice - and 
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The imposition of colonial government introduced a new dynamic into these 
relationships, by greatly restricting group and personal vi 84 In the early 
colonial period, it was often the young men who resisted government control. As 
Simonse shows, in 1918 attacks by Lokolya on police, mail and merchants XN-Cre 
blamed on the juniors: "only a few young bloods were responsible in their desire for 
the notoriety to be gained by killing someone". 85 Such resistance was quick],,, 
crushed however. Pax britannica - the monopolisation of violence by the state - 
could be seen to involve the emasculation and disempowerment of colonial subjects, 
especially in the face of the kind of humiliating and invasive medical interventions 
already discussed. The results in Western Mongalla were complex however: 
violence was not entirely annexed to the state, but was rather channelled into new 
forms of ritual or hidden violence. It also exploded in sudden outbursts of open 
conflict or torture, in which the chiefs often played an important role, either as 
instruments or peacemakers. 
4.3 Rituals and Categorisations of Violence 
The kind of open violence which continued throughout the period was largely a 
controlled and even ritualised form of feuding with relatively close neighbours. 
There was a tendency on the part of Europeans to depict all kinds of pre-colonial 
conflict as sporadic or uncontrolled raiding, but there were clearly rules and 
categorisations for it. 86 For example, there was reported to have been a "continual 
state of war" between Kakwa and Lugware, but raiding was confined to the period 
after the rainy season. 87 As Kurimoto and Simonse show, enemies were categorised 
according to the degree of violence that was used in mutual confrontations. 
88 A 
the role of alcohol - in reproducing the authority of male elders: Potent Brews, pp. 50-75. See also, 
e. g., Berman, Making, pp. 40-41. 
84 See Ali A. Mazrui, Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda. - The Making of a Military Ethnocracy 
(Beverly Hills, 1975), pp. 55-64, for 'the decline of the warrior tradition'. 
85 MPIR Sept. 1918, NRO IN 2/48/408; Simon Simonse, 'Age, Conflict and Power in the Monyomiji 
Age Systems', in Kurimoto and Simonse, Conflict, pp. 51-78, at p. 72. 
86 See Reid, Political Power, pp. 178-9, on depictions of pre-colonial warfare. 
8' SIR 195, Oct. 1910, PRO WO 106 234. 
88 Kurimoto and Simonse, 'Introduction', p. 5. See also Mynors, 'Notes on the Nloru', 1935, SAD 
777/3/1-40: "inter-village fights: a challenge would be sent to the opposing clan to meet early one 
morning in some open toic, and the fight would go on until a few had been killed on each side and the 
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simplistic distinction might be that within a community, sticks xvould be used in 
either real or ritualised confrontations, whereas spears or arro,, N-s ývere eniployed 
against outside enemies. During the Ugandan administration, the Luluba seized the 
opportunity to attack the Gondokoro area, reportedly because the Bari \ý-ere trusting 
in the rifles of the police to protect them and were walking about with sticks instead 
of spears. 89 This resulted in a government patrol, reflecting the way in which this 
kind of warfare was suppressed under colonial rule. 
The collective violence during the colonial period was usually more localised, and 
hence controlled in the extent of damage caused. Even a relatively serious fight in 
1932 between the villages of Ngangala and Ngulere resulted in twelve wounded, but 
no deaths. 90 In 1938, affrays in Mongalla and among the Mandari were described as 
"desultory fighting" with mostly minor injuries: "[t]here is no wider significance to 
this affray; and the Bari seem surprised at the fighting spirit they showed but with no 
desire to reproduce it". 91 In the same year, a "tremendous drunken brawl" occurred 
at Tokiman: "[t]here were no serious injuries as the combatants were all armed with 
the favounte Bari weapon - whips", clearly showing that community violence was 
regulated in terms of the weapons permitted. 92 In 1942, a Moru district report 
reflected the limited nature of such violence: 
[A]ffrays at dancing parties have been frequent - fortunately resulting in 
nothing more serious than a few bruises. A policeman sent to investigate one 
such disturbance added gratuitously in his report 'These injuries are like 
bruises got while playing football and no government action is required'. 93 
At times there were more serious outbreaks of violence, which might lead to deaths 
and which therefore required peace-making and the purifications of blood from the 
communities involved. 94 Again this related to the category of enmity; where blood 
money was paid firom outside the community, it was believed to be tainted and to 
elders decided it was time to call it off. Otherwise it was considered definitely anti-social to kill 
people from neighbouring tribes". 
89 Beaton, 'A short history of the Luluba Hills', 1934, NRO JD I/l/2. 
90 (Anon. ) 'Tribal no. 20 Liria', NRO JD 1/ 1 /2. 
91 EPMD Sept. -Oct. 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29. 92 EPMD Nov. 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29. 
93 EPMD July 1942, NRO CS 57/16/60. 
94 EPMD Sept. 1950, NRO DK 57/9/24; Buxton, Chiefs, pp. 126-7. 
233 
Chapter Five: Knowi"g the Body 
bring disease. 95 This probably explains the refusal of a group of Kuku whose 
relatives were killed while hunting in Uganda to accept the compensation offered by 
the Uganda government. 96 However, the role of the rainmaker in the past in safely 
97 receiving blood money was increasingly taken on by the chief or goVernment . 
Similarly, the importance of the curse of rain priests or other arbitrators as a sanction 
by which to enforce a truce, may have been partially taken over by the chiefs as 
peace-makers. 98 In the 1940s, for example, there was serious violence between Aliab 
Dinka and Mandari as the former increasingly crossed into the province for grazing; 
these conflicts were settled by chiefs in court, by agreeing blood-money and holding 
peace ceremonies. 99 
One particularly striking example of the peace-making role of a chief involved Chief 
Lolik Lado of Lyria. In 1953 he presided over a special court following another 
Mandari-Aliab fight; two months later though, he hosted a meeting in Lyna with 
Latuka chiefs and headmen to resolve outstanding disputes and boundary questions, 
which erupted into violence: 
The Lokoya, being hosts, gave an exhibition of some of their better known 
war dances which were most impressive. Unfortunately however one or two 
of the participants took it as an opportunity to settle old scores. Two people 
were killed and nine injured. Chief Lolik distinguished himself in the way 
that he dealt with this sudden outbreak of fighting. He received news of it 
when he was walking home in the evening from his cultivation at Lomeiga, 
about 20 miles away. He promptly set off on foot with his two rifles and 2 
surkalis and arrived at Lyria as the cocks were crowing. He first located the 
murderers, disarmed them, and then exhorted his armed and angry people to 
listen to reason. When the Police arrived from Juba, Chief Lolik was sitting 
on a chair with his two loaded rifles in front of him and on either side of him, 
95 Nalder, Tribal Survey, pp. 43-4. 
96 YDMD Sept. 1943, June-Sept. 1944, Feb. 1945, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
97 Nalder, Tribal Survey, pp. 44-5. 
98 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14/95; Beaton to 
Governor, 'History of the Nyori district', 2 Nov. 1932, NRO EP 2/34/127; Mynors, 'Notes on the 
Moru', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40; Johnson, 'Judicial Regulation', p. 72. 
99 EPMD Feb. -March 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5; EPMD Jan. 
1940, NRO CS 57/12/46; EPMD July, 
Sept., Nov. 1950, NRO DK 57/9/24. 
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sitting quietly on the ground, were between a hundred and fiffi and tvvo 
hundred sheepish looking wamors. 100 
It was not only Loll *C \N' * ik's guns and policemen, but also his persuasive abiliti s hich 
made him a successful peacemaker; as Komma shows in the case of the Kipsl, -, Is of 
Kenya, peacemakers required a special eloquence, and a neutral marginality, which 
could be taken on by the colonial chiefs as mediators. 101 
Chiefs also played something of a balancing role between elders and youth. They 
too needed the labour of the latter, and seem to have succeeded in mobilising it ill 
some cases through age-set systems; newly initiated adults spent a period of time 
working for the chief. 102 In addition, the tax system even seems to have become a 
form of initiation: 
[T]he youths had all been paraded for admission to the Tax Lists and, as is 
not unusual, the whole of one Age-Class was present. The majority passed 
the test, but a few of them were excused for another year, until they had 
grown stronger. They followed me along the road, pleading to be admitted 
with their fellows, as they feared to return to their village, where, they said, 
the scornful glances of the girls awaited them -a thing not to be endured. 
103 
This suggests that the payment of taxes had become a symbol of manhood in a way 
that must have helped to ensure payment. Yet as the account by the interviewee at 
the beginning of the chapter showed, there was also a humiliating emasculation 
inherent in the tax parades. Faced with this, many young men, as the previous 
chapter showed, increasingly asserted their independence by working abroad or 
moving to the urban centre of Juba. In 1938 a round-up of unemployed young men 
in Juba found a hundred such, aged 15-25 years old; in Yei district a "younger class 
of lads" were also said to be joining the migration to Uganda. 
' 04 In turn the elders 
100 EPMD Oct., Nov. 1953, NRO CS2 30/3/6. 
'0' Komma, 'Peacemakers', pp. 193-4,198. 
102 Lewis, 'Notes on Bari', SAD 600/7/1-49; Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The 
future of Native 
Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 1/39/105. Lomodong 
Lako, Lokoiya. pp. 69-71 
on age-sets Nvorking as mutual labour parties. 
103 Beaton, 'The Bari', p. 143. 
104 EPMD April, Dec. 1938, NRO CS 57/7, '29. 
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sought to maintain community obligations, including through the rituals of dances 
and stick-fights. 105 
4.4. Secret Violence 
The normalisation and routine visibility of coercion and corporal punishment by the 
government, chiefs and courts was also about open violence. As the right of ordinary 
people to physical retaliation or assault was partially curtailed, so more closed forms 
of violence may have become increasingly significant, both as the means of 
protection and as the most feared kind of power. According to a Moru district D. C., 
Mynors, the odraba and similar experts were a relatively recent profession, imported 
perhaps from the Nilotic peoples to the north. This may simply reflect a common 
British belief that certain kinds of ritual practice were not indigenous, as with the 
Nuer prophets. 106 But Mynors' suggestion that their rise had occurred "since the 
introduction of settled government discouraged violence and necessitated the 
employment of subtler methods to protect oneself', may have held some truth. ' 07 Far 
from eradicating belief in such powers, as the missionaries and officials hoped, the 
imposition of colonial knowledge and administration only increased the need to find 
means of protecting the body from a proliferation of unknown potential forces, and 
from the sense of helplessness which the intrusive government medical and tax 
inspections engendered. The suppression of such experts by the administrators, and 
sometimes also the chiefs, would have only added to their secrecy and mystery, and 
therefore further enhanced their power. 108 
The frequent claim then that poisoning and 'witchcraft' were increasing during the 
colonial period, may have partly reflected an increased tendency for people to 
employ supernatural methods of personal attack and defence, in reaction to the 
growing monopoly over violence and physical force by the government and local 
authorities. 'Witchcraft' definitions will be discussed ftirther in Chapter Six in terms 
of the morality of secret knowledge. But in the sense of deliberately causing 
harm by 
'05 Beaton, 'Bari Studies', esp. p. 80,83; see also Bravrnan, Making, pp. 150-1. 
106 Johnson, Nuer Prophets, pp. 24-9. 
107 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
'0' Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14'95. 
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invisible methods, witchcraft was a kind of closed violence, operating in an 
underworld below the visible routines of state violence. It therefore re-empo%N-ered 
its practitioners and their clients, and simultaneously contributed to the spiralling 
sense of physical vulnerability and the need for protection. The colonial state even 
removed the use of violence in the form of ordeals to detect the source of harm; 
similarly in 1920s Ghana, it was believed that the ban on medicine oracles to detect 
witchcraft meant that "the white man had come to take their protection away so that 
they could treat them the way they wanted". 109 Witchcraft was therefore intimately 
linked to the state monopolisation of violence and the resulting sense of loss of 
control and protection. 
There was also a specific kind of open violence which took the form of sudden 
collective outbursts of beating or torture, and which usually occurred when there 
was an unexplained death or illness. People increasingly pressured their chiefs to 
offer them protection from witchcraft, which at times led to public and collective 
attempts to exorcise the sources of harm and regain a sense of control through 
violence. In 1944, it was reported that Chief Ruba had obtained by force a 
confession from an alleged murderer, who was probably suspected of witchcraft. 
The D. C. was disturbed by "the attitude of the ordinary folk, who seemed to regard 
it as perfectly nonnal" that the chief had employed 'torture' methods. " 0 Similarly in 
Kajo Kaji, the use of torture to detect poisoners (about which more will be said in 
the next chapter) was reported to be the result of popular pressure. In another case 
of suspected witchcraft, "a number of people" beat a man and forced a woman to 
drink the sick man's urine, all with the cooperation of the chief"I This kind of 
collective assault was employed at times against rain-makers, 'witches' or 
'magicians', and even against chiefs or their police. Simonse argues that it was an 
integral part of the balance of power between people and their 'scapegoat kings', 
employed when the latter failed to provide rain. 112 'Torture' by chiefs, as opposed to 
'corporal punishment', was usually only reported in relation to witchcraft 
'09 Natasha Gray, 'Witches, Oracles and Colonial Law: Evolving Anti-Witchcraft Practices in Ghana, 
1927-1932', International Journal of Aftican Historical Studies 34, no. 2 (200 1), pp. 339-63, at p. 
347. 
110 EPMD March 1944, NRO CS 57/20/78. 
111 EPMD Jan. 1940, NRO CS 57/12/46. 
112 Simonse, Kings, esp. pp. 345-73. 
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suspicions, reflecting the way that this kind of violence operated outside the normal 
routines of state coercion. 
Conclusion 
Not only was the force wielded by the chiefs less terrifying than more supernatural 
forms of harm, but the monopoly of the chiefs and colonial government over violent 
force may have also driven people more towards those who could offer other 
methods of reprisal and protection. The colonial state demonstrated its power over 
the bodies of its subjects through injections, isolations, floggings and forced laboLir, 
but these invasions and appropriations only led to a re-emphasis of indigenous 
knowledge of the body and its interrelation with society and morality. As the state 
invaded and extracted the bodies of its subjects, so the latter underlined and 
emphasised the inseparability of those bodies from their origins and social 
connections. Only those who knew and understood the situation in time, place and 
community of a body could know what it needed or what its symptoms indicated. 
Holistic curing involved a restoration of the body to a harmony within that situation, 
and thus reaffirmed the community to which it belonged. People might assimilate 
new kinds of medicine and external treatment, but nothing could eradicate or 
substitute for the exploration of causation within the community. Knowing the body 
meant knowing the person and their place in society. 
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Knowing the Community: 
The Morality of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Nlorality 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters have discussed the resistance of local communities to the 
imposition of state knowledge in relation to the land and their own bodies; their 
preservation of multiple sources of profit, protection and expertise; and their 
willingness to experiment with new kinds of knowledge. This chapter will explore in 
greater detail this kind of experimentation within communities, and it will follow 
Allen's use of the concept of 'moral knowledge' as linked "to the implicit texture of 
communal identity, to the underlying notions shaping social networks, and to the 
ideas used in the drawing of lines between what is socially and morally inside and 
what is outside". ' As Bravman argues, 'community' membership implies both a 
positive 'belonging', and a pressure to conform to hegemonic definitions of 
community ways. 2 But those definitions - of what was inside or outside - were 
continually being contested. Once again the authority of the chiefs will be shown to 
have been limited; despite being treated in many cases by the colonial government 
as the repositories of local knowledge, they were only one among the multiple 
claimants to such knowledge. 
In Affica generally, male elders and chiefs have been seen to have benefited from 
colonial courts and the formation of 'customary law'. 3 In Western Mongalla, the 
importance of the courts as the source of hegemonic discourse was limited, in the 
first place because the discourses emerging in the courts may have been formulated 
selectively for presentation to, and in the language of, the colonial government; and 
later on because the courts also became arenas of debate, as people increasingly used 
them to challenge and question. It also appears that court cases were often only the 
1 Allen, 'Violence' p. 5 1. 
2 Braman, Making, pp. 4-7. 
F. g. Chanock, Law, Custom; Ranger, 'Invention', fliffe, Africans, pp. 198-9. 
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tip of the iceberg of bigger debates that were clearly going on in other contexts. 
Court decisions did not always address these wider issues or provide the kind of 
resolution and cleansing needed by the community. It is therefore important not to 
take the discourses developing in the courts at face value; they reflected complex 
debates, tensions and adjustments in the moral economy. 
This chapter will also seek to identify some of the ways in which knowledge %vas 
categorised and differentiated by communities. It will make use of the term 'mantic', 
adopted by Johnson from Chadwick: "[m]antic activity refers to the acquisition, 
cultivation and declaration of knowledge; knowledge of the coinnionly unknown 
4 present and past, as well as of the future" (my italics). Those who claimed to know 
the commonly unknown operated largely in the hidden realm of local politics, and 
they were powerful in forming discourses of community morality. But the 
possession of specialist knowledge also conveyed a moral responsibility as to its 
use; the discourses on this morality of knowledge helped again to redefine the 
boundaries of the moral community. The use of secret and esoteric knowledge was 
particularly contentious; as the debates over 'witchcraft' reveal, it could be the most 
powerful kind of knowledge, but also the most morally ambiguous. 
Knowledge of local history and community ways was formulated through debate, 
q5 
and its diversified ownership "preserved the openness of intellectual alternatives . 
This chapter will argue that the colonial period did not see the imposition or 
formation of a single hegemonic discourse either by the state or by particular 
individuals or groups within communities. Instead, a number of different idioms 
were used to claim moral knowledge, and to enforce or challenge the moral 
economy. The language and rituals of the courts, 'Christian' ideology, and various 
kinds of intellectual activity were experimented with and drawn upon to compete for 
the right to define community ways. But this competition and debate ensured that 
new ideas or challenges were ultimately translated into a local meaning, and that 
therefore the community maintained autonomous and dynamic 'traditions' and 
epistemologies. 
4 Johnson, Nuer Prophets, p. 35. 
5 Feiernian, Peasant Intellectuals, pp. 109-11. 
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1.1930s Mongalla: A Case of Poison and a Christian Revival 
The colonial records are naturally limited in their illumination of the internal debates 
in local society, but they do offer occasional windows into communities. In the late 
1930s, the economic difficulties and growing resistance to the chiefs prompted 
greater experimentation with different kinds of knowledge, and brought more of 
those debates and tensions to the attention of administrators, as the follo\ving 
narratives illustrate. The accounts both of suspected poisoning in Kajo Kaji and of 
the Chnstian revival in Moru district reveal the existence or development of 
alternative claims to knowledge, subverting the authonty of government, chiefs or 
elders, and generating contests and moral debates within communities. 
]. I Poisoning Cases in Kajo Kaji Sub-District 
In 1932, one of the first missionaries to Kajo Kaji reported the deaths of four women 
at "a big Trial by Ordeal... conducted by an evil poisoner-hunter brought in for the 
purpose from another district by several of the local chiefS". 6 The trial occurred after 
the sudden death of a prominent rain priest, and the 'poisoner-hunter' was an expert 
from Opan district, invited to Kajo Kaji by Chief Yenge to solve the case by poison 
ordeal. The expert, Ajuke, was afterwards imprisoned for manslaughter. 7 
A few years later, a major outbreak of suspected poisoning was again reported in the 
area. By 1937-8, the Kajo Kaji people were clearly struggling after recent forced 
relocations of villages, new outbreaks of sleeping sickness and CSM, increasing 
erosion on the plateau, and recurring drought and food shortages. According to the 
local missionary, after a tin of alleged poison was discovered in an old woman's hut, 
"the tribe was seized with mass hysteria" and a major hunt for polsoners and witches 
resulted in over two hundred women being imprisoned and many of them physically 
tortured by the chiefs and elders in the public court. A collective fine was imposed 
on chief and people afterwards. 8 The D. C. added that often "the only person in a 
6 Mrs Selwyn, Kajo Kaji, Aug. 1932, CMS G3 AL. 
7 Winder, 'Fifty Years On': Service in Mongalla Province, 1930-33', (1979) SAD 54 1/7/1 -32. 
8 Finch, Kajo Kaji, 8 Nov. 1938, CMS G3 AL. 
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small community who does not believe implicitly in her power to poison is the 
woman herself. but the power wielded by a reputed poisoner is a bait she cannot 
resist". 
9 
Two years later, a suspected case of 'poison' again reached the provincial records, 
although this time it actually involved a very different recourse to professional 
expertise: 
The case arose from the death of a woman [Gune] in child birth wlio had 
been induced by the sorcery of her first divorced husband [Kanbbe] to return 
to him from the house of her new husband [Paulo]. The former husband %N'ho 
was sterile, had enlisted the aid of a local K jur first to cure his stenlitý' and Ui 
later to get his ex wife back. ' 0 
The 'Kujur', known as the 'Khalifa', practised primarily as a doctor, using his Koran 
and Islamic written charms. " Paulo was a young man who had been baptised 
Christian and had spent six months working in Uganda. Gune had met him at a 
dance while her husband was in prison for failing to obtain a sleeping sickness pass 
to trade in Uganda; he had been trying to earn the money to pay the Khallfa to cure 
his sterility. Gune's uncles were Chief Abina (Yenge's son) and the leading rain- 
maker Yacobo. 
The poison accusations first surfaced when Gune claimed that Karibbe had drawn 
patterns on her body with oil from an ink bottle thrown away by the police office. 
Chief Abina was afraid of the talk of poison reaching the government, and decided 
not to act until Gune showed any ill-effects from the magic; when Karibbe was 
beaten by Gune's brothers he imprisoned two of the latter. The question of divorce 
was taken to Chief Tete's court and Karibbe received his bride-price of cattle back; 
the Yenge family lost out in the process because Paulo could not afford such a high 
price. While he was working in Juba, the pregnant Gune heard that Karibbe and the 
Khalifa were 'praying' to make her return to Karibbe, which she then did out of fear 
9 EPAR 1937, NRO CS 57/24/99. 
10 EPMD Oct 1939, NRO CS 57/11/42. 
11 The rest of this account is taken from (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 
1939, RHL MSS Perham based on the records of the police sergeant, who wrote down "the words of 
each witness in turn". 
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of their power. Paulo demanded his bride-price back, and the case went to court %, et 
again, to the dismay of Chief Tete: "the case was a dangerous and persistent 
nuisance". Gune was remarried to Karibbe, but she haemorrhaged during the birth of 
Paulo's child, and died despite the attentions of the Khalifa. Her brothers accused 
Karibbe and the Khalifa of poisoning her and the case finally went before the D. C., 
who reprimanded the chiefs for their "concealment of matters of importance such as 
poison and magic". The court sentenced Karibbe to a year's imprisonment, but was 
reluctant to sentence the Khalifa; they left it to the D. C. "who could better afford to 
carry the onus and peril of such a judgement". He sentenced Kanibbe to six months 
imprisonment, and the Khalifa to three months and to exile from the district. 
1.2 Revivalism in Moru District 
At the same time as these poisoning cases in Kajo Kaji, a 'Christian Revival' was 
reported in Moru district: 
I met Chief Jambo... in a very disturbed state of mind. He complained that 
his people, with whom hitherto he said he had never had any trouble, were 
disobeying him and refusing to work on the roads and on their cultivations... 
These people, said Chief Jambo, refused to do anything unless directed to do 
so by God in a dream. They were predicting that the end of the world would 
come shortly and that a star would fall and wipe out Jambo. They foretold 
the fate of Governors, District Commissioners and Missionaries as 
everlasting fire. They were arranging marriages by signs received in dreams 
and were not always waiting for the preliminaries to be settled, they were 
also advocating poverty, but chiefly they were flouting the authority of Chief 
Jambo... I hear that a small section of Chief Ngere's people (neighbours of 
Jambo's) are also infected with this enthusiasm for what Chief Jambo called 
'the new God'. 
He added that he infinitely preferred the old one. 12 
12 Harrison, A/D. C. Juba, to Governor, 8 Sept. 1938, NRO EP 1/5/26. 
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The Revival was apparently started by some ex-schoolboys from the CMS Nugent 
School at Loka, particularly one Matteo. The Lui mission sent two teachers to 
Jambo's to calm the people, but this only led Matteo to return to the area: 
Matteo... attacked Chief Jumbo in public for reporting matters to Lui; he 
infon-ned the Chief that Govemors, DCs, Chiefs and missionaries 
worshipped only their bellies and were all fuel for the fires of hell... Chief 
Jumbo did not reply to this attack but noted Matteo's words. 
Jambo indeed appears to have 'noted' Matteo's words; soon afterwards, according to 
this report, people had settled down but everyone, including the Chief and the 
mission teachers, was convinced of the authenticity of the reported visions, and 
Jambo was holding the prayer meetings in his own house. 'Witchdoctors' were also 
reported to be voluntarily destroying their own 'paraphernalia'. ' 3 The Revival spread 
beyond Jambo's, and by 1939 there were reported to be 2,000 Christians in the area, 
who were "Increasingly vocal, increasingly insistent on the prohibitions of dancing, 
of beer-drinking, and of the ancestor-cult which their new faith demands". " By the 
1940s, however, the missions reported a continual decline in church attendance as 
the Revival waned 15 
These accounts are revealing of some of the internal debates within communities, 
which will now be explored, particularly in relation to marriage, divorce, 
bridewealth, migrant labour and 'witchcraft' or 'poison'. They also offer glimpses 
into the alternative claims to knowledge, and the multiple arenas for their 
expression. 
13 Morrison, 'Report on Religious Revival in Chief Jumbo's country, Moru district', 28 Sept. 193S. 
NRO EP 1/5/26. 
" Moru District AR 1939, NRO EP 1'26/94. 
15 Read, Lui, 3 April 1946, CNIS AF AL. 
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2. Courts and Custom 
Trials and judgements were a prominent aspect of the episodes outlined abox c. 
Chanock's study of British Central Africa is useful in demonstrating that 'customan, 
law' was neither immutable tradition nor a colonial invention but rather the result of 
the interaction between Africans and Europeans in the specific colonial context. "' 
However, his emphasis on the rigidifying nature of the codification and recording of 
laws, and on the domination of this process by male elders is more open to question. 
Mann and Roberts show the contested nature of this process, and the opportunities it 
also offered subordinate groups to use in struggles against elites. But their 
discussion of the fundamental impact of the colonial courts still over-emphasises 
their significance. Despite showing the role of Africans in the shaping of la-ýk,, they 
declare that, "[I]n the process of these struggles influential Europeans called into 
being that which they expected to find in Africa". 17 Similarly Chanock writes that 
the courts developed in the image of the colonial administration, securing obedience 
rather than arbitrating disputes. This contradicts his own argument that the number 
of marital disputes brought to the court reflected a genuine need or desire among the 
people. 18 
These studies of colonial courts have tended to privilege the court records, and to 
take these discourses as a representation of reality, when it was more the case that 
the courts encouraged the formulation of sets of knowledge of 'tradition' and 
4customary law' for presentation to the external world, and to the government in 
particular. As Scott argues, "public transcripts" performed in the presence of the 
dominant often distract from the backstage "hidden transcripts" of resistance to 
them. 19 In the chiefs' courts of Western Mongalla, complex social and economic 
issues were translated into a particular language, which was itself the creolised 
product of European legal procedure and moral ideologies, and the search for 
16 Chanock, Laiv, Custom. 
17 Mann and Roberts, 'Law in Colonial Africa', p. 22-, Spear, 'Neo-traditionalism', pp. 
13-16. 
" Chanock, Laiv, Custom, pp. 123-4,229. 
'9 Jarnes C. Scott, Domination and the. 4rts of Resistance. - Hidden Transcripts (Ncvv Haven, 1990), 
pp. 3-4. 
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African 'customary law'. As Mann and Roberts also argue, it was therefore the 
ideology of the rule of law that was more prevailing than its actual practice. 
2.1 Courts and Adultery 
As Chapter Three showed, even if the courts started out as institutions through 
which the chiefs could enforce their own authority and shape 'customary law', the. y 
soon became arena of debate, invaded by communities and even used to pressure the 
chiefs. However, they could nevertheless be seen to exclude women and to impose a 
hegemonic elder male control over them, especially in the face of greater 
opportunities for young men to earn independence in marriage. Certainly the 
construction of fonnal court houses excluded women: according to one informant, 
they would "come to the court and sit some distance away... but they speak from 
behind the doors, they can't enter", whereas, "when the elders meet themselves to 
settle cases, then the women are present". 21 
The discourses of the courts in relation to women and adultery, if taken at face 
value, would also appear to reflect the imposition of a brutal and controlling male 
view of female sexuality, using the rhetoric of customary law very much in the 
pattern discussed by Chanock. In 1931, chiefs and elders in Yei district expressed 
concern that adultery had "always been regarded in native law as an offence" and 
had been punished harshly by beating the woman and possibly killing the man; the 
increasing incidence of adultery was felt to be threatening "the bedrock of society". 
[my italicS]22 The following year, "Chief Sanambia again asked for the Courts to be 
given powers to beat adulterous women on the grounds that short terins of 
imprisonment are no deterrent". 23 In 1929, the Kajo Kaji chiefs' lukiko, claiming to 
be 'cleaning up the morals' of their people, forwarded resolutions through the D. C. 
calling for harsher punishments for adultery, including enforced prostitution in the 
merkaz, or district headquarters, for guilty women. They also described women who 
had been married to northern Sudanese or foreign officials or merchants and then 
20 Mann and Roberts, 'Law in Colonial Africa', p. 35. 
2' Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
22 Logan Gray, ADC Yei to Governor, 30 Sept. 193 1, NRO EP 123/86. 
23 'Diary July 1932', NRO CS 1/39/105. 
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abandoned, as prostitutes who "upset the morals of the other women of the 
district". 24 These various claims thus appear to reveal a male fear of female 
sexuality, and especially of women who had been somehow corrupted by foreign 
marriages, and the desire to either re-impose control by beating, or to exclude them 
from the community by banishing them to the territory of government. 
But these claims also reflect a particular construction or defence of community 
morality. Chanock argues that such depictions of a 'traditional' moral order were 
more a reflection of current concerns than an accurate picture of the past. 25 The Kajo 
Kaji court's resolutions can be understood better in the context of a growing 
resentment at the behaviour of northern or foreign officials and traders, who were 
forcing parents to agree to marriages with a very low bride-price, and then later 
abandoning the women. The suggestions for enforced prostitution thus also express 
a view that the merkaz, taken to represent government and foreigners, should take 
responsibility for the women it had extracted from their communities. The chiefs 
also called for a fixed high bride-price for such marriages, and for them to come 
before the court to ensure parental and female consent. Above all, "[t]he Chiefs said 
that if an outsider marries one of their women that they should abide by their 
,, 26 customs whilst living in the district. 
More generally, the court rhetoric reflected the imposition of a government judicial 
system, which, while claiming to be based on customary law, was introducing new 
ideas of crime and punishment. Even the category of 'adultery' obscured the 
nuances of marital relations, and in particular merged together issues of private 
sexual fidelity with more public marital disputes and divorce claims. 27 Something of 
this was expressed by one administrator: 
Before our coming the injured husband punished his wife himself.. Private 
punishment of this kind we do not allow: but have put nothing adequate in its 
24 Whalley, A/D. C. Opari and Kajo Kaji, to Governor, 'Resolutions from Kuku chiefs of Kajo Kaji 
Lukiko', 19 Nov. 1929 and 22 Nov. 1929, NRO CS 1/39/104. 
25 Chanock, Law, Custom, pp. 7-8; Spear, 'Neo-traditionalism', p. 6. 
26 Whalley, A/D. C. Opari and Kajo Kaji, to Governor, 'Resolutions from Kuku chiefs of Kajo Kaji 
Lukiko', 19 Nov. 1929, NRO CS 1/39/104. For the long history of prostitution associated with 
foreign merchants in the area: see Toniolo and Hill, Opening, p. 189. 
27 See also Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas, pp. 219-2 1: British rule transformed adultery from a "private 
delict" into a criminal offence. 
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place. A short term of imprisonment merely penalises the husband and is 
probably regarded by the woman as a not unpleasant holiday. 28 
Administrators were conftised about suitable 'punishments'. a-%N, are that 
imprisonment was a novel and perhaps unsuitable penalty, and that flogging was 
potentially viewed with some distaste by superiors. Increasingly fines were imposed 
instead, although even then there was concern that if they were paid direct to the 
husband, he might encourage his wife to repeatedly commit adultery in order to 
profit. 29 
In fact, a major influence on the court discourses regarding adultery were the British 
administrators themselves. They described native women as "incorrigible whores", 
, 30 and sympathised with chiefs' requests to "whip whonng wives'. In 1929, the 
Governor of Bahr El Ghazal Province reiterated the prevailing view of women: 
[A] moderate beating is undoubtedly good for the women and often well- 
deserved... They are largely whores at heart... When, if ever, the women 
become fairly moral, the matter will right itself and Chiefs Courts and 
Criminal Courts will have little work to do. 31 
With such blatantly held stereotypes of African female sexuality, it is hardly 
surprising that administrators imprinted the early courts with their moral 
interpretation of marital disputes. As late as 1947, they could still be categonsed as 
"sexual offences". 32 In reality it seems unlikely that many of these court cases were 
actually about sex, as opposed to cohabitation or elopement, as the 'Case of Poison' 
suggests; it was not until Gune actually moved in with Paulo that her divorce case 
reached the courts. 33 In the Yei and Loka courts in 1924, there were a total of 295 
cases relating to bridewealth, divorce or "restitution of conjugal rights", and 
"women refusing to live with their husbands", but only 23 listed specifically as 
28 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 193 3, NRO CS 57/3 5/13 1. 
29 YDMD June 1944, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
30 Holland, 'Lukiko District order no. 3', 30 Sept. 1923, NRO MP I/l/2; Governor MP to Goý-emor 
UNP, 'Notes on native courts', 7 Sept. 1932, NRO CS 1/13/42. 
31 Brock, Governor BGP, to CS, 4 July 1929, NRO CS 1/13/43. Johnson highlights Brock's "extreme 
moral zeal" and "simplistic approach to African culture": Douglas H. Johnson, 'Criminal Secrecy: 
The Case of the Zande 'Secret Societies", Past and Present 130 (199 1), pp. 170-200, at p. 180. 
32 EPAR 1946, NRO DK 57/10/32. 
33 Shadle, 'Bridewealth', p. 250. 
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'adultery'. 34 In the same district in 1929, it was reported that adultery xvas "treated 
, 35 as damages for trespass upon the owner's rights and the adulterer is fined'. By the 
1930s fines were the usual punishment for adultery. 36 
The approach of British administrators was particularly crucial when 'adulterý, ' 
actually involved a divorce claim by the woman. They assumed that the financial 
transactions involved in marriage would make divorce too disruptive, and they 
therefore ensured that the early courts invariably ordered women to return to their 
husbands. 37 Those who refused were imprisoned, so that, as the Yei D. C. explained 
in his 1939 annual report, "the woman can reconsider her personal reasons for 
rebelling against the accepted rules of the society into which she has been bom". 38 
Yet the extent to which these were the 'rules of society', let alone 'accepted', is 
questionable. As the case of Gune showed, divorce was granted (twice! ) provided 
the bridewealth exchanges could be agreed, and there was no suggestion of 
judicially punishing her or Paulo. Not surprisingly, it was reported in 1930 that 
adulterers would admit their 'guilt' in a chiefs' court, but not before a British first- 
class magistrate; the latter treated their actions as a 'crime' while the former treated 
the case more as a dispute over rights. 39 
2.2 Debating Marriage 
The rhetoric of customary law which developed in the courts was thus a colonial 
creolisation of British and African male discourses about female sexuality, and 
confused understandings of marital law. But such discourse should not be assumed 
to indicate a simplistic reality of senior male dominance beyond the colonial records 
themselves As Shadle argues, Aftican case law was in practice far more nuanced 
than the versions presented to colonial administrators, due "to debates among 'senior 
men', and to the ability of women to exploit the cracks in the edifice of the 
34 'Notes on Chiefs Courts in Yei and Loka', 1924, NRO MP 1/ 1/2. 
35 Davidson (LS), 'Note on Chief s Court at Yei', 15 May 1929, NRO CS 1/ 13/42. 
36 Winder, 'Fifty Years On: Service in Mongalla Province, 193 0-3 3', (1979) SAD 541/7/1-3 2. 
37 Davidson (LS), 'Note on Chief s Court at Yei', 15 May 1929, NRO CS l/ 13/42. See Iýjchardson to 
D. C. Yei, 29 May 193 1, Gray to Governor, 30 Sept. 193 1, Richardson to Gray, 3 Oct. 193 1, Gray to 
Richardson, 7 Oct. 193 1, NRO EP 2/23/86, for brief experiment with allowing divorces. 
31 Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94. 
39 Wallis, Governor Bahr El Ghazal, 7 March 1930, NRO CS 1/ 13/42. 
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'patriarchal' courts". 4" Even without the kind of court records used by Shadle, 
similar processes are evident in Western Mongalla, as adultery and divorce cases 
forced debates about marriage into the courts more from the 1930s, and as women 
and younger men found ways to influence these debates. 
As in Gusiiland, a significant increase in bridewealth in Western Mongalla meant 
that parents were increasingly marrying their daughters to Nvealthier older husbands, 
which in turn contributed to the reported increase in adultery as young wives resisted 
this control by husbands and parents, and as young men hoped to use elopement to 
force parents to reduce or defer bridewealth payments. As a more discerning D. C. 
explained, adultery had only become problematic because "the punishment of the 
Courts tends to be stereotyped and ineffective, whilst lack of cash for dowry lem,, es 
present-day youth with little alternative' .41 In the case of Gune, the younger Paulo 
could not afford the high bridewealth paid by the retired policeman Karibbe. As 
Shadle shows, divorces in such situations were usually only granted if the woman's 
family supported her claim and were willing to return the bridewealth to the first 
husband. 42 This was unlikely in this case; Gune had brothers who would have been 
relying on her bridewealth to make their own marriages. However, Gune ýN, on her 
family over: firstly the women were convinced by her complaints about Karibbe's 
infertility and his subsequent beating of her; they then influenced her uncles not to 
force her to return to Karibbe. Gune then claimed that Karibbe had poisoned her, 
and this finally persuaded her brothers, who tried unsuccessfully to use the poison 
accusation to avoid repaying the bridewealth. Not only did Gune and Paulo succeed 
in having their marriage recognised, but Paulo also convinced her family to accept 
cash rather than cows as the bridewealth, which was already less than that paid by 
Karibbe. The story is thus revealing of a number of significant points. 
Firstly, women were contesting the definition of legitimate marriage. Under the 
direction of the British administrators, the early courts had consistently refused to 
grant divorces to women, who had nevertheless cited ill-treatment by husbands as 
40 Shadle, 'Changing Traditions', pp. 425-6; and 'Bridc\\-ealth', p. 262. 
41 Mynors, 'Notes on the rvloru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
42 Shadle, 'Bridewcalth', p. 259. 
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43 
justification for leaving them An account from the early 1920s by a Swian 
medical officer, Negib Yunis, stated that women in KaJo KaJi district had always 
been able to avoid a marriage or achieve a divorce by eloping with their choice of 
husband, and that fathers kept the bridewealth secure, ready for repayment, in 
anticipation of such an event. 44 Girls are said to have threatened suicide in order to 
avoid forced marriages, and young people increasingly arranged their own marriages 
through meeting at dances, contributing to the general "growth of freedom from 
9 45 parental control' . Women 
frequently refused to accept court decisions in cases of 
adultery and divorce, preferring to spend time in prison than return to husbands. "' 
Women also used the B courts to appeal sentences of adultery, suggesting that they 
were seeking to use the court system to their own advantage, rather than viexving it 
as a hostile male domain. 47 They also increasingly used the issue of original consent 
to claim divorce. 48 This was the one justification that had won some support from 
administrators, who were concerned about child betrothals, as well as from chiefs. 4' 
In one court in 1940, chiefs blamed child betrothals and marriages for increased 
adultery and divorce, and proposed that "[a]ny girl who refused her parents choice 
should have the opportunity of saying so before a native court which would point 
out to her parents the dangers of a forced marriage". 50 
More generally women were also trying to define when it was legitimate to divorce, 
even if they had consented to the marriage originally. Gune's complaints about 
Karibbe's infertility and poisoning represent her definition of the requirements and 
obligations of a husband .51 The account 
by Yums from the 1920s suggests that a 
husband's infertility had long been used as a justification for divorce. 52 Increasingly 
another justification related to migrant labour, especially if husbands remained 
abroad during the cultivation season. In 1937, it was reported that, "the exodus to 
43 Davidson (LS), 'Note on Chief s Court at Yei', 15 May 1929, NRO CS 1/ 13/42. 
44 yUniS, 'Notes on the Kuku', pp. 15-17. 
45 Interview with Lubari Ramba, 31 Aug. 2004, Mitika, Yei; Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 
1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
46 Davidson (I-S), 'Note on Chief s Court at Yei', 15 May 1929, NRO CS 1/13/42. 
47 EPMD Oct. 1947, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
48 Shadle, 'Bridewealth', p. 255. 
49 Davidson (LS), 'Note on Chief s Court at Yei', 15 May 1929, NRO CS 1/13142. 
50 EPMD Sept. 1946, NRO CS 57/12/46. 
51 See Shadle, 'Bridewealth', p. 253. 
52 Yunis, 'Notes on the Kuk-u', p. 16. 
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I 
Uganda, from Amadi district seems to have stopped, the young women having taken 
the matter into their hands, i. e. reftising to be left as grass widoNvs and claiming their 
freedom to remarry. , 53 By the 1940s, courts were granting remarriages in such 
cases. 54 In addition, "many cases have been seen in native courts connected NvIth 
complaints by wives against husbands for failure to cultivate", and 'Idleness' was 
reported to be a legitimate reason for divorcing husbands. 55 Women were thus using 
the courts to define and enforce their rights in relation to the labour (and presence! ) 
of their husbands. This partly limited the independence of the men, the majority of 
whom remained at home during the cultivation season. 56 
A second point revealed in the story of Gune is the unwillingness of senior men to 
forcibly return her to Karibbe, let alone to physically punish her themselves, despite 
all the rhetoric about beating adulterous women. More generally, by the late 1930s, 
it was reported that the courts tended to be more severe towards the men committing 
adultery than to the women, and that most courts displayed a very 'fair attitude' 
57 towards women. The story of Gune also showed the receptivity of the chief and 
senior men to the influence of women, and therefore the role of the latter in marital 
decisions generally. Interviewees emphasise the importance of this female role, both 
in mediating marriage arrangements, and in resolving marital disputes; it was the 
mother of the bride who received the first share of the bride-wealth. 58 The fact that it 
was the colonial government, rather than 'native law', which had privileged an 
entirely male discourse on adultery and marriage was finally brought home to one 
administrator in 1948: 
Impressed by the difficulties confronting a group of elders in investigating 
the case of an erring young woman unhappily married, District 
Commissioner Yei asked if it might not be a good thing to allow one or two 
women of good repute to sit with them when hearing matrimonial cases. 
53 EPMD Oct. 1937, NRO CS 57/4/17. 
54 YDMD Sept. 1944, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
55 YDMD April 1942, NRO EP 2/24/87; 'Application of the Southern Sudan Teachers and Dressers 
to Governor and Bishop of Southern Sudan', 29 May 1944, NRO EP 1/4/17. 
56 EPMD April 1938, NRO CS 57/7/29. 
57 Yei District AR 1939, NRO EP 2/26/94; EPMD Jan. 1949, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
5' interviews with Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, 
Simon Wani Ramba, 10 Jan. 2003, Khartoum; Bamaba Dumo Wani, written answers, 2003, 
Khartoum; Whitehead, 'Property'. 
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Their reply, which has since been confin-ned by elders of other courts, Nvas 
that formerly this had in fact been the custom but the government had 
prevented it. 59 
By 1949, there were two women members of the court, and they were demanding 
equal pay to the male members. 60 Even if the courts had started out as the arena for 
elder male dominance, they did not remain as such; women could also make use of 
4custom' to claim rights. 61 
Thirdly, the story of Gune demonstrated that both young men and women were 
pressuring parents and elders over bridewealth, and forcing its renegotiation. Chiefs 
were in an ambivalent position in this regard: as some of the wealthiest men in the 
community, they would if anything benefit from high bridewealth. Chief Okopoi 
was reported to have made further profits by making bridewealth payments for most 
of the young women in his chiefdom, and then accepting payments for them from 
young men wishing to marry them. 62 Chiefs also defended the tendency for parents 
to increase bridewealth amounts to compensate for the increase of migrant labour, 
by arguing that, "it was a good thing to squeeze as much as possible out of those 
working outside the district, thereby increasing the wealth of the district", and that 
"parents-in-law expect their sons-in-law to work in their cultivations, and that if they 
are in work elsewhere must demand a higher bride price to compensate for the loss 
of their service' 9.63 
However, chiefs were also sensitive to the consequences of high bridewealth, citing 
parental greed as the cause of later "unfaithfulness and troubles", and recommending 
a fixed limit in 1924.64 By the 1940s chiefs were reported to be concerned at the 
high bridewealth, because it was contributing to increased wrangles in court over 
59 EPMD July 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. See also Interviews with Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 
2002, and Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartourn. 
60 EPMD Jan., Nov. 1949, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
61 The Governor was soon referring to the female membership of Yei court as 'local custom': AR 
1948, SAD 777/10/1-52. 
62 EPMD June 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53. 
63 EPMD April 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
64 Mamour Mongalla, 'Bari-Mandaris Habits and Laws of Legislation together with adopted rules for 
Mongalla district chiefs court', II Sept. 1924, NRO MP l/l/2. 
253 
Chapter Six: Knowing the Community 
amounts paid . 
65 The Tall court chiefs were particularly worried that Nvealthy Allab 
were marrying too many Mandari girls, and that Mandari men could not afford the 
inflated bridewealth. 66 In 1946 the Kajo Kaji court recommended legislatiN-c action 
in a letter saying "that many girls are staying unmarried in their fathers' homes 
because the average young man cannot afford to pay the bride price demanded". 67 
Across Western Mongalla, courts therefore imposed maximum limits on the 
bridewealth . 
68 As Paulo's cash payment reveals, younger men also sometimes 
succeeded in obtaining an individual reduction or deferment, and they were 
contributing to a gradual and partial monetisation of the payments, as Chapter Four 
showed. 
The issues of labour migration, bride-wealth, divorce and adultery generated debates 
about the moral economy which increasingly entered the courts and gave voices to 
younger men and women, even if they had less weight in the official records than 
the chiefs and elder men. The result was ongoing renegotiation and conflict, rather 
than the absolute hegemony of the latter. 'Custom' was not made wholly rigid 
through its definitions in the colonial courts: chiefs and other court members had to 
adapt their strategies for dealing with marital disputes and the changing economy. 
2.3 The Limitations of the Courts 
People were also increasingly demanding satisfaction from the courts in terms of 
achieving resolution of disputes and protection from disease and drought, as 
discussed in the previous chapters. The accounts of poisoning cases in Kajo Kaji 
reveal similar pressures on chiefs and their courts. Chanock argues that accusations 
of witchcraft, and the use of ordeals to detect it, were a powerful way of enforcing 
political power in nineteenth-century Central Africa . 
69 However, in Western 
Mongalla, chiefs had generally not held such a monopoly, and it was the popular 
discourse in relation to witchcraft which pressured chiefs into taking action. As 
65 EPMD Sept. 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
66 EPMD Aug. 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
67 EPMD Nov. 1946, NRO DK 57/2/5. 
68 EPMD Dec. 1947, NRO DK 57/2/5; Interview with Venansio Loro Lado, II Nov. 2002, 
Khartoum. 
69 Chanock, Law, Custom, pp. 89-92. 
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Fields argues, the significance of the ordeal in central Africa had been its expression 
of the power of the collectivity; the chief or diviner had merely been the agent of the 
latter . 
70 In 1937, the local missionary in Kajo Kaji sought to excuse the chief's 
actions by declaring that he "had reverted to tribal custom through being pressed by 
the whole tribe to take action' 5.71 
Yet these cases also revealed the limitations of the courts. In reporting the 1937 
poison case in Kajo Kaji, the D. C. recognised the difficulties faced by the chief in 
avoiding further punishment by government and yet dealing effectively with the 
poisoning fears: "he felt that if he could obtain a clear confession somehow the 
mystery would all be cleared away". 72 People expected their chiefs and other 
authorities to know how to protect them from witchcraft, and yet the accusations 
exposed their very lack of knowledge. Without ordeals or divination, it was 
frequently very difficult to discover the unknown cause or culprit of suspected 
harmful acts. As late as 1948, the Mvolo court "put in a plea for the reintroduction 
of trial by ordeal to try... to stem the tide of witchcraft cases". 73 In the official 
absence of ordeals, the Amadi B court "summoned all known wizards to attend the 
B court... and their spells were burnt amid much applause. ý, 74 But this was only 
effective where 'wizards' were 'known' and in possession of tools. Often the 
colonial courts could only deal with such cases after a culprit had been identified 
through other specialist kinds of knowledge. 
Also, the courts remained linked to government, especially as a result of the 
recording of court cases. The Kajo Kaji cases demonstrate the desire to deal with 
such issues before they reached the government, in order to maintain local autonomy 
and control and avoid reprisals. The chiefs can once again be seen to be acting as 
gatekeepers, concealing knowledge from the government. The B courts functioned 
largely as the interface between government and people; we thus return to the idea 
that court discourses were at least partly fon-nulated for presentation to the 
70 Fields, Revival, p. 264. 
71 Finch, Kajo Kaji, 8 Nov. 1938, CMS G3 AL. 
72 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham, p. 15. 
73 EPMD Dec. 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. See also EPMD Aug. 1939, NRO CS 57/11 42. 
" EPMD April 194, S, NRO DK 57 5113. See also chief using chicken oracle, in Winder, 'Fifty Years 
On: Service in Mongalla Province, 1930-33', (1979) SAD 541/7/1-32 
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government. Interviewees emphasise the efforts made to settle cases within the 
village community, the "domain of the chiefs and elders": "if it could be possible, 
these elders would sit as a sort of traditional court and try to settle this dispute, 
outside the court". " It is important to place the cases reported by the government in 
this context; they were only the most difficult or prominent symptoms of wider 
debates that were worked out largely outside the arenas of the courts. The Kajo Kaji 
poison case was discussed endlessly before reaching the court, through general 
social meetings, gossip and rumour. 
As Johnson argues, there might also be a need for a deeper community resolution to 
disputes than could be achieved within a court that sat at the interface between 
government and people. 76 In 1924, the first Yei court regulations included one that 
"[i]f a man causes blood to be spilt he will pay six sheep to the Chief to purify the 
village". 77 This idea of the need for purification or cooling of a community after 
bloodshed or conflict was however generally excluded from the remit of the colonial 
courts as they developed further. The British notion of individual punishment 
instead prevailed, and by 1933 the courts were reported to be awarding punitive 
rather than compensatory sentences. 78 Communities thus had to turn elsewhere for 
the kind of resolution required in some cases. 
75Interviews with Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, 
Severino Mati, 27 Jan. 2003, Khartoum. 
76 Johnson, 'Judicial Regulation', pp. 734. 
77 Major Maynard D. C. Opari-Yei district, to Governor, 2 Jan. 1924, NRO MP 1/ 1/2. 
78 Nalder, 'Mongalla Province Summary of Information', Nov. 1933, NRO CS 57/35/13 1. 
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3. History and Tradition: Intellectual and Nlantic Activity 
The frequent inability of the colonial courts to establish the causes and truths of 
cases ensured that other experts and other arenas continued to be as much or more 
powerful and important in community life. In the 1932 poisoning case in Kajo Kaji, 
Chief Yenge turned to Ajuke, "a well known man for investigations into sucil 
matters". 79 In the 1939 case, the 'Khalifa' was said to be able to "tell a man what is 
right and what is wrong; and how to protect himself... For he can cure the future in 
truth. , 80 Such mantic specialists claimed to kno-vv the commonly unknown, and, 
together with 'peasant intellectuals', were powerful in formulating community 
discourse. 81 
3.1 Peasant Intellectuals 
Chapters Three and Four showed the way in which claims to know history and 
tradition were increasingly used to assert authority, clan identity and rights over 
land. The report of a meeting to discuss government plans to make the Bala Hills in 
Yei district into a reserve is particularly revealing in this regard: 
The people objected very strongly to the name Bala Hills and speaker after 
speaker rose to prove that the name should not be Bala at all. The audience 
were carried back over the past, in one case as far back as the time when the 
Nile divided to allow the original ancestors of the Bon tribe to cross over 
from the East... The most dramatic bard of all was one who argued that the 
hill should be called Jebel Alima after a remarkable and undoubtedly 
fascinating woman chief of that name. 82 
Hills have been shown to be of particular significance to definitions of social groups 
and their histories more widely in Affica. 83 This report is an example of the way in 
which community knowledge was constantly open to debate and contest, but it also 
reflects the authority attached to skilful speakers. The use of the word 'bard' was 
79 Winder, 'Fifty Years On: Service in Mongalla Province, 1930-33', (1979) SAD 541/7/1-32. 
80 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham, p. 3a. 
81 Feierman, Peasant 1wellectuals. 
'2 EPMD Feb. 1953, NRO CS2 30/3'6. 
83 Leopold, 'Roots of Violence', p. 190. 
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very apt; those who could combine discursive and oratoncal skills NN-ith their 
knowledge of history were the local intellectuals shaping moral communities in 
Western Mongalla. They are hard to detect from archival sources, in which educated 
government staff or chiefs are more prominent; while the latter may have also been 
I intellectuals', their creolised knowledge was less powerful 14, ithin the moral 
community. 84 
The construction of moral discourses involved a subtle representation of hegemonic 
decisions, often in the context of arbitration of disputes, so that they appeared to be 
the reflection of community consensus. One skill of the intellectual was to listen and 
to speak in such a way that they were accepted as community leaders. As Johnson 
shows, the 'power of words' held by the Nuer 'statesman', relied upon his 
articulation of "the feelings of his own people". 85 In Western Mongalla, various 
figures might fulfil this role of moral spokesman. Mandari communities were 
defined in part by acceptance of the authority of the Mar, whose mouth was "given 
86 by God, that is why we heed him", and who was there to 'talk'. Even the colonial 
courts became arenas for demonstrating and evaluating skills of speech. 87 
The leading elders of communities were therefore those with the most respected 
oratorical and discursive skills: "the way one talks entitles one to certain positions"; 
the elders were those who "talk and advise". 88 Certain elders succeeded in being 
seen to know the history and traditions of their community. 89 Buxton emphasises the 
importance of Mandari clan histories in claiming not only land rights but also 
community membership; to lack known origins implied marginal social and moral 
status. 90 Historical knowledge gave weight and legitimacy to authority or privilege: 
thus a Yei district chief, Baraba, claimed descent via his mother from Wai, the first 
84 Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, esp. pp. 5,120-3. 
85 Johnson, Nuer Prophets, p. 58; see also Lonsdale, 'Contests of Time', pp. 216-7. 
86 Buxton, Chiefs, p. 77. 
87 'Juba District Information Handbook', NRO JD 1/2/6; Governor MP to Governor UNP, 'Notes on 
native courts', 7 Sept. 1932, NRO CS 1/13/42, 
88 Interview with Festo Limi Sorninda, 14 Jan. 2003, Khartoum; Lewis, 'Notes on Ban', SAD 
600/7/1-49. 
89 Shadle, 'Patronage', p. 43. The pre-literate orators of Kikuyu mbari (subclan) traditions were 
similarly "those for whom the negotiation of knowledge was of value in the intricate exchanges of 
inbari power": Lonsdale, 'Contests of Time', p. 205 
9' Buxton, Chiefs, pp. 18-33. 
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ancestor of the 'Bora rain-making clan in that area, a claim that must have needed 
the backing of local intellectuals. 91 
Songs were one of the most important ways in xvhich history was recorded and 
discussed. There was therefore also an established intellectual in the person of the 
song-maker': 
They have wisdom in writing songs. This man is a great poet, he composed 
very meaningful songs. He goes from area to area and picks prominent 
persons to talk about, and events, and it becomes very representative of what 
has been happening in that area at that time. 92 
Similarly in Moru district, 
In the center of every dance is to be found the 'loygoba', or song-leader, a 
position of eminence much prized: the tunes appear to be more or less 
traditional, but the songs are always new, - topical and personal, related to 
the events of the moment, and responsible for many a quarrel. 
Songs were thus as contentious a form of local discourse as any other. This account 
added that community dances provided an opportunity generally for discussion: 
"speeches are made on any subjects of particular local importance". 93 Dancing was a 
way in which to bring the community together visibly: one interviewee suggested 
that, "usually good dancers are also very good people, with good knowledge of the 
community and good understanding". 94 Dances also brought together wider 
networks, which in turn maintained the inter-personal knowledge that has been 
shown to be vital to local government: 
These dances are where you do the courtship and also where you know these 
colleagues of yours, these age mates. And therefore when someone is chosen 
[as chief] from that area, you will know because you have met in so many 
dance places. 95 
Alcohol was drunk by the elders as part of the ritual of such social and ceremonial 
events, and the provision of food and beer by community or age-set leaders was 
91 Interview with Luban Ramba, 31 Aug. 2004, Mitika, Yei. 
92 Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum; Spence to mother, Yei, 10 Jan. 1915, 
SAL D 121202/1-19. See also Deng, The Dinka, pp. 78-95: songs are "a mirror of society". 
93 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
94 Interview with Francis Bassan, 18 Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
95 Interview with Francis Bassan, 18 Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
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crucial in the reinforcement of moral obligations. 96 When the Christian Reviý-alists 
in Moru district attempted to overturn the community authorities, the elders Nvere 
reported to be particularly concerned at the decline in attendance at dances. " Yet 
elders themselves also disliked dances if they were felt to be undisciplined; songs 
and dances could thus represent the conflicts as well as unity of communities. 98 
In particular, songs were an opportunity to express resentment, anger, sadness and 
longing for a golden past. Buxton translates a number of songs from the Mandan' 
area in the early 1950s, which described the harshness and extractions of the 
government. Amalgamations and loss of local autonomy were expressed as 'death' 
and nostalgia for lost sovereignty: "don't you regret the dying out of this, our 
stronghold? "99 Similarly songs from Moru district in the 1930s criticised chiefs, 
prison and government 'stealing' of livestock. 100 Nyangwara songs translated by 
Beaton in the same period lampooned the court clerk for enforcing the orders of 
'foreigners'. 101 
Song-makers thus had a license to be openly critical of chiefs and government; 
anonymously-authored songs could be sung collectively, adding to the power of this 
form of discourse. They provide an example of the way that history is constructed 
through a process of negotiation and contested claims, not created as a coherent 
single 'text'. 102 The songs also reflect the way that communities may have defined 
themselves in part against the 'government' and 'foreigners', including other 
communities or neighbourhoods. But their common discourse of moral deterioration 
and spiritual death also provided a context within which holders of knowledge could 
offer guidance on remedying these ills. 
96 Barnaba Durno Wani, written answers, 2003, Khartoum; Lewis, 'Notes on Bari', SAD 600/7/1-49. 
See also Willis, Potent Brews. 
97 'Extract Moru Monthly diary, Feb. 1939', NRO EP 1/5/26. 
98 E. g. Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40: elders 'lament' the 'craze' for 
dancing. 
99 Buxton, Chiefs, pp. 148-53. 
100 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
101 Beaton, 'Bari studies', p. 69. 
102 Willis, 'The Makings', pp. 192-3,207-8. 
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3.2 Mantic Experts 
Johnson argues that mantic activity among the Nilotes defines and sustains the moral 
community, primarily through uncovering the 'truth' about indi\, iduals and 
society. 103 It is important to see claims to such 'truth' as a powerful form of 
discourse; versions of history or custom were open to debate, whereas a claim to 
know the 'commonly unknown' was less easy to challenge. It is not surprising that 
mantic figures, like rain and earth priests and diviners, are remembered as having 
been more powerful than the chiefs. 104 According to Yunis, in 1924, for example, 
the 'Kujurs' among the Kuku communicated directly with the supreme divinity 
Ngulaitait, and as a result their word was "taken as law" by the people. ' 05 
The most potent mantic activity was usually related to knowing the rain; rain priests 
were intermediaries with divinity. 106 Simonse argues that the central value of the 
moral community is 'coolness': "a state of non-violent togetherness undisturbed by 
hunger and disease", and signified above all by rain. 107 Other studies have also 
drawn attention to the role of leaders in 'cooling' the land to bring peace and 
harmony to the community, as symbolised by rain. 108 Rain and earth priests 
succeeded in drawing on rain and other relationships with divinities to claim that 
they knew how to restore health and peace, in the process of which they could 
reinforce discourses about their own role and the moral and social order. One 
interviewee described the Monye lori from his childhood: 
It's the man who takes care of the situation of the village, the peace of the 
village, he sees to the good of all the village. And he is the man contacted if 
there are problems, if there are constant sickness in the village then he is 
103 Johnson, Nuer Prophets, p. 35. 
104 Interview with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
105 Yunis, 'Notes on the Kuku', pp. 25-8. 
106 Barnaba Dumo Wani, written answers, 2003, Khartoum; Nalder to D. C. 's and CS, 'The future of 
Native Administration in Mongalla', 5 Feb. 1935, NRO CS 1/39/105. 
107 Simonse, Kings, pp. 337,419; Interview with Chief James Josea Ramadalla, 31 Aug. 2004, Yei. 
10' Johnson, Nuer Prophets, p. 329; Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, pp. 6-8; Buxton, Chiefs, pp. 85- 
9, and Religion, pp. 353-62; Mitzi Gobeen, 'Chiefs, Sub-Chiefs and Local Control: Negotiations over 
Land, Struggles over Meaning', Aftica 62, no. 3 (1992), pp. 389412, at p. 400; Paul S. Landau, 
'When Rain Falls: Rainmaking and Community in a Tswana Village, C. 1870 to Recent Times', The 
International Journal ofAfrican Historical Studies 26, no. I (1993), pp. 1-30, esp. pp. 10,28-9. 
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asked what is happening, then they will decide with the people %vhat to do. 
Maybe... we have not done this, grandfather is angry about this. "' 
Threats, problems and crises prompted self-examination and internal discussion by 
the community. For example, the infertility of a chief s wife in Moru district led her 
family to debate the cause and come to the consensus that her deceased father had 
not been paid the rites due on her betrothal and marriage, and Nvas therefore angrv, a 
ceremony was performed to appease him, perhaps reflecting a reinforcement of 
patriarchal authority within the family. 110 In Juba district in 1939, a lion killed a 
number of people, and the consensus in the local court was that it had been sent by a 
man whose bnde-wealth had not been repaid as it should. " 1 This case is revealing of 
the processes of 'judicial' resolution by the moral community: they already knelt, 
that the bride wealth needed to be paid, and the failure of the man to come and claim 
it aroused unease at the knowledge of the debt. The lion could therefore be seen as 
an expression of their sense of his anger and jealousy. 
The direction of such processes by mantic figures was a central aspect of the 
negotiation and defining of moral communities. In Moru district, lendriba diviners 
could "trace the source of your suffering, the source of death, the source of 
misfortune... he can read and find the source of any problem". 
112 During a famine, 
one female mantic was reported to have "appeared at the psychological moment, and 
informed the people that one of their old gods was angry, and if they did not 
renounce 'Christian God' they would all die of hunger and their crops would fall 
again". 113 The ability of mantic practitioners to provide credible answers and 
solutions to the questions and crises facing communities was crucial to their status, 
and thus had to meet an existing need or source of doubt. Their success rested on 
knowing how to put their finger on the heart of the matter. In this example, it may be 
that the presence of Christianity was widely felt to be causing hann to the 
community. 
109 interview with Francis Bassan, 18 Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
110 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
111 EPMD Jan. -March 1939, NRO CS 57/11/42. 112 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
113 Allison, Juba, 20 April 1942, CMS AF AL. 
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Mantic experts' ability to uncover truth also ensured a continuing judicial role. For 
example, it emerged that "a series of magician's 'courts' had sprung up in various 
parts of the Meridi area which were tending to usurp the functions of the Chiefs and 
State Courts", especially in adultery cases, because people believed they Nvould die 
if they did not tell the truth before them. ' 14 Administrators, not surprisingly, saNN, this 
as dangerous and exploitative, and in Moru district, rain-makers and diviners like the 
Bori were imprisoned and threatened by government. 11 5 Yet one Moru D. C. also had 
to admit that their skills had been harnessed in the pre-colonial past to assist in 
judicial processes. 116 Often chiefs and courts welcomed the expertise of mantic 
figures to assist in the resolution of difficult cases, as Yenge's recourse to the poison 
expert Ajuki revealed. ' 17 In the early 1930s, Evans-Pritchard also observed a case of 
adultery in Moru district, in which the Bori "were working hand in hand with the 
chief towards maintenance of order" and formed one of his means "of enforcing 
legal prohibitions". 118 The fear of the curse of such people thus remained a means of 
enforcing judicial authority and could be utillsed by the chiefs or even 
administrators: in Kajo Kaji, the D. C. "made use of [a] kuJur's reputation by having 
secured a spear-like iron-rod belonging to him and placing it in the Office for the 
purpose of swearing people with it when evidence is required". ' 19 Other oath rituals 
and the evidence from divination practices (such as chicken feathers) were also 
employed in the chiefs' courts. 120 
Chapter Five argued that the coercive force of chiefs and goverriment might have 
been less frightening than supernatural kinds of force. Mantic experts were very 
successful in emphasising the threat inherent in their possession of knowledge, and 
also their inability to ftilly control it. Like spirit possession, their knowledge of 
divinities, spirits and powers could be so embodied within them, or even within their 
114 EPMD Sept. 1943, NRO CS 57/19/74; also EPMD Sept. 1944, NRO CS 57/20/78. 
115 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14/95. 
116 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
117 Mrs Selwyn, Kajo Kaji, Aug. 1932, CMS G3 AL; Winder, 'Fifty Years On: Service in Mongalla 
Province, 1930-33', (1979) SAD 541/7/1-32. 
118 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14/95. 
119 Yunis, 'Notes on the Kuku', p. 27. 
120 EPMD Nov. 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53; Interview with Dr Rubena Lumaya Wani, 22.2.03, 
Khartoum. 
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families, that it was inseparable from them, and thus uncontrollable. 121 The Lokoiya 
'masters', for example, might cause all kinds of misfortune if they -%vere Nvronged, 
and yet this was not believed to be their fault, but rather the fault of whoever had 
provoked them. 122 A Moru interviewee emphasised the threat in the power of magic 
practitioners generally: they were the "community leaders more or less, so they Nvere 
powerful, they were feared and respected because they could do harm to you". 123 
The embodied nature of their knowledge thus meant that mantic experts could be 
excused moral responsibility for this harm. They could also be seen to be outside the 
jurisdiction of chiefs and courts; for example in the 1939 poison case in Kajo Kaji, 
the chiefs and court were wary of sentencing the 'Khalifa'. 124 Interviewees explain 
that people used to be afraid to take such figures to court even if they were 'caught 
red-handed' . 
125 In 1926, Dr Fraser described Moru specialists as 'anti-foreign' and 
extremely powerful: "[n]o one dare claim redress from the government against these 
people". However, five years later he declared that, "[t]he chiefs are no longer afraid 
to inforrn the government officials of the doings of even the most powerful of these 
incredibly evil charlatans". 126 The D. C. also reported "a very considerable latent 
antagonism to their activities, particularly, of course, amongst the chiefs, who 
violently oppose any rival to their authority". 127 This appears to contradict Evans- 
Pritchard's account of the cooperation between chiefs and bori, but it probably also 
reflected British assumptions that any inspired religious figure must be an alien 
usurper of authentic authorities like the chiefs. 128 Though there might indeed be 
rivalry, chiefs also needed to turn to such experts to assist in cases where their own 
knowledge was limited and there was community pressure to achieve resolution. 
They might also be close relatives of course; Chief Jambo in Moru district is 
121 See Johnson, Nuer Prophets, p. 86. 
122 Interview with Severino Mati, 27 Jan. 2003, Khartoum. 
123 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
124 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham, p. 3 1. 
125 Interview with Margaret Keji Loro, 18 Feb. 2003, Khartourn. 
126 Fraser, 'Witchcraft and Healing in the Moro Tribe', and 'Progress at Lui (formerly Yllu)', The 
Mission Hospital, Vol. 30,1926, pp. 159-62, and Vol. 35,193 1, pp. 294-7. 
127 Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
128 See Johnson, Nuer Prophets, pp. 24-9. 
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remembered as having good relations with the local rain-maker, who was also his 
matemal uncle. 129 
From the 1920s, rain priests were said to have stopped displaying the out"vard signs 
of their expertise as a result of goverment persecution, while at the same time the 
chiefs were increasingly wearing the uniforms and badges of their governnient 
knowledge. 130 This was symbolic of their different spheres of knowledge and the 
increasing secrecy of what Pels calls the 'substrate' realm of indigenous politics. In 
Western Mongalla the relations between this realm and the creolised intennediate 
realm of local government were more harmonious however, with the gate-keeping 
chiefs also playing an important part in maintaining the secrecy of the fori-ner. The 
government repression of mantic activity may have also heightened its status and 
helped to place certain mantic experts at the centre of the local moral community, 
while chiefs were situated more on the thin line between community and 
government. This depended on mantic practitioners being seen to use their 
knowledge primarily for the good of the community however, as the discussion of 
witchcraft and the morality of knowledge will show. They were also challenged by 
the newer claims of mission-educated people, some of whom used similar methods 
to demonstrate their knowledge. 
"' Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
130 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112 14,, 9 5. 
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4. Christianity, Education and Modernity 
Mantic experts and community elders provided either riNýal or complementary 
avenues to judicial resolution and moral definitions, alongside the chiefs and courts. 
But those who were dissatisfied with both courts and community authorities might 
also look in other directions, for new sources of knowledge and po"ver. Both the 
government and missions offered this, but that of the latter was more xvidelv 
accessible. This was particularly apparent in the Moru Revival, which NN'Ill be 
examined initially, as an experiment in new claims to knowledge. But aspects of 
both government and mission knowledge were also appropriated and utillsed in 
more lasting ways, as people used writing and ideologies of Christianity and 
modernity to assert new definitions of morality. And yet such people could only 
make those claims by remaining within their local communities: their new kinds of 
knowledge were thus mixed with existing ones to form creolised, rather than 
contradictory, discourses. 
4.1 The Revival 
The Christian Revival in Moru district detailed above involved a dramatic assault on 
the existing authorities, including government officials, chiefs, community elders 
and 'witchdoctors', and even missionaries, suggesting that the latter were viewed as 
little different from the government. It was primarily a youth movement, and it 
incorporated resistance to labour demands, alternative claims to healing power, and 
rejection of community rituals and recreations. But perhaps most strikingly, it 
sought to overturn the authority of the courts: Matteo preached that the judgements 
of chiefs and officials "came from hell", and the elect should instead "judge 
themselves with judgements inspired by Heaven". Marital issues were a particular 
focus for challenges to conventional authority: one twelve-year old boy arranged ten 
marriages, having greatly reduced the bride-price. 1 31 The Revival thus fits into the 
context of general unrest and resentment at the demands by government and chiefs 
131 Morrison, 'Report on Religious Revival in Chief Jumbo's country, Moru district', 28 Sept. 1938, 
NRO EP 1/5/26. 
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in the late 1930s, together with the debates over bride-wealth and the moral 
economy already discussed. 
The movement was termed a 'Christian' revival and welcomed b%, some 
missionaries. But its adherents were largely non-Christian, and its ideology 
represented a creolised mixture of Christian imagery and local culture. Jesus and the 
Archangel Gabriel featured regularly in the visions, but in other respects the elect 
were claiming to communicate directly with divine power in much the same way as 
other mantic figures. The movement adopted a mission version of morality, in terms 
of condemning beer-drinking and dances, thus attacking patronage and power 
structures within communities. 132 One missionary compared the methods of the elect 
with those of 'witchcraft', and indeed the emphasis on fear as a tool reflects the 
location of the Revival within the power struggles of the time. ' 33 It demonstrated the 
way that the ideas and practices of the missionaries could be appropriated and 
reshaped, and manipulated by different actors, whereas knowledge of the 
government remained monopolised by chiefs, clerks and other employees. The 
Revival also exposed the difficult position of the chiefs, forcing them to choose 
whether to side with the popular revivalism at the risk of government disapproval. 134 
Jambo's plaintive dislike of the 'new god' reflects the innovative nature of the 
movement; the fact that it was not sustained for long suggests that it was essentially 
a short-lived experiment with new kinds of knowledge and forms of expression. 
4.2 Christianity and Education 
Christianity and mission education did play a longer-terin role in community 
dynamics however. They were most obviously tools for younger people to use to 
claim knowledge and power and to challenge authorities and norms. But as Christian 
ideas became more diffused, so the issues became more complex than this, partly 
because these new forms of knowledge were formulated into creolised practices, and 
132 Shadle also shows the way in which chiefs, missionaries and adepts of Mumboism competed as 
patrons, all functioning as "an amalgam of a supernatural and potent being and patron-client 
networks": Shadle, 'Patronage', pp. 43-4. 
1.13 Carey, Juba, 23 July 1938, CMS G3 AL. For connections between revivalism and witchcraft 
eradication, see Fields, Revival. 
134 See also Fields, Revival, esp. pp. 163-92,254,270. 
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also because different sections of society might draw on aspects of them at different 
times, according to their usefulness. 
In general, early Christianity in colonial Africa has been seen as a tool used by the 
'marginalized', such as ex-slaves, women and youth. 135 In Western Mongalla, chiefs 
and elders reportedly complained that education made young men behave arrogantly 
and disregard the established community authorities, rituals and labour obligations; 
education was blamed for spoiling "the customs of the country". 136 But this Nvas 
partly because it was linked to socio-economic changes, contributing to labour 
migration. Attitudes were therefore complicated: education came to be seen partly as 
an investment, with communities and families keen to have one or two of their sons 
in government or mission employment. But people were also reported by one 
schoolboy to think that "education is merely for finding jobs, it does not bring any 
goodness in the country at all, it brings ruin to the country". 137 In the 1940s, Yei 
chiefs and elders were complaining of the general decline in "parental discipline and 
boys manners", and the fact that "desire for clothes makes boys leave home to work 
for enough cash to buy a shirt and shorts"-' 38 Clothing was one example of the 
deeper conflicts over morality, according to one interviewee from Lyria: 
When you go naked it means you are a virgin, you do not have evil thoughts 
- they have high morals... So when the people came back from the school 
with the clothes they were despised, they said what is that, you are hiding 
your ugliness? 139 
Government trainees in 1941 reported an even more negative public attitude towards 
the education of girls: 
'They say that if women are educated they will be proud and they will not 
like to do any work ... they would constitute a class of their own and 
do not 
keep touch with other women of the villages but would only think of 
135 Shadle, 'Patronage', p. 4 1. For a critique of the simplistic idea of converts as 'the marginal', see 
Justin Willis, 'The Nature of a Mission Community The Universities Mission to Central Africa in 
Bonde', Past and Present 140 (1993), pp. 127-54. 
136 Juba Mission Report 1942, CMS G3 Sg2; Governor Parr to Hickson, Inspector Education, 20 
March 1939, NRO EP 1/4/17. 
137 Janson-Smith, 'Report on Juba training school Final Examination, 194 V, NRO DK3 1/6/29. 
138 YDMD March 1945, NRO EP 2/24/87 
139 Interview with Severino Mati, 27 Jan. 2003, Khartourn. 
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themselves better than anyone... and the constitution of such a class ofteT i 
leads to unfaithfulness to husbands and divorces'. When a marriage has been 
fixed the father is unwilling to let the girl go to school 'otherxise she may be 
deceived by the other educated young men and may refuse the one who had 
140 already paid for her' . 
There was clearly fear of women gaining knowledge of a nexv kind, and resisting 
male control. There are interesting parallels here with the view of the Kajo Kaji 
court in the 1920s towards women who had been married to foreigners; the idea that 
women who had gained different kinds of knowledge and experience fori-ned a 
separate and potentially corrupting 'class'. 141 One interviewee also suggested that 
people were afraid that educated girls would not marry "for cows", but instead 
would "go out from civilisation". 142 This is additionally striking in linking 
bridewealth marriage to 'civilisation', i. e. the core of community ways. If women 
would not conform with this basis of the political economy, they would be seen to 
be outside the community entirely. 
Another trainee revealed an additional perspective on female education: 
They say that women are unfit to work on paper and that even if a girl is well 
educated she will never be employed by the government and will never 
receive money as a result of the education she received. 143 
So there was also a fear on the other hand that this kind of knowledge was of no use 
to women; this may have been partly a consequence of the gender prejudices of the 
British administrators, with whom 'work on paper' was associated. Yet by the late 
1940s, girls themselves were asserting - to the disappointment of the missionaries - 
their desire for education simply as a tool with which to "get a job", suggesting that 
they were overturning any assumptions that they could not profit from such 
knowledge. 144 
140 Janson-Srnith, 'Report on Juba training school Final Exan-driation, 194 V, NRO DK3 1,6 29. See 
also Read, Lui, 3 April 1946, CMS AF AL. 
141 Whalley, A/D. C. Opari and Kajo Kaji, to Governor, 'Resolutions from Kuku chiefs of Kajo Kaji 
Lukiko', 19 Nov. 1929 and 22 Nov. 1929, NRO CS 1/39/104. 
142 Interiew with Margaret Keji Loro, 18 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
143 Janson-Smith, 'Report on Juba training school Final Examination, 1941', NRO DK3 1/6/29. 
144 Guillebaud, Yei, 1948, CMS AF AL. 
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Divisions between educated and non-educated people Nvere exacerbated by the 
missionary control of education and their Christian evangelism; they sought to create 
new communities of Christians. They pressured their pupils and employees to resist 
any customs related to rituals, alcohol and dancing, and this brought them into 
conflict with community authorities: 
The chief, at first, was friendly and helpful, so much so that he repeatedlý' 
invited Adama, the young teacher, to join him round the beer-bowl. Adama 
met this temptation with a stout and determined refusal, saying that he had 
come there solely to teach the Words of God, and that Christians had left this 
kind of thing altogether. The chief s attitude immediately changed, and since 
then he has been the reverse of helpful. 145 
As Bravinan shows, such actions by Christians involved their withdraNNral froni 
cclineage mutualities", as embodied in social beer-drinking and rituals. 146 The 
missionaries sought to make baptism a symbolic ritual of such withdrawal; 
candidates passed across streams from the bank of the 'heathen' to that of the 
converted. 147 They also created new bunal-grounds for Christians; a direct attack on 
family burial sites, which could arouse intense opposition from relatives. 148 The 
Italian Catholic Mission at Rejaf East also tried to prevent mamages between 
Christians and non-Christians, and welcomed women who ran away from husbands 
or fathers. 149 
To an extent, new Christian communities were forming as a result. Employees of the 
missions tended to live in the mission compound and sociallse and intermarry with 
other Christians; the mission could also be a refuge for women abandoned by their 
husbands. 150 Some Christians were reported to be refusing to accept the jurisdiction 
of the chiefs and courts in matters of marriage and divorce. 151 The development of 
'Church Councils' since the 1930s ftirther contributed to the creation of alternative 
145 Riley, Yei, 17 Aug. 33, CMS G3 AL. 
146 Bravrnan, Making, p. 100. 
147 Baring-Gould, Journal, II Feb 1933/34, Lui, CMS Acc. 2 1, F7B. 
148 Mrs Fraser, Lui, 22 April 1932, CMS Acc. 168, F2; Kajo Kaji Mission Report, 1942, (AIS G3 
Sg3. 
149 Wilson, D. C. Latuka, to Governor Mongalla, 16 Sept. 1929, NRO CS 1/13,43; Governor to 
'Reverend Sir', 6 March 1933, and Governor to Secretary Education, 20 Nov 1933, NRO EP 1/10/51. 
150 Hilary Paul Logali, 'Autobiography', SAD 890/l/1-80; Bertram, Lui, Sept. 1948, C\. IS AF., %[,. 
'5' Parr, 'Note for Mr Skeet', 20-30 Aug. 1942, NRO DK 57/l/l. 
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communities with their own moral authorities, debating such matters as alcohol, 
hashish and dancing. 152 In the 1944 diocesan council meeting, one of the first 
ordained Sudanese, Pastor Andarea Apaya, "raised the question as to NvIiether 
Christians partaking in beer-drinking and dancing should be allowed to attend Holy 
Communion. "' 53 In 1943, one administrator criticised the Church Council in Moru 
district for exercising "such a dictatorship over the consciences of its oxN, n 
community, so that no Christian dare drink a cup of beer or be seen near a dance, for 
fear of being cast out utterly by the Church. "' 54 
Yet these accounts reflect one extreme; the power of the Church Council in Moru 
district was partly the legacy of the fear generated during the 1938 revival. In 
general, the numbers of actual converts to Christianity were limited, and even more 
so their continuing adherence to the missionary version of morality. As is well- 
established, the missionary idea of 'conversion' was rarely applicable anywhere; 
instead 'Christianity' was appropriated and added to other cultural practice and 
knowledge systems. 155 Meyer shows that most converts rediscovered their reliance 
on family ties, access to land through lineage heads, and previous kinds of 
healing. 156 The Moru Revival was similarly followed by disillusionment in the early 
1940s, with missionaries constantly reporting the decline in attendance at church and 
the 'secret' return to 'superstition' and to 'immoral' habits like "smoking, dancing, 
&inking, adultery, lying, deceit". 157 They also complained at the 'glib' capacity of 
boys "to feign an interest in spiritual things while young in order to gain their own 
ends". 1 58 
The complexities of creolised Christian knowledge were apparent in 1947, when the 
missionaries at Lui asked church members to create a Moru hymn for a service of 
agricultural blessing: 
52 Selwyn, Loka, 1930, CMS G3 AL; Mrs Fraser, Lui, 27 Sept. 1936, CMS G3 AL. : 
53 '1944 Diocesan Council Meeting, Yei', CMS G3 S I/ 10- 13. 
154 Keen to Governor, 9 Dec. 1943, NRO EP 1/5/26. 
155 E. g. Pier M. Larson, "Capacities and Modes of Thinking': Intellectual Engagements and Subaltern 
Hegemony in the Early History of Malagasy Christianity. % American Historical Review 102, no. 4 
(1997), pp. 969-1002; Comaroff and Comaroff, Of Revelation, Vol. 's I and 2. 
156 Meyer, Translating, p. 104; see also Willis, 'The Nyamang', p. 52; Bravman, Making, pp. 135-6. 
157 Lui Mission Report 1945-6, CMS G3 Sg6; Riley, Mandi and Yei, 30 Aug. 1934, CMS G3 AL. 
158 Nugent School, Loka Report 1945, CMS G3 Se3; Elliott, Loka, 1935, CMS G3 AL. 
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They got hold of one of their song-makers and produced a tune and with a bit 
of help the words... It seemed too good to be true. It was' The evening 
before the service, two Church Council members came and said that this \vas 
a drinking song with bad connections and we could not use it. ' 59 
The Council members were thus claiming to be the interlocutors Nvith the 
missionaries, and to know the 'real' meaning of the song, while the rest of the 
community was combining its own song-making with Christian language and ritual. 
'Sunday' became a particular source of conflict bevvveen missions and communities, 
and highlighted the ambiguities of the position of 'Christians'. In Yei district, many 
of the young men were baptised while working in Uganda, and returned Nvith 
clothes, but the increased attendance at Sunday services or school did not have the 
effect desired by the missionaries: 
On the return of these young men to their homes, the young women, attracted 
by their smart appearance, try in their turn to attract them with beer and 
dancing, usually on Sundays, when it has now become the fashion to wear 
best clothes... In this way many have been drawn away, and have not only 
given up church attendance but apparently all desire for baptism... Many of 
the young women too, who a few years ago were being enrolled as 
catechumens in rapidly increasing numbers, have been drawn back by these 
Sunday dances, and seem to have lost all desire for spiritual things. 160 
Thus aspects of missionary cultural practice were appropriated, such as holding 
community events and wearing best clothes on a Sunday, but amalgamated with 
existing cultures, leaving the missionaries to complain bitterly, that "Sunday 
evenings are a babel of dance drams and drunken yellings by the villagers". 
16 1 The 
role of young women in pulling the converted migrant workers back into the local 
community is significant here, and undermines the idea that young women would 
automatically view Christianity as a tool and sanctuary. Women were also most 
likely to uphold the fertility and healing rituals attacked by mission Christianity, for 
the sake of their households and children. ' 
62 
159 Read, Lui, 3 Dec. 1947, CMS AF AL. 
160 Riley, Yei, Aug. 1938, CMS G3 AL. 
"' De Saram, Loka, 30 Nov. 1941, CMS AF AL. 
162 Mcver, Translating, p. 105. 
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The selective appropriation of Christianity was thus the outcome of contesting ideas 
and understandings. A good illustration of this comes from Lainya, where the 
technical department of Nugent school was situated from 1946: "[t]hls junction was 
the meeting place for African travellers, and beer, gambling and such like could 
usually be found here". The impact of these outsider visitors on the moral 
community may help to explain the efforts by the headman of the village to enforce 
'Christian' morality by 1948, preventing dances and the brewing of strong beer. 
However, he "had to sustain severe criticism from some of his people, and \ý,, hen a 
child of his was bom with a hare-lip shortly afterwards the women-folk joined in the 
barrage, saying that it was because he had been converted". A local pupil revealed 
continuing social practices in the village at odds with the missionary ideals: 
When I go home, my parents try to make me drink too much beer. Then they 
send me to a local dance, where there is a lot of beer, and hashish smoking. 
They often try to make me go with a girl after the dance - one who has drunk 
too much - so that I shall have a child which she will have through me. 
This missionary also reported that 'witchcraft' was not reduced, but had simply gone 
'underground'. While the Lainya villages had supposedly been 'cleaned up' by 
tevangelistic campaigns', he had to admit that, "the African can easily conceal from 
us that which he does not want us to see". 163 The area was clearly the site of 
considerable contests over moral and social behaviour, intensified by the presence of 
the mission school. 
The headman at Lainya drew on Christian ideas to try to redefine the moral 
community, but this may have reflected a desire for reform emerging very much 
from within that community, not from wholly external influences. There were issues 
on which church leaders and community elders and chiefs could generally agree. For 
example, in the 1940s, the wartime labour, trade and troop movements led amongst 
other things to increased gambling, which chiefs, elders and Christians all 
condemned. 164 Around the same time, a new kind of dance, called 'Bambulia' was 
said to have spread from Uganda, and to be leading to an increase in adultery; it was 
163 Williams, Lainya, 15 Oct. 1949, CNIS AF AL. 
164 Yei Mission Report 1942, CNIS G3 Sg 11; '1944 Diocesan Council Meeting Ye", CNIS G3 SI/ 10- 
13. 
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'frowned on' by the Church Council and 'banned' by a number of chiefs. 165 
Christianity was not simply or automatically a tool for the young to use in 
opposition to oligarchic power - many Christians were older anyway 166 - nor for 
educated chiefs to use to reshape the moral community, nor for women to use 
against male dominance. Instead it was a source of cultural practice and moral 
knowledge, which was selectively appropriated and informed debates within 
communities. It would later become much more significant as a resource for a 
Southern identity, in reaction to the perceived threat of the Islamicising Khartoum 
Government; a more powerful revivalism would also return in the forin of 
'Balokole' in the 1950s and 1960s. 167 But Christianity was also always inextricably 
connected to education, literacy and European ideas of modernity. 168 
4.3 Paper and Development 
The power of writing was illustrated repeatedly in the detailed account of the 1939 
case of poison in Kajo Kaji. The 'Khallfa' seems have had Nubi origins, and he had 
studied with a Fiki in Kodok, and now used his Koran as "a doctor's appliance". His 
reading from it, together with his written Arabic charms, had a mystery for the 
people of Kajo Kaji which enhanced his power, but also earned mistrust. Similarly 
Karibbe's use of an ink bottle from the police station to draw on Gune's body 
immediately aroused fear and suspicion. Symbolically, the missionaries also drew 
marks in chalk on the "black bodies" of their pupils. ' 69 The "mystery of writing" 
conveyed power, but it was also linked to foreigners and government and their 
power over the colonised body, and was thus morally ambiguous. In the 1937 poison 
case, Christians in general supported the ordeal trials; it was the Christian clerks 
165 YDMD April, Sept. 1945, NRO EP 2/24/87 
166 Yei Mission Report 1942, CMS G3 Sg 11. 
167 Balokole, or the East African Revival, originated in Rwanda and Uganda in the 1930s and 
probably contributed to the Moru Revival (it was mentioned in this context in Gelsthorpe to Skeet, 13 
Dec. 1943, NRO EP 1/5/26): see Kevin Ward, "Tukutendereza Yesu': The Balokole Revival in 
Uganda', in Z Ntharnburi (ed. ), A Handbook of Christianity in East Aftica, (Nairobi, 199 1), pp. 113- 
44; Adrian Hastings, The Church in Aftica, 1450-1950 (Oxford, 1994), pp. 596-601. Balokole 
evangelists ftom Uganda appeared in Kajo Kaji by 1950: EPMD Nov. 1950, NRO DK 57/9/24; 
Interview with Barnaba Durno Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
168 See also Lonsdale, 'Contests of Time': the first educated Christian Kikuyu were known as athomi, 
or 'readers', "a name that put their new communicative power before their new belief'. 
169 Baring-Gould, Journal, 8 Feb 1933/34, Lui, CMS Acc. 2 1,177B. 
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who were threatened by the chiefs, because their writing could reveal the case to the 
government. 170 
The first generation of mission pupils were mostly employed locally as clerks, 
teachers or dressers; they remained rooted in the local communities. By the later 
1940s and 1950s, however, a second generation of pupils had gone on to secondary 
education in Uganda or Rumbek, and a small number had received administrative 
training in other parts of Sudan. Their emergence as a self-defined group of 
'Southern Intellectuals' by the 1950s marked the first real creation of a nexv 
educated community, which saw itself as standing outside the 'traditional' rural 
moral communities of Western Mongalla. They drew on their Christianity and their 
education, together with knowledge of wider political and nationalist ideologies, to 
create a new kind of discourse about the 'backwardness' of the South, the failure of 
the colonial state to develop it, and the power of collective action. 17 1 They were thus 
valuing knowledge of the wider world above local knowledge, and envisaging 
communities that did not yet exist for the majority of their members. There are 
parallels here with the developments among the Nuer in the 1980s chronicled by 
Hutchinson, whereby an increasing divide opened up between rural, illiterate 
communities, and the urbanised, educated elite whose knowledge and relationship 
with government was embodied in the mysteries of 'paper' and writing. Their 
refusal to undergo the male initiation of scarification resulted in their appellation 
'bull-boys' to describe their ambivalent position outside the moral community. 172 
Yet the evidence of interviewees -a number of whom belonged to this group of 
'Southern Politicians' after Independence - suggests that even they embodied a 
creolised discourse, somewhere between tradition and modernity: the result of 
competing definitions of morality and knowledge. They use a language of ethnicity, 
which had been encouraged by the missionary use of certain 'group languages' for 
teaching and translation. ' 73 They also use English terminology and Christian 
170 Finch, KaJo KaJi, 8 Nov. 1938, CMS G3 AL. 
171 Hilary Paul Logali, 'Autobiography', SAD 890/l/1-80. 
172 Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas, pp. 270-98. 
173 Interview with Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, Khartoum. See Allen 'Ethnicity', p. 
135, for the importance of Acholi grammar books to the development of Acholi identity. The 
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ideology, to assert, for example, that their forefathers already had the 'Ten 
Commandments' before the missionaries arrived, and that their communities had 
systems of government and 'constitutions'. 174 This is less important as an 'invention 
of tradition' than as evidence of the way in which people adopted the idioms of the 
colonial state in order to defend local autonomy and moral values. At the same time, 
it shows the success of elders in retaining respect and prominence in defining 
community ways: they are said to have provided "the wisdom of the village and how 
people should live". 175 And the informants' support for chiefship reflects the 
absence of the kind of division between an educated political elite and the chiefs that 
opened up elsewhere; these categories overlapped anyway thanks to the chiefs' 
involvement with the missions. 176 
The interviewees displayed an apparently contradictory, but clearly not 
incompatible, mixture of scepticism with belief, Christianity with local spirituality, 
and pride in their Western education with respect for traditional expertise and the 
authority of elders. This is illustrated, for example, by the story told by a few of 
them about the Bari rain-maker Pitya Lugor. During the Second World War, the 
government built a new bridge across the Nile. Pitya became angry that he had not 
been consulted, because, as he told D. C. Cooke, he and the rain shrines of Sindiru 
owned the water in the Nile. Pitya then caused a seven-day flood which washed the 
bridge away; an incident reported by the government as a 'calamity'. 177 One 
interviewee, trained as an engineer, explained in detail that the foundations of the 
bridge had been faulty. But he also emphasised that the power of the flood was 
caused by the rain-maker: "Pitya Lugor really had supernatural powers and the 
British were made aware of this". 178 
Yet the same interviewee had exposed what he saw as the fraud of a local doctor, as 
detailed in Chapter Five. Another interviewee recounted the story of "a man who 
hegemony of 'Juba' Bari may also have contributed to a stronger ethnic identity than among the other 
Bari dialect groups: Interview with Barriaba Dumo Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, Khartown. 
174 Interview with Severino Mati, 27 Jan. 2003, Khartourn. 
175 Interview with Francis Bassan, 18 Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
176 See Crowder and Ikime, 'Introduction', for such divisions elsewhere. 
177 Interviews with Serefino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Major-General Peter Cirillo, 27 Oct. 2002, 
Venansio Loro Lado, II Nov. 2002, Khartoum; EPMD June 1943, NRO CS 57/19/74. 
178 Interview with Serefino Wani Swaka, 23 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
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pretended to be a rain-chief', who "would run in the night and enter one of the cax-es 
and pretend to talk like a god". He demanded gifts of beer and goats, but when the 
rain still failed he was eventually identified and caught. 179 The same interviewee 
spoke with respect for genuine mantic figures in this area, demonstrating again that 
scepticism and belief were not incompatible, but rather that claims to knowledge 
were subject to rigorous evaluation of their authenticity. 
Unlike in Greene's reading of Ghanaian history then, the informants' use of a 
language of modernity does not reveal "the failures of certain local understandings 
about the African landscape to survive the onslaught of European epistemologies"; 
rather it reflects the way that idioms and knowledge could be adopted (especially for 
presentation to outsiders) without eradicating other beliefs, at least during the 
colonial period itself 180 And this mixture of scepticism and belief was apparent in 
general in Western Mongalla, as people rigorously evaluated claims to knowledge 
and power, and sought to uncover the truth. The discourses around practices termed 
by administrators as 'witchcraft' are particularly revealing of this evaluation and 
categorisation of knowledge by communities. 
179 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
'go Greene, Sacred Sites, p. 13. 
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5. Witchcraft and Poison 
Claiming or appearing to mediate with the unknown, in accordance \N'ith the needs 
and moral bounds of the community, generated authority , vhich could in turn be 
used to define those bounds, thus perpetuating a moral order in which mantic experts 
were dominant. However, claiming or appearing to mediate with the unknoA-ii, in 
opposition to or outside those moral bounds, could bring power, but also a socialk' 
and morally ambiguous and mistrusted position. Discussions of xvitchcraft' thus 
involved defining the morality of such esoteric or secret knowledge and its practice. 
Colonial administrators in Western Mongalla were frequently undiscerning in their 
use of terms like 'magic', 'sorcery', 'poison' and 'witchcraft' to cover a range of 
different kinds of knowledge and power. Yet even if taken as a misunderstood 
category of experience, the reports of such cases and beliefs can be used to explore 
understandings of knowledge and its use, and the developing discourses of morality. 
In addition they often reflected the ways in which European knowledge was not only 
limited, but also reshaped - even if not consciously - by local knowledge. In trying to 
reform 'native law' and 'superstition', administrators and missionaries often became 
drawn into "the witchcraft logic". ' 81 
The 1939 case of poison in Kajo Kaji reflected the power of rumour; the persistence 
of an undercurrent of popular suspicion undermined the efforts of the chiefs to treat 
the case as a straightforward marital dispute. 182 Witchcraft accusations were an 
alarming idiom through which people could gain the attention of the authorities and 
raise issues in court. They also brought people into the court; administrators reported 
that any case of 'magic' always attracted a crowd to listen to the debates., 
83 
Witchcraft and poison accusation became increasingly prominent in the courts from 
the late 1930s, 184 reflecting both the way in which the latter had become arenas of 
public debate, and the economic changes and social tensions of the time. Above all, 
181 See Fields, Revival, pp. 75-8. 
182 See White, Speaking on power of rumour. See also Pels, 'Creolisation', p. 18 on anonyrrUty of 
rumour as political discourse. 
183 YDMD Sept. 1942, NRO EP 2/24/87. 
184 In 1920s lists of cases, witchcraft and magic do not appear (NRO MP 1/1/2). but in 1945 there 
were 39 recorded witchcraft cases in Yei district B courts: Yei District AR 1945, NRO EP 2'27/98. 
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witchcraft accusation was a popular discourse about the use, or absence, of 
knowledge. 
5.1 Professional Knowledge 
Both Johnson and Pels draw attention to the monopoly claimed by leaders over 
legitimate secrecy, and Pels makes the important point that it was the perceived 
necessity of this secrecy to the well-being of the community, which legitimated It. 185 
However, in Western Mongalla, there appear to have been more complex 
categorisations of secret knowledge. These categories included a differentiation 
between esoteric expertise that was nevertheless publicly exercised; secret 
professional knowledge which could be purchased; and secret, inherited and often 
gender-specific abilities to curse and poison. The former has already been discussed 
in relation to mantic activity; such practitioners also relied on secret knowledge, but 
they were known and identifiable, and their rituals were practised relatively publicly. 
Their knowledge and practices were also considered necessary to the moral, 
physical and social well-being of the community, and hence their more negative 
aspects were tolerated. And they were located inside the realm of the known and 
familiar, even if their knowledge was secret. 
Something of the difference between the first and second categories of expertise is 
illustrated by the descriptions of various 'magic' practitioners in Moru district. Both 
a colonial official and an informant emphasised that the bori fell into the first 
category: 
The real difference between them is that the odraba is merely a hired 
magician who will put a spell on anyone for payment without regard to social 
consequences, whereas the 'bori has a far more spiritual influence and is not 
concerned primarily with spells laid on Individuals: such as they do perforin 
are merely an incidental result of their being supernaturally possessed in 
order to make rain. 186 
185 Johnson, 'Crin-dnal Secrecy', and also Nuer Prophets, pp. 328-9; Pels, 'Creolisation', p. 16. 
186 Mynors, 'Notes on Evans-Pritchard's Draft Account of the Moru tribe', NRO DK 112/14/95. 
See 
also Fraser, 'Witchcraft and Healing'; Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of 
the 
Moro', NRO DK 112/14/95. 
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According to the interviewee: 
The powers of the odraba: these are acquired, you are not born with it... This 
[bon] is different from the odraba or the other ones. Bon is power gi%,, en to 
you for doing the right thing, not for hurting. But also for hurting someone 
who has wronged you, then he would have the punishment, the nemesis.: " 
Another British D. C. further emphasised the professional and profitable nature of the 
practices of the second category of experts: 
[T]he principal 'black' magicians, the Odraba and NIboriju... both appear to 
work by putting on their victims spells involving sickness or death, usualk, 
for reward and usually they can be bought off. One old Odraba near A111adi, 
named Peke, is reputed to have amassed enormous wealth, as he is the 
leading practitioner and people even come to buy the power from him. 188 
Yet the official's label of 'black' magic does not convey the complexities of the 
local moral categorisation of expertise. The secret knowledge of professional 
4magicians' was seen to be amoral rather than immoral, because they did not 
intentionally cause harm through their own personal hostility to the victim. Their 
practices were thus always a symptom of other people's feuds and tensions: a sign 
that the community needed to examine itself The chiefs found them hard to deal 
with, partly because they could be very popular, and partly because of fear and 
respect for their powers: "even if they were brought before him in the court he 
would try to send them away to settle it themselves". ' 89 Another interviewee 
suggested that the chiefs would only interfere if they were selling their medicine to 
use for harm; this may reflect developments over the colonial period, however, as 
chiefs came under greater pressure from both government and people to deal with 
'bad magic'. 190 Their ability to do so was a test of their own moral knowledge, and 
thus of their membership of the local community. ' 91 
187 Interview with Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Khartoum. 
18' Mynors, 'Notes on the Moru Tribe', 1935, SAD 777/3/1-40. 
189 Interviews with Paulino Wadn Lado, II Feb. 2003, Philip Yona Jambi, 19 Feb. 2003, Kliartoum. 
'90 Interview with Venansio Loro Lado, II Nov. 2002, Khartoum. 
191 See Geschiere, 'Chiefs and the Problem', esp. pp. 322-4. 
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As a result, the courts became an arena for the discussion of the moralitv of 
knowledge. One example of such debate occurred during a court case in 1942 in 
Yei, following the death of a woman who had allegedly been forced out of fear to 
take medicine from an old woman claiming healing powers. According to the D. C., 
this generated debate about the use of 'good magic': "[t]he chiefs felt strongly that a 
practitioner of 'good' magic should not force his attentions on the unwilling, if he 
does so it is for no good purpose. "' 92 While chiefs and people continued to need 
mantic experts, doctors and protectors, and to fear and respect those with the 
capacity to cause harm, they were also redefining the meaning of 'bad magic', or 
'witchcraft'. 
5.2 Secrecy and Morality 
An obvious criterion for defining 'witchcraft' or 'poisoning' was the extent of its 
secrecy. While mantics and professionals needed to display their knowledge and 
practice to demonstrate their status, witches and poisoners operated at night and in 
anonymity, outside all bounds of public knowledge. 193 According to a Yei D. C., it 
was the unknown identity of poisoners that intensified the fear of them: 
This dread of poison is a greater social menace than magic ever is. Every 
woman is a potential poisoner; [whereas] magic lies within the powers of a 
few. ' 94 
Witchcraft was thus partly a way to label the most anonymous and secretive 
activities, and was often equated with theft or adultery. ' 95 
Johnson argues that in the Nilotic moral community, all secret and prIvate use of 
cmagic' was 'evil'; Chanock also suggests that the banning of the ordeal removed a 
crucial means of eradicating 'evil' from the community. ' 96 But secrecy was more 
differentiated than this, as we have seen, and the concept of 'evil' is too evocative of 
192 YDMD June 1942, NRO EP 2/24/87 
193 Yunis, 'Notes on the Kuku', pp. 30-35; Interview with Barnaba Dumo Wani, 17 Feb. 2003, 
Khartoum. 
194 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham, p. 14. 
195 Buxton, Chiefs, p. 133; Johnson, 'Criminal Secrecy', p. 183. 
196 Johnson, 'Criminal Secrecy', pp. 187,192; Nuer Prophets, pp. 328-9; Chanock, Law, Ctistom, 
86. Also Fields, Revival, p. 12 1. 
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a Euro-centric or Christian view of good and bad. Allen discusses the Madi ývord 
onzi, which is translated into English as 'bad' or 'evil', but is actually evocative of 
more complex ideas of spiritual and mystical forces, and that Nvhich is morally 
'outside'; it is thus more ambiguous than 'evil' . 
197 'Witchcraft' has perhaps become 
the name for this kind of power - outside, unknown and therefore morally 
ambiguous - when it enters the 'inside' community of close relations, thus bringing 
the unknown into the realm of the known. The real need is therefore to discover and 
identify the source, in order to regain knowledge and a resulting sense of control and 
protection. This process involved changing definitions of the outside and inside, or 
in other words the evolving moral norms of the community. 
Scholars also sometimes assume a static notion of witchcraft and of 'customary' 
ways to deal with it in the pre-colonial past; 198 but 'witchcraft' was far from being a 
consistent category and its nature should not be assumed from projections back into 
the past. 199 In many areas, witchcraft had been treated as a potential power carried 
by most people and expressed involuntarily as well as deliberately, as with the 
poisoners in Kajo Kaj i. 200 So it seems that a growing intolerance and ostracisation or 
eradication of 'witches' as a distinct category of individuals has often occurred 
during and since the colonial period. The particular idea of 'evil' brought by the 
Christian missionaries and vernacularised by Afficans has been shown to have 
'diabolised' all aspects of previous indigenous religion. 20 1 At the same time, 
Christianity became seen as a source of protection Erom witchcraft, which in turn led 
to revivalist and Watchtower movements using baptism to define who was inside 
and outside, and to label and condemn the latter as witches. 202 It is not surprising 
197 Allen, 'Ethnicity', p. 13 1; see also Geschiere, 'Chiefs and the Problem', p. 312. 
'98 Fields, Revival, e. g. pp. 72-3,248. 
199 Peter Delius shows that while witchcraft beliefs were reported from 1860s Transvaal, there were 
very few actual accusations or attacks on witches; he therefore warns against assumptions based on 
'golden-age' accounts of witchcraft control in the past: 'Witches and Missionaries in Nineteenth 
Century Transvaal', Journal ofSouthern Ajrican Studies 27, no. 3 (2001), pp. 429-43, at pp. 430, 
440-41. 
200 Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, pp. 112-4; Gray, 'Witches, Oracles', p. 361. See also Buxton, Chiefs, 
134: witches were "a recognised part of social life". 
Meyer, Translating; and 'If You Are a Devil, You Are a Witch and, If You Are a Witch, You Are 
a Devil. ' The Integration of 'Pagan' Ideas into the Conceptual Universe of Ewe Christians in 
Southeastern Ghana', Journal of Religion in Africa 22, no. 2 (1992), pp. 98-132; Behrend, 'Power to 
Heal', p. 22. 202 Fields, Revival. 
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therefore that the poisoning trials in Kajo Kaji occurred around the same time as the 
Moru Revival, or that they would be followed from the late 1940s by Balokole 
Christian revivalism: all represented ways to define moral bounds and to deal xvith 
the unknown. 
Christianity was only one source of definitions of evil however. In 1944, a court in 
Moru district banned three kinds of 'black magic', which It claimed had increased 
due to lack of action against them. 203 Yet in making such practices illegal, the 
authorities were contributing to their role as a form of resistance or subversion. 
Lambek defines 'sorcery' as "the secret, deliberate, illegitimate exertion of control 
over the lives of others". In Mayotte, he argues that sorcery was an internal critique 
of, and an expression of resistance to, the power relations that the prevailing political 
economy of knowledge engendered. 204 Thus the actual practice of witchcraft can be 
seen as kind of counter-discourse: a subversion of the moral order. Jil Western 
Mongalla, there were repeated reports of witchcraft being practised against chiefs. 205 
Witchcraft was also reported to have spread in areas where the chiefs courts were 
less popular or effective. 206 A self-perpetuating cycle may thus have operated, 
whereby witchcraft subverted the moral community and the claims of its leaders to 
knowledge; they in turn sought to identify and know the source or conduit of the 
witchcraft. 
Witchcraft may have been particularly exploited by women as a source of 
subversive power. The Yei D. C. believed that poisoning had been deliberately 
adopted by the Kuku women: "[t]he women first intuitively perceived its latent 
possibilities of power and seized upon it as a weapon in the age old feud of the 
sexes". This may also have partly been a reaction to the refusal of the colonial courts 
to allow them to divorce. He also suggests that it had become a common threat made 
203 Moru District AR 1944, NRO EP 2/27/97. An increasing number of witchcraft cases were also 
reported in Yei: Yei District AR 1945, NRO EP 2/27/98- 
204 Lambek, Knowledge, pp. 238,244. 
205 EPMD March 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53; EPMD April 1944, NRO CS 57/20/78: EPMD Oct. 1946, 
NRO DK 57/2/5. 
20" EPMD Dec. 1948, NRO DK 57/5/13. 
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half-seriously by women. 207 Women were reported to proudly claim the poNver and 
right to poison. 208 
In the Kajo Kaji area, poisoning was passed from mother to daughter; a daughter 
who refused to practise would become sterile, suggesting a link to ideas of female 
sexuality and fertility. So the association of women with witchcraft may have also 
reflected male fears of women, or a community fear of incoming strangers. Guyer 
and Belinga show that women were a source of new kinds of knoxvledge 
incorporated into patrilineal societies through marriage . 
209 This is backed up by one 
Fajelu informant: 
Our raim-nakers actually came from Bari, through intermarriages. The story 
is that one of our grand-grandfathers married a daughter of a rainmaker... it 
became just like wealth, somebody came with wealth to the husband. 210 
But the negative side of this, as Allen shows, is that women, especially the newly 
married or those whose bridewealth was not yet fully paid, were potentially onzi, or 
dangerous outsiders, with continuing access to forces outside the "ideal, patrilineally 
regulated moral world". They might therefore be consulted for their knowledge as 
diviners or healers, but they were also most likely to be accused of sorcery or 
poisoning. 211 The targeting of old women in particular was a symptom of their 
vulnerability, because they were less bound or protected by kinship relations. 
5.3 Witchcraft and Social Relations 
Suspicion of women was also part of the fear of close relations secretly intending 
harm; the paternal aunt was often first in line for accusations. 212 Witchcraft has often 
been described as "an idiom of intimacy", revealing social tensions and conflicts 
between close neighbours and relations. 213 During the Kajo Kaji poison scare, for 
example, a missionary reported that, "[t]he slanders and back biting of African 
207 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham, p. 14. 
208 EPAR 1937, NRO CS 57/24/99. Also YDNM Sept. 1944, NRO EP 2/24/87 
209 Guyer and Belinga, 'Wealth in People', pp. 115-6. 
210 Interview with Simon Wani Ramba, 10 Jan. 2003, Khartoum. 
21 1 Allen, 'Ethnicity', pp. 131-2; and 'Violence', p. 63. 
212 Meyer, Translating, P. 9 1. 
213 White, Speaking, p. 20; Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, p. 73; Kate Crehan, The Fractured 
Community Landscapes of Power and Gender in Rural Zambia (Berkeley, 1997), p. 36. 
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village life now came out into the open, and many accused their neighbours of being 
witches and poisoners". 214 This in turn was a reflection of the hardship, social 
competition and growing pressure on the land at this time. In Kajo Kaji, as 
elsewhere, resettlement would have led to unprecedented intimacy ývith neighbours, 
which increased the likelihood of anti-witchcraft movements. 215 
Such socio-econornic changes generated a consequent need to invoke moral 
obligations, especially against those seen to be unduly profiting or behaving too 
proudly. 216 In Western Mongalla, wealth brought status if it was earned through the 
accepted moral economy, but this economy was changing, as chapter Four sho"ved. 
As people sought to maintain reciprocity in the face of individualising migrant 
labour and the beginnings of greater differentiation, those who achieved or craved 
success beyond their ability, or beyond their investment in social relations, were 
accused of witchcraft. 217 Geschiere shows that in Cameroon witchcraft could be 
practised as a weapon of the weak, jealous of the rich, or at the same time used to 
accuse the latter, so that they were careful to redistribute as well as display their 
218 wealth. 
By the end of the colonial period, a discourse of witchcraft seems to have emerged 
in Western Mongalla that was tied to ideas of community obligations and proper 
behaviour. Beliefs about witchcraft will have continued to evolve since 
Independence, and this is no doubt reflected in the statements by interviewees. But 
they suggest that in the 1940s and '50s, witchcraft accusation was a way to label 
those who were somehow different, and to justify their marginalisation or 
ostracisation, thus forming a powerful social sanction enforcing conformity with the 
moral community. People seen as 'strange', 'proud', 'trouble-makers', or even 
adulterous, were suspected of witchcraft and night activity, and such people were 
214 Finch, Kajo Kaji, 8 Nov. 1938, CMS G3 AL. 
215 Isak Niehaus, with Eliazaar Mohlala and Kally Shokane, Witchcraft, Power and Politics: 
Exploring the Occult in the South African Lowveld (London, 2001), p. 8; Green, Priests, Witches, p. 
137. 
216 Chanock, Law, Custom, e. g. p. 102. 
217 See Meyer, Translating, pp. 90-93,106-7; also Shaw, Memories, p. 24; Evans-Pritchard, 
Witchcraft, p. 80. 
2 '8 Geschiere, 'Chiefs and the Problem', p. 313; Meyer, 'If you are', p. 118. 
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avoided in marriage. 21 9 The description of those with the 'evil eye' b%, Evans- 
Pritchard also supports such views: 
The Moro say that one can tell who they are because when they are sitting 
with other people who are joking and chatting together they alone remain 
silent and morose. 220 
The idiom of 'witchcraft', though crudely represented in the colonial records, thus 
seems to have increasingly been used to describe anti-social or immoral behaviour 
The British administrators tended to approach witchcraft and magic cases with the 
assumption that all such practice was fraudulent, exploitative and ill-intentioned. Yet 
for local people, the evaluation of this practice was far more complex. The fact that 
someone might profit financially from their specialist knowledge was not a problem; 
it actually provided a less dangerous motive for harmful practices than personal 
hatred. What seems to have mattered most in the evaluation of the morality of 
knowledge and practice was whether the practitioner was seen to be in relationship 
with the community; it was those whose character or personal situation isolated 
them from the normal bonds of kinship and neighbourhood who were always most 
vulnerable to accusations of immoral witchcraft. As Englund argues, secrecy in 
politics is not viewed as negative as long as it is part of, not outside, social 
relations. 221 Thus the idiom of 'witchcraft' - in this narrower sense - was a powerful 
discourse about community membership. 
The European officials and missionaries were also drawn into local discourses 
through witchcraft cases. Missionaries were particularly receptive to the power of 
magic and witchcraft, labelling much of indigenous belief as such, and deliberately 
engaging in battle with it. 222 But even administrators were concerned by the public 
panic that could result from suspicion of witchcraft, and fully believed that some 
individuals had the intention of causing harm by magic, even if they could not quite 
219 Interiews with Margaret Keji Loro, 18 Feb. 2003, Francis Bassan, 18 Nov. 2002, and 
Severino 
Mati, 27 Jan. 2003, Khartourn. 
220 Evans-Pritchard, 'Preliminary Draft of An account of the Moro', NRO DK 112/14/95. 
221 Harri Englund, 'Perils of Transparency: Accountability and the Occult in Malawi', paper 
presented at the conference on 'Traditional Accountability and Modem 
Governance in Africa', 
University of Durham July 2004. 
222 See also Delius, 'Witches', pp. 432-3. 
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admit its credibility. Their reports therefore frequently adopted an idiom of 
credulity, as reflected in the Yei D. C. 's conviction of the accused in the KaJo Kaji 
poison case for "tampering with the powers of darkness". 223 Another report on 
'magic' emphasised "how necessary it is to support nati\, e institutions in their 
attempts to put down anti-social practices which have such a paralysing influence on 
social life. ý224 This illustrates the power that a popular discourse held over both 
Native Authorities and the colonial administration. Both the practice and the 
accusation of witchcraft had the effect of directing the definition of 'anti-social 
practices', because the impact of rumour and suspicion was 'paralysing' and forced 
the authorities to attempt to deal with it. In the process, the use of knowledge was 
debated in a way that affected the behaviour of all members of the community, 
including mantic experts. Thus those who claimed knowledge and power also found 
themselves subject to community evaluation as to how they used it; the boundaries 
of the moral community were shaped by popular rumour and accusation as well as 
by the discourses of 'Intellectuals'. 
223 (Anon., prob. Tracey), 'A Case of Poison', Yei, 31 Dec. 1939, RHL MSS Perham, p. 
31. 
224 EPMD June 1941, NRO CS 57/14/53. See also Gray, 'Witches, Oracles', for British quandaries 
over witchcraft. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has used the accounts of poison trials in KaJo KaJi and Christian 
revivalism in Moru district to explore the ways in which communities NN, ere dealing 
with different forrns of knowledge, and experimenting with neNN* ones. It 
demonstrates that there was no hegemonic colonial power imposing a ne\\. 
epistemology, and nor were chiefs necessarily in control of defining 'custom'. 
During the colonial period, individuals in Western Mongalla claimed or 
demonstrated specialist knowledge, which derived from multiple sources, but ýN-hich 
generally offered the explanations for events and the solutions to, or means of 
protection ftom, threats and problems. Mantic experts claimed to know causes and 
cures through rituals and divine understandings; chiefs and elders in court asserted 
their authority to know how and what to do, based on their version of the customs 
and laws of their community; and education and Christianity provided new sources 
of moral knowledge and explanatory powers. But while knowledge brought power 
and status, it also subjected the holder to the rigorous evaluation of the community, 
and endowed them with a greater degree of moral responsibility and liability. Over 
the colonial period, a common discourse continued or developed, regarding the duty 
of those with knowledge to use it for the good of the community; i. e. to remain in 
relationship. 
288 
Conclusion 
From the Knowledge of the Foreigner to the 
Knowledge of the Community 
This has been a small-scale study in terms of geographical scope, yet there has still 
been little space (or continuity in the sources) for telling the detailed stones of 
individual chiefs; such stones would ftirther illuminate the contingency and 
complexity of 'chiefship'. Instead the thesis has focussed upon the structure of their 
individual agency': the patterns underlying the institutional i sati on of chiefship 
across this region. That structure cannot be found in a static 'tradition' of authoritN", 
it was after all the dynamism of chiefship that enabled it to evolve from vaned local 
forms of external mediation and protection, through a stage when these forms were 
invested with colonial force and strained by colonial demands, to the domestication 
of the 'chief as a figurehead of the community. The structure of this dynamic 
agency lies rather in the relationship of knowledge to authority, and in the double 
gate-keeping functions of chiefship. 
A salutary warning as to the difficulties and risks of taking on these functions - as 
well as an indication of the nature of traditionality - could have been observed in the 
neighbouring Zande kingdoms. Here the kings or chiefs had far more obviously 
institutionalised pre-colonial roots, and yet, according to Johnson and Reming, they 
lost legitimacy over the colonial period and came to play a 'one-sided role', 
enforcing the punitive and restrictive colonial policies, offering little in return, and 
eventually being attacked for their apparent complicity with the northern 
government. 2 This highlights the need to measure traditionality in terms of its 
local 
roots and the extent to which it draws upon the deep popular understandings of 
history and legitimate authority. 
' Felerman, Peasant Intellectuals, p. 34. 
2 Johnson, 'Criminal Secrecy'; Reining, The Zande, esp. p. 27. 
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'Recognition' is a more useful concept than 'consent' in understanding the nature of 
this local authority. In order for the chiefs of Western Mongalla to become 
'traditional authorities', they had to firstly demonstrate the value of their knoNvIedge 
to the communities in which they lived and operated. Their origins ]a\, in their 
knowledge of the turuk; this knowledge went through a number of incarnations, 
from trade and Nubi military culture to bureaucratic administrative practices and 
national politics. They also had to know their communities, as expressed vanously 
through rain control, the local politics of patronage, and increasingly the definition 
of community traditions and history. They had to display both of these kinds of 
knowledge to the foreigners and governments in order to be seen as useful 'native 
authorities'. But crucially, their dual knowledge also had to be recognised by the 
people; the chiefs thus had to be doubly knowing and doubly known. Chiefship 
developed as a product of the interaction between foreign and local, state and 
community, and of the reciprocal, interpersonal cognition and recognition within the 
latter: a process by which individual specialist knowledge was absorbed into the 
community bank of knowledge and reflected back in the collective recognition of 
legitimate authority. 
Knowledge/power was accessed from external sources by experts and then both 
revealed and concealed, in order to maintain their monopoly and at the same time be 
assimilated into the community and drawn upon to define it. Knowledge thus 
formed the currents of power and identity that circulted through social and ritual 
networks, sparking off each other but also generating and regenerating the moral 
community. Moral and political authority lay in the ability to convert outside 
knowledge into recognisable rituals, objects and language which in turn contributed 
to the production and reproduction of a body of knowledge that was synonymous 
with the community itself. 
This might appear to be a discussion of hegemony. But the thesis has argued that 
this body of knowledge - and the sense of self-hood of the community -,, ý'as 
formed 
not out of the dominance of one set of elites and intellectuals, but out of moral 
debates, political competitions and rival claims to a changing vanety of external 
sources of knowledge/power. And because those claims had to resonate in the 
local 
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community, they had to demonstrate 'the power of speech', by using local idioms 
and ideologies that drew on deeper historical roots and popular discourses. The latter 
were powerfully revealed in gossip, songs and the resistance - passive or vocal - to 
any authority that overstepped the bounds of the tacit moral compact formed 
between people and those with the access to knowledge/power. This compact 
restricted authority to a particular sphere according to the nature of its knoýN, Iedge, 
ensuring that multiple forms of authority were maintained. The chiefs might 
dominate the sphere relating to the hakuma, but because this remained a distinct 
external entity, it existed in horizontal rather than vertical relation to other sources of 
knowledge/power. The latter might all generate wealth and authority, but they could 
also invite suspicion - as illustrated most vividly in 'witchcraft' accusations - if used 
for individual gain rather than invested in social relations. For know ledge/po Nver to 
become reproductive, it therefore had to be converted into political and social 
relations, tying elites into mutual obligations and subjecting them to popular 
evaluations. The moral ambiguity of knowledge also tended to reflect antagonisms, 
for example between rich and poor, old and young, 'Christians' and non-Christians. 
The success of the chiefs and other leaders lay in their ability to insert themselves 
into the in-between liminal spaces of society and mediate antagonistic oppositions. 
This kind of 'peace-making' connects with much wider and deeper spiritual, moral 
3 and political traditions of thought and need across Southern Sudan and beyond . 
As von Trotha argues, the intermediary role of chiefs also reflected the strong 
antagonisms between rulers and ruled, centre and hinterland, in colonial and post- 
colonial Africa, and thus the limits of state power. 4 This antagonism has been 
particularly apparent in Sudan. As the thesis has demonstrated, the people of 
Western Mongalla conceptualised the government or hakuma as a vague and yet 
clearly separate and distant entity, experienced historically as a series of violent 
extractions and impositions, from which they needed protection. The violence of the 
colonial state became normalised and diffused over time, so that increasing]v it was 
experienced more as an epistemic violence. The resulting struggles over authont'v, 
bodies and landscape led people not only to appropriate and creolise aspects of this 
3 See Johnson, Nuer Prophets, esp. pp. 55-70,329. 
' Von Trotlia, 'From Administrative', pp. 82-3. 
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state epistemology, but also to emphasise their own knowledge of the historical 
social and moral meanings and networks that interwove the physical geography and 
its inhabitants. The epistemic violence of the colonial state led then not to a neNN. 
hegemony - this would have required harnessing the eclectic local forms of 
intellectual and mantic activity, which instead remained largely secret and substrate 
- but to the strengthening of a local sense of self-hood and community. The nature 
of the colonial state in Africa, particularly its attempt to centralise and monopolise 
knowledge, was a major cause of assertive local (in some cases, ethnic) conimunal 
identities. Those identities might involve powerful normative constructions of the 
community, but they were built from 'below' as well as manipulated by elites. They 
were the result of the general need for a sense of belonging and for security and 
protection through mutual obligations, and also of the need to know the unknown 
and to control the effects of the new kinds of knowledge and experience that were 
constantly entering, or being imposed upon, the local neighbourhood. 
In this context, the nationalist politics of Khartoum threatened the capacity of local 
communities to maintain a sense of control and knowledge in relation to the 
hakuma. The influx of northern officials and the later policies of Islamicisation were 
understood and experienced as the ultimate epistemic violence by the state, 
reflecting both the long historical patterns of extraction by the turuk and the more 
recent centralising and homogenising forces of the colonial state. The fear of this 
centralising momentum was expressed in the popular sense that even Southern 
politicians were being sucked into the centre in Khartoum. Only those 
representatives and authorities who could demonstrate their rootedness in the local 
community - as embodied in social relations and displayed through socially- 
productive wealth and historical and interpersonal knowledge - could be fully trusted 
to defend local autonomy, rights and interests. 
Since Independence, the sense of a wider Southern identity has become stronger and 
at the same time the regional and ethnic divisions within the South have been 
exacerbated. Pels argues that in Tanzania, the nation emerged as an 'anti -structure', 
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in opposition to the state structures of local government. 5 But Southern Sudan, as a 
nation, emerged out of the local communities and their strategies for defending 
themselves against the hakuma; the 'colonial' structures of local goN, ernment here 
evolved into this 'anti-structure'. And this in turn was possible because theý, were 
never simply part of the hierarchical apparatus of the colonial state; their structure 
was formed instead by the local strategies for protecting local knowledge ftom state 
centralisation. 
In recognition of the central role of these local or 'traditional' authorities and in 
awareness of the dangers of fragmentation and division within Southern Sudan, 
those involved in the creation of the 'Government of Southern Sudan' are now 
seeking to incorporate them into new state structures and co-opt their 'traditional 
legitimacy'. But they will need to be mindful of historical experience and of the 
wider lessons of chiefship discussed in the introduction. As the example of Western 
Mongalla demonstrates, there is no automatic traditional legitimacy attached to the 
chiefs. There are dangers if they become appropriated into the state as "subaltern 
civil servants"; there are already complaints about chiefs appointed by the 
SPLM/A .6 And there are also 
dangers if they become the focus for narrowly 
communal interests and means of access to resources. This is most likely if the state 
attempts to centralise knowledge/power and wealth and restrict local autonomy. It 
should also be recognised that the historical authority of the chiefs lay not in 
preserving a static version of tradition and customary law, but in mediating and 
converting external resources of knowledge/power into the deep local language of 
social and political relations. 
5 Pels, 'Creolisation', p. 23. 
6 Von Trotha, 'From Administrative', pp. 87-8. 
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